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Near East/South Asia Report

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DAMASCUS MEETING OF LEFTISTS, COMMUNISTS

Beirut AL-NIDA' in Arabic 27 Oct 85 pp 1, 3

[Text] A delegation of representatives from the Arab national liberation movements present in Damascus made a visit to the office of the Lebanese Communist Party in the Syrian capital. The delegation included comrades from the Iraqi Communist Party, the Grouping of Egyptian Patriots Abroad, PFLO, the Bahraini Popular Liberation Front, the Popular Front in Bahrain, the Jordanian Patriotic Movement, the Democratic Union Party in Sudan, the Communist Party in Saudi Arabia, the Kurdistan Socialist Party, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party. The delegation was received by Comrades Nadim 'Abd-al-Samad and 'Ali al-'Abd.

All of the members of the delegation spoke at the meeting and, in the name of their organizations, together hailed the courageous operation which the martyr group of Ahmad al-Mir al-Ayyubi and Salim Yamut carried out, leading to the destruction of the agent Lahad radio station in the heart of the so-called security belt which Israel has imposed. The members of the delegation expressed great pride in the courageous operations which the heroes of the Lebanese patriotic resistance front have carried out. They hailed the new kind of operation, which is an important blow at Israel and its agents, and affirmed that the Israeli occupation would be chased out of the last inch of Lebanon under the pressure of such blows. The members of the delegation stressed the importance of this operation and the many other courageous operations because they form the one true method of dealing with the Zionist enemy, liberating the occupied territories and forming an impetus for the patriotic struggle at the Arab level.

As for the occasion itself, the Lebanese Communist Party office in Damascus was visited by a delegation from the Syrian Communist Party command including Comrade Yusuf Faysal, the deputy secretary general, and Politburo members Zuhayr 'Abd-al-Samad, Daniel Ni'mah, Ramu Shaykhu, and 'Umar al-Siba'i. The delegation was delighted with the courageous operation and the Syrian comrades expressed their pride in the courage of storming the agent Lahad radio. They hailed this qualitative operation which forms an important escalation in the struggle against the Israeli occupation forces and their agents.

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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

GCC RAILWAY PLAN SHELVED--Plans for a Trans-Gulf Railway linking member states of the GCC have been shelved for the time being for cost reasons, an official said yesterday. A feasibility study, commissioned by the GCC, showed initial cost at about $4 billion (BD1.5 billion). The study was discussed by GCC transport ministers at a meeting in Riyadh last week. They recommended more research before a final decision was taken, the GCC official said. [Text] [Manama GULF DAILY NEWS in English 17 Dec 85 p 1 GF] /6662

NEW ANGLO-ARAB JOURNAL--London, Dec 16 (KUNA)--A joint Anglo-Arab publication to be launched in January 1986 will provide data information on the six GCC countries as well as Iraq, it was reported here Monday. The Gulf organization for industrial consulting, a research organization funded by the seven states and based in Doha, Qatar, has signed an agreement with the publishers "Lyme Book of Newcastle-Under-Lyme", in the English midlands, to produce a quarterly English language journal ARAB GULF INDUSTRY. The journal will include translations of research articles, field studies and interviews with top officials as well as information on companies, organisations and specific industries in the Gulf. "The material is drawn from the resources of this organisation whose Arabic language quarterly research journal, AL-TA'AWUN AL-SINA'I, has become an important forum for industrial dialogue in the Arab Gulf states and the Arab world as a whole", a spokesman for Lyme books said. This Gulf body hopes, through this English language journal, to extend the dialogue to industrial developing nations all over the world", the spokesman added. Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman have reached a high level of urban and social development in the past 10 years, he added. Now with the oil boom over, these countries are looking to create a regional industrial base to make full use of their energy resources, the spokesman concluded. [Text] [Kuwait KUNA in English 1245 GMT 16 Dec 85 LD] /6662

CSO: 4400/72

PLANNING EXPERTS DISCUSS URGENT ECONOMIC TASKS

Cairo AL-SIYASI in Arabic 15 Sep 85 p 3

[Article by Ibrahim 'Abd-al-'Aziz: "Urgent Economic Tasks Face New Government"]

[Text] What is the planning experts' viewpoint concerning the priorities to be considered first by the new government and the way to achieve a stable economy which will move society out of the recession phase? Furthermore, what is the way to deal with the question of prices--through unconventional policies integrated with economic measures?

AL-SIYASI presented these and other questions to a number of planning experts and listened to their proposals.

Expansion of Credit

Dr Muhammad 'Abd-al-Majid al-Khulwi (an expert at the National planning Institute) said:

The new government must adopt economic measures leading to an upturn in the national economy and the transcendence of the recession phase, which the national economy is going through, through credit expansion, support and follow-up of investments to assure the quick success of investments according to a timetable, and the adoption of a price policy in the rationalization and usage of resources. The employment policy must remain as it is without freezing the employment structure, since the private sector absorbs the labor surplus.

In the field of foreign trade, we must attempt to increase export of products assigned for export by firms specializing in production for export, and by looking for foreign partnership ensuring export markets through joint investments.

In the industrial sector, we must keep away from the assembly industries in the fields of electronics, automobile and other industries and instead concentrate in complete production, in Egypt.

Attention must also be paid to the mining industries for ceramics, china, cement and phosphates.

Import Rationalization

Dr Ahmad Baraniyah (an expert at the Agricultural Planning Center of the Planning Institute) said:

We must not view economic problems separately; instead a comprehensive treatment must be accomplished. Here, the second 5-year plan must be emphasized and we must prepare the relevant legislation and follow up its total implementation after it has been approved.

In the field of foreign trade, we must concern ourselves in the coming period with import rationalization of luxury and leisure goods and the necessity of removing the conflict between encouraging domestic production and importing competing merchandise from abroad. Furthermore, we must pay attention to education and culture and establish a foundation for education in Egypt, to restore her cultural position and provide readers with books, in order to give the coming generations something new.

Wages and Production

Sayyid Abu-al-Layl (an expert at the Specialized National Councils) said:

The government must start finding prompt solutions for several urgent problems. The most important of these:

1-To handle the issue of prices through unconventional policies integrated with economic measures within the framework of accomplishing a balance between wages, productivity and prices, so that the balance is on an economic basis as much as possible.

2-To review the credit policy by giving banks more flexibility in the field of commercial credit and participation in the development programs.

3-To increase the search for new and permanent sources of foreign currencies to replace the present temporary sources such as tourism and export.

4-The private sector suffers from recession, and its bank deposits increase, indicating its movement away from investment. We must look for a way to involve the private sector to participate in the development.

5-We must support investments within the framework of preparing the conditions to achieve greater effectiveness in the policy of an open-door production economy. Indicators point to the decline in the number of investment projects approved, especially in the free zone areas. The conditions at Port Sa'id must be reviewed, so that it becomes an example of open-door production.

Dealing with Price Escalation

Dr 'Ala al-Hakim (an expert at the Regional Planning Center of the Planning Institute) said:

First, we must provide the broad segment of the people with their basic requirement of food, clothing and housing in an adequate manner and deal with the issue of price escalation, especially for food items. We must also work to achieve a balance between wages and prices and not tamper with subsidies, which might harm the working class segment of society.

Problems which hinder development must be solved within a comprehensive framework and not treated individually because successful development is integrated in all aspects, without one dominating another.

Greater attention must also be paid to regional planning when building new cities and the role of regional planning in development plans must be increased. The role of local areas in decision-making should be increased. We must solve the problems of big cities, develop the countryside, and convert the villages to production zones, as they were in the past, after they have become a consumption zone. Education must be tied to the planning program and to the requirement of the country for various fields of specialization. We must work to stabilize decisions affecting economic fields, especially to encourage investments and tourism.

Rationalization of Loans Usage

Dr 'Imad Mustafa (an expert at the Planning Institute) said:

The new government's programs give priority to several problems. The most salients are:

1-To arrest the decline in the balance of payments through an increase in expected exports, and to limit dispensable consumption import items and concentrate only on basic import requirements.

2-To rationalize the usage of loans in the essential sectors of society and reduce the role of foreign lending sources in limiting the usage of these loans.

3-To control hard currency prices and establish a definite policy to eliminate this problem, which has affected the economy for a long time.

4-To attend to urgent problems, which are increasing in complexity with time, such as the problem of agricultural land shortage, and housing and utility problems.

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EGYPT

ADMINISTRATIVE CRISIS IN EGYPT CONSIDERED

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 23 Oct 85 p 10

[Interview with Minister of Cabinet Affairs and Administrative Development, Dr 'Atif 'Ubayd; in Cairo, date not specified]

[Text] Doctor 'Atif 'Ubayd, minister of administrative development, stated that retirement and departure of personnel to private enterprise have severely reduced the number of high-level managers in Egypt. The crisis, he said, is not likely to be soon resolved except by appealing to those qualified and experienced professionals now working abroad to return to Egypt, by clearing the path for them to take over the management of the economy, providing them an increase in benefits that will guarantee a suitable standard of living and convincing them to remain in Egypt to face the challenges of the job.

Dr 'Ubayd noted that using traditional solutions to alleviate the crisis will only lead the economy from bad to worse and from crisis to crisis; Egypt now needs to think and act in non-traditional ways. Dr. 'Ubayd said in a comprehensive interview with AL-QABAS:

One possible recourse would be to transfer the responsibility of education to the private sector, a measure that would certainly improve conditions for the teachers, and to transfer security and cleaning services now under government administration to private companies, thereby reducing the number of employees in the Egyptian bureaucracy by 30 percent.

He added that if the government would apply modern administrative standards and procedures, Egypt's already existing production base would allow her a definite level of economic independence.

He substantiated his statements with the following statistics:

The net worth of the state's assets--and these include companies in the public sector, economic institutions, and joint ventures--is 97.4 billion Egyptian pounds, a value almost matched by the private sector. The yearly return on government assets, however, is no greater than 35.6 million pounds, that is, 36 piastres for every 100 pounds--less than one-half percent.

The private sector, too, faces other problems and its yearly return on assets is currently well below the international average.

The Four Problems

Dr 'Ubayd stated that the return on government assets is so declining that it no longer can contribute to accumulating interest necessary for reinvestment, encouraging projects and financing development. It has become standard practice for the government to fall back on foreign loans to finance new projects.

Dr 'Ubayd said that Egypt could increase its return if it could overcome four major problems:

First: the social price paid for products. Economic units have been forced to sell their products to the citizens at prices below cost in compliance with the government's stated social priorities. Although such social prices have been accepted and in equilibrium for 15 years, now the costs are much greater, and the prices cover less than the traditional obligations.

Second: the crisis of foreign funding. The problem, in Dr 'Ubayd's opinion, is not in supplying foreign currency because it is available, whether through local banks or through loans and foreign financiers. The problem is rather that of repayment of loans. Egypt's resources are limited, and foreign currency available in cash is in short supply. At the same time, demand is increasing its prices are rising, and the cost of repayment, whose rates once fluctuated at an average of 20 to 30 percent, has now risen 100 percent.

Third: the multiplicity of laws regulating the market. In Egypt today there are six independent laws: public sector law, economic institutions law; private sector law; corporate law; investment law; and finally, new development projects law.

Says the minister: It seems inconceivable to me that any market could maximize its efficiency under such legislative diversity, where very basic rights and responsibilities directly conflict with one another.

The Greatest Problem of Them All

Finally: the severe problem of administration. Egypt, despite her wealth of administrative and technical professionals, is lacking a current base of managers to fill the high-level positions, professionals who distinguish themselves in their ability to make decisions and take risks, display initiative, adapt to changes, and utilize these to the fullest to improve the management of the country's economy. But, at the moment, the proper conditions do not exist for the creation of and training of such a professional team.

History also reflects this problem; out of the total number of large companies in Egypt before the revolution, which was not more than 95, 78 were owned and managed by foreigners. That means that Egypt entered its age of nationalization with a group of managers trained in the Western Liberal school of thought.

In no way does the minister underestimate the competency of these professionals, a large portion of whom worked abroad and achieved success. Those who left to work for the private sector were also successful. Those who remained in government service are moving swiftly towards retirement age, leaving a large gap in the upper-level management positions.

What To Do?!

According to Minister 'Ubayd, Egypt has three inter-related alternatives:

The first is that we try to repatriate as many professionals as possible. Other countries that have had similar problems and shared similar goals, such as Korea, Turkey, Greece, and China, have adopted this measure.

The minister cited Greece as an example, saying that between 1974 and 1980, Greece repatriated almost 20,000 administrative leaders; and since its adoption of a liberal policy, China, too, has repatriated 18,000 professionals.

The second option is both modification of financial legislations to allow for appropriate compensation of the managers with benefits commensurate to the work involved, as well as standardization of legislations regulating the market.

The third option is to form a group of institutions--wholly integrated with various projects--responsible for providing the administrators with both theoretical and practical training. The site for the training center could be selected from any of the iron and steel companies, al-Mahallah al-Kubra, the aluminum complex, petroleum projects, the Suez canal, al-Salihiyah, or elsewhere. Any of these would be suitable to be institutes to turn out promising administrators.

The Umbrella of Success

Answering questions about possibility for success of managers coming home from abroad or being trained within Egypt given these continuing acute problems of price setting, foreign financing, and the inconsistency of the laws, Dr 'Ubayd declared:

A review of legislations regulating the market must necessarily accompny the narrowing of the administrative gap. Either we must implement deregulation in price setting or create an alternate system.

If we could address the three problems which are under Egyptian control, we could certainly also make headway into regulating foreign currency which, up until this point, we have not been able to control effectively. But we will be able to regulate it in the future.

We shall not take any step to implement these ideas until they have been presented for discussion to the labor organizations, businessmen and political parties.

In Dr 'Ubayd's opinion, such choices as are now being made will set a trend for Egypt's history of dealing with the rights and responsibilities of her people; it is important that everyone be convinced of such ideas before their implementation.

Egypt's Bureaucratic Diet

In this interview with AL-QABAS the minister addressed two other problems, the first of which relates to the large surplus of manpower in the government, and the second to free education.

On the first problem he stated: There is an enormous oversupply of employees in government administration. Right now the number of government employees totals 3.2 million, of which 640,000 are security or cleaning staff, 700,000 are clerical workers, and 750,000 are teachers.

We must give some thought to the future development of these three groups, as well as to how gradually to ease the burden they put on the government. In short, the Egyptian bureaucracy has become obese and has got to go on a very strict diet.

I would recommend that the government give all cleaning and security responsibilities over to companies in the private sector, and to allow for a complete integration of the workforce into these new companies. I have no doubt that private administration of the now idle workforce would prove to be far more effective than the government has been.

For clerical employees, I would suggest a re-training and re-qualifying program for both professional and production activities.

The issue of the teaching force is related to the problem of free education.

An Ambiguous Equation

The problem of the teaching force poses an ambiguous and insolvable equation, for which we must find a non-mathematical solution.

One side of the equation claims that the government should be committed to free education on all levels. But the education budget is swelling so much that it threatens the very capabilities of the country. Educational services are sinking to the lowest levels by any pedagogic standards, and "free" education is no longer a reality because of the high cost of private tutors, foreign textbooks, and so on.

Dr 'Ubayd added that the low salaries and infrequent promotions of teachers also reflect the general lack of resources and that as it now stands there is no real hope of improving job conditions in any tangible way.

"Given all this, I believe we must consider non-traditional ideas to alleviate the situation, such as encouraging the private sector and the cooperative sector to take a larger and more active role, for instance, they could expand to build private schools, as well as special language, technical, and industrial schools. Such a transfer of responsibilities would allow a larger number of teachers to relocate to the new sector, where their salaries would be higher. From another perspective, it would ease the burden on the government and increase the possibility of improving conditions for government-hired teachers.

Dr 'Ubayd concluded by saying that this idea would also be discussed, given that it, again, constitutes an historical choice for Egypt.

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AL-SHARQAWI URGES NEW FOREIGN POLICY DIRECTION

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 23 Oct 85 p 12

[Article by 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Sharqawi: "Free Thoughts Instead of a Dead End"]

[Text] The only solution before us is self-reliance. Reliance on Arab regimes is a dead end, or at best a useless reliance on a wall that wants to be demolished and can only be reerected by the power of the peoples who must regain their rights from the usurpers in order to assess the checks and balances.

The only way the Arab regimes can redeem themselves is to institute popular rule and establish democracy, for this is the true and sincere application of the Islamic Shari'ah. Most of these regimes claim that they apply the Shari'ah while they try to foment trouble in Egypt on the pretext of demanding the application of the Shari'ah.

Neither I nor anyone else knows by what kind of vengeance these Arab regimes are driven to act the way they do toward Egypt! Is it because it disgraces some Arab rulers before their people? Indeed! Then let them try democracy! Let them try a small measure of democracy. Or are they afraid to lose their thrones? But they will not remain in the seat of power against the will of their people and at the expense of human rights! Most of these Arab rulers did not share Egypt's plight. They did not send one word of support for its successful efforts to save the lives of over 400 passengers on the Italian ship. They did not send a single word of condolence nor back any announcement when Egypt was subjected to American piracy, forcing its defenseless civilian airliner to land at an American military base in the Mediterranean, although all civilized countries supported Egypt's position.

Moreover, Egyptian public opinion was outraged at this American blackmail and the affront to our national pride and to international law. President Mubarak, in the name of ancient civilization, in the name of Arab pride, and in the name of the honor and dignity of the greatest Arab people, protested this hideous American crime and asked for an apology to the Egyptian people. But the Arab regimes remained silent as though this matter were of no concern to them! Egyptian students moved to express their anger in demonstrations which witnessed the burning of the Israeli and American flags. Anger got out of hand when some students from 'Ayn Shams University attacked a university building and others went overboard in their shouting. It was very painful for us to hear about these demonstrations only on foreign radio broadcasts, some of which are not known for their veracity while others are known for their exaggeration, with every announcer distorting the news more than the previous one until the truth is almost lost! It is painful to realize that we did not hear the truth on the radio and TV in Egypt! Concealing the facts from the people is what undermines stability because this gives free rein to lies and makes people lose their trust in their mass media. This is a backward stage which we have crossed and escaped with the hope that we will not experience its mistakes once again! The Egyptian people are fully confident that their mass media provide them with the complete facts, thus rejecting rumors and feeling no need to search for the truth in foreign broadcasts. The people have the right to know!

It is not strange that some foreign newspapers belonging to the CIA and world Zionism, such as NEWSWEEK, which is Israel's voice in America, should revile Egypt. But it is indeed strange that some newspapers belonging to friendly fraternal regimes should take to reviling Egypt and taking malicious joy in its misfortune!

It is no secret that several parties in the Western world and in the Arab world itself want to take aim at the Egyptian experience, and at President Husni Mubarak as well, because his firm decisive stands which reflect our people's aspirations conflict sharply with the interests and ambitions of those Arab and international parties. Those circles want to deal a blow to Egypt and to Mubarak by various wily means, including the use of mercenaries to manifest religious and political extremism, fear and intimidation, the exacerbation of the economic crisis, the impoverishment of Egypt, and the spreading of drugs! This is what prompted the national forces to join hands and rally around Husni Mubarak, regardless of affiliation, as an urgent national duty.

We will not tire of calling for solidarity in a strong front under Husni Mubarak's banner in order to realize our people's aspirations, to solve their economic problems, and to safeguard their independence, security, right to education, culture, health, affluence, and brotherhood with other peoples.

Our only salvation is this kind of solidarity. Our only salvation is self-reliance in developing production in order to manage without others and not to feel disgraced because we are unable to feed ourselves although we used to feed others.

If we direct our efforts to production and growth, we will be able to meet our food and clothing needs.

As for the Arab brothers, I do not know, and neither do the astrologers, why they are intent on weakening and impoverishing Egypt! May God enlighten and guide them! If in our weakness they find strength and in our impoverishment they find riches, we can understand their shameful deeds. But it is quite the opposite. Their deeds strip them of all weapons and encourage their enemies, undermining their position and leaving them naked to face the gales of violent incidents. Have they become rich without Egypt? Indeed not. They are poorer and more miserable than homeless orphans! Their behavior toward us makes them a sorry example of ingratitude and presents them to the world and history as despicable ingrates. When I speak of Arab brothers, I refer only to some rulers because the people are helpless and are the ones who have compassion! But those who bully their older brothers are certain Arab rulers. It is high time we speak openly with one another. The day of reckoning has come. Egypt must expose the position of all Arab rulers who fit this category. It must bring out a book for them to read: "And it will be said unto him: read thy book. Thy soul sufficeth as reckoner against thee this day."

Price of Blood

There is not one Arab country which is not indebted to Egypt, as all fair-minded civilized people will concede. But Egypt's refusal to flaunt its benevolence has led some people to forget Egypt's kindness to them, thus inducing misunderstanding and abuse. This ungrateful group is biting Egypt's hand which reached out to it to help it become human.

Let those ungrateful Arab rulers remember that Egypt sent its best people to Arab countries to teach and educate them. It sent its workers, engineers, and farmers to build up the land. Egypt sent its doctors to fight disease in these countries and look after the health of their peoples. Egypt took food out of its people's mouths to feed the hungry. It was not long ago when our students, even the very young among them, used to deprive themselves of their daily allowance to give it to the Arab poor! Some ruling families remember this kindness without complexes or sensitivity!

And it was Egypt which sent out its best men to give their lives in the defense of Palestinian rights in four wars. Every single village in Egypt has offered young martyrs in defense of Palestine.

Egypt was the one to give shelter and assistance without a price and without interfering in anyone's affairs or anyone's decision. May God preserve Yasir 'Arafat's life, for he did not forget this even during the rift.

It was Egypt which sacrificed its children's lives and its happiness as a price for the mad opulence enjoyed by the oil playboys in the wake of the 1973 war which restored Arab pride after defeat.

Egypt, through its people's sacrifice, caused the price of oil to go up, thus allowing the oil princes to gain, at the cost of Egyptian blood, billions of dollars which they are now spending shamelessly on pleasure, impudence, and parties or on conspiracies, mercenaries, self-indulgence, and the acquisition of palaces all over the world. They also spend it in bars, disreputable nightclubs, and gambling casinos, thus giving a stark example of impudence, corruption, and reckless spending and making themselves the laughing stock of the entire world, including those mercenaries and pimps who get rich through their corruption, suspect men and women, and the effete.

Some of them squander millions of dollars in Egypt on some mercenaries allegedly for building mosques, for supporting the abrogation of Camp David, and for backing the representatives of some currents which they incite under flashy misleading slogans of religious and political extremism.

Those radical mercenaries have not criticized a single ruler in any Arab or Islamic country that finances and uses them.

Why is it that not a single voice has been raised to ask some of the wealthy Arab people and Arab rulers how they spend their money and what they do with the leftover wealth in a nation whose people are torn by need. There is no other nation on earth poorer and more destitute than the Arab nation and the Islamic nation.

Or do those who trade in religion use double standards for Islam and the application of the Shari'ah?

As for those who trade in political ideology, we know them for what they are! We have read their loathsome, abusive accusations of the honorable people of this country. We have read their insolent charges and invectives against our magnanimous citizens. We have read their distortions of everything noble and bright in our lives and of our exploits, including the October war epic which dazzled the world. We have read their calumnies about the bold unbiased Egyptian foreign policy, accusing it of subordination to Israel and America. We have read the glorification of Asad as a hero, and of Saddam Husayn before him. And we have read their praise of al-Qadhdhafi as a prophet who came before his time and as the last of the hawks! I do not know what they think today of the other Arab hawks, the likes of Saddam Husayn. Could it be that he has lost the auction in the slave market? And what do they think of Asad's positions toward Israel and America compared to his positions toward Iraq and Jordan? And how do they regard the human rights violations committed by their only hawk and prophet in his country, the barbaric violence against and physical liquidation of his enemies, and his squandering of the Libyan people's money on sabotage and terrorism against his opponents? And what do they think about his oil sales to America at a time when all the other oil-producing Arab countries, led by the late King Faysal, may he rest in peace, boycotted the United States and organized a boycott campaign against all the supporters of Israel? And what do the mercenaries, who trade in political and religious ideologies, think of the way some Arab rulers and wealthy people are managing Arab money?

And where are the oil revenues which have grown because of the sacrifices Egypt has offered? Was Egyptian blood, which flowed in the defense of Arab honor and Palestinian rights, shed so that billions of dollars could flow into the treasuries of the Arab oil playboys, most of whom transferred them to Zionist banks in Europe and America?

Shame on You

We are not asking for the price of blood, for all your wealth cannot compensate for the blood of one martyr! We are, however, asking for the rights of the Egyptian people who sacrificed their wealth and their standard of living to protect you, only to be abused and reviled by some of your insolent people!

We are not asking you not to deposit money you gained through our sacrifices in Zionist banks, where it is converted into weapons aimed at our hearts and your hearts, into an instrument of destruction against us and you, and into a tool that threatens you, forcing you to follow a policy which your people reject.

Do you refuse to invest your money in our country and in Arab development projects, depositing it instead in Zionist banks? Why do you refuse to invest your money in development projects for your and our peoples? Why do you not invest it in Egypt, as some of your distinguished people do, for this will bring you honest profits which are better and more honorable than the money you get from Zionist banks in Europe and America?

Who do you not invest your money to development projects in Egypt?

Your participation in Egyptian development projects will not be gratitude. It will indeed bring you profits beyond your imagination and will enhance your standing in history. It will also wash away your ingratitude.

If you had paid Egypt for all the gains you have realized through the blood of its people, you would have settled a part of your indebtedness to it, which is a duty, not a favor. How much has Egypt spent on you? It has spent tens of billions from the people's daily bread to defend Arab and Palestinian rights. Had it not sacrificed all the martyrs and all the money that it did in the wars, it would have been one of the richest and most advanced countries in the world and Israel's occupation of your countries would have been more pervasive. Israel would have trampled on your freedom while you were amusing youselves.

This ingratitude of yours inflames your people more than it enrages our people. All your attempts to trifle with our internal security and unity and your endeavors at undermining our strong and enlightened nation front, which is under formation, and at fragmentation through the mercenaries you hire will not do you any good and will not keep you on your thrones. These are machinations which can only benefit the intelligence services of the enemies with whom some of you cooperate against the interests of your peoples. Our Arab peoples feel the bonds of friendship and solidarity. They stand united in the defense of their common destiny and goals. They censure you for your position toward Egypt and your ingratitude as much as they censure you for investing the money you gained through Egyptian blood in Zionist banks in Europe and America! Do not think that the crumbs you hand the Egyptians who offer services to your people are a fair compensation for their efforts. The salaries Egyptians receive in your countries are the lowest anywhere! An American or European doing the same job and having the same qualifications works fewer hours and is paid more than twice as much as an Egyptian. A Palestinian or a Syrian is paid more than an Egyptian, notwithstanding your admission that the Egyptian is indispensible and more productive! I do not know the reason for such discrimination. Is it an inferiority complex or is it a phobia?

Repent

You will have no security without a strong, rich, and able Egypt. So turn to God in sincere repentance. Turn the page of the disgraceful past; look where fear and submission to oneupsmanship have led you. What have you gained from doing away with the Arab War Industrialization Organization? O how useful it would have been to have been allowed to continue production. It would have freed you of the need to seek foreign weapons. Arab weapons developed by your mental power would have deterred anyone contemplating aggression against us. It would have given the Arabs prestige and consequently world respect instead of ridicule because of the behavior of some of their rich people and contempt for the tyranny and stumbling of some of their rulers.

What have you gained from the folly of blockading Egypt economically and from your attempts to starve the people of Egypt? The Egyptian people have not starved nor have they dropped to their knees, but you have hurt them! You have not liberated Jerusalem by boycotting Egypt, but Israel has occupied new Arab territory while you were waiting.

Iran and Iraq went to war, draining Arab money while you trembled!

What have you gained from your folly with Egypt? You have not restored the rights of the Palestinian people, but Syria and Israel are exterminating the Palestinians while you are made to pay. You pay Syria for no other reason than your fear of its terrorism.

As for us, we have chosen the civilized way to deal with you and this is what we get! You moved the Arab League out of Egypt and you froze Egypt's membership in it. You severed your diplomatic relations with Egypt. What good has such irresponsible behavior done except everlasting shame and disgrace before history and your people? Hear this: your only salvation is respect for the will of your people and freedom for them. Set up a democratic rule in your country instead of conspiring against democracy in Egypt and pushing the mercenaries who trade in politics and religion into positions which may lead to adverturism or entanglement which only tanks can settle, thus causing Egypt to lose its democracy. You stand to gain nothing. So respect human rights in your country and "guard yourselves against a chastisement which cannot fall exclusively on those of you who are wrongdoers." Learn how to disagree in a way befitting our common refined civilization. Instead of constant conflict, aim to agree before the common enemy so as to safeguard our common destiny. The only redemption for any of us is through a national front inside our country and strong Arab national fronts.

Yasir 'Arafat and Saddam Husayn were the most eager members of the Baghdad summit to issue a resolution to boycott Egypt and to sever relations with it. They succeeded in urging the moderates to shift position after they scoffed at the call to institute a boycott.

Hence, the Arab world has been separated from Egypt, becoming like a stranger in a far-off land. Mercy be upon it! It has left its loved ones and neither they nor we have reaped any benefits!

Perhaps events have proved to Saddam Husayn and Yasir 'Arafat that they have made a fatal mistake. So would they not correct their mistake? Admitting one's mistakes and working to correct them are what real courage is all about.

Egypt does not ruin its friendships by seeking gratitude. But it does not allow anyone to deny its kindness or to violate its rights. Gratitude is not the praise Egypt is receiving from these two men. It is to right the wrong they have done, may God forgive them!

As for us Egyptians, we must know how to rely on ourselves. Egypt is rich and full of rich people. But those people misuse their wealth and squander it on pleasure just like some of the shameless wealthy Arabs. Let us issue laws for confiscating the properties of drug dealers and users and let us earmark this money for development. England, the mother of democracy, and its conservative government have done something similar to counteract the drug epidemic and the economic crisis.

The national front elements must meet to agree on urgent solutions to our economic problems, away from upsmanship and overbidding.

The only solution available to us Arabs is strong solidarity and arms self-sufficiency under a front led by the leader of the Arab world, democratic Egypt.

Egypt's leadership is neither a glory nor an honor. It is hard work and suffering and an affliction from God as well as a visitation.

Our only hope is solidarity and self-reliance. It is better than a dead end.

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EGYPTIAN, PALESTINIAN INTERNATIONAL POSITIONS CONSIDERED

Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 25 Oct 85 p 5

[Commentary by Dr 'Abd-al-Mun'im al-Mashat: "Egypt, the Arabs, and the United States of America"]

[Text] The events that exploded recently in the Middle East, the effects of which will not cease after a great many questions, touch not only on the future of the Palestinian problem or the struggle in the Middle East, but also on Egyptian relations with the Arab states and Arab relations with Egypt and the United States of America, particularly in light of the current Arab disunity and the clear strategic weakness resulting from the disunity, the lack of attention to national interests, and the triumph of the violent interests of each area without consideration of the interests of the other areas.

New Circumstances and Old Slogans

The young Arab generations face new circumstances in the world and the Arab nation, and we do not find clear and sufficiently satisfactory responses. They see the clear divisions in the Arab system, they see the Arabs fighting, they suffer from Israeli obstinacy, terrorism and expansionism, they see the American quarrelsomeness and piracy, and they ask about the embassies and national companies and their role in the face of all of this.

In the face of these new manifestations, some of us are still holding on to what we are accustomed to and the slogans with which were raised and perhaps grew old, without an effort to choose them within the frame of the current conditions. There is no doubt that the talk about pan-Arabism and Arab solidarity must awaken more than a question about the truth of all of this. Furthermore, the talk about the Arab organizations, chief of which is the Arab League, must awaken a question not about the desirability of its existence, for it is important, but about the effectiveness of its role, which is nonexistent. Furthermore, the talk about the Arab summit must awaken a question about whether, where, or how it will convene, since some of the Arab states have conspired with the superpowers against each other.

There is no doubt that what is happening over the entire Arab world requires the sensible among us to urge an effort to modify these slogans and organizations in keeping with these conditions. I have not come to the point that some have about this, talking about the end of Arabism or the lack of a need for the pan-Arab organizations, such as the Arab League. But without doubt, I wish for them to see that these slogans and organizations cannot be effective unless development takes place collectively so as to progress to a level of involvement with the new circumstances.

America and the Logic of the Tribal Shaykh

In their involvement with the crisis in the Middle East, particularly the Arab-Israeli struggle, the Arabs have thrown themselves into the American military camp without remembering that we live in a dualistic international system in which the other superpower, namely, the Soviet Union, can play a role in creating a balance with the United States.

The Arabs conduct the crisis by a logic of waiting rather than of initiative, even though it is their crisis, not someone else's. The Arabs always wait for the initiative from the Americans and wait for American domestic developments and their results for the Arabs. They act like this, moreover, looking to the American president as if he were the tribal shaykh who has the keys to solve the problem, who distributes reward and punishment, and who organizes relations between the core of the tribe and its various parts.

While the Arabs are waiting for American policy to produce initiatives, no one is waiting for them. The states strive, first and foremost, to achieve their national interests, without consideration for anything else. It seems to me, in view of the strong centralization of power in the Arab states and the lack of popular participation in most of them, and the fact that their political systems rest on denial of the citizens' rights, that the Arab states do not understand the difference between their gain and their loss or that the United States is not equivalent to a tribal shaykh. It has viewed the Arabs as if they are second-class citizens who do not have rights but who do have obligations towards the American will.

The Arabs and the Palestinians

From the beginning, the Palestinians have understood these disgraceful facts of Arab and international politics, and they have understood the disgraceful nature of the Arab regimes. Therefore, some of the Palestinian organizations have seen that the liberation of Palestine begins with the liberation of the Arab capitals from the feudal authorities linked with the major capitals. The Palestinian dilemma today is essentially an Arab dilemma before being an American or Israeli dilemma. It is embodied in the fact that, with the exception of Egypt, the policy of no Arab state has changed toward the Palestinian dimension. At a time in which the Palestinians have accepted steps toward a peaceful solution to their struggle with Israel, the United States and Israel have retrogressed, with no Arab country trying to move these steps onward, with the exception of Egypt and Jordan, both of whom are the only ones to try repeatedly to find a place for the Palestinians in the negotiation process and to defend the character and existence of the Palestinians.

It appears that the alternatives today are confined to a narrow range that has no precedent. The Arabs are neither ashamed nor respectful of the Palestinians. Tunisia is a clear example of this, and Syria another. Moreover, Israel does not attach much importance to any Palestinian role, beginning from a logic of American rejection. What is left to the Palestinians? The road to individual and collective use of force is the only road open to the Palestinians. Blocked in the Arab world and strangled internationally by Israel and the United States and the effort to eliminate them physically by means of American arms in Israeli hands, they are compelled to change to violence and the use of force to remain alive in the regional and international arena.

Egypt and the Role Expected of It

There is no doubt that Egypt must move continually in the direction of closing the above gaps by means of the long and competent diplomatic experience for which it is well known. Recent developments require new consideration of movement toward the Arabs and toward the two superpowers and Europe, and even toward the third-world nations. Egyptian policy must aim, primarily and above all, to preserve Palestinian participation in settlement of the problem. The Palestinians are the essence of the problem, which cannot be resolved without them. Egypt is the state that can embrace, without claims or restraint, Palestinian demands. Egypt, inasmuch as it has international weight, can renew the attack with the two superpowers, and it must concentrate its efforts with the third world states.

Within all of this, Egypt must seize the initiative in the Arab world and arouse it from the deadening Arab quiescence. Arab national interest, exposed to danger, cannot await [an end to] Arab foolishness and lack of understanding and awareness. Further, Arab interest does not lead to a full and total rupture with the United States of America.

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EGYPT

DETAILED STUDY ON FORMATION OF NATIONAL FRONT

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic 28 Oct 85 pp 48-54

[Article by Rida Hilal: "The National Front: Of Whom and Why?]

[Text] To call for the creation of a national front made up of national forces and parties is still the big domestic political event which the force of recent foreign events has failed to impair.

Perhaps the reason for this is the presence of more than one objective "crisis/goal" condition for the existence of the front. On the other hand, an agreement among the "parties of the front," if reached, will lead to redrawing the party map and to alterating the dynamics of political life in Egypt.

Nonetheless, the current proposal to form the front does not identify the essential "objective" of the front. Nor does it identify the "parties" of which it will be comprised. It can be said in behalf of as well as against this proposal that it is a loose suggestion subject to debate and praise or censure until the parties reach a common decision.

How It Happened

The recent call for the creation of a national front came at the initiative of the well-known writer, 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Sharqawi, on the pages of AL-AHRAM newspaper (6 July 1985) when he said: "It is necessary to create an able national front comprised of all national forces, all political parties, all the educated people who represent popular forces of various opinions and inclinations, and all Muslims and Christians alike to extricate the nation, themselves, and their children from the terror of strife."

The following week (13 July 1985) al-Sharqawi mentioned that the objective of the front was to "reach a common ground," adding: "All forces, regardless of their differences, agree that the nation has a right to live in peace and security before all enemies. They also agree on the need to guarantee people the right to enjoy a good life and suitable housing and agree on the government's obligation to preserve the dignity of all citizens and to guarantee them a good education, in addition to guaranteeing their right to justice, equality, and democratic freedom.

Al-Sharqawi invited the Wafd Party to undertake the formation of the front. His second choice, if the Wafd turned down the task, was Mr 'Umar al-Talmasani's group, as he called it. He urged all parties and social and political forces to prod their members everywhere to oppose those he described as provocateurs in the name of religion.

Al-Sharqawi added in a subsequent week: "The national front does not mean forming a coalition government or giving up cabinet seats for others" (AL-AHRAM, 20 July 1985). He then justified his invitation to the Wafd Party to form the front by saying that he did not invite the National Party because it is the ruling party. Therefore, he turned to the opposition parties and chose the Wafd Party because it has the most seats in the elected People's Assembly, is the oldest party after the National Party, and had experience in forming a national front in 1936 (AL-AHRAM, 27 July 1985). To satisfy the other parties, al-Sharqawi delegated to the Labor Party [SLP] and the Grouping Party [NPUG] the task of calling for a unified Arab front.

Stormy Dialogue

The first reaction to the initiative to form a national front came from the Wafd Party. An official Wafd spokesman explained that Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din, in the speech he delivered during the commemoration ceremonies honoring Sa'd Zaghlul and al-Nahhas [Pasha] (23 August 1983), called for the creation of a national front. Siraj-al-Din believes that the "serious problems facing the government in the form of economic and political crises, housing, education and public sector problems, high prices, and poor public utilities cannot be remedied by any 'partisan' government because such a government fears partisan upsmanship and political maneuvering." Therefore, the Wafd Party's initial position on the formation of a national front can be described as positive. Beyond that, however, the party has not touched this matter in any way and has had nothing at all, good or bad, to say about it.

The Grouping Party, in an article in AL-AHALI newspaper signed by its editor, Husayn 'Abd-al-Razzaq, rejected "the front al-Sharqawi was advocating because al-Sharqawi refused to define the enemy or the parties of the front and because the front's objectives have not been made clear." The party called for a "front against subjection, corruption, and parasitism for the salvation of national independence, the realization of democracy, and the elimination of one-party supremacy, and for putting a stop to the decline in the standard of living." He added: "And the Grouping Party is ready to work with any party or force that accepts even one of these objectives" (AL-AHALI, 28 August 1985).

Al-Sharqawi's reply to AL-AHALI was a surprise that turned the dialogue into a storm. In an article in AL-AHRAM (7 September 1985) under the headline "Do Not Believe Them at All," he said that the opinion expressed by AL-AHALI's editor-in-chief, did not reflect the views of the newspaper or the party and he added: "The left is made up of huge and broad forces at the grassroots that are not confined to one party. The newspaper does not represent the left of the party." He went on to say: "The Grouping represents a part of the left and this part includes mercenaries who trade in beliefs just as some of the Muslim fundamentalists who trade in religion." As for his newspaper, according to al-Sharqawi, it is published with "foreign subsidies, not all of which come from leftist treasuries, but perhaps most of which comes from rightist oil treasuries."

AL-AHALI's reply in the 11 September issue came in an article signed by Mr Lutfi Wakid who emphasized that AL-AHALI's article about the call for a national front was written at the direction of the NPUG's general secretariat and central secretariat and that it was an accurate reflection of the party's position on this issue based on the general secretariat's debates.

In a subsequent development, Mr Mahmud Tawfiq, secretary general of the Egyptian AAPSO committee, in an article (AL-AHRAM 14 September 1985) entitled "The Egyptian Left and the National Front," described the Grouping as the left's foolhardy party, saying that "the national left opposes the policies and positions of the left's foolhardy party and its newspaper, particularly as it pertains to the national front issue."

The greatest irony that became manifest through the gales of that stormy dialogue was the statement made by a ranking NPUG official--whom we will interview in a future issue--that AL-AHALI's call for a front against parasitism, subjection, and corruption was within the framework of attack and counter-attack, that the party was ready to enter into a front with any party, and that the decision of the Egyptian AAPSO committee on what the committee's secretary, Mahmud Tawfiq, said reflected his personal opinion.

Partisan Scenario

The SLP's viewpoint was explained by Mamduh Qinawi, member of the party's supreme executive committee. It is summed up in the view that the task of setting up a front must not be entrusted to one party (the Wafd). It must be delegated to a preparatory committee representing all parties and tendencies on an equal footing, with a secretariat rather than a chairmanship that dominates from one side or another. The leading party member emphasized that the front's mission is "national salvation and not the rescue of any other situation."

On another level, SLP leader Eng Ibrahim Shukri told AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI that he was going to call for a national front for the sake of democracy at a later date.

Concerning the Muslim Brotherhood's viewpoint, Mr 'Umar al-Talmasani told AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI that he "agreed to participate in the front with conditions" and that he approved of the Wafd representing the Muslim Brotherhood in the front. He also said that the Islamic groups had agreed to be represented by him in the front.

Meanwhile, Shaykh Salah Abu Isma'il, the Brotherhood's top-ranking person, told AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI that the Brotherhood was assiduously seeking to get out of the Wafd.

As for the National Party position, the party leadership had not announced, as of the date of this article, any signs of rejection or acceptance. The National Party had turned down a previous invitation by al-Sharqawi in 1983 on the pretext that it was a majority party and therefore did not need to join a front. AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI's information says that Dr Yusuf Wali used the same pretext in his talk with an opposition party personality although he did not refuse to join the front.

Observers conclude that the current position regarding the national front can be summed up in the fact that all parties feel a need for the front at this time and that the scenario of events and the reservations of the parties have given a different impression. The Wafd, despite its reservations, grabbed the invitation, then waited for the outcome of the imbroglio in the left's greater circle. The SLP demanded the formation of a front preparatory committee as a condition for its participation. The NPUG, its rejection of al-Sharqawi's front notwithstanding, did not reject the idea of a front. The Liberal Party is ready any time and the National Party is awaiting the outcome of the squabble between the various parties and also waiting to determine what concessions it will make at the policy level and at the partisan level as well. But what prevents the formation of the front?

Interview with Dr Wahid Ra'fat, Wafd Party Deputy Leader

[Question] Our first question is how much progress has the call for a national front made in Wafd Party Circles?

[Answer] Let me explain first that I shall express my personal opinion, which does not necessarily reflect the position of the Wafd Party. The Wafd Party has not yet studied this matter adequately. It has not held a special session to discuss it in the party's supreme body, perhaps because the behavior of the other parties does not encourage the examination of this matter in the aftermath of such division and of the great difference between the viewpoint of brother 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Sharqawi and the NPUG, for example, and the brickbats and accusations which cannot please anyone. The idea itself is still vague dispite the large number of articles by Mr al-Sharqawi.

[Question]. What is the purpose of the front in your opinion?

[Answer] The idea of the front did not come from the unknown. There is a purpose behind it. Egypt at present, and more than any other time since the 1952 revolution, is facing many problems in its various economic, financial, social, and political affairs. We are in a situation which we must not ignore or hide from the youth and upcoming generations until the year 2000. Although the late Anwar al-Sadat talked about prosperity, prosperity is way out of reach in Egypt. Conversely, many of us believe that the future is grim and dark and that we must try as much as possible to gather ourselves in one united front around our position and search through teamwork for a solution to our problems, forgetting for a year, or for half a year or several months, all personal and partisan considerations. We import 70 percent of our wheat and our debts total $31 billion, according to an IMF report. Add to that the problems of unemployment, education, unlimited imports, lower production, and the landlord-tenant relationship with respect to arable land and real estate.

Problems have piled up into hills or rather high mountains. The idea brother 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Sharqawi put forth is the way outof this dilemma. The way out of this dilemma is not to abrogate Camp David as some people imagine. The way out of this dilemma requires the solution of all these problems. Those who demand the abrogation of Camp David are in fact demanding the abrogation of the peace treaty. Is this a safe policy at the present time?

The most important things in my view are the thorny economic issues which cannot be solved by any one party alone, assuming that what Dr 'Abd-al-Muhsin al-Nimr said--a fact we do not deny--that the ruling party has the capabilities. But one hand cannot clap alone. Moreover, the other parties have other capabilities which must not be denied to the country. Our future must not be decided by one party alone, even if such a party has the capabilities.

Furthermore, it is impossible for any one party to solve these problems because the other parties will band together against it and stir up a storm against any solution in which they do not participate. This is a fact in all countries and not Egypt alone. The opposition may go overboard in its opposition and sometimes may go by the adage, "If you are not in it, make it vanish." So long as it is absent from rule, it cannot appreciate it as much as those who hold the reins of power, for the one who has his hand in the fire is not like the one who has his hand in cold water. Accordingly, it is imperative to invite the parties to participate in the solution of these problems because such a move places the public interest above any party interests, including that of the ruling party, even if it has the capabilities.

[Question] Who are the parties or the forces that form the front?

[Answer] The al-Sharqawi front is, in my opinion, a jelly-like front because Mr al-Sharqawi did not identify its parties, saying it was not limited to parties but rather included all national forces. Does that mean that it includes the Islamic extremist groups? I admit to the existence of one moderate group, the Muslim Brotherhood, represented by a big brother, Mr 'Umar al-Talmasani. But in addition to this group there are 20 other religious ones. The intelligence service says that there are over 60 religious groups. Are these the intended groups? Do we invite the moderate and extremist groups?

Do we invite the Nasirist forces? And what do these Nasirist forces represent? All these parties claim a connection with Nasirism: the

National Party, the Grouping, the Labor, and the Liberal Parties. Furthermore, the Nasirist forces are split, and what is their purpose anyway? Is it to revive the Nasir era? Are we concerned with the revival of the al-Sadat era or the Nasir era or the prerevolutionary era, or are we preoccupied at present with real problems? Hence, the front, in such an undefined jelly-like framework, will not get anywhere. The best example is what happened in Sudan where parties and unions, which constitute the ruling council, have not agreed up to now on any position because some of the unions have radical leftist, not to say communist, elements. I am not against communism, for it is a political doctrine. So, do we want a front of all forces without defining what these forces are?

[Question] Then is there some wavering in identifying the parties of the front?

[Answer] Yes, there is wavering and a lack of clarity. The Egyptian constitution is clear. For the first time, the 1980 amendment of the 1971 constitution stipulated in Article V that the Egyptian political system is a multi-party system. Prior to that, al-Sadat announced in the opening parliamentary session in February 1976 the transformation of platforms into political parties. The parties are constitutional institutions and everyone must understand that. They are not adversaries of the government, but rather complement the system of rule.

[Question] Does this mean that you limit the front's components to the existing political parties?

[Answer] I personally believe that the front will not yield any results unless we confine it to the political parties.

[Question] But there are political forces in the street who do not have parties.

[Answer] The existing parties are able to form the front without the forces in the street. The street forces include extremist tendencies such as the fundamentalist religious groups and irregular political tendencies. The group which can be dealt with is the Muslim Brotherhood. It is represented by eight deputies within the Wafd Party. This is the first time that the Brotherhood has been represented in parliament by this number.

[Question] Do you mean that the Brotherhood will join the front through the Wafd Party?

[Answer] I think so because provisions of the parties law prohibit it from forming a party. This will remain so until this law is amended to allow the Brotherhood to form a political party.

[Question] Shifting from the front's objective and parties, what form do you think the front will take?

[Answer] The idea of the front, as put forth by brother 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Sharqawi, is that it will be on the periphery of the constitutional institutions. However, its link to these institutions has not been defined. If the purpose behind it is to create an advisory council, we have the Shura Council, the specialized national councils, the unions, and the societies.

[Question] Mr al-Sharqawi wrote that the front will have a council whose resolutions will be binding.

[Answer] This is a constitutional mistake which no country can accept. It is not possible to recognize a front created on the periphery of the constitutional institutions that imposes its will on these institutions. This is a flagrant constitutional violation. The front must work within the constitutional framework.

[Question] Is this to be achieved through a coalition government?

[Answer] I do not say a coalition cabinet. A coalition cabinet means the distribution of cabinet portfolios among the political parties. The Wafd has been opposed to a coalition cabinet ever since the 1928 experience. What I am calling for is a "national salvation cabinet," which is different from a coalition cabinet. We do not want to be in power and do not seek power because we have been excluded for 30 years.

[Question] What do you mean by a national salvation cabinet?

[Answer] I mean that each political party must be represented in the cabinet by one minister, if even a minister of state, a minister who does not have a ministry but who takes part in discussing and solving problems and who is his party's ambassador to the cabinet and the cabinet's ambassador to his party. He conveys to the cabinet his party's opinions and solutions and keeps his party apprised of the cabinet's activities.

The object behind a national salvation cabinet is participation in governing for a specific purpose, which is to solve problems. Participation may be for 1 or 2 years, until the mission is fulfilled. It can be like a "higher policies committee" or a "mini-cabinet" in which the parties can participate. In other words, the policies committee may be transformed into a "national committee" which, besides the ruling party ministers, will include representatives from the political parties that agree to participate in the front.

[Question] How will the voting be conducted?

[Answer] The votes in the national salvation front will be weighed but not counted. The intent is not to demonstrate a majority or a minority. The aim is to arrive at an agreement of consent on the solution to any problem. The national salvation cabinet will include, besides the government (the prime minister and his deputies), a party representative (a representative from each party which agrees to participate). Every problem will be discussed within the cabinet until an agreement on a radical solution is reached. There will be differences of opinion, but an agreement will be reached on a common position. A national salvation cabinet is something like a "panel of doctors" who gather around a patient's bed to come up with a treatment by giving individual opinions and then agree on a course of action through conviction.

A national salvation cabinet is like a mini-cabinet within a larger cabinet. Every opinion agreed upon will be referred to the larger cabinet for ratification as a solution, then to the People's Assembly if legislation is required.

With this logic, there is no fear of anyone losing a cabinet position; the ministers remain ministers. The purpose is to include the parties in solving problems. But to form an amorphous front without a constitutional or legal status but which can issue binding recommendations is an impossible proposition.

[Question] Does this mean that every party that joins the front must abandon its party platform?

[Answer] This is the difference between a national salvation cabinet and a coalition cabinet. In a coalition cabinet, a party can join the cabinet without sacrificing its party platform. In a national salvation cabinet, however, a party sacrifices its platform when it joins the cabinet. A party representative, when he joins the national salvation cabinet, sheds his party garb. For example, when debating a matter like the subsidies issue, the Wafd Party is of the opinion that subsidies must be canceled gradually over a period of 5 years, while another party believes that salaries must be raised and subsidies must be canceled and a third party believes that in-kind subsidies must be converted into money subsidies, and so on. In a national salvation cabinet, all opinions are discussed until a specific opinion is agreed upon.

Of course it is difficult to ask any party to give up its party platform on which it ran for elections. But so long as we are talking about "salvaging what can be salvaged," we must forget about party platforms.

I say that a national salvation cabinet will not solve all problems, but if we succeed in solving one-fifth of our problems it will be an accomplishment. I say to you in conclusion that the 18-19 January 1977 demonstrations showed that the ruling party cannot singlehandedly solve any major problem such as subsidies, free education, or relations with the United States and Israel after the opposition parties attacks the government because it has raised prices.

Dialogue About the Front

'Umar al-Talmasani, General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood

Although he is bed-ridden, he did not refuse our request for an interview, saying before and after the interview that his house is always open. The interview, brief as it was, took place in a climate of al-Ta'i's hospitality and a preacher's forbearance in a house, as modest in location and furniture as that of the simplest Egyptian, overlooking al-Zahir Bibrus al-Bandagdari Mosque. The man did not want to overplay his simplicity and ascetic way of life.

Mr 'Umar al-Talmasani--God grant him long life--did not accuse anyone of infidelity nor did he speak ill of anyone. Rather, he defended the existence of a communist party and, on the other hand, censured the parties for their divisiveness and the exchange of insults among them. He condemned violence and criticized "the green march" and the Cairo University demonstration which was staged in reply to the Israeli aggression against Tunis. Following is the text of the interview:

[Question] What do you think about the recent call for a national front?

[Answer] I cannot perceive any benefit from a front formed by existing parties because the basic idea behind a front is to agree on specific principles among all parties for them to defend and seek to achieve. But, as you can see, the present situation, in which the SLP vilifies the NPUG and the NPUG vilifies the Wafd Party which in turn vilifies the National Party, is a sad picture, particularly since we are experiencing many crises. I have conditions for joining this front, foremost of which is that the parties refrain from tearing themselves apart. The parties have chosen to promote the principles of hatred among the different groups of people while their only concern is supposed to be the interest of the people.

I see no objection to the front if the parties agree to put aside the kind of bickering we read about in our party newspapers, after which we must agree on specific principles for all of us to defend.

The second condition is that the front be effective and influential, not just a superficial front, in the sense that it must go to the street to inspect the conditions of the people (the congretation) so that we may express their point of view.

The third condition is for the front to meet with the president of the republic once a month to submit to him monthly reports and to discuss matters it deems of benefit to the people. This does not mean that the front must be an advisory body, but there has to be a moral commitment to the front's opinions. Opinions expressed by the front must be viewed by the president, the cabinet, and the People's Assembly as the people's viewpoint.

The fourth condition is that intelligence agencies stay away from the front because our goal is the discussion of issues, not sabotage or terrorism. Otherwise, the front will be a name without substance.

[Question] Which parties, in your opinion, should the front include?

[Answer] Each party would meet to elect one or two representatives to the front and the front members would ask their parties for a truce period to discuss the country's problems.

[Question] Who will represent the Muslim Brotherhood?

[Answer] When we entered the People's Assembly, we told Fu'ad Pasha that the Wafdist is a Wafdist and the Brotherhood is a Brotherhood. The Wafd was a legitimate conviction through which we entered the People's Assembly and we will never change our principles.

[Question] Does this mean that the Wafd will not represent the Brotherhood in the front?

[Answer] There is no objection, maybe yes, maybe no. We demand the application of the Islamic Shari'ah. I have heard of Wafdist movements to oppose the application of the Shari'ah. I do not approve of those who oppose the application of the Shari'ah. I told Rif'at al-Mahjub in the People's Assembly, when he invited me to it in on a session, that the Shari'ah must be applied slowly and gradually. He always cited this opinion of mine.

[Question] Shaykh Salah Abu Isma'il is supposed to have said that the Brotherhood was trying to break away from the Wafd. Is this true?

[Answer] Ask me about the Brotherhood. Shaykh Salah Abu Isma'il expresses a personal opinion on general issues. This is a commendable practice in the Brotherhood which allows each person to express his opinion freely as he deems fit. But as for the Brotherhood's opinion, hear it from me, and as a responsible member, I say there is not split, no conflict.

[Question] I ask you again, do you approve of the Wafd representing you in the front?

[Answer] If it is responsible and committee.

[Question] Does that mean that you confine the front's parties to political parties?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] Are there forces who are not represented in a party?

[Answer] You mean the Islamic groups and the Nasirists?

[Question] As an axample.

[Answer] They include members from the Islamic groups such as Shaykh Hafiz Salamah and a shaykh from Hulwan by the name of 'Abd-al-Hamid.

I have been asked whether I would allow the creation of a Nasirist party in Egypt. I replied that I would even allow the creation of an Egyptian communist party. There is no limit to personal freedom. Unfortunately, we use the word democracy and democracy is nothing but restrictions. I wish we used the word freedom in Islam. There is a vast difference between Western democracy and freedom in Islam.

[Question] What do you mean by freedom in Islam?

[Answer] The concept of freedom in Islam means that there are rights only the Creator could prescribe for mankind to enjoy. Democracy was contrived by people and each group of people follows in its country the form that suits it best and this is called democracy. This is nonsense.

Freedom in Islam is to do what you please within the bounds of the interests of others.

[Question] Does that mean you reject the concept of Western democracy?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] Even though you filed a suit to form a party, and the multi-party system is the basis of Western democracy?

[Answer] I was compelled, and when compelled, a person resorts to difficult choices. All legal channels of expression were closed in the Brotherhood's face. I view the Brotherhood as an international group and the political parties as local groups. What a difference between local groups and international groups!

[Question] But you sought to form a Muslim Brotherhood party!

[Answer] I am in fact working to this end. I have different opinions on Islam. When I commit myself to and support a certain opinion, I use it as a basis for forming a party, but on condition that you will never hear a single improper word against a party or a leader, including the Communists.

[Question] Let me rephrase the question. From the Islamic point of view, you reject the multi-party system because it is the basis of Western democracy. Nonetheless, you are seeking to form a political party. Is this not a contradiction of your own opinions?

[Answer] Under our law, necessity permits the impermissible. If I form a party, it will be under compulsion because the only way I can get to the people and the People's Assembly is through a party.

There is a difference between doing something under compulsion and doing something by choice. Any action you take under compulsion will be abandoned at the first opportunity because you are forced to do it. The Brotherhood is an international group which speaks to the whole world and works for the good of the whole world, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. Therefore, a party is not an end, but I am forced to form one. Nonetheless, I say that the parties, the ethics law, and the press laws were tailor-made for the National Party to exclude the Brotherhood.

I reiterate that the Brotherhood is an international group for Muslims as well as non-Muslims, and the relationship between me and Pope Shanudah, the Coptic leader, is extremely friendly and amicable.

[Question] What do you think about the religious groups which have proliferated recently?

[Answer] Ask me about myself. Do not ask me about others.

[Question] I am not asking you about people, I am asking you about an existing phenomenon.

[Answer] The expression religious group is a loose one. These are groups that spread Islam and the Islamic Call. And whereas some of them resort to violence, the Brotherhood does not use violence, terrorism, and sabotage because these actions can only benefit the enemies of this country. If I go out on a march from a mosque and hire people--who are found in all the countries of the world--to infiltrate it, what good would I have done? The march will turn into vandalism and the country will end up getting hurt.

[Question] Does that mean that you did not approve of Shaykh Hafizz Salamah's march?

[Answer] No, I did not approve of it at all and I expressed these feelings on the first day. Shaykh Salamah said that some friends advised him against the march so as not to give the hired people a chance to infiltrate it. I had given him this advice, saying that he would not be able to control it. The same thing goes for the recent demonstration following the Israeli aggression on Tunis. had the Brotherhood not kept it under control, it would have turned into a battle.

[Question] Do these groups accept Mr 'Uman al-Talmasani as their representative in the front.

[Answer] This question must not be directed to me, but to them, and none of them will tell you no. We have nothing but love and good feelings for each other. However, my health does not allow me to participate because if I accept this job I will have to be faithful to it and to work hard. I do not have the strength any more and have lost my ability to read.

National Front Lexicon: The Front in Egyptian Political Movement Experience

The Egyptian political movement came to know the "national front" with the start of political organizations in Egypt near the end of the 19th century.

Although the national front concept was associated in political literature with the party phenomenon in view of the fact that a front is an agreement among a number of political parties on a specific goal, Egypt came to know "the front" before it knew the "political party." Indeed, the first Egyptian political party, the "Old National Party," came into existence from a front between two organizations (the army organization and the Hulwan Society) under the leadership of 'Urabi. Its name reflected this fact for it was knows as the people's party or the farmers' party. The party's communique (4 February 1979) reflected this same fact as well when it said: "The National Party is a non-religious political party composed of men of various ideologies and creeds and all Christians and Jews. Anyone who tills Egyptian soil and speaks its language is part of the party, irrespective of ideology. It realizes that all the people are brothers and have equal rights in politics and law."

This front, which was composed of al-Jahadiyah princes and aides, led the national struggle against the khedive until it clashed with him in September 1882.

Then Mustafa Kamil founded the National Party in 1907. Kamil said in the preface of his book, "The Eastern Question": The Kedive is the head of the National Party because he is the head of the nation and the National Party is the whole nation." In the speech he delivered during the party's dedication ceremony, he said: "A country deprived of its independence and under foreign control can only have one political party, which is the National Party, the party of freedom...the party of independence."

The National Party led the national struggle until the 1919 revolution when the Wafd emerged as an alternative to the national movement leadership.

Likewise, when the Wafd Party came into existence, it was closer to a front than a political party for its rise was based on the Egyptian delegation which was formed on 23 February 1918 by the popular agency to demand Egypt's independence. This delegation was headed by Sa'd Zaghlul Pasha and a number of personalities representing various political forces in Egypt (the Ummah Party, the National Party, the Prince 'Umar Tusun Followers, and the Copts), including Isma'il Sidqi Pasha, Mahmud Bey Abu-al-Nasr, Hafiz 'Afifi Bey, Mustafa al-Nahhas, Sinut Hanna Bey, Georgy Khayyat and Hamad al-Basil Pasha. In a speech on 2 July 1924, Sa'd Zaghlul said: "I am not a head of a party but rather an agent of a nation." In the 1925 elections, he said: "The Wafd is running for elections not as a party but rather as an agent of the Egyptian nation." Thus, Sa'd Zaghlul was called "the leader," his home was called "the nation's home," and his wife was called "the mother of the Egyptians."

Historical evidence attests to the fact that the political party in Egypt, as was the case in a large number of African and Asian countries, began as a national front "to demand the nation's independence." It did not begin in a parliamentary framework with the aim of seeking power as was the case in the Western democracies.

After Egypt attained its formal independence in accordance with the 28 February 1922 declaration and the parliamentary experience began on the basis of the 1923 constitution, the Egyptian political movement came to know the front in the sense of a party coalition (among several parties) and a popular coalition (among several popular forces).

Historians cite three examples of this kind of front:

--The 1925 coalition between the Wafd Party, the National Party, and the Constitutional Liberals Party for the restoration of the constitution and repeal of the 1925 elections (two-tier elections).

--The 1935 national front among all the existing parties (the Wafd-the National-the Constitutional Liberals).

--The 1946 national front which was formed following the Labor and Student National Committee demonstrations demanding the abrogation of the 1936 treaty between Egypt and England. A negotiating delegation was formed from the Constitutional Liberals Party, the Sa'dists, the Wafdist Bloc, and some independents. The Wafd Party and the National Party did not join this delegation.

We will talk about these fronts in detail in future articles.

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EGYPT

NEW PRIME MINISTER'S PHILOSOPHY OUTLINED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 27 Sep 85 pp 1, 3, 7

[Interview with Prime Minister 'Ali Lutfi by Ibrahim Nafi': "Tour in New Prime Minister's Mind; 'Ali Lutfi in First Comprehensive Interview Since He Assumed Premiership: We Must Face Mistakes of Economic Policies Courageously; Palliative Approach Realizes Cheap Popularity to Which We Must Not Resort and Our Only Option Is Solution to Fundamental Problems;" date and place not specified

[Text] I met him when he was minister of finance in Dr Mustafa Khalil's cabinet. His most prominent qualities were strength, seriousness, and strictness in collecting society's dues in taxes for the benefit of the people's toiling majority.

I met him again a few days ago as prime minister and discovered that a feeling of challenge has been added to his basic qualities--a feeling emanating from his awareness of the heavy responsibility he shoulders and from his wish to do something big with which he contributes, through his cabinet, to finding fundamental solutions to many of the problems under which the citizens are straining.

As for me, the special challenge was to penetrate the boundaries of his private thoughts to discover the new prime minister's thinking on the main issues which time permits discussing.

As a result of an interview lasting 75 minutes which I wrenched from his loaded appointment list, I can discern some aspects of the new prime minister's thinking and say: He is a serious man who combines in his personality the theoretical knowledge of a university professor with the practical experience of an ex-minister, of a former expert in the economic consultation sector, and of a party official who headed the National Party's Economic Committee and whose position gave him the opportunity to put his finger on many faulty and deficient spots.

Nobody Can Tell You Like an Expert

The man knows everything about the problems of the Egyptian bureaucracy. He was perhaps personally burnt by its fire during his work as an adviser in the area of economic consultation.

The man has experienced all the problems of the 1980's, and he has the sincere desire to tackle the mistakes and eliminate the flaws.

The man feels closely all of the citizens' hardships and problems with the Egyptian administration, with the problem of earning a living, and with his aspiration for a better life. He has a daring heart, he is not reluctant to present what he believes to be sound and true, and he does not waver in his struggle to implement the programs and reforms he believes in. He is certainly an obstinate personality who does not submit to failure easily and who never despairs of continuing the struggle to achieve his objectives.

When I began the interview with him, he said to me: "I am responsible for everything I will say. Therefore, I ask you and public opinion to bring me to account later on for what I say now. I want people to watch me so that they may find out if I change my present ideas, and I want the others to bring me to account if I do tomorrow the opposite of what I say today."

The truth is that the word "watch" has a special significance to the new prime minister. He believes that many of our problems are due to the absence of watching or to the lack of serious watching in most cases.

There is on his desk a small notebook in which he writes in his own hand the date for the completion of any public work, for the end of a phase in a project, and for the execution of a required task and of any promise by a public official to end a problem on a certain date so that every official may be brought to account for fulfilling his promises. His primary weapon in this is an iron memory, a small notebook for following up, and a strong desire to achieve something big.

Because my interview with the prime minister was lengthy, I will be content with this brief personal glimpse of the man so that the dialogue with his ideas, projections, and programs for Egypt in the coming phase may begin.

In returning to the "roots" of the Egyptian economic problem as an essential insight to the scientific solution that governs his thinking, Dr 'Ali Lutfi cited the fundamental facts which bequeathed us all the accumulated problems from which we are suffering, including the four wars which we waged and which cost us more than 100 billion pounds, not to mention the martyrs whose dear blood cannot be priced and the reconstruction costs which strained our backs and obstructed the development of our utilities for a long time and which came in the wake of enormous military spending.

But the new prime minister's thinking does not stop at the "fateful roots" imposed by Egypt's Arabism and by Egypt's responsibility in the Arab area. It goes beyond to underline another fundamental cause behind our economic problem:

"We must face courageously mistakes that were made in past economic policies that led to the instability of those policies.

"If the 'state's economy' must be inevitably influenced by international factors and changes, then it is logical that we should not disregard the effects of the international prices which rose abnormally in the 1970's in the wake of the October war and the burdens with which those prices saddled a country that imports more than it exports."

Four Phenomena

If the "scientific solution" to the Egyptian economic problem requires "diagnosing the problem" after defining "its roots," then Dr 'Ali Lutfi's thinking offers an accurate diagnosis of several flaws:

- "A flaw in the economic balance, because we consume more than we produce.

- "A flaw in saving and investment, because we invest more than we save.

- "A flaw in the state's exports and imports, because we import more than we export.

- "A flaw between cultivable land and population, if we consider the individual's share was 1 feddan during Muhammad 'Ali's rule 180 years ago, and that this share has now decreased, despite all the efforts exerted to build dams and reclaim land, to one-seventh of a feddan. This, in my opinion, is a serious flaw."

Where Is the Problem?

Despite all kinds of "flaws" from which the Egyptian economy suffers, these flaws could have had a less severe effect on the people's suffering with the living conditions and with the service facilities because there are other positive factors that have not yet been exploited to the desired degree--factors which represent to the economics professor a big question mark when he speaks about them:

"We have an impressive working force that proceeds daily to its work in agriculture, industry, and the services and whose annual investments in the public and private sectors exceed 700 million pounds a year. Moreover, we cultivate 6 million feddans, meaning that we have the land, the manpower, and the investments. So where is the problem? When I retreat with myself and think about Egypt as an economics professor, I imagine that there is something wrong in exploiting this available number of production elements. It is true that efforts have been exerted, that results have been achieved, and that the people have begun to feel these results. For example, there has been an improvement in traffic flow because of the construction of a large number of tunnels and bridges. Telephone services have improved, especially in Cairo and Alexandria, and the businessmen have felt the degree of improvement in international communications. But I want to be precise and careful in my words, and I do not at all claim that we have ended all the problems."

When Dr 'Ali Lutfi puts matters aright in this manner, then he must inevitably follow this by familiarizing the people with his thinking as to the cure which, he believes, can be achieved in one of two ways, of which only the second can provide a "safe option":

"The first is what we may call the palliative approach, which is an extremely dangerous approach that can lead to applause and popularity which, in my opinion, is a cheap popularity to which we must not resort.

"The second is a fundamental approach to which the new government has committed itself in tackling the problems. It suffices as an example in this regard to note that the palliative approach is used in tackling the sewerage problem. The 100-day project to repair the sewerage networks did not succeed in saving those networks which were more than 70 years old in Cairo and more than 75 years old in Alexandria. No renewals or replacements, which are required for a fundamental solution, were made on the networks, and the problem thus disappeared for a period only to reappear sharply. The new cabinet does not want to tackle problems which such an approach."

What governs the new prime minister's thinking is the "scientific approach" alone--an approach which begins, in the prime minister's words, with studying the problem and determining its dimensions and the consequences emanating from it and ends with charting the possible alternatives to find the solution to the fundamental problem.

If there is a "fundamental solution" that can be found, then this solution does not represent, in the prime minister's thinking, the "end of the road." The solution represents only the "beginning of an action" which must be taken along parallel lines, the first and most important of which is, in the prime minister's opinion:

"The Egyptian citizen's feeling of belonging and the popular participation and intrinsic efforts emanating from this feeling represent a basic element in the solution, in addition to the efforts of the government which cannot solve any problem alone. The government draws up the plans and the policies, and then every citizen has a role with which he contributes inasmuch as his feeling of belonging urges him to contribute."

It is true that the issue of belonging is extremely significant. But if the indisputable rule says that belonging emanates fundamentally from the feeling of achieving of an individual or a personal interest, in addition to public performance, then what goes on in the new prime minister's mind to revive the feeling of belonging?

Three Main Axes

Even though Dr 'Ali Lutfi agrees with me on the soundness of the rule concerning individual interests, he views the issue from another angle which he believes we have neglected for a long time, namely, the negativism with which we have been afflicted and which has caused us to lose popular participation.

To find this lost participation, the prime minister believes that it is necessary to work along several axes:

We must abolish all the exceptions "so that every citizen may feel that he belongs to this homeland and participates in building it and so that he may, consequently, begin safeguarding the public money."

The government must begin with itself "so that it may be the model for the citizens in rationalizing spending and eliminating extravagance and waste.

"Before all this, in the prime minister's opinion, the masses must be told frankly of all the problems and the true conditions."

Such a visualization of the feeling of belonging, in addition to the individual incentive which cannot be disregarded, can actually play an effective role in implementing the government's plans and policies. It may be convenient now to move to another area in the new prime minister's thinking--an area occupied by his conception of the solutions for specific problems. Let us ask, for example, how we can deal with the small supply of foreign currency and how we can reduce spending.

One thing that Dr 'Ali Lutfi asserts is that we need foreign currency for basic uses. But at the same time, he defines several means to deal with the shortage of foreign currency.

According to the prime minister:

"In the present phase, we can achieve a further rationalization in use. Some controls have actually been issued to regulate travel abroad. What is important is that the rationalization should not affect production. I should not ban or reduce the importation of a capital commodity, meaning machinery, equipment, semiprocessed goods, or raw materials needed for industry. We also cannot ban the importation of basic foodstuffs such as wheat and flour. If there are nonessential goods which are produced locally in adequate quantities and at a reasonable price, then we say that there is no need for imports and we thus may rationalize spending.

"There are steps that can be taken to develop our foreign currency resources. Some of them are long-range steps that need time to produce results. In the short run, I believe that we should turn to the remittances made by Egyptians abroad which can help solve the problem to a large degree. I imagine that there are 3 million Egyptians working abroad. The average annual savings of each of them amount to 300 dollars, i.e., their savings amount to nearly 1 billion dollars, of which no more than one-third comes to Egypt. Why shouldn't we attract the remaining two-thirds?"

Stability...Serious Factor

There is a fundamental objective which, if achieved, can actually double Egypt's foreign currency resources which constitute an "influential factor" in tackling the economic problem.

But how?

The answer is complete in the new prime minister's thinking, with specific courses of action:

"First, we work to achieve stability in our economic policies to assure Egyptians working abroad that there is a climate in which this money in

Egypt may be received with the utmost safety. The first features of this new plan that we are preparing is that we will impose no restrictions on the incoming money and will give this money full freedom of movement and their owners the right to take it out of the country again.

"Second, we prepare feasibility studies for projects that serve the Egyptian economy and need foreign currency and then submit these studies to our sons who work abroad and explain to them the projects' profitability. In this case, they will certainly participate in these projects. I say that we are not concerned if their money does not come to us in cash. But we do want this money in the form of participation in projects, because this means the real development of the Egyptian economy.

"Third, we encourage the private sector and give it a strong boost. This was the first decision made in the first session held by the new cabinet so that we may assure our sons who work abroad that there is complete stability in our economic policies and that we encourage productive investment and give it full opportunity. We agreed to discuss in the cabinet's next session all the means through which the Egyptian private sector, whether working at home or abroad, can be encouraged. The decrees pertaining to this policy of encouragement will be issued within a month, God willing."

If achieving stability in economic policy and making this policy's features clear is the "good conducive element" leading to the development of our foreign currency resources, then can we achieve the desired clarity in our economic policies with the issuance of conflicting decrees to regulate imports and our economic and banking life? There is also a subsequent question that imposes itself: How can the Egyptian economy regain others' confidence in it? What, for example, is the government's policy concerning the free zones, and how can these zones be transformed into first-class industrial zones which fundamentally channel production toward the outside world?

Within Narrowest Limits

It is Dr 'Ali Lutfi's view that special free zones "must not be established except within the narrowest limits and only when there is an urgent need for them, such as an oil project in a certain area or a project in a port, i.e., when the nature of a project requires that the project be in a special free zone."

As for the public free zones, of which we have four--in Cairo, al-'Amiriyah, Port Said, and Suez--the new prime minister gives them his vote but makes a reservation concerning an important fault, namely, that all utilities and services should have been secured for these zones from the start. But it seems that because we were in a hurry to achieve an open-door economy, we expanded the establishment of such zones before providing them with all the requirements. "It is our duty now to make up for what these zones lack, so that we may give them a full boost and actually turn them into export-oriented industrial zones. But to set up commodity storage projects in these zones and then to allow these commodities to enter the country under the pressure of need are unacceptable, because the normal situation for such zones is to work for exports and to turn them into a foreign currency source and not into a means of draining foreign currency. I will declare here clearly that we welcome any industrial project in the free zones and that we will give such projects all our facilities and assistance so that they may work for Egypt."

Now that we are confronting the reality with such frankness and openness, it must be said that it has been noticed recently that there is a degree of restraint from investment in Egypt. This has perhaps come as a result of the fact that some banks expanded their credit facilities without guarantees, of the lack of clear vision on the part of the investors, or of obstacles that make the investor ultimately run away when he reaches his wit's end. What means does the prime minister see to encourage investment in Egypt and to create new and beneficial spheres?

What is established in the prime minister's mind with utter clarity is that investment cannot take place in a void, but that it can be achieved in a certain society with a certain climate. It can be achieved with stable economic policies, laws, and regulations, and this is what is being done now. There are other influential factors which, Dr Lutfi believes, it is important to take into consideration:

- Establish certain incentives for investors, including tax and customs exemptions.

- Secure as much land as possible in the new cities for the investors to set up their projects far from Cairo's bottlenecks and its high land prices.

- Simplify the bureaucratic procedures in the departments that issue approvals for such projects, be they the Investment Authority, in case there is a foreign partner in the project, or the other authorities and ministries concerned, so that the investor may get his approval easily.

All this must be coupled, in the prime minister's opinion, with an important fact of which we must not lose sight for a single moment, namely, that the investor "has a personal interest and does not come for the sake of the others. We must welcome him within the framework of the state's general plan and policy and acknowledge his right to moderate profits that encourage him to invest. For example, it is not right, in my estimate, to impose a low price on the private sector's production, because such a step will inevitably force the investor to run away."

Productive and Consumer-Oriented

It may be necessary at this point of the issue of investment in Egypt to cast a glance at Dr 'Ali Lutfi's mind to find out what the productive open-door economy and the consumption open-door economy mean to him, since the thin thread separating the two has not yet been adequately defined, not to mention the conflicting transactions created by the varying concepts.

The prime minister is eager to explain two points in this regard, and I agree with him on the necessity of an explanation:

"First, some may have understood the open-door economy to be confined to the private sector only. I say that when the public sector develops, then this becomes a part of the open-door economic policy. Even though development of the public sector represents to me a major issue that merits a detailed interview, I will say very briefly that this sector must be freed of the centralization of decision-making and of the need to refer to the ministry and the authority for every decision. It must be given the opportunity to replace and renew its machinery and equipment--an opportunity it was denied for a long time during the war years. Moreover, the subsidy must, in my opinion, come at the final link of the transaction when the commodity is sold to the consumer. I must not impose a compulsory price on the public-sector company, thus causing it to lose and causing its financing structure to be flawed.

"Second, the productive open-door economy does not mean that I should confine myself to the production of goods such as iron, cement, or fertilizers. No. When a project is set up for the production of consumer goods, then this also is a productive open-door economic policy. This is an issue that is not sufficiently clear to the people. If we say, for example, that we have an investment project for the production of refrigerators, then isn't this project a productive open-door economy? It is true that the plant produces a consumer commodity. But then isn't consumption the ultimate goal of production? Consumption is the basic move behind every activity. The mistake made at the outset of the open-door economic policy in the 1970's was that we greatly increased the importation of luxury goods and called this the consumer open-door economy. Such importation is undesirable in the current phase, and it has nothing to do with the open-door economic policy."

Opening up to Tourism

The explanation Dr 'Ali Lutfi offered of his view for encouraging tourism in Egypt also falls within the concept and framework of open-door economic policies.

Does Dr 'Ali Lutfi believe that there is truly tourism in Egypt and that tourism has its tangible place on the investment map, a place with which it may be said that tourism has gotten its share? It was necessary to move closer to the man's thinking about this source that is rich with foreign currency and that gives meagerly to Egypt despite Egypt's enormous tourism potential which most tourist countries lack.

There is, of course, tourism in Egypt. But when the number of tourists is within 1 million a year, then this is, in the new prime minister's viewpoint, a totally unreasonable and unacceptable figures, especially when we note that 41 million tourists visit Spain each year, although Spain's population does not exceed 39 million, i.e., the number of tourists is bigger than the population. In Italy, the figure is close to 30 million tourists a year. "I believe that America and Florida [as published] receive the same number each year. This is happening even though all the mainstays of tourism are available in Egypt, including a temperate climate, historical sites that exist in no other part of the world, and prices that are relatively much lower than the prices in other countries. Despite all this, we find an excess of hotel capacity. Let us speak frankly. It is true that the plan's target in the tourism sector has not been achieved. I believe that my colleague Dr Fu'ad Sultan is an economist who will give the tourism sector a strong boost. He has begun to study the problem of the money-losing public-sector hotels that are run by Egyptian management and study the means to turn them into profitable hotels. We must find the ideal answers to all the questions the president raised in Aswan as to why Egyptian management is not as good as, or even better than, foreign management."

Prices Are Issue of All

It is certain that this entire tour in the prime minister's thinking on the dimensions of the economic problem with all its tributaries and challenges and with all the possible courses to eliminate its influence on daily life must lead us to the issue that concerns all, namely, the issue of wages and prices and of the strain-producing contrast between them.

Insofar as prices are concerned, the economics professor who heads the cabinet does not dwell long on the conventional local and international causes that lead to higher prices but goes beyond to underline an important fact concluded by past studies conducted by the university--the fact that one-third of Egyptian society represents people with limited incomes who alone suffer the hardship of rising prices. This is in contrast with other groups with high incomes, not to say wages, who benefit from rising prices. A professional may raise his fees by 30 percent if the prices rise by 10 percent, and a craftsman may double his fees for the smallest increase in prices. Under the pressure of the need for such a craftsman's services and because of the emigration of some craftsmen to the Arab countries, people are compelled to pay what he demands. "It may be said that the classes we describe as those with a limited income may have incomes from sources other than wages. A government or public-sector employee or a retiree may have some cultivable land or may own several shares in a project or a number of investment certificates. But I know that the overwhelming majority of these people who represent one-third of Egyptian society suffer from the hardship of high prices."

If Dr 'Ali Lutfi were heard expressing opinions on tackling high prices before assuming the premiership, and if a question were raised now by public opinion as to the extent of his readiness to implement those opinions, then Dr Lutfi's clear viewpoint would be: "Those are my personal opinions, and I cannot now compel all my colleagues the ministers to accept them. There is the Council of Ministers, the Policies Committee, the National Party, and the People's Assembly. Some of the tendencies I expressed require the promulgation of laws. I will say that I will present the opinions I expressed before assuming responsibility before all these institutions and that we will discuss and debate them democratically so that we may choose the best means to control prices in the shortest time possible."

Steps on Path

This democratic approach which governs Dr 'Ali Lutfi's steps does not prevent him from crystallizing in his mind several courses of action which he takes to the study channels. "The distribution outlets must be increased in number, with the right to choose the outlet sites reserved for the government. Dr Yusuf Wali issued a decree calling for delivery of the entire production of the Ministry of Agriculture and of the companies under its control to the Ministry of Supply and for abolishing the auctions that contribute to raising prices by a large degree, especially in essential commodities such as fruits and vegetables of which nearly 200 tons are now delivered to the Ministry of Supply each day. We agreed to increase this quantity of 300 tons and to impose strict control on the markets under the canopy of a voluntary price that does not lead to concealing the goods.

"The tendency is to set up sound consumer cooperatives and not cooperatives similar to the currently existing ones in which the management cost is high and the service standard is low. I hope that there will be real cooperation through which the citizens get to own the cooperatives and through which the commodity moves from the producer to the actual consumer directly and without any middlemen. What I mean is that we can raise the service to a level that is better than the admirable service level in the supermarkets which have spread recently.

"It is very important to eliminate the loss and waste in all the production and distribution phases. Some studies have proven, for example, that more than 30-40 percent of the tomato crop is lost to us because of poor packaging and transportation. This reflects necessarily on tomato prices and available quantities, and it compels us to import goods for hard currency. Thus, the interconnnection between the problems becomes obvious.

"It is also of maximum importance to use modern technology in agriculture. Experimentation in the use of this technology in Egypt has begun with the so-called agricultural vehicles which yield eight times the conventional production. It is true that each costs 4,000 pounds, but they produce abundantly and solve a big problem. There is also no alternative to increasing land reclamation from 150,000 feddans to at least 200,000 feddans a year to be added to the productive cultivable land. Thank God that the previous cabinet was alert to the problem of cultivable-soil removal and the problem of construction on cultivable land and banned these practices."

Insofar as wages are concerned, the new prime minister acknowledges that the wage level is low. But he does not see it as sharply low as some portray it to be. "When we mention the salary of a university graduate or of a general director, we note the salary solely without mentioning the other cash benefits, such as overtime pay, expense accounts, professional allowances, awards, incentives, and grants given more than once a year. But after all this, I still say frankly that the wages are low. I will also say frankly that any minister of finance can double the wages overnight by putting the money printing press into operation for 2 hours. But this would be tantamount to sabotaging the Egyptian economy which is like a building with an escalator and a lift. Should the wages jump on the escalator, the prices beat them by taking the lift. There will also be an increase in the purchasing power not countered by an increase in production. Therefore, raising the wages is a demand to which there is no objection, provided that the raise is calculated, gradual, and compatible with the increase in production."

Tax Rates Are Enough...But

"A confrontation like this with the wage and price issue leads automatically to another issue related to it, namely, how to achieve a fair tax that does not increase the price burden, that diminishes wages only by a reasonable degree, and that curtails what I view as the most dangerous and serious problem, meaning the forms of tax evasion whose methods are mastered only by those who benefit from high prices?"

The situation may seem very reassuring to the common people when Dr 'Ali Lutfi says that the current tax rates in Egypt are reasonable and that they are neither too low nor exaggerated but that the major problem lies, in his opinion, in tax evasion.

"I had to grapple with this evasion when I was minister of finance. When we compare the yield on taxes with the national product, taking into consideration the exemptions, we find that this yield is meager. It is completely obvious that those with large incomes evade the payment of taxes, either totally by failing to submit tax statements--with some of them perhaps never entering the tax offices and not even knowing what their addresses are--or partially by submitting statements concealing some of their income and exaggerating their expenses.

"The effective means to cure tax evasion are not absent from the prime minister's mind:

- Taking steps by the government to steer away from excessive spending which generates in the citizen the feeling of a lack of responsibility and which makes tax evasion attractive to him because the government does not spend the tax money well.

- Completing the on-the-spot survey of the tax community, which is something I started in 1980.

- Introducing comprehensive development into the Tax Agency to include within its framework the use of computers and the systems of keeping files on microfilm.

- Spreading awareness among the citizens by way of all the information media and through an enlightenment campaign that entrenches in the citizens' minds the concept that the taxes they pay end up in benefits for their children.

"There is no doubt that the services represent one of the most important aspects of the tangible yield for which the taxpayer looks before anything else. Therefore, the question is: How can the government tackle with practical solutions that the president spelled out in his letter of designation to the ministers, including the achievement of a greater accomplishment in popular economy housing in particular and the introduction of necessary development in education?"

Economical Housing Is Basis

The new prime minister fully believes that the problem of housing in Egypt lies in economical housing. "This is definitely a good beginning toward a cure. The solution begins, in my assessment, by securing the construction materials, including cement, iron, lumber, and glass. We will study how to boost our production of these basic materials. Along a parallel line, we are studying with Field Marshal Abu Ghazalah how the armed forces can help us by supplying the trained labor in which we are experiencing a shortage and whose wages are high. I have seen for myself in the 6 October City how disciplined is the labor trained by the armed forces. Before we do this, it is necessary to secure the lands supplied with utilities."

However, Dr 'Ali Lutfi's thinking turns with strong interest to tackling the many deficient aspects that have surfaced in the housing cooperatives. "It is my assessment that it has become necessary to introduce them into the computer, to examine their memberships, and to examine the cases where a member has obtained more than one apartment by taking advantage of the cooperative loans and using the name of more than one member of his family to get such loans."

In viewing the reality of education in Egypt, Dr 'Ali Lutfi does not imagine that we have serious education when 50 or 60 students are crowded in a classroom. "When we find schools operating in two shifts and some in three shifts, nobody can be pleased with this. It is my opinion that we must universalize the system of a full day of study and that we must have an athletic and cultural program and a program for gardening, for example. Education is not just stuffing the student's minds with data."

Ministerial Harmony a Must

We may perhaps say that the first step in any cabinet's success in achieving all these tasks, not to mention the success of every cabinet member which is attributed to the entire cabinet, is the presence of what is called ministerial harmony. A clear vision of how the ministers are to work as a harmonious team becomes a must here.

Dr 'Ali Lutfi fully agrees with me on the need to achieve this ministerial harmony. Consequently, he has translated this into something like a covenant or a code on which he agreed with his minister colleagues in the first session the cabinet held. This covenant includes 16 points, foremost of which are cooperation and coordination between all the ministers so that they may work as a complete team. The prime minister was successful when the first utterance he made to his colleagues, to whom and to whose history he is tied by a firm acquaintance, was:

"I am not the boss of the ministers. I am the chairman of the Council of Ministers, and I head the council's session once a month."

Then there was agreement that differences of opinion and viewpoint are likely. But when we agree on an opinion after discussing it democratically, then the minority should respect the majority's opinion and only a united voice must issue from the cabinet.

Party and Government

Finally, the tour in the new prime minister's mind may become complete with a pause focusing on the public's questions concerning his visualization of the relationship between his cabinet and the National Party and his view of the opposition parties and of their constitutional role. The political view can thus complement the economic view in confronting those who say that 'Ali Lutfi's cabinet represents a partisan government, meaning that this cabinet is governed by the restricted view that is confined to the party's interests only. Dr 'Ali Lutfi asserted that his is the government of the 49 million people, regardless of how different their creeds and opinions are, as long as we have accepted the irrevocable democratic system. "I even believe in the need to attain the highest levels of democracy. Regarding the relationship with the constitutional institutions, I say in my capacity as the prime minister that it is a very good relationship.

"My colleagues and I will try to attend the largest number possible of the sessions of the People's Assembly and of the Consultative Council in order to entrench the relationship between the government and the legislative authority."

Regarding the relationship with the party, the prime minister, who was chairman of one of the party's committees, believes that the party has to play a major role in the coming phase in studying the problems and in proposing alternative solutions. "I will be as careful as possible to attend the meetings of the party's committees and the political club will again meet once every 2 weeks to discuss the problems so that there may be complete cohesion between the party and the government."

As for his view of the opposition, it is founded on accepting tolerantly the criticism the opposition voices. "I will never be annoyed with criticism, regardless of what kind it is. This is a new task to which I invite my colleagues, the chairmen of the parties, and the chief editors of the partisan papers. I will meet with them on numerous occasions because I respect counteropinions." However, the new prime minister warns, and his warning is in place, against wasting time between the attempts of some opposition parties to pursue mistakes and the attempts of a party that has gained power democratically to answer the opposition. The man believes that there is a more beneficial approach that must prevail in Egypt's democratic system--an approach whereby cooperation is established between the ruling party and the opposition parties immediately upon conclusion of the elections. This does not mean that the government should approve everything. But it means precisely an objective criticism of the policies and revelations of corruption, supported by documents, especially if an issue concerns the reputation or integrity of individuals. Every citizen is entitled to preserve his dignity which we muct safeguard and protect out of a belief that a man is innocent until proven guilty. "If the opposition happens to have at any time studies and research dealing with a national issue, then I welcome the opening of an objective dialogue with the opposition on such an issue. My belief in debating counteropinions is bound by no limits."

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PRIME MINISTER'S COMPLAINTS BUREAU LAUNCHES ACTIVITIES

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 23 Oct 85 p 3

[Article by 'Abd-al-Nasir Salamah: "Bureau at Premiership To End Investors' Problems; How Are 48 Complaints Discussed in 28 Hours?"]

[Text] The new bureau formed by the prime minister and attached to his office has begun its task of receiving the investors' complaints. Within 2 days, the bureau received 48 complaints. Bureau officials put an immediate end to some problems and referred the others to the prime minister for a decision.

To start with, Prime Minister Dr 'Ali Lutfi said that we work constantly to encourage the private sector and give it a strong boost. This is why he held several meetings with businessmen in Cairo and Alexandria, with the Union of the Chambers of Commerce, with egg and poultry producers, and with prominent merchants to encourage Egypt's private sector.

Rif'at Mutawa', director of the new bureau, said that all these meetings had to be crowned with the creation of the cabinet's complaints bureau, which is under his supervision, so that it may provide a decisive end to all the investors' complaints in Egypt because we are always committed to caring for the producers in the public and private sectors by facilitating their affairs. The creation of the bureau is a step in facilitating the investors' affairs. It may be an important step because its objective is to invite the investors to embark on more projects. The bureau is also a serious step toward solving these problems because the bureau's workers are researchers engaged in developing the procedures when such procedures do not keep pace with the times. They submit proposals for development and after these proposals are presented to the authorities concerned, they take the legal course to bring about change.

"Requests Bureau"

As to whether this bureau is another example of the complaints bureau of the Investment Authority, Rif'at Mutawa' said:

The bureau is primarily a requests bureau. Its workers are researchers who specialize in all fields in which investors engage and they are experienced in this sphere. This is why we study every request independently and exert efforts to overcome the obstacles about which each investor complains by contacting the authority concerned, be it a ministry or another agency. This is why the bureau has been put under the prime minister's control.

As for the complaints and requests received by the bureau, they amounted to 22 on the first day and 26 on the second day, all complaining either about general problems, such as telephones, water, utilities, and bank interest rates, for example, or about special problems concerning investors, such as customs fees, electricity, marketing, and other areas. We exert efforts to solve every problem in the shortest time possible. But if the complaints pertain to general problems, we exert efforts to issue decrees to end such problems after presenting the complaints to the prime minister.

Rif'at Mutawa' added that despite his heavy workload, the prime minister devotes some of his time each day to discussing these requests with the bureau's management and to formulating complete solutions for them so as to make things easier for the investors. The bureau works each day from 0800 to 1300 to receive complaints either by telephone on numbers 553791, 547370, 547376, and 547377 or to have them delivered by hand to its offices at the premier's premises. Big facilities have been arranged to receive the investors.

What Do Investors Say?

At the premier's complaints bureau, 'Ali Mahmud Rihan, owner of an investment project, said in his complaint: I am listed in the exporters register and I was the biggest exporter of bees honey in the Middle East for 4 years. My prices were nearly 600 dollars per ton higher than the prices established by the Price-setting Committee. I opened in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia markets that had not existed before. I set up in Egypt a plant for the production of honey processed by evaporation so that it may not congeal because the Arab citizen believes that sugar is used in congealed honey. This is the secret of my success. My exports have yielded half a million pounds, I always observe the country's interest because I represent Egypt commercially in foreign trade. I could have concealed this money in any country and could have sold it on the free market without having to pay taxes for it. But I rejected this and I have paid all the taxes, customs fees, and other fees I owe. My problem is that after I exported 40 tons of honey to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in 1981, Iraq hit some naval targets in the Gulf and maritime traffic was interrupted. The last ship loaded with goods sailed back to Cyprus and was delayed there for nearly 5 months after which the goods were delivered damaged to the merchants in Kuwait who refused to collect them and who demanded that I repay them their money in dollars, amounting to nearly 12,000 pounds. At the time, the dollar was priced at 83 piasters but the merchants now want their dollars at the current price of 135 piasters a dollar. So I have come to the premier's bureau to solve my problem. Otherwise, I will have to pay 9,000 pounds more than I should, not to mention the fact that the merchants have sued me and that the litigation has cost me nearly 7,000 dollars so far.

Mahmud 'Abd-al-Rahim, the prime minister's information adviser, said: All the requests and complaints we received in the past 2 days have been presented to the prime minister on the spot so that they may be ended immediately. The most important characteristic of these complaints so far is that they are private complaints. For example, an investment firm for the production of canned goods complained that the taxes on canned goods are high and demanded that it be treated in the same way as the public-sector companies.

In another case, the owner of a private-sector investment firm for the production of eggs requested that water be supplied to his project at state expense. A number of investors also requested meetings with the prime minister to present to him ideas on new projects.

"Interest in Other Offices"

Al-Sayyid Yusuf al-'Abd, first secretary of the People's Assembly's Proposals and Complaints Committee, said that the creation of the investors' complaints bureau at the cabinet adds a new dimension to the prime minister's profound interest in discussing a fundamental issue connected with the future development of a sector whose contribution has become indispensable in the current phase. He added that for this experiment to achieve its main objective in all spheres, the prime minister must codify the procedures stipulated in the constitution for filling complaints so that it may become possible to take advantage of the complaint offices in the ministries, agencies, and authorities and so that the complaints may not become a burden on the executive agencies. This requires that the other complaint offices be bolstered with energetic scientific capabilities and their workers granted the right to find out the truth by all means of investigation so that when numerous complaints come from other sectors the prime minister is not compelled to set up for them special complaint offices in the cabinet and so that the complaints offices of the ministries, authorities, and agencies may not be turned into a mere administration for the referral of complaints until the party complained about is reached. These offices will thus lose their significance and will become a factor in shaking the citizens' confidence in them. These offices should also be given the power to propose the decision on the problems or complaints presented to them.

The first secretary of the Proposals and Complaints Committee wondered: Why isn't open house day restored to every executive official so that he may be able to familiarize himself with the true nature of the problems, thus helping to make the right decision?

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CSO: 4504/63

MAURITANIA

MAURITANIAN PRESIDENT SAYS ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS NOW FREE

LD132234 Paris International Service in French 1245 GMT 13 Dec 85

/Interview with Mauritanian President Maayouia Ould Taya with unidentified correspondent; date and place not given--recorded/

/Text/ President Maayouia Ould Taya of Mauritania arrived only yesterday in Paris. Before coming to France, he had to preside over the ceremonies marking the first anniversary of his coming to power. On this occasion, Colonel Ould Taya announced an amnesty covering several political prisoners. First, I asked him why, in his opinion, is the French-African summit important, before asking his questions on political prisoners:

/Ould Taya/ The French-African summit is a summit for consultations. It is therefore an excellent occasion for me to meet a great many African heads of state, as well as President Mitterrand, to discuss with them problems concerning Africa, each of our countries, and even important international problems.

/Unidentified correspondent/ You have spoken about the Sahara with the president?

/Ould Taya/ It had talks with the president on relations between France and Mauritania, and so how would it have been possible to mention Western Sahara? First and foremost there were the problems concerning cooperation between France and Mauritania.

/Correspondent/ Mr President, are there still political prisoners in Mauritania?

/Ould Taya/ No, there are no political prisoners left in prisons. Two days ago we freed the last five, who were convicted for crime against the internal and external security of the state. This is proof of our good will.

/Correspondent/ And as far as former President Ould Haidala is concerned?

/Ould Taya/ He is well treated; he is under arrest in a villa inside the country.

/Correspondent/ How have relations developed with Morocco, Algeria and Libya in the past year?

/Ould Taya/ Relations are good with Algeria since we have proceeded from the accord of concord and fraternity. With Morocco, you know that we resumed diplomatic relations in 1985; our relations are developing favorably. Our relations are tangibly improving with Morocco. They are developing with Algeria. With Libya, our relations are now very correct.

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CSO: 4500/47

MOROCCO

BRIEFS

AGREEMENT WITH LIBYA--Rabat--Morocco and SPLAJ signed today at noon at the Bank of Morocco in Rabat an agreement aimed at establishing a new system for payment between the two countries in order to facilitate the exchange operations and consolidate the commercial exchanges between them. The agreement was signed from the Moroccan side by Mr Ahmed Benani, the governor of the Bank of Morocco, and from the Libyan side by Mr Rajab Abdallah al-Misallati, the governor of the Central Bank of Libya. The signing took place with the attendance of Mr Abdelouahed Radi, the secretary general of the Arab African Union. [Excerpt] [Rabat MAP in Arabic 1530 GMT 21 Nov 85]

/9604
CSO: 4500/37

TUNISIA

MZALI DISCUSSES RELATIONS WITH LIBYA, ISRAELI RAID

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 21 Oct 85 p 6

[Interview with Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali by Shawqi Mallasi: "Mohamed Mzali: Al-Qadhdhafi's Radios Urge Army To Rebel"]

[Text] Hours before his departure for the Italian capital, Tunisian Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali paid a visit to South Tunisia, during which he met with a number of journalists who heard from him a detailed disclosure about the latest developments in Tunisia and about Tunisia's crisis with Colonel al-Qadhdhafi. On the plane heading south, colleague Shawqi Mallasi had the opportunity to interview the prime minister, who kindly answered AL-DUSTUR's questions in this concentrated and brief interview:

[Question] You pointed out in your latest press conference that Tunisia has made a decision to rely on itself. Does this mean that Tunisia will actually follow this course?

[Answer] Tunisia will continue to rely on itself, and it will try harder than ever before to make this reliance complete. We exert ceaseless efforts to achieve this goal.

[Question] You also noted that you reject the reports of some experts. Does this mean the World Bank and the IMF experts?

[Answer] Those meant are some experts who make theoretical reports which at times lack a knowledge of the country's reality, since some reports cover purely economic considerations and lack the social or political dimension, and since they may result in trouble for some governments.

[Question] You have linked the green revolution with defending the country and said that this revolution is the oil that cannot be depleted. We beg you to give us some explanations on this issue.

[Answer] Oil wealth is a gift from God. But it is not a lasting gift. We rely on agriculture and agricultural investment and on the level of the Tunisian cadres and workers. This is why we are reclaiming vast areas of land, and by creating a kind of wealth through which we can enable people to settle on their fathers' lands, we can achieve self-sufficiency and can also produce for export. This wealth will last and will be a source of stability, sufficiency, and prosperity.

[Question] Don't you find a connection between al-Qadhdhafi's plots against Tunisia and the Israeli raid?

[Answer] The Israeli raid has caused Tunisian public opinion, which was pained and was unanimous on the need to be alert and to confront all manifestations of Libyan aggression, to focus its efforts on confronting Israeli aggression. Regrettably, Libyan aggression persists in the meantime. The proof of this is that the Libyan radios continue to urge the army and other Tunisians to rebel and rise up against the regime. If we were united, Israel would not dare attack any Arab country. But Libyan policy has weakened the Arab ranks.

[Question] How true are the reports that Libya has modern radar that enables it to detect the Israeli aircraft half an hour before they reached Tunisia?

[Answer] I have no information on this issue. This may be true. However, what is known is that the Italian military authorities declared that the Israelis jammed the Italian radar.

As for the Libyans, they of course have their radar, and I don't know what happened to it.

[Question] Al-Qadhdhafi is rejected by the Libyan people, and he holds hostile positions toward Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Iraq, and other Arab countries. What are the forces that help him stay in power?

[Answer] Al-Qadhdhafi's rule is a despotic rule. There is no democracy in Libya, and al-Qadhdhafi's regime relies on intimidation and the logic of force.

[Question] Is there a foreign force supporting him?

[Answer] I don't know. However, his behavior and his attempts to divide the Arab nation and to plant chaos in its ranks help, of course, the Arab nation's enemies, regardless of whether he wants to or not.

[Question] In light of your experience with Colonel al-Qadhdhafi's regime, what can you tell your Sudanese brothers?

[Answer] I greet my brothers in Sudan, and I beseech God to help them solve their social and economic problems. I know that the Sudanese people are a proud people rich with patriotism. This is an asset that is likely to protect them from all foreign attempts.

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CSO: 4504/69

TUNISIA

BRIEFS

MUP MEMBER ARRESTED--The Popular Unity Movement (MUP) issued a communique in which it revealed that Abderrahman Abid, a member of the movment's political bureau, had been arrested as of last Tuesday. The movement's sources say that they do not know the reasons for his arrest. [Text] [Tunis AL-SABAH in Arabic 15 Nov 85 p 2] /7358

PASSPORT THEFT ARREST--AL-ANWAR has learned that the Moroccan police recently arrested a young Tunisian man who was carrying two Tunisian passports. He confessed that he had stolen three other Tunisian passports and had intended to falsify them. He also confessed that he "works" within a network that specializes in falsifying passports. The arrested man is 29 years old, is married, and lives in the suburb of Bardo. [Text] [Tunis AL-ANWAR AL-TUNISIYYAH in Arabic 10 Nov 85 p 5] /7358

CSO: 4504/111

ISRAEL

AIR FORCE COMMANDER INTERVIEWED ON TUNIS RAID

Tel Aviv BAMAHANE in Hebrew 9 Oct 85 pp 5, 6

[Interview with Brigadier Lapidot, Air Force Commander: "I Do Not Believe There Can Be a Counterattack Like Our Operation;" date and place not specified]

[Question] How were the pilots selected for the operation?

[Answer] We do not have a special selection process for these missions. When a squadron is assigned a mission, its pilots carry it out. Within the squadron, there are pilots who have more and less seniority. We take into account the expertise of the pilots with the various weapons systems. Not all the pilots of the squadron are necessarily skilled in all kinds of weapons. The pilots chosen for this mission did not have special training but were, rather, ones with a lot of combat experience. This time they did not endanger themselves in order to provide experience for young pilots.

[Question] Did you train according to any particular pattern?

[Answer] We made all the necessary preparations to assure as successful an operation as possible.

[Question] There was no day of training?

[Answer] There were many preparations in many areas. The mission was very successful from a technical point of view. Efficiency was very high, and there were no problems or mishaps. All this did not happen by chance but as the result of very serious planning.

[Question] Doesn't a mission like this reveal a system? And could we not use an operation like this in another situation such as a war?

[Answer] A certain amount of exposure goes on in every military action. The dilemma for those who make operational decisions is which combat methods and systems to choose so as not to reveal very sensitive and important things. In the area of basic decisions, the question is whether carrying out a mission is justified in light of the fact that there will be some kind of exposure like this afterwards. This dilemma always exists during relatively quiet times and less in wartime. At times, the value of certain missions during quiet periods is even greater than similar missions in wartime. In those cases, the soul searching is not very intense. Those who make the decisions do so after considering every angle. In this case, I hope that in the final analysis, not too much will be revealed.

[Question] Were there options for escape?

[Answer] That is part of the basic science of combat. We have two important principles in planning operations. The first is that we do not leave combatants in the area. If it happens that a pilot has to abandon his plane, we do everything to get him home as soon as possible. The second principle is really the secret of good planning and involves analyzing all kinds of foreseeable and imaginable developments and coming up with appropriate answers for every possible development.

[Question] Did you run into any opposition at the time of the mission?

[Answer] Generally, no.

[Question] Are we safe from similar kinds of surprise attacks?

[Answer] In my estimation, they cannot carry out the kind of operations that we can. You cannot compare the Israeli Air Force with other air forces in our region, either from the point of view of strike capacity or in terms of defense of the nation's skies. Still, we cannot absolutely promise that there will never be any infiltration from the air.

[Question] Was there radio communication with the forces?

[Answer] Communication with participating forces is an established principle in every operation. And in this mission, too, we were in communication with the forces.

[Question] What were the main difficulties for the mission?

[Answer] What stood out in this operation was the distance from home--1,300 miles. That is the longest range for an Israeli air attack, more than twice the distance of the operation which destroyed Iraq's nuclear reactor. This fact creates complicated operational problems. An example of this is fueling of the planes. The flight is very long, and there must be refueling in the air. This is a delicate and not at all simple operation with a potential for mishaps which may cause a foul-up in the action and even force the plane to return home without fuel. Second, flying planes for such an extended period has the potential of problems with the plane's systems. The plane is an extensive system of delicate and complex subsystems. Third is the length of time for pilots in the air. A combat pilot is not accustomed to carrying out such extensive battle objectives. Such a flight represents a big effort. The people are likely to be in a less than a maximally alert state. Fourth are problems of control. Difficulties grow proportionally to the square of the distance.

[Question] Perhaps you can draw a bit of a comparison between the attack on Baghdad and that on Tunis?

[Answer] I can compare several objective parameters. The distance of the flight to Tunis was more than twice the distance to Baghdad. In the current flight, the planes flew over the sea, whereas the flight to Baghdad was over enemy territory. The reactor in Baghdad was heavily guarded by a system of ground-to-air missiles, which were in an advanced state of readiness. This was not the case in Tunis.

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ISRAEL

ARIEL SHARON REMEMBERS UNIT 101

Tel Aviv BAMAHANE in Hebrew 2 Oct 85 pp 19-21

[Article by Hanokh Shinman: "101 Now: Sharon Remembers"]

[Text] The week that Minister Sharon proposed attacking terrorist units in Jordan was also the 32d anniversary of several of the most famous reprisals of Unit 101, which Sharon established and commanded. Hanokh Shinman sat in Sharon's office for 3½ hours and listened to him recalling episodes from that period, during which his star began to rise. It was very clear that it would be difficult for him to relate impassively to what he sees as obvious similarities between then and now.

In August 1953, Arik Sharon, then 24 years old, left the university, donned an army uniform once again, and accepted command of a new unit established by the IDF--Unit 101 The unit, which numbered no more than 45 men, carried out a few dozen missions. Despite this, and despite the fact that it existed for only 5 months (in January it was dismantled and became part of the paratroops), its powerful influence on the IDF, which was in its formative years, is unquestionable. Some see it as the catalyst for the revolution in the IDF's principles of combat.

BAMAHANE went to Sharon to hear what he had to say today about what happened then. When it comes to 101, his senses sharpen. Thirty-two years later, he remembers the period in exquisite detail, dwells on minutiae, reconstructs fleeting thoughts. One is used to speaking of the present and the future with Sharon. For 3 hours we spoke of the past while keeping in mind its clear and direct connection with the present.

The office of Sharon, minister of commerce and industry, is located in Flass House on Agron Street in Jerusalem. At the time of the Mandate, this beautiful building was the most elegant hotel in Jerusalem. Sarah, the minister's secretary, cleaned up for a long time before the interview. "After all, you are going to talk about the 101." The time was 3:30 pm, the heat that raged outside was not noticeable in the air-conditioned room. There was a photograph of Sharon in his youth on one wall.

After stretching out on the huge director's chair, he began to recount his version of the story of 101. It is hard to say that he spoke with caution.

His words poured out in a torrent of freshness and vitality. Through his perspective, the picture was painted in vivid colors. He went over things 4 or 5 times to make sure that he was completely understood.

Unit 101 was presented as an ideal model, the peak of perfection. He vigorously resisted any attempt to refute this myth. "The same principles which guided me then still guide me today," he declared.

Sharon admitted that the IDF did not start in 1953 when he established Unit 101. "The IDF was a big army during the Independence War, but it entered a difficult period immediately after." He described the groundwork which paved the way for the unit. "From 1949-1953 there was a very big wave of Palestinian Arab terrorist activity. Arab terrorism is not a new phenomenon. It is not an outgrowth of the war in Lebanon. Arab terrorism is already 100 years old."

Sharon began to speak of this in a subdued tone of voice, then gradually raised his voice, and when he reached the climax he slammed his fist on the table. "In 1953," Sharon said, "there were more than 3,000 penetrations which, at that time, were called infiltrations. We are speaking of hundreds of Jews killed, the majority citizens." Sharon continued to stand by these numbers, even when I cited sources which say that there were hundreds of penetrations during the years 1949-1953 and only 124 Israeli casualties and not all of them deaths. "The problem," said Sharon, "lay in the capability of the terrorists to enter from Jordan in one day, carry out a murderous strike the evening of the second day, and, that night, to cross the border back to an area under Jordanian control. The IDF was unable to respond to this problem. There was no defensive solution to the Green Line, which measured hundreds of kilometers. Even today, if the border were the Green Line, we would be unable to seal it hermetically."

Sharon described the failures in the attempts to stop the wave of terror. "The response to the killings involved presenting protests to the United Nations and to the committees on arms control. This was useless. Defensive measures were also adopted, ending in failure. There were no units able to carry out appropriate retaliatory actions." The solution to the problem of penetration, in Sharon's opinion, was deterrence and only deterrence. This is also the approach he supports today.

The official proposal to establish an attack force to carry out deterrent actions came from Col Mishal Shaham, commander of the Jerusalem brigade. Sharon was in the middle of study leave from the army. He was preparing for exams between the 1st and 2d years in History and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. Shaham persuaded him to establish and lead the strike force.

Arik agreed immediately. "I had no hesitation. When it came to security, my upbringing had taught me that nothing was as important, including university studies, no matter how strong my desire to learn was. And I want to point out that I enjoyed the life of a student very much after long, hard years of filling various positions in the army." The commando unit that he established was called "Unit 101" after the famous American paratroop unit.

I asked Sharon what would have happened if Shaham had not asked him to establish the unit.

"It was no accident that Shaham turned to me. He knew that I was not sitting around studying without a care but that I was following the deteriorating situation. I saw the danger in the growing terrorist activity as it accumulated successes. Shaham knew, from many conversations we had had, that I had the feeling that the situation could be overturned. He knew that I felt I was the right person to organize missions and actions which would stop the Arab terror. So if they had not called on me at that time, they would have done so later. And even if they had not called me at all, I do not think I could have continued to watch from the sidelines. I would have found a way on my own."

Under Arik's command, the 101, composed by and large of kibbutz and moshav members, carried out successful retaliatory actions against Arab objectives, usually villages from which the infiltrators came. For a long time, this would be the most famous unit in the IDF, a myth representing devotion to a goal, readiness to sacrifice, not leaving wounded on the battlefield, and the saying, "Follow me." These principles of battle were to be passed on to paratroopers as a permanent legacy.

What was Sharon after? What was the goal of the unit? "It was clear to me that there had to be a unit which those who assign military objectives could count on to carry out those objectives completely and successfully. This would eliminate those episodes where soldiers would go out and fire a few rounds from a distance and go back home. Instead, someone would take charge and carry out the operation."

Sharon imbued the unit with two principles. One--after every murder there must be a retaliatory action. Two--no returning without carrying out the mission. Sharon exemplified another goal in establishing the 101. "I am a follower of the system that says that every army must have a small elite unit. As soon as there is such a unit, all the other units will work to raise their standards. If you look closely, you will see that the accomplishments of the special unit later become standard fare for the rest of the army and that the special unit progressed even further."

In fact, the accomplishments of the 101 have since become part of the entire IDF. Even after the 101 was dismantled, the IDF set up patrols which filled the role of the 101 and developed high standards as well.

"Nowadays, you can recruit any number of people for a special unit. Unit 101 usually consisted of 25 men and towards the end 45, including administration. Even that small a group was hard for me to recruit. They were mostly people I knew from the Independence War, from the moshav, or some who had the reputation of being very brave."

The fighters of Unit 101 trained intensively, carried out night patrols across the border, and gained a great deal of self-confidence. They received nicknames like "the suicide unit," "Arik's gang," and "the wild animals." Sharon says that these names have no relationship to reality but without a doubt capture the image of the unit in the eyes of the soldiers in other units. They were seen as fighters ready for anything but wild-looking in their outward appearance. They wore sandals, grew long hair and beards, and did not pay a lot of attention to dress. Sharon says that were he commanding the unit now, he would be strict about etiquette and discipline. According to him, except for the issue of appearance, his soldiers were no less disciplined than soldiers of other elite units today. "We did not retain anyone in the unit who disregarded discipline."

At the time the unit was established, these viewpoints on defense were not yet crystallized. This was also true for procedures in battle. Secrecy surrounded the IDF, and there were no public debates about proper combat procedures in antiterrorist operations. What the IDF did was accepted as given. But internal differences of opinion erupted with regard to some of the operations of the 101.

Three weeks after the establishment of the 101, they carried out an attack on the refugee camp al-Brayj in the Gaza Strip. One of the fighters, Pelah, says that he was opposed to entering the refugee camp, because it went against all the values he had been raised with and in which he believed and because he worried about a reaction involving an infiltration of terrorists into an immigrant camp.

Pelah announced that he would not go on the mission. Sharon did not let an argument get going and did not propose the question: Who is willing to go and who is not? Pelah went with the section of the unit which did not enter the camp. The result of the mission was 30 dead and 50 wounded among the enemy. Even Me'ir Har Tziyon, the 101's most famous fighter, who was known for his extremist views, asked himself, "Is this the enemy? This screaming, wailing crowd?"

The biggest and most important operation that the 101 took part in was "Operation Shoshana," a retaliatory action for the murder of a mother and her two children in Yahud. The 101, together with Davidi's paratroopers under Sharon's command, attacked the village of Kibiya, 2 kilometers from Israel's eastern border.

Sharon speaks nostalgically of the hours before the operation. "I remember that hour in the forest of Ben-Shemen near Moshav Bet Shemen. I had finished briefings with all the forces, and I remember Davidi reading to the soldiers from the newspaper AL HAMISHMAR a description of the murder of the mother Shoshana and her two children. The Arabs had thrown a grenade into their bedroom. I do not recall the soldiers shaking their fists. Perhaps Davidi remembers. I remember them quiet, heads bent, somewhat anxious. Evening fell in the woods, and the shadows of the pine trees grew long. I sat leaning against the trunk of a pine tree. I was having trouble writing down the operation commands that I had to give to the General Staff.

I had already given the soldiers their orders, but I had a hard time getting them down on paper. We were used to action and not writing. But the General Staff wanted a copy of the orders before the operation. When I came time to get going and I had not completed the orders, I wrote on the unfinished orders: "I was unfortunately unable to finish the administrative section and will complete it after the mission."

The force attacked Kibiya at nightfall. The soldiers entered dozens of homes, fired on the roofs, asked in Arabic and English whether there was anyone inside. When there was no answer, they blew them up. Sharon reported 12 dead. The Jordanians reported 69 dead, mostly civilians. Most of those killed hid in cellars and were buried under the rubble. The attack on Kibiya echoed loudly in the world. Prime Minister and Defense Minister David Ben-Gurion made the following official announcement: "We have conducted a detailed investigation and have found that not a single army unit was away from camp on the night of the attack on Kibiya. The border settlements in Israel received arms from the government and were trained to defend their lives. Their patience gave out, and they attacked."

Did Sharon deviate from the orders he received in the attack on Kibiya? Sharon: "Nothing was done beyond the orders. Someday, when all the facts are know, it will be clear that I carried out less than the full instructions given me. Our superiors knew exactly the quantity of explosives we were carrying, down to the last kilo."

The operation raised two questions. Was it right to choose a civilian target and was the check that was done in the houses sufficient? Sharon says, "We are speaking of a nighttime operation in enemy territory, a large Arab village which served as a base for murderers. We came across 10-12 dead. That is what we saw in the trenches or in the place where we met reinforcements who tried to reach the village. From the blockages, it was reported that there was a great exodus of people from the village. We spent several hours in the village, and it appeared completely empty. Every room where explosives were planted was checked. I remember one case where a boy was removed after the charge was set in place. In another case that comes to mind, crying was heard after the fuse was lit. Shlomo Gruber, a sabotage officer, entered and brought out a little girl from the building.

"In my opinion, all steps were taken which a military unit ought to take in enemy territory. In a note I received from Head of Operations Moshe Dayan, he wrote, 'There is no one like you.' No one complained about the propriety of the mission. It was a great victory after years of defeat. It was a turning point, for the IDF saw for the first time that it could carry out an operation and succeed. I remember my first meeting with Ben-Gurion after the Kibiya operation. I remember precisely what he said in relation to the fuss the world was making. 'It does not matter what the world says about this. What is important is what the Arabs who live near us think.' Ben-Gurion knew that the operation made the Arabs think twice about their ability to kill without being punished."

Uri Milstein writes in his book on the paratroopers that, were the political climate of that time what it is today, an investigation might have been ordered for the Kibiya episode.

Sharon: "I suggest that we stop picking at ourselves constantly. The most important thing is to carry out the objective. As for the civilians who were killed, I have thought about them many times. It was not our fault. You do not tie the hands of an army with defense objectives simply because of the fear that some innocent person will be hurt. If they are so innocent, they should not be harboring murderers. Exaggerated caution destroys the motivation of an army."

The problem of purity at arms which was first raised in Unit 101 did not end there. Discussion of this question has been with the IDF all along. Perhaps it is no accident that public discussion grew louder during the war in Lebanon, when the commander of 101 became the defense minister.

"It will take many years before we overcome this process which has spread among us in recent years. It is time to stop selling this concept of purity at arms. I do not acknowledge it. There is nothing to it. It is time to stop standing around with signs soaked in crocodile tears," says Sharon. "All attempts to pit our right to live here in Israel against the tragedy of hurting civilians is a mistake. First we have to survive."

Uri Milstein writes in his book that "Sharon became defense minister in 1953 and not in 1982." What gave Sharon his strength then is still the source of his strength now. He is not stopped by the means. He blazes a new trail and does not concern himself with small matters. He goes after the big ones. Sharon obeys himself, his goals, and his principles. For this reason, his path is laden with controversy. This was how he commanded Unit 101.

Milstein writes further that Sharon used to report about a "quiet trip across the border," but he revealed his true reason to Me'ir Har-Tziyon. "If you get there and you happen to run into a guard and the circumstances permit, take care of him." He was known for the liberal interpretations he assigned to the orders he received. Milstein: "Lt Commander Sharon had an appetite for combat, leadership talent, and the ability to read a situation. The IDF was interested in this and not yet aware of the danger of commanders giving orders an extreme interpretation."

Sharon does not agree. He feels that as commander of the 101, he was obedient to those who appointed him but was rebellious about conventions and givens. "It was a rebelliousness in relation to the thought that it is impossible to attain certain objectives. This was not a unit of lawbreakers as some have described it over the years.

"It is difficult in any army in the world to establish special units. Their existence in the face of the usual military guidelines is not simple. I was not afraid to express my opinions. I struggled over them with the General Staff and turned to the defense minister when necessary. In those days, you could not run to the media whenever you did not like something. I always went through normal channels. When they disagreed with me, I did not regard that opposition as the end of the line. I ran into every kind of opposition that a commander of a special unit could. I certainly initiated certain operations and fought over them. After all, I was not a storekeeper. Did I give up because I was afraid that making waves would keep me from advancing my career in the future? I say, definitely no. Certainly, it did cause delays at times, occasionally for years, but I had the strength to struggle in a legitimate way. I did not calculate whether my actions would help or hurt me in the future. I looked at everything as it was at that moment."

In Sharon's opinion, the IDF's objective during the period of the 101 was not to engage in advanced strategy but rather to enter an Arab village and carry out necessary operations. "There was no difference between this and strategic conceptions." Still, he argues that Unit 101 gave a big boost to strategic thought. He vigorously rejects the attempt to attribute to the 101 the style of shooting from the hip. "Whoever examines the preparations will find that I believed in the most detailed preparations. There was no other way to carry out retaliatory actions."

The last chapter in the story of the 101 concerns its merging with the paratroops. Sharon, the commander of the smaller unit, was appointed by Moshe Dayan as commander of the paratroop brigade instead of Yehuda Harari, who had led the brigade till the merger.

Sharon describes it. "I have a picture in which you see me standing and talking to soldiers after I received command of the regiment. You see the fence behind me and the soldiers with their heads lowered. It was a staff camp near Jerusalem. The paratroopers loved Yehuda Harari, and they took my appointment hard. I knew Harari well and had heard of his service in the British Army. He was known as a courageous and gifted fighter. The paratroop unit was unique and had chosen a difficult and dangerous path. They used antiquated parachuting equipment, underwent tough training, and were very united. The fact that a unit was coming from outside apparently to take control of them undoubtedly hurt. A few officers left, but the majority remained.

I believe that the merger was the right step to take, but I am not sure that the General Staff carried it out in a way that was conducive to good feelings. At first, I encountered serious problems. It was not easy to come to a roll call and find the regiment standing at ease, against the rules, and yelling out curses. I understood the pain. I do not think that they behaved properly in relation to Harari. They could have prevented the bitterness. It did not affect my relationship with Harari. We remained good friends. In a short time, the bitterness vanished, and the paratroopers came together again as a single, exceptional unit similar to the 101."

According to Sharon, relations between the members of the unit were friendly. "I do not want to offend anyone else, but the greatness of the 101 came from the personalities of its members." Relations between commanders and fighters were also friendly, but "when it came time to get to work," says Sharon, "everyone knew his place." The fighters felt a great affection for their commander.

Despite the excellent relations and the mythology, no clique of "graduates of Unit 101" emerged. They do not have reunions. The reason may be that they unit did not last that long and, therefore, did not allow for deep relationships. It can be said, however, that what was created was a "101 system," to which many adhered who never served in the unit but who identified with what it symbolized. Strongest representatives of that system include Sharon, Rafa'el Eytan, and Moteh Gur. And many in the IDF today adhere to that system.

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JORDAN

FINANCE MINISTER'S BUDGET STATEMENT

JN041437 Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 1223 GMT 4 Dec 85

[Statement on state general budget for 1986 fiscal year read by Finance Minister Dr Hanna 'Awdah at House of Representatives session in Amman on 4 December 1985; carried within "Newsreel" program--recorded]

[Text] In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate.

Mr Speaker, honorable representatives: Acting on the principles and bases contained in the royal letter of designation and asserted in the speech from the throne opening the second ordinary session of the 10th parliament, and in accordance with the statement of policy on which the government has won confidence, the state general budget bill for 1986 fiscal which I have the honor to present to your esteemed chamber has come as scheduled under the constitution to chart the government's work program for the next year.

Today, as we experience the Kingdom's celebrations of the 50th birthday of His Exalted Majesty King Husayn, we pledge to his majesty that we remain loyal to his historic mission and inspired leadership as we proceed toward a brighter future in Jordan's triumphant march, God willing.

Since 1986 marks the first year of the third 5-year 1986-1990 development plan, the government has made it a point to achieve [word indistinct] and harmony between the draft state general budget for the next year and the aspirations, programs, and plans of the first year in the 5-year plan. The preparation of the state general budget has taken place in an international atmosphere marked by changes and vicissitudes. Some signs of this atmosphere point to a relaxation in the strangulating economic and financial crises that have swept nations, both rich and poor, since the beginning of this decade, and others point to a return of economic recession.

At a time when there has been a drop in the exchange rate of the U.S. dollar, in the interest rate on most world currency [deposits], and in the prices of the major products of developing countries, including oil, and also an increase in the rate of growth in many of the industrial and developing countries over the levels that prevailed during the early eighties, which has strengthened hope for movement from the recession impasse to a resurgence, the major industrial powers' continuous behavior in obstructing the flow of foreign trade, and, consequently, their ability to meet the obligations of their heavy foreign debts.

In the midst of this unsteady and uncertain economic atmosphere, countries have differed in their ability to cope with daily changes in the international arena. The Arab countries, and especially the oil-rich ones, have been affected by successive international economic developments. They have suffered directly and indirectly from the drop in oil demand and oil prices and also from the continuation of the Iraq-Iran war, which has entered its 6th year.

The challenges facing Jordan's march are not confined to the economic storms blowing from abroad. In fact, these challenges stem from two facts which attend this march: first, Jordan's geographic position in the forefront of the confrontation against the Zionist enemy and its intuitional interaction with the central Arab issue, a fact that has created additional burdens for this country in its effort to strongly defend the Arab mainland, identity, and structure and to entrench the Palestinian people on their national soil and to enable them to confront Israel's oppression and persecution which are aimed at emptying and carving up the land; and second, the limited available resources in comparison with Jordan's development, social, and cultural aspirations to achieve the desired qualitative leap at the expected speed.

Despite these facts and the open-door economic policy it has pursued with the world in general and the Arab states in particular, Jordan has been able to cope with the many international and regional economic vicissitudes and to absorb much of the chock thanks to the solid structure and flexibility of its national economy, which has given it the ability to move freely and adjust to developments, and also thanks to the success of the Jordanian experiment in running its economy and preserving its credibility and strength.

Initial figures on the growth rate of the gross national product indicate an increase in fixed prices amounting to 5 percent in 1985. At a time when the value of imports have maintained their 1984 level, the value of exports has increased by more than 10 percent. This will reflect positively on the balance of trade in 1985. The deficit in the current account of the balance of payments dropped in 1985. Official transfers have increased and the remittances of Jordanians working abroad have maintained the levels of previous years.

Furthermore, the Jordanian dinar has maintained a fairly steady exchange rate at a time when most currencies have weakened. Foreign debt payments remained linked to the total exports of commodities and services within acceptable and reassuring limits. The Kingdom's foreign currency assets have improved tangibly. The government has succeeded in keeping public expenditures at the lowest level possible, taking into consideration the great effect of government expenditure on internal economic activity. The government has also succeeded in achieving an increase in local revenues over the 1985 figures.

I feel dutybound here to praise the citizen's special role and cooperation in enabling the government to achieve tangible growth rates in local revenues despite the fact that the sums paid to Jordan as part of the Arab aid are still below the level fixed at the Baghdad summit because of the failure of some

Arab states in fulfilling their obligations and the ability of some of them to pay only a part of these obligations. Despite all these positive signs about the national economy, the labor market has suffered structural flaws because of the recent internal and regional conditions which led to unemployment, which is now increasing, especially among new graduates. This is evident from the increasing number of people looking for work.

Mr Speaker, honorable representatives: Allow me to outline the main objectives and bases which the government has adopted in drafting the state general budget for 1986 fiscal year.

First, supporting our brave Armed Forces, the power of the homeland and the shield of the nation, and providing them with all the requirements of power and might to enable them to perform their historical pan-Arab mission and to protect our national gains; supporting and developing the public security and civil defense organs to enable them to maintain peace and order in the Kingdom; and implementing and spreading the Popular Army programs.

Second, confronting Israeli actions to Judaize and empty Arab territory and entrenching our kinfolk in their national struggle and backing their steadfastness.

Third, continuing efforts to achieve Arab economic integration--one of the pillars of Arab solidarity--and extending a sincere hand of cooperation to all Arab brothers.

Fourth, maintaining the Kingdom's notable international status and solid economic credibility by maintaining our distinguished economic performance and paying our financial obligations on time.

Fifth, maintaining a balance between the production and services sectors and achieving the highest degree of self-dependence by meeting local needs and increasing the possibilities of foreign marketing for our national products in order to reduce the deficit in our balance of trade.

Sixth, entrenching the principle of individual enterprise and fair competition in order to give the private sector its leading role in creativity, production, and investment and to also support and protect this sector.

Seventh, completing basic structure projects and asserting fair distribution of development gains among the various sectors and regions in the Kingdom and tackling pockets of poverty and illiteracy wherever they may be.

Eighth, achieving a balance between current expenditures and local revenues by curtailing public expenditures as much as possible and promoting local revenues and improving the means of obtaining them.

Mr. Speaker, honorable representatives: International, Arab, and local economic developments have forced us to adapt to the new situation. The government has defined the most important problems which face the economic sectors and took a number of measures, some of which were devoted to solving urgent, current issues and others were devoted to amending organizational and financial legislation with the aim of finding deep-rooted solutions to problems which hinder progress in order to move from the stage of adaptation to that of advancement.

The first government move was to affirm the basic role of the private sector in the direct process of production. We are certain that the private sector--both individuals and organizations--will rise to the great responsibility assigned to it and will interact with the nation's cares and interests, taking into consideration the public interest in endeavoring to achieve personal gains. Thanks to internal stability and flexible economic policies, Jordan is enjoying a suitable climate for investments which allows investing local capital and drawing on the savings of Jordanians working abroad, as well as attracting foreign and Arab capital and investing it in feasible channels of investment which are in harmony with goals of economic and social development. Jordan has a strong basis which qualifies it to become a regional center providing surrounding Arab areas with skilled manpower and expertise.

In order to entrench this climate, the government is bent on developing and modernizing economic and financial legislation, as well as administrative instructions, concerning savings, investment, and production. These measures include developing the performance of the administrative body, raising the efficiency of public establishments, and spreading the use of modern technology and advanced scientific methods in various activities, particularly in conducting the work of the government apparatus and its dealings with the public.

Aware of the seriousness of forced unemployment, the government is earnestly working to confront it and tackle it comprehensively on the national level with the cooperation of the private sector so that all these steps and measures will lead to absorbing the greatest number of unemployed persons from various sources and so that the ratio of unemployment will remain within safe limits.

Out of its belief in the importance of relations between the homeland and expatriates, the government was careful to expand various channels with the expatriates, extend bridges between them and the homeland, and regard their first conference, held in Amman earlier this year, as a good sign that, God willing, will be repeated every year.

Mr Speaker, honorable representatives: The draft budget, which we are presenting to your esteemed council, contains several government policies for the coming year--policies which constitute an extension of its policies for the current year--the most important of which are:

1. Agriculture.

Food security is regarded as one of the basic pillars in preserving our independence and economic progress. Therefore, the government took special care with this sector. The aim is to ensure better use of local resources and local elements of production in order to achieve the best measure of self-sufficiency and increase investment returns in this sector. The government has made numerous decisions in this field, the most important of which are:

a. Exempting farmers who honored their commitments to the specialized agricultural credit corporations from interest on their loans for the year 1985.

b. Giving direct support to local production of grains, fodder, and other agricultural produce by purchasing them at previously fixed good prices, maintaining a strategic storage of these products, and continuing to subsidize bread by allocating the sum of 11 million dinars in next year's budget for this purpose.

c. Revising the capital of the company for grading and canning agricultural products and removing the difficulties facing it to enable it to achieve its objectives.

d. Implementing agricultural patterns in the Al-Shafa and Jordan Valley regions in order to achieve a balance between meeting the needs of the local market and exports to ensure good income for the farmer and the national economy.

e. Reclaiming and developing agricultural land in the eastern and southern regions by leasing estate lands to the private sector at nominal rents to carry out projects for growing grain and fodder and breeding cattle.

f. Carrying out the Al-Zarqa' Basin Development Project for the purpose of conserving soil and environment, modernizing agricultural methods, growing fruit trees, planting forest trees, and also improving agriculture in the highlands through direct investment, guidance, training, and research.

g. Taking the necessary measures to carry out a general survey of all areas in the Kingdom in order to determine the types of soil available and the use of land for agriculture and other purposes.

2. Industry

The government has taken great steps to promote local industry. It gave protection to certain sponsored industries, whose production complies with Jordanian specifications. It is serious about applying these conditions so protection will not be at the expense of the consumer with regard the price and quality of goods.

The government has also encouraged exports by providing installations and financial credits and simplifying exportation procedures. At a time when the government is increasing the marketing of products of local industries through the principle of equal deals and the conclusion of bilateral agreements with various countries, it hopes that the commercial sector will play its role in marketing these products.

In the field of mining industries, which constitutes the backbone of our national exports and increases the Kingdom's revenues in foreign currencies, the main industries, such as phosphates, potash, fertilizers, and cement, have recorded high rates of production and exportation. However, in view of the drop in international prices, several Jordanian industries are facing financial difficulties, which has prompted the government to immediately study their conditions and take the necessary measures to help them surmount these difficulties by revising their capital and providing the necessary funds for them.

In the field of reorganizing and consolidating the industrial sector, the government has encouraged the merger of integral and similar firms in order to improve their efficiency, benefit from the savings of macroeconomics, employ modern technologies, and prevent duplication.

3. Water

The government pays great attention to water as a vital and basic element for continued existence and development. It gives water projects top priority in view of their connection with people and with the economic and social sectors. A number of decisions relating to the use, regulation, and conservation of water have been made, including:

a. Gathering, developing, and modernizing all available studies on water and completing studies on other areas in order to draft a water budget for a water policy going beyond the year 2000. This policy shall define the use of water for agricultural, industrial, and domestic purposes.

b. Carrying out detailed studies for building a network of dams in various parts of the country and publicizing modern irrigation methods.

c. Carrying out sewage projects and building water purification plants in several parts of the Kingdom, beginning with areas of very dense population within the framework of public safety and preventive medicine.

d. Operating the Dayr 'Alla-Amman project for pumping drinking water to the Greater Amman area and increasing Amman's water resources.

e. Checking the water networks inside the main cities in order to modernize them and raise their efficiency to limit water dissipation.

4. Energy

The most important aspect of this sector is that the Kingdom is importing all its requirements for energy, which amounted to one fifth of our imports, something which prompted the government to take the necessary measures to reduce the volume of these imports. The most important of these measures are:

a. Continuing national programs of oil exploration in Hamzah and other areas and opening the door for foreign companies to work in this field.

b. Completing the study of preserving energy in major industries and implementing recommendations of this study, which provides for saving a great amount of fuel, and implementing programs for rationing energy. Preliminary figures indicate an obvious drop in fuel and electricity consumption in 1985.

c. Accelerating studies concerning exploitation of shale oil and starting the second phase concerning industrial experiments and alternative sources of energy, like solar energy, wind energy, subterranean sources of energy, and coal. Methods of transporting fuel and gas will be studied in order to ensure public safety. Light derivatives of oil will be transported from the refinery to residential areas through pipes. Stations supplying natural gas will be established in central and northern regions. It must be mentioned that 25 million dinars went to subsidize fuel consumption. The sum of 5 million dinars has been allotted for this purpose for 1986 because of the drop in the U.S. dollar and speculations about a possible drop in oil prices.

In the field of electricity, intensive work has been going on to complete the implementation of rural electrification. It is expected that electricity will reach 93 percent of the populated areas by the end of this year. All the Kingdom's towns have electricity. The government has started to light the main roads within Greater Amman. In accordance with his majesty's instructions, the government exempted municipalities and village and local councils from paying the price of lighting streets and square within their areas.

5. Construction

The government paid special attention to this sector because of its connection with all other sectors, the high amount of its surplus value [as heard], and its possibilities for savings and local manpower. Therefore, the government worked for the support and protection of the Jordanian contractor and for preferring him to foreign contractors. The government will work for unifying the systems for tenders in the state organs and bodies. All returns accrued from selling real estate, as well as 50 percent of rents outside Amman and 35 percent of rents within the Amman governorate, have been exempted from income tax. The transfer of items of property financed by organizations and bodies which do not place interest on their loans will be exempted from registration fees. Real estate companies will be encouraged so they may develop the land and provide it with utilities with the aim of selling these lands after dividing and registering them. The budget bill was careful to consider a number of important highways and rural roads.

In the field of housing, the Department of Urban Development was merged with the Housing Corporation with the aim of establishing housing projects in all parts of the Kingdom. Necessary measures were taken to complete the Abu Nusayr project by the end of 1986. There will be expansion in housing for all workers and low income groups. The amount of 9.3 million dinars is earmarked in the draft budget for this purpose.

6. Transportation

In view of Jordan's central position in the heart of the Arab world and its importance in the transit routes among the Arab states, the government laid special emphasis on this sector so that it may play its required role in an effective way both at home and abroad. The government has allowed trucks to increase their ordinary loads by reasonable amounts and has reduced customs rates on trucks which are registered outside Jordan and which belong to Jordanians. The ports corporation is establishing a special jetty for importing and exporting oil and chemical products. It is considering establishing a number of specialized jetties to import coal for the Aqaba thermal power station. Measures were taken to raise the efficiency of railway transportation and modernize railway workshops. Jordanian airports will be supplied with more sophisticated equipment in order to meet security requirements for Jordan's airspace.

7. Tourism

In view of the Kingdom's attractive tourist resources and the importance of the tourism sector as a primary industry in the development process and in supporting the balance of payments, the government has begun a comprehensive study of this sector with the aim of learning about the conditions of its tourism bodies, overcoming the difficulties facing them, and realizing better profits from the current investment in tourism. Emphasis will be laid on internal tourism as an alternative to tourism abroad so as to reduce hard currency spending and activate tourism marketing abroad, especially in the Arab region both separately and within joint Arab programs.

Here I would like to point out the central role of the private sector in this regard and its policy of promoting tourism inside the country instead of exporting tourism. The private sector is also required to improve services and support efforts to serve foreign tourists.

On its part, the government is working to give the necessary assistance and encouragement in this field through the law of encouraging investments. The government will implement more works of renovation and improvement in main tourist sites and will complete the infrastructure of the tourist industry. The sum of 1 million dinars has been allocated in the draft budget for this purpose.

8. Other Services

In the field of public health, the budget includes allocations for increasing the number of clinics and health centers in order to cover most populated centers and to expand existing hospitals.

Our students are the hope for our future. Therefore, the government has exerted its utmost to provide funds for building model schools in all parts of the Kingdom through the contribution of the Treasury and loans for educational projects. An examination for admission to the secondary schools has been created with the aim of realizing a balance between vocational and academic training. The creation of a ministry for hither education is a means for guiding higher education in accordance with the nedds of society and the people's current and future aspirations.

In order to encourage assimilation of knowledge and enhance the use of scientific methods and technological advances in various activities, computers were exempted from customs duty and have been used in educational establishments. In order to provide means of recreation and physical training for our youths, suitable amounts of capital have been allocated for establishing sport fields and stadiums. Emphasis was laid on culture as a line which we endeavor to uphold among various groups. Intensive work is going on to develop telephone and telecommunications lines, as well as post offices, in order to improve their performance.

In accordance with his majesty's instructions, there has been expansion in decentralization by creating new changes in administrative divisions in accordance with population distribution. In order to provide a decent life, which is imposed by the duties of cooperation and solidarity among the members of the Jordanian family, a national fund for assistance has been created to which the government contributes 1.5 million dinars in next year's budget in addition to contributions from national organizations.

The government will continue to back charity organizations and to contribute toward implementing their projects and centers, particularly centers for the handicapped. The government is concerned with supporting the Ministry of Awqaf, Religious Affairs, and Holy Places in order to cover its current expenditures and to enable it to renovate and maintain its mosques, buildings, and real estate, particularly the tombs of Muslim martyrs and the prophet's associates. The draft budget includes 8.2 million dinars for this purpose.

9. Joint Arab Action

Jordan has adopted a pan-Arab policy, whose groundwork was laid by his majesty the king--a policy eptomized by a continued sincere call for clearing the Arab atmosphere in order to make great strides toward Arab solidarity. As a practical translation of this sincere policy, the government concluded bilateral agreements with many Arab countries to support the process of integration and set up joint companies with Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Oman. A Jordanian-Egyptian-Iraqi company was also registered under the name of The Arab Bridge Shipping Company which will link the capitals of the three countreis to the port of Aqaba and the port of Qabus in the Arab Republic of Egypt. Every Arab country has the right to join it. There are also plans for Egypt to join the Jordanian-Iraqi company for land transportation. Joint committees between Jordan and Syria were also reactivated to continue the joint Arab march.

Mr Speaker, honorable representatives: The 1986 general budget includes allocations required for capital projects [as heard], whose allocations were not paid during the previous 2 years because the government had decided to adopt the principle of noncirculation of such allocations. It also did not include internal and external loans in revenues, as previously was the case. In addition to that, the draft budgets of public establishments were also included in one document to be presented by the government to your honorable

House along with the state's general budget. The main features of the draft general budget for the year of 1986 can be summed up as follows:

a. The 1986 budget is estimated at 923.7 million dinars which is 12.08 percent higher than the 1985 budget.

b. The size of the first part [as heard]: Revenues are estimated at 787.9 million dinars for 1986.

1. Local revenues are estimated at 497.9 million dinars for 1986 which is 14.6 percent higher than it was in 1985.

2. Financial aid is estimated at 253 million dinars for 1986 which is higher than it was in 1985 by 29.08 percent.

3. Interest on restored loans is 36.9 million dinars for 1986 which is 218 percent higher than it was in 1985.

b. [As heard] Expenditures are estimated at 825.5 million dinars for 1986.

1. Current expenditures are estimated at 563.8 million dinars for 1986 which is 4 percent higher than in 1985.

2. Capital expenditures are 261.7 million dinars for 1986 which is 43 percent higher than in 1985.

3. The size of the second part [as heard]: Loans and aid are 98.2 million dinars for 1986 which is 4.7 percent higher than it was in 1985. The deficit in the draft budget is estimated at 37.6 million dinars which constitutes 4.8 percent of the total revenues of the first part. This deficit will be covered by controlling expenditures and improving revenues, as well as by internal and external loans. It is noteworthy that local revenues will cover 88.3 percent of the current expenditures estimated for 1986, compared with 80.2 in the year of 1985.

The allocations included in the budget bill are distributed among the most important sectors as follows:

The defense and security sector: 243.7 million dinars.

The economic sector: 260.3 million dinars.

The social and cultural sectors: 250.3 million dinars.

The administration and finance sectors: 169.4 million dinars.

The 1986 budget bill includes 44.4 million dinars as a subsidy for establishments [as heard]. This sum includes 16.9 million dinars as a subsidy for their current expenditures and 31.5 million dinars for their capital expenditures.

The budgets for public establishments are estimated at more than 500 million dinars. By adding this amount to the general budget, general expenditures will reach about 1,424 million dinars in 1986.

Mr Speaker, honorable representatives: The pan-Arab duty urges us to express our thanks and gratitude to fraternal Saudi Arabia for its continued financial support for Jordan. We also thank fraternal Kuwait, the UAE, and Qatar for the support they gave as a part of their financial commitment made during the Baghdad summit despite the financial difficulties which they are facing and which we hope they will bypass in the coming year.

Mr Speaker, honorable representatives: We are confident that constructive dialogue and calm discussion with your esteemed chamber on the draft state general budget for the 1986 fiscal year will be of great help to the government in implementing its working program to achieve Jordan's objectives of wellbeing and strength under His Majesty King Husayn.

Peace be upon you.

/6662
CSO: 4400/68

DEFENSE MINISTER ON GCC, FOOD SECURITY

GF301956 Manama WAKH in English 1620 GMT 30 Nov 85

[Text] Kuwait, 30 Nov (WAKH)--Kuwait's Defence Minister Shaykh Salim Sabah al-Salim has said upgrading defence capabilities and fulfillment of food security were the pivotal elements in the new defence strategy for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

In an interview published Saturday in the Kuwaiti daily AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM Shaykh Salim made no secret that forces of the six GCC member countries were coordinating military exercises and working to unify programs of their military academies.

"We can safely say that the GCC armies now form a joint force undergoing a common training system," the minister said.

Shaykh Salim, meanwhile, said special emphasis has been attached to the achievement of food security in the region which he described as "a strategic necessity of greater significance of several military considerations." [sentence as received]

The six GCC states, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman and Saudi Arabia are largely dependent on imported food to meet domestic demand. Saudi Arabia and Oman, however, have recently achieved a measures of self-sufficiency.

The GCC joint defence strategy which was endorsed by the last summit in Oman early this month also envisaged upgrading the Gulf nationals' productivity and development of educational and media programs to increase the sense of responsibility of individuals, he said.

Shaykh Salim did not believe Kuwait was in need for submarines, but rather to light vessels of strong firepower which would be used for defensive purposes such as chasing an intruder force. [sentence as received]

Asked if there is a GCC naval force, the minister replied affirmatively, saying the new-born force has carried out a number of joint maneuvers on defensive techniques.

Shaykh Salim said the successful implementation of conscription in Kuwait and the existence of batches of reservists have made it unnecessary for the country to have a popular army.

On the Gulf war, Shaykh Salim said Iran and Iraq continued to stick to their separate terms for an end of the conflict, adding, however, that the GCC countries were saving no efforts to bridge the gap between the two warring nations. He cited "positive GCC moves" towards that end after the GCC summit in Oman earlier this month.

/6662
CSO: 4400/70

OMAN

BRIEFS

ARMY COMMUNICATIONS AGREEMENT SIGNED--An agreement was signed yesterday with the Marconi firm for international communications at the office of his highness the deputy prime minister for security and defense affairs to expand and improve the communications network in the sultan's armed forces. Under the agreement, Marconi will install special equipment which will greatly expand communications within the sultan's armed forces, including the provision of integrated mobile radio systems covering all parts of Oman, telephone switchboards, equipment for detecting message routes, and other modern communications facilities which will serve the sultan's armed forces. [Excerpts] [Oman 'UMAN in Arabic 14 Dec 85 p 1 GF] /6662

CSO: 4400/70

UK TV ON PLO, 'ARAFAT INTERVIEW

LD171054 [Editorial Report] London BBC television in its 16 December "Panorama" program at 2125 GMT broadcasts a 40-minute program: "Arafat: Paying the Price of Terror," by Gavin Hewitt.

This program is interspersed with clips of an interview with 'Arafat by Hewitt. The date and place of the interview portions are not specified.

The program begins with scenes of Palestinian refugees living in plastic covered make-shift shelters and a brief interview with the wife of an imprisoned PLO member. PLO Chairman 'Arafat is shown arriving for a "crisis meeting" among PLO leaders at his private office in Amman, Jordan. 'Arafat is seen meeting with Bishop Khuri and Muhammad Milhim. Abu Jihad, identified as PLO military commander, is shown with other unidentified men sitting around a table with 'Arafat.

Hewitt asks 'Arafat whether the policy of a gun in one hand and an olive branch in the other has failed. 'Arafat shakes his head in a negative response saying "No, no, I don't think so." When asked which is the real 'Arafat, he holds up two fingers saying "both of them because I am carrying the olive branch, and a gun to protect this olive branch."

Hewitt then gives a brief historical picture of the PLO with scenes in the United Nations, and their Beirut departure in 1982, which marked the PLO's collapse as a military force.

Back with 'Arafat, Hewitt asks him whether the fact that the PLO fighters have been "on the run" is not Israel's "success," in that they are effectively denying the PLO a base anywhere. 'Arafat responds that it is true the PLO lost their base in Beirut but Israel "lost the war." Being moved further and further from Israel is a "part of our struggle," 'Arafat says.

Hewitt then lists areas where the PLO has taken resident since Beirut: Tunisia, Algeria, Iraq, North and South Yemen and Sudan. This places the PLO farther away from the Palestinian refugees living under Israeli occupation whom they are supposed to be liberating.

Focusing on the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Hewitt turns to the Gaza Strip refugee camps. One woman says they have food and do not hope for a solution or "outside help" from the PLO. Hewitt broaches this with 'Arafat asking him how he would respond to such a refugee who asks why her land is being taken away. 'Arafat says, "I am also a refugee. When I became the president, ah, the chairman of the PLO, all my country was under occupation. So I am suffering like this woman."

Street scenes are then shown and Hewitt discusses daily Palestinian resistance to Israeli rule. Armed Israeli soldiers are shown walking along crowded streets. Hewitt explains that Palestinians are deported for being political inciters. They complain of daily humiliations. The "iron fist" policy applied in Lebanon is now being used in territories under Israeli rule. "The Palestinians can't win, but they make Israel pay a price," Hewitt says. He then turns to the Gaza Strip where Israeli settlements are expanding. A settler is asked whose land he is living on and he denies that it is Arab land. The Gaza fishermen are "victims of Israel's continuing battle against the PLO" because they are limited to work along the coast to prevent "rendevousing with any larger ships which might be carrying PLO fighters," Hewitt adds. Hewitt says that the fishermen claim that their boats have been impounded so their work can go to the Israeli settlers. Former Mayor of Gaza Rashad Shawaa comments on life in the Gaza Strip and the use of Palestinian Arabs to do menial labor in Israel.

Turning to Amman, Hewitt notes the number of PLO offices there. The PLO decided to step up its attacks against Israel to counter claims they were pursuing peace out of weakness. This was the "road to disaster" and Hewitt raises the 26 September attack on the Israeli yacht in Larnaca harbor which did "lasting damage to 'Arafat's credibility."

'Arafat responds to the Larnaca attack saying. "We have declared that we have no relation; it is true that they have, there are some, some news about that they were working in the PLO, but actually the PLO is not behind it." 'Arafat then again emphasizes that the arrested men "were" working in the PLO but not when they carried out the Larnaca operation. When Hewitt asks how it is possible for such an operation to be launched without his approval, 'Arafat says, "I have to ask Mr Reagan himself, that can he control all the Americans. He was in some time, a target for one of these extremists to kill him."

Turing to the Achille Lauro hijacking, Hewitt notes that here the PLO was seen "out of control with 'Arafat evasive and defensive."

'Arafat says, "Instead of thanking the PLO, and thanking the Egyptian Government, because according to our coordination we succeed to safeguard 400--the crew and the passengers of this ship, this Italian ship--they are making a big story because one of the passengers had been killed. We are against it."

Hewitt then continues the program by noting that this hijacking had played into the Israeli hands. It was followed by the Israeli attack on PLO headquarters in Tunisia. Scenes of rubble with 'Arafat inspecting the damage are shown. Tunis was chosen over Jordan to "remind the Arab wrold of Israel's long arm" Hewitt adds. Then a short clip follows with General Ahud Barak, chief Israeli military intelligence explaining Israeli efforts to hit sources of terrorist activity wherever they may be situated.

As a result of the Tunis raid, Hewitt explains that PLO fighters are moving from their bases in Tunisia, North Yemen and Jordan to Iraq. In Iraq, the PLO has a base, but little to no freedom of action because of strict Iraqi regulations in which 'Arafat himself must inform the authorities before he can visit his own men. 'Arafat is shown arriving at his office in Baghdad, but Hewitt adds that security men then ordered his crew to leave. As they were escorted away, Hewitt said that Abu 'Abbas arrived, which confirmed that 'Abbas was in Baghdad, as well as retained in his position in the PLO after the Achille Lauro hijacking.

Following this, Hewitt says that his crew was invited to attend a PLO Executive Committee meeting with Abu 'Abbas "discretely absent." Shown around the conference table are Abu Iad, PLO military leader, Abu Jihad, military commander, among other unidentified men. Hewitt assesses the PLO attempt to prevent disintegration among its leaders, and then shows Egyptian President Husni Mubarak with 'Arafat in Cairo after the signing of the Cario declaration that PLO attacks will be limited to territories under Israeli occupation. Hewitt says that 'Arafat himself made it clear that Israel itself remained a target. Hewitt then asks 'Arafat to explain what the Cairo declaration means as regards the armed struggle; where he thinks it is legitimate to carry out the struggle. 'Arafat responds "inside our occupied territories" and when Hewitt asks about Israel, 'Arafat says "I am speaking about Palestinian territories." When Hewitt repeats his question whether this includes Israel, 'Arafat again repeats that he is "speaking about Palestinian territories, it is clear and obvious."

Israeli patrol boats with soldiers and mounted weaponry are shown as Hewitt comments on Israel's war against the PLO. Israeli patrol boats are seen searching for small unidentified boats near Israeli shores. The shores, as well as borders are carefully guarded. Arabs who travel into Israel are shown being body-searched by soldiers who then meticulously search all luggage and clothing. Trucks coming into Israel from Jordan are shown being searched by soldiers.

Several exiled Palestinians who have been released from prisons for supporting the PLO are shown talking together. Hewitt explains that violence inside Israel is now originating from Arabs under Israeli occupation and that according to the authorities over half such incidents are "homegrown." Hewitt quotes a former unidentified Israeli minister that they are no longer dealing with isolated incidents but an epidemic--the new enemy is not across the border but "within." Further attacks and incidents are cited by Hewitt with scenes of settlers, streets, and villages. A scene shows an Arab mother atop her house in rubble after it was bulldozed by Israelis in retaliation for her son's activities. Former Gaza Mayor Shawaa tells Hewitt that the Arabs in the occupied areas are resorting to their own actions out of frustration and that many of them are carried out on individual initiative not as part of PLO plans.

Showing street scenes in Jerusalem, Hewitt recounts recent attacks.

Back in his interview with 'Arafat, Hewitt asks if he is prepared to recognize Israel's right to exist. 'Arafat says, "Simple and clear, I am ready to accept all United Nations resolutions and international (?legality). I am not ready to offer these cards through one of these interviews." When pressed to answer the question "clearly" 'Arafat tells Hewitt "I have many cards; I have small cards; I haven't many cards to play with it." 'Arafat maintains it is not a difficult question to answer saying "but I have to look, I have to feel to be honest for the rights of my people I am representing--the aspiration of my people, I have to be honest with them."

Hewitt notes that if 'Arafat cannot control the PLO then, it may disintegrate to the benefit of the extremists. Next the program moves to areas being bulldozed by the Israelis with Arab women trying to stop the machinery. Israeli soldiers are present and the filming crew is asked to stop filming. Hewitt says that the problem comes down to the land, that the Israelis will exchange peace for more land. He then cites 'Arafat saying that they can do away with him, but the problem of the Palestinians remains.

/6662
CSO: 4400/70

KUWAITI PAPER INTERVIEWS FATAH'S ABU DAWUD

GF110848 Kuwait AL-ANBA' in Arabic 9 Dec 85 pp 8, 9

[Interview with Muhammad Dawud, alias Abu Dawud, Fatah Revolutionary Council member, by Nabil Nammurah and Hakimah Shahin--place, date not given]

[Excerpts] Question: Where is the Palestinian revolution heading to now?

[Muhammad Dawud] I believe that the Fatah Central Council which met recently has no right to authorize or allow or justify recognition of UN Security Council Resolution 242 or any other resolution, because any recognition of such a resolution is a departure from the PLO charter. It is the PNC alone which is authorized to discuss any matter connected with the charter, and not any other intermediate or alternative body. Therefore, it is not the right of the Palestine Central Council to discuss this matter in the first place.

If we want to find a way out of the present dilemma we must approve a clear policy and make a thorough study of national unity and our alliances, so that there will be a wide scope for a firmer and more solid political action.

Question: How do you assess the results of the 17th PNC session that was held in Amman?

Dawud: The 17th PNC session has not consolidated anything. There is more talk about it than what actually happened at the session. I believe that the Amman session was merely to provide a quorum: that is, to consolidate Palestinian legitimacy by convening a PNC session. There were differences with some Arab quarters and the PNC session was held. It was merely a session for a quorum and nothing more. What happened after the session was illegal. For example, when 'Arafat's visit to Cairo was debated, only 63 out of the PNC's 450 members were presented and voted.

Question: Why did you not vote for the PLO Executive Committee?

[Dawud] In my view, some PLO Executive Committee members have no right to be major figures in the PLO because they do not believe in its charter. No one has the right to represent a body or a club if he does not believe in its aims. Some PLO Executive Committee members do not believe in some of the aims of the charter which constitutes the backbone of the PLO, therefore how can anyone who does not believe in the charter be a member of a committee that seeks to implement it?

Question: Abu Dawud is a member of the Fatah Revolutionary Council. Is it true that your membership has been suspended or rescinded?

[Dawud] It is true that I am a member of the Fatah Revolutionary Council. My membership is not suspended, but I refuse to attend the meetings of the Revolutionary Council. My membership has not been rescinded or withdrawn. I was asked several times to attend the council's meetings, but because of my views I refuse to attend.

Question: Do you not believe that your failure to attend meetings of the Fatah Revolutionary Council is a negative attitude?

[Dawud] At times, when one sees that correcting a situation is not easy one prefers to stay aside so as not to be party to a course of action in which one does not believe. Reform within Fatah requires the convening of a general congress in which all the issues and all the principles approved at Fatah's congresses are discussed and the extent of adherence to these principles is examined. If there is adherence to the principles when the bodies that are capable of implementing these principles will be formed, and if there is a departure from these principles the participants are given the option of renewing their commitment to the principles or go home. This is the radical reform for Fatah.

Question: It is being said that many of those who had supported the Fatah dissident movement--which proclaimed Fatah's reform as its principal aim--have toned down their support because they do not want to be accused of diviation, agentry, or treason. How true is this?

[Dawud] There is some truth in this, particularly as the main motive of the brothers was to carry out reform. However, the course of events and circumstances have caused matters to reach their present state. There are many who are afraid of advocating reform within Fatah because they do not want to be accused of being dissident or of turning to a particular Arab quarter. I emphasize that he who believes in reform fears nothing and disregards any intellectual intimidation such as being accused of wanting to join an Arab quarter. For example, they had accused me once of working for an Arab quarter. That quarter has become their dearest friend: Let them go and ask it if want ever its agent. They know very well that it is not true. They also know that I did not get close to this or that party so as to strike at the Palestinian revolution.

Question: What is your view of the Cairo declaration and its condemnation of terrorism?

[Dawud] I believe that the Cairo delcaration was a great mistake, because we did not practice terrorism in the first place. We are defending our rights and our cause everywhere. The terrorist actions that have been committed are not attributed to us, so why should we bear the onus of denying them?

I also relieve that the Cairo delcaration was made under pressure from the Egyptian politicians who are party to the U.S. settlement game.

Question: It was said that King Husayn raised a few questions to the organization's leadership and that he is awaiting their reply. What is the truth about these questions and their answers?

[Dawud] The questions concern the PLO's stance on resolutions 242 and 338 and that the PLO is supposed to approve them. I do not know if there are any other questions. I would like to point out that the February agreement died after King Husayn's visit to the United States and not, as some say, after the Achille Lauro incident, as King Husayn felt that Reagan would not give any role in the settlement to the Palestinians representing the PLO. Therefore, the King, who does not want to bet on a losing horse--the PLO--decided to bet on Syria. I would like to assure King Husayn and all the Arabs that Israel's nationalism guarantees that it will not make any concessions to the Arabs.

Question: Before this situation, what did the United States propose to Jordan?

[Dawud] The United States proposed Jordanian-Israeli participation in ruling the West Bank and Gaza Strip only, on the basis that Israel would assume the security and defense role and Jordan the administrative role. Jordan appears to have started implementing this, as it is being said that the activation of Jordanian establishments in the West Bank and Gaza Strip has started.

Question: How do you see the future of Syrian-Palestinian relations after their long estrangement? What are the reasons for the differences with Syria?

[Dawud] I would first of all like to affirm the need for quick efforts by the revolution to restore relations with Syria in any way. Syria is a nation and land which are always with the Palestinian cause.

Regarding the reasons for differences with Syria, I believe that there are two differences and we both have made mistakes in them. First, there are formal or official differences between the two leaderships. Second, there are differences, which are basic, between the PLO and the Syrians with regard to the region's stratety, particularly after 1982.

The revolution looks at this strategy from a definite point and the Syrians from another. The differences started here, but there were similar differences between Syria and Jordan which have now been resolved. I agree that differences should be resolved according to the joint Syrian-Jordanian communique which stipulates nonacceptance of unilateral solutions, nor reconciliation or recognition of Israel, and approves the Fes summit.

If there is an opportunity to implement this plan between Syria and the Palestinian revolution, then why is one of the sides refusing? Unless they want to disregard the PLO, and this is not in the interest of the Syrians or the Jordanians.

Question: It is said that you contacted Zionist powers in Europe. Is this true?

[Dawud] Whoever spread this rumor knew nothing about my way of thinking. I am against any contact with the Zionists or the Americans. I believe that the only way to deal with the Zionists and the Americans is to fight them by force; this is my conviction, but I am not ready to discuss my point of view now.

I believe that if I want to see my cause live and reach a happy ending, then I must strengthen the political and military struggle against all Zionist and U.S. establishments anywhere that I can reach without giving names. I believe it is ridiculous for anybody to discuss this matter.

Question: During the current stage, do you think it is possible to convene a general conference for Fatah?

[Dawud] Convening a general conference in the current circumstances is difficult because there does not exist a desire and to convene it in light of insufficient interest is not acceptable. Despite the fact that such a conference was scheduled to convene this month and some optimists fixed its date, I believe it will not happen. The conditions may become conductive toward convening it after a few months.

However, we must refer to the fact that there have been revolutionary parties which have held conferences under enemy air raids and shelling. It is not necessary to make it a conference similar to the fourth Fatah conference which comprised a demonstration gathering the "movement's trivialities" and calling them conference members. The Fatah conference could be small to include the active cadres who can take resolutions and adopt a political trend. Those are the people defining the course of the Fatah movement.

Question: What is your position within Fatah and the PLO?

[Dawud] I have no position within Fatah or the PLO. Concerning my position within the revolution, I am merely a PNC member and no more. I have undertaken general activities which I feel are useful within the general framework of my Palestinian cause.

Question: What is the nature of your relations with Abu Nidal, Abu Musa, and the Naji 'Alush group? Are they organized relations?

[Dawud] My relations are not organized with any of them. I used to have relations with all of them including Abu Salih, Abu Musa, Abu Khalid, Naji 'Alush, Majid Abu Sharar, Abu Iyad, and Abu Mazin. Sometimes, we used to agree on certain issues. For example, I agreed with Abu Nidal on no liquidation and in 1974 we jointly rejected the stage plan. I used to concur with many of them on the political solution, but probably differed in its implementation. It is not necessary for political concurrence to follow organized or material work.

/6662
CSO: 4400/70

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

KUWAITI DAILY PUBLISHES MESSAGES BY FATAH DISSIDENTS

GF130452 [Editorial Report] Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic in its issue of 7 December on page 20 publishes the text of a 1,500-word message by Samih Abu Kuwayk, alias Qadri, former Fatah Central Committee member and secretary and information officer of the provisional leadership of the Fatah dissident forces, addressed to the Fatah "provisional council," describing the situation inside the Fatah "uprising movement."

In his message addressed to the members of the Fatah provisional revolutionary council, Qadri reminds the members of a previous memorandum which he sent to them in which he "explained what is going on inside the movement and pinpointing the nature of differences inside the provisional council." He says that in his first memorandum, he "affirmed that the movement is being jeopardized as a result of a destructive plot which is being implemented by a mentality which has no other objective than to usurp the movement." This, he adds, "has resulted in rendering true services to 'Arafat and his trend because the uprising has been scattered." He says that this "led to the uprising becoming completely unable to realize the gaols for which it was staged--toppling the trend of deviation and its symbols and to continue the revolution inside and outside the occupied territories."

Qadri continues his message saying that out of his faithfulness to the uprising and to "our ambitions and the martyrs who have been killed in defending the dream of revolutionary change, this made me resist the plot and its destructive effect. That is why I rejected the coup measures which were said to be in accordance with the agreement of the provisional leadership in Tripoli. I rejected this out of my belief because I considered myself trusted for tasks which, if I conceded, will be a capitulation to the plot and the objectives of its owners."

Qadri draws the members' attention that "despite the negative effect this has had on the movement's unity as a result of these measures and the frustration and despair which the movement's strugglers have felt, I responded to the good efforts to find a solution, without any preconditions to stop the deterioration of the situation in the movement and to restore its unity." He adds that his positive response was met by "individual measures" in which "an individual elected a leadership and a revolutionary council and made changes in tasks and positions, a thing which 'Arafat himself would not dare to do, even in the prime of his strength and autocracy." He explains that these individual measures were a "culmination of the plot which I warned against in my previous memorandum--controlling the movement."

Appealing to the members to stop these measures, Qadri calls on them "to shoulder their responsibility by abolishing these measures which contravene the simplest principles of democracy." He warns them that "failing to do so will make them responsible for the revolutionaries, masses, martyrs, and history."

The newspaper also publishes on the same page the text of an approximate 3,500-word letter by Palestinian writer 'Abd al-Qadir Yasin, one of the figures who joined the "Fatah uprising" from its beginning, addressed to Fatah dissident leader Colonel Abu Musa (Sa'id Musa Muragha). The letter is dated 20 September 1985.

At the beginning of his letter, 'Abd al-Qadir Yasin criticizes Colonel Abu Musa for accusing the four who were killed in 'Ayn al-Hulwah in southern Lebanon in July, of collaborating with Israel and expressing surprise over that. He defends the four of being true revolutioanries who were killed by a group of murderers who included "a drug smuggler and a coward who has fled in all battles with Israel."

Yasin goes on to accuse those who are in the Fatah uprising of "suppressing the people," and "carrying out arbitrary arrests, atrocities, robbery, and mistreating people." He accuses them "of carrying out a military coup inside Fatah, because they could not carry out such a coup while they were in the Jordanian army."

He then says that some practices inside the uprsing have deviated from the original course of the movement and this led to a decrease in the number of its members because thousands of people have deserted the movement and the people began to oppose it. He reminds Abu Musa of the previous criticism he made against the movement and its practices as a thing "which angered you and your colleagues in the leadership because you are not used to such criticism."

Presenting his resignation from the movement, he says toward the end of the letter "that your repeated practices showed that you were determined to continue the wrong course and thus you lost the chance." He finishes his letter by "holding him responsible for the situation the uprising has reached."

/6662
CSO: 4400/70

SAUDI ARABIA

PRESS VIEWS SAUDI MILITARY DEVELOPMENT

GF280909 Riyadh Domestic Service in Arabic 0400 GMT 28 Nov 85

[From the press review]

[Text] The newspapers AL-BILAD and 'UKAZ tackle the issue of the Saudi Armed Forces, which are based on the Islamic creed and adherence to the Koran and the teachings of the prophet. The papers state that trust is combined with well-planned and conscious steps whenever a new group graduates from the military colleges in our dear country.

AL-BILAD says: Before the Kingdom studied the policy of armament according to plan, it work to prepare young Saudi men to learn about weapons and acquire military sciences regardless of cost. The Kingdom established colleges and institutes of various specializations, and acquired the most modern equipment that technology can supply for use by young Saudi men, praise be to God, once they are able to understand and operate them with total confidence.

The paper adds: When King Faysal Air Force College celebrates the graduation of the 20th group of new pilots and technicians, among whom are a number of the nationals of fraternal Arab countries, it is actually a cause for pride for every Arab citizen, since this Saudi achievement is an achievement of Arab and Islamic power to defend its sanctities and dignity.

The newspaper 'UKAZ writes: Our dear country bolsters and develops its capabilities to uphold God's religion and word in a way that preserves for our people their religion, dignity, and pride, and supports the region's security and stability. Saudi Arabia has opened the doors of its scientific and military edifices to the sons of the GCC countries and the fraternal Arab countries, as a positive contribution toward boosting Gulf, Islamic, and Arab cadres and capabilities. It exemplifies the spirit of fraternity and cooperation among brothers. It is concerned with safeguarding the supreme interests of Arabs and Muslims, and with supporting the Arab and Islamic nations. This is represented by the existing coordination among the military colleges in the GCC countries.

The paper adds: By sincere efforts and confident steps, Saudi Arabia continues to boost and develop its intrinsic capabilities in defense.

The paper further says: The presence of a number of Saudi industry missions in a number of friendly countries, as part of the studies pertaining to the establishment of a munitions manufacturing plant in the Kingdom, proves that the country is concerned with providing that which is required to boost its capabilities and forces which constitute strength for Islam and peace. This also proves that we do not adopt merely formal decisions, but those decisions that accurate studies prove are practically useful within our comprehensive development plans in all spheres.

/6662
CSO: 4400/71

'SECRET' ARMS DEAL TALKS REPORTED WITH BRAZIL

GF021452 Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 30 Nov 85 pp 1, 24

[Report from Paris]

[Text] Well-informed Western diplomatic sources revealed to AL-QABAS that secret negotiations are currently being held between Saudi Arabia and Brazil to conclude the biggest tanks deal ever between any Arab and foreign country.

The sources reported that these negotiations, which are held in strict confidence by both sides, aim at reaching an agreement to sell 1,000 Brazilian Urutu heavy tanks. These tanks, which are considered progressive, modern, and highly effective, are supplied with 120 mm French guns. The sources revealed that the value of this deal is between $3 billion and $4 billion.

The same sources revealed that the negotiations between the Saudi and Brazilian officials will also deal with another important subject: The construction of a huge factory in Saudi Arabia, in cooperation with Brazil, to assemble parts for these tanks. If an agreement is reached this factory will be the only one of its kind in the Arabian Gulf region.

All this is part of the keenness of Saudi officials to establish a military industry in the Kingdom and a variety of arms sources. Well-informed Arab sources told AL-QABAS that for some time now Saudi Arabia has been planning to obtain developed and heavy tanks and that it held contacts and negotiations in this regard with four big countries before Brazil.

Saudi Arabia was interested in getting AL-1 tanks from the United States, AMX-40 tanks from France, Challenger tanks from Britain, and Leopard tanks from the FRG. But during these contacts and negotiations, various obstacles appeared, some were political reasons and some military and technical. As a result, Saudi Arabia turned toward Brazil and concluded an important two-part deal:

1. Buying 1,000 Urutu heavy tanks.

2. Constructing a huge factory in Saudi Arabia to assemble parts of these tanks in the Kingdom.

Has the final agreement been achieved between Saudi Arabia and Brazil on this deal?

The information that AL-QABAS has received from well-informed Western sources reveals that an initial understanding has been achieved now between the two countries, but no deal or agreement has been signed yet, even though negotiations achieved clear progress. These sources say that French officials support this deal as they have a share in it since the guns of these tanks are French-made. The sources added that nothing will be declared in both countries before reaching to a final agreement. Another case is revealed here. AL-QABAS has learned that the Brazilian officials at the highest levels are interested in the signing of this deal with Saudi Arabia, not only because of its big financial value but also because this deal might encourage other Gulf countries to purchase Brazilian tanks, particularly if a factory to assemble its parts is built in Saudi Arabia.

According to AL-QABAS' information, it seems that Brazil is also interested in convincing Iraq to purchase this kind of tank, particularly since Iraq primarily depends on Soviet tanks.

/6662
CSO: 4400/71

SAUDI ARABIA

BRIEFS

UK CONSTRUCTION FIRMS TO DEPART--London, Nov 29 (AFP)--Two of Britain's biggest building firms, John Laing and George Wimpey, said last night they were pulling out of Saudi Arabia because of the deteriorating economic situation there. The withdrawal, involving repatriation of all expatriate staff, follows the non-payment of work carried out by the Liang-Wimpey-Alireza group and a local partner, spokesmen for the two British firms said. John Laing and George Wimpey have been established for about 20 years in Saudi Arabia, where they have built several hospitals and official buildings. A spokesman for John Liang said that since 1983 the firm had noted a deterioration of the business climate and economic activity in Saudi Arabia, which was faced with a recession due to a depressed oil market. The spokesman said there had been payment problems on "individual contracts". Over the past five years, the two firms have completed contracts worth more than 112 million pounds sterling (nearly 157 million dollars). [Text] [Hong Kong AFP in English 0051 GMT 29 Nov 85 HK] /6662

DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY INDUSTRIES--In its editorial, the newspaper 'UKAZ comments on the issuance of the royal approval of the internal law of the general institution of military industries. The paper says: Since we desire not to make merely formal decisions which are not in agreement with out actual needs or with our ability to implement such decisions, the process of building, boosting, and developing our defense capabilities is carried out in accordance with accurate calculations, conscious plans, and careful studies both with regard to preparing, qualifying, and training the members of the armed forces and with regard to armament and military industries. The paper adds: The issuing of the royal decree approving the law of the general institution of military industries, does not merely lay a strong foundation for these industries and their development in the kingdom, but also constitutes a practical beginning for cooperation and coordination among the GCC countries and is an effective start in this field within the framework of boosting the intrinsic capabilities of the GCC countries in consecration of the aims and principles from which the cooperation march has proceeded. Foremost among these principles and aims is that the defense of the region's stability and security must be the responsibility of its people. [From the press review] [Text] [Riyadh Domestic Service in Arabic 0400 GMT 11 Dec 85 GF] /6662

FACTORY OUTPUT INCREASE REPORTED--Abu Dhabi, 15 Dec (WAKH)--'Abd al-'Aziz al-Zamil, Saudi minister of industry and electricity, has stated that the number of Saudi factories has increased to about 2,000 and that investments in 1985 totalled 60 billion Saudi riyals, while sales have topped 25 billion Saudi riyals. In a statement published today in the Abu Dhabi newspaper AL-ITTIHAD, Al-Zamil added that the Saudi industrial sector has maintained 10 percent average annual growth rate in recent years. It contributed 9 percent to local production last year, while this contribution has not exceeded 5 percent over the past few years. [Excerpt] [Manama WAKH in Arabic 0835 GMT 15 Dec 85 GF] /6662

PLANE MAINTENANCE AGREEMENT SIGNED--Riyadh, 9 Dec 85 (SPA)--His royal highness the second deputy prime minister, minister of defense and aviation, and inspector general, has told SPA that the committee of economic balance has concluded its initial discussions at the Secretariat of the Economic Balance Department in the Saudi engines complex to restructure and maintain engines of various types of planes. It is considered one of the projects of the economic balance program which have attracted the attention of his majesty the king and the crown prince. Following the meeting, the partners--General Electric Company, Pratt and Witney, Saudi Airlines, the National Production Company, and the Gulf investment establishment--signed the agreement of the joint project. It is worth noting that the capital of this vital commercial project exceeds 600 million riyals. The project will contribute to overhauling and restructuring plane engines in the region by the best technical means. [Text] [Riyadh SPA in Arabic 1850 GMT 9 Dec 85 GF] /6662

GCC ECONOMIC AGREEMENT APPROVED--The GCC Secretariat has received Saudi Arabia's approval to allow free export of livestock and agricultural products in conformity with paragraph A, Article I of the unified economic agreement among the GCC countries. The above article states that the GCC member countries will allow the free exchange of agricultural, animal, and industrial products, including natural products of the GCC states. The Saudi approval excluded the import and export of female livestock and Arabian horses unless a special permit is obtained. [Summary] [Jeddah Domestic Service in Arabic 1400 GMT 3 Dec 85 GF] /6662

CSO: 4400/71

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

PAPER URGES DRAWING UP OF PERMANENT CONSTITUTION

GF110906 AL-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 10 Dec 85 p 1, 21

[Editorial: "The Federation Is the Future"]

[Text] Drawing up the federal budget early and agreeing on how to finance it is a positive matter.

Tackling the economic situation and the recession is a positive matter.

Activating the federal government is also positive.

Developing federal services (schools, hospitals, roads, housing, and so on and so forth) is a positive matter.

These are the tasks whose accomplishment may result in the rejuvination of federal institutions so that they become stronger and the federation becomes stronger. However, such a strength will only last for a time: Suffice to review the efforts to strengthen the federation and its institutions in the past 5 years to conclude that all the measures that were adopted had a temporary effect.

What is required is decisive solutions to the federation's problems. Temporary solutions have been tried and exhausted, and pose a real threat to our achievements, namely the popular merger and national loyalty to the federation. In the past we would find solutions to the problems facing the federation: The budget would be late, but eventually it would be announced. A recession would occur in the estate business, but funds eventually allocated to pay for estate debts. The federal government would fail to meet its commitments to contractors and importers, but another sum of money would be earmarked to meet such obligations. The schools would become too overcrowded, so the regulations for admission and registration would be changed. The fuel of a power station in one of the amirates would be used up, so it would be supplied with fuel at the very last moment. And so on and so forth. We always find a solution but at a high cost and at the expense of the federation, its strength, stability, security, its prominent role on the regional and Arab levels, and its aspirations and future.

Acquiescence to the present state of the federation and its institutions, and the continued reliance on temporary solutions when tackling problems, in effect means the gradual--and organized--abandonment of all the great achievements that have been accomplished, foremost among which is the federation itself.

There can be no alternative to radical and final solutions that turn problems or crises into ordinary technical matters that can be resolved within the framework of the legitimate federal institutions. National efforts must be concentrated to tackle the roots of the problems, not their branches. Our federal problems are structural, and any solutions that do not tackle the roots of the federation's structural problems will be a repetition of past experiments that failed to prove their usefulness for a lasting period. It will be a squandering of efforts, time, and opportunities for development and reform.

Foremost among the structural issues is the constitution. We are now at the beginning of the last year of the second extended term of the provisional constitution. Is the drawing up of a permanent constitution being considered? This should be our main preoccupation at present. The provisional constitution has regulated the measures for preparing the permanent constitution, and fixed the latest date for referring the draft of the permanent constitution to the Federal National Council. Article 144 of the provisional constitution says: "During the transition period the Supreme Council will adopt the necessary measures to prepare the draft of a permanent constitution to replace the present provisional constitution." Clause IV of the same article says: "The Supreme Council will call for an extraordinary meeting of the Federal National Council not later than 6 months prior to the expiry of the present provisional constitution. The draft of the permament constitution will be discussed at the meeting." Thus, there is in practice 6 months to draw up the permanent constitution and to initiate contacts, discussion, and procedures. Will we act during these 6 months to draw up the permanent constitution, or will we do the same as we did on 2 December 1976 and 2 December 1981 when the term of the provisional constitution was extended?

The constitution does not only regulate the relationship between the people and their institutions, authorities, rights, and duties, but above all it regulates the relationship between the federation and the amirates and relations among the amirates themselves. These are active relations, relations resulting from a popular merger and a common loyalty, destiny, and future. These relations are interlinked and integrated in all fields, in authority, legislation, security, the economy, and all other aspects of human activity.

/6662
CSO: 4400/72

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

BRIEFS

METHANOL PLANT PLANNED--The country's first methanol plant, heralding a new era in the production of petrochemicals is to be set up in the emirate of Sharjah next year. It would initially produce half a million tons of methanol, now in great demand in the industrialised countries. Informed sources at the Gulf Chambers of Commerce disclosing the proposed plan, said that the production of methanol would at least take three years and the first shipments are likely to be made in 1939. [Excerpt] [Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 15 Dec 85 p 11 GF] /6662

CSO: 4400/72

ARTICLE DETAILS SOVIET CONTROL OF RURAL POPULATION

Paris EST & OUEST in French Nov 85 pp 14-16

[Article by Jean-Jose Puig: "Soviet Methods of Controlling the Rural Population"]

[Text] There is no longer hardly any doubt about Moscow's desire to eventually integrate Afghanistan into the Soviet bloc. The fiction of an independent state as a nonaligned country makes it possible at least to avoid concluding a process that none of the participants wants to complete yet, but it is now not enough to hide the USSR's objective.

This integration requires a policy strategy based on four partial objectives that have to be completed and not conflict with each other. Their relative importance is not always evaluated in the same way by the Soviet leaders, but the overall strategy is not affected. These four partial objectives are the following:

--Reduction to a "tolerable" level of the armed resistance;

--Preparation of the future leadership of this new "republic";

--Control of the rural population;

--A halt to the worsening of the USSR's image on the international scene.

The application of specific policies to achieve each of these objectives may produce incoherences and contradictions, and the harmful factor created by the indirect strategy makes it difficult to precisely judge the degree of real achievement. However, the Soviets are learning daily how to resolve the incoherence and eliminate the contradictions, or more precisely to turn them to their advantage. Their only solution is to dissolve them over time, in space, and in that semi-incomprehensible dimension of the segmentation of civilian societies of Afghanistan.

Hence, there is an extraordinarily great disparity of methods and results achieved, without the possibility, in each particular case, of evaluating the degree of irreversibility of the situation. The changes in rhythm in the alternation of brutal military operations and charm operations; the geographic multiplicity of contradictory policies; the dialectical variations in the official line of Kabul, depending whether it is talking about Islam, socialism, progress or free enterprise; and the harmful favoritism enjoyed by the members of certain tribes--all this attests no longer to trial and error, but to a deliberate policy of confusion in order to achieve objectives that are "a priori" contradictory.

The complexity is such, sometimes, that there is a radical simplification in order to promote a particular objective. Thus, 1985 witnessed a reaffirmation of the importance and urgency of the primary objective (reduction of the armed resistance), while at the beginning of 1984 priority was given to control of the rural areas. However, the implementation of other objectives continues in the shadow of the priority objective of the moment (and often of the place), and it would be wrong to interpret this as a change by the Soviets in their original strategy.

Control of the rural population falls under an indirect strategy to the extent that the Soviets do not have "native affairs officers." They are thus compelled to entrust the application of their policy to the Afghans of the government.

The Soviets thus have a pacification apparatus and policy[1] based mainly on the colonial wars, the objective being to rally the rural population groups to the regime in Kabul by stirring up the latent conflicts. The various propaganda organizations--including the PDPA[2] itself--are not part of this apparatus (these propaganda organizations--Young Pioneers, the movement for emancipation of women, and trade unions--are only used with captive population, mainly in Kabul, in the context of "Sovietization").

The propaganda organizations do include:

--Khad (State Intelligence Service, the Afghan branch of the KGB);

--Ministry of Tribes and Nationalities;

--"Fatherland National Front."

1. The Khad, controlled directly by the KGB, is directed by Dr Najibullah, a Parcham member and a Pashtun[3], who also heads the department of "qawm" and tribes in the Ministry of Tribes and Nationalities.[4] Along with its secret police role, the Khad is charged with infiltrating the resistance and encouraging conflicts among rival groups. It is the Khad that sets the secret conditions for defections.

2. The task of the Ministry of Tribes and Nationalities is to analyze the population elements based on the information from the Khad, study opportunities, and adapt methods to the local situations. Indeed, the department of the "qawm" and tribes plays the role of the Khad in the tribal areas south and east of Kabul. The Soviets are trying to implement a policy of nationalities in Afghanistan, as they did in the conquest of Turkestan in 1917.

3. The Fatherland National Front is a tentacled organization charged with direct contacts with the people in the country, with the goal of defections.

It is also assigned to recruit local personalities to use their influence on the local population and the resistance. To this end, it does not proclaim any ideology and generously compensates the notables, whom it succeeds in turning toward the government. Established at the end of 1980, after some early difficulties, it underwent some expansion until 1983. It is the sole possible intermediary between the rural people and the regime. Also, its role was confirmed at the end of 1983 to include the urban areas. It now includes the propaganda organizations. This causes problems, because there is a clear antagonism between old rural conservatives and young revolutionary citizens. However, despite their speeches, the Soviets hardly believe any longer in the "Revolution."

Thus, the pacification policy is developed by the KGB and the Khad, evaluated and adopted according to opportunity by the Ministry of Tribes and Nationalities, and implemented in the field by the Fatherland National Front.

The policy implementation of the pacification process is relatively simple in principle: starting with a militia that establishes a security ring around a base, there is a nonaggression agreement between the militia and people in the concentric area around the security ring. In general, this area is held by the resistance, which, to avoid losing its logistical support, accedes to the pressures of the rural population to conduct its operations elsewhere.

When that is possible, the outside circle is integrated into the militia one, and the circle extended. However, that assumes a combination of favorable circumstances only likely in the plains or large valleys.

The establishment of the first militia group, which is to serve as the rallying point, is a crucial operation. In general, the militia that are subsidiary to the military posts are composed of the first beneficiaries of the agrarian reform, or displaced persons, or even mercenaries attracted by the appetite for gain: the wage of a militiaman is about 3,000 afghani.[5] These individuals are above all concerned to avoid the enemies, and their combativeness is commensurate with their personal commitment. Often, they are content with preventing the resistance from developing in their territory.

Another way of establishing a militia is to persuade entire resistance groups to change sides. It is mainly the infiltration work of the Khad that enables this kind of defection. The aggravation of local conflicts means that at any given moment there is always one of two adversaries in a position of inferiority. Though the Khad may often have been at the origin of the dispute, it is always present to offer its "disinterested" aid to the group in difficulty, in the form of arms, ammunition or money. The counterpart is secret winning over, and the defector group has to continue, for a time, claiming to be in the resistance. During this period, the conflicts multiply, and the Soviet troops come to strike at the fighters opportunely and very selectively. When the ground has been more or less cleared, the defecting secret group openly changes sides and assumes the status of auxiliary of the Afghan army ("opratifi").

Another variant of this method no longer relies on established armed groups, but on ethnic or religious minorities. This is the case in certain regions of northern Afghanistan, where the Pashtuns transplanted at the end of the last century are not well integrated into the Persian and Turkish-speaking populations. This was the case also for certain Ismaelian minorities of Badakhstan.[6]

Finally, for the people who are hard to influence, the method is brutal and without subtlety: the villages are bombed, livestock destroyed, and harvests burned to bring the people to reason.[7]

The harrassed people end up by approaching the Fatherland National Front, which promises to try to intervene, but without guarantee. A calm period of varying duration (1 to 3 weeks) ensues, then the bombing resumes. At that point the village chief goes to the nearest administrative center, where he is offered the role of representative of the Fatherland National Front for his village. After a further respite, the bombing resumes. The village chief, who has come for information, learns that there are back taxes. This scenario continues, to persuade the young men of the village to go and join, etc.

Along with the work of establishing the militias, there is a large-scale work of disinformation. In the beginning, this was the task of the Khad, which used traveling agents. Thus, a very typical discourse took place in the inns, tea houses and bazaars. After condemning the ravages of the war and praising the courage of the resistance, these outsider orators regretted that there was not more understanding in order to avoid the accompanying misfortunes. It was very simple: the Afghans must work together; moreover, the Soviets were in a hurry to return home. Also, one should not confuse the state and communism. The present government, little different from the preceding regimes, had ended the communist excesses of Taraki and particularly Hafizullah Amin.

Though often suspected, these people were not concerned, because they took care to conduct themselves as good Muslims, and it was impossible to prove that they belonged to the government. However, their words did not have much impact, because as a result of the war these meeting places were frequented by people from very different horizons, and this disinformation work was not followed up or carried out in depth among a given people. Things have changed since 1983, with the expansion of the Fatherland National Front. The regime now has a locally based instrument that is able, along with this disinformation, to give concrete demonstrations of it. The line is tailored to suit the characteristics of a region, and the disinformation purveyor can, as proof of good faith, undertake to directly resolve matters with the government authorities, always under the guise of personal contacts.

The results of such a policy are difficult to measure, though it has indisputably won over several groups to the regime. Its effectiveness assumes a return to internal order and strengthening of the traditional society. However, Afghanistan has changed with the war, and this policy also involves serious shortcomings. The resistance members have changed attitudes, and their young commanders now share the power with the old nobles. Many of the latter have been discredited by going into exile or by trying to save their personal interests at the expense of those of their community. Moreover, the society has been politicized by the effort of the resistance leadership, and this factor is an obstacle to the pacification policy.

In addition, since it is an indirect strategy, the Soviets do not themselves control the relations between the representatives of the regime and the peasants. Thus, the militia are not well led and are little disposed toward excessive zeal. As for the prominent individuals in the Fatherland Front, they can decide to play their own game, which in fact becomes a double game between the resistance and the regime.

Finally, by definition, the tribal policy is reversible. The reconstituted and strengthened group defines its alliances in terms of its immediate interest. If the resistance scores some points locally, the group will return to the resistance. There have already been numerous examples of this.

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1. See: "The 'Pacification' Policy On-site," by Olivier Roy. DOCUMENTATION FRANCAISE No 4 785: "The Afghanistan War" and "The KGB: A New Policy in Afghanistan," by J.-J. Puig, No 10 of AFGHANISTAN-INFO.

2. Afghan People's Democratic Party--in other words, the Communist Party.

3. The "Parcham" is one of the two wings of the PDPA. The Pashtuns were the most numerous tribe in Afghanistan before 1980.

4. "Clan" is a close, but improper, translation of "qawm," which refers to any solidarity group, whether religious, economic, vocational, mystical, family or tribe.

5. About 300 francs.

6. In the regions of Urugzan, Farah, Nimruz, and Samangan, the Soviets have even used bands of looters and highway bandits, armed and paid for their services, to force the people to call on the group for police service. This occurs where no resistance is present.

7. These actions should not be confused with reprisal operations, for they are usually conducted in areas where there is no resistance activity.

9920
CSO: 4619/10

REFUGEES REJECT POSITION ON DRA

LD282223 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 2030 GMT 28 Nov 85

[Text] In a joint statement, the parties and Islamic organizations of Afghans living in Iran have strongly condemned the compromise reached on the problem of Afghanistan during the recent U.S.-Soviet summit. According to a central news unit report in this statement the said parties and groups referred to the Soviet Union's readiness to accept a political solution to Afghanistan's problem as a sign of this super-power's retreat and emphasized: It is clear to the Muslims of Afghanistan that despite their superficial differences, the two super-powers are equal partners in the ferocity of their hostility against the world oppressed and deprived.

In conclusion, the statement says: The Muslim nation of Afghanistan, while condemning the Soviet aggression against Afghanistan and the recent efforts of the summit to reach a compromise with the puppet regime of Kabul, once again reminds the leaders of the two blocs that despite their conspiracies the Muslim nation of Afghanistan will continue its holy war until the full eradication of sedition, and the Soviet Union will be left with no alternative but complete evacuation from the Islamic territory of Afghanistan. And the world-devouring United States should also realize that the nation of Afghanistan is well aware of the crafty goals of this super-power and the efforts of the United States and of its satellites to drag the justice-seeking struggles of the Afghan muslims into a compromise will bear no fruit.

/7358
CSO: 4640/94

FIGHTING RESUMES IN PANJSHER

LD291839 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1630 GMT 29 Nov 85

[Text] From the Central News Unit: Reports received from Afghanistan tell of new fighting between the joint Soviet-Afghanistan Armed Forces and the Afghan Muslim revolutionaries in and around Panjsher valley. According to these reports this fighting, has been stagnant since August as compared to the months before. After the strengthening of Soviet forces in Panjsher valley, the Afghan Muslim revolutionaries have reacted extensively; so much so that they have forced Soviet forces to deploy commandos and paratroopers there. The clashes, which generally begin with the attack of the Afghan Muslim revolutionaries against the bases and military columns of the Soviet forces, usually end shortly afterward with the bombing of the inhabited villages of the region by Soviet aircraft. Another IRNA report states: The attacks against the inhabited areas of the Afghan Muslims are not confined Panjsher valley and the regions surrounding it; during the middle of the present Christian month Soviet troops attacked the village of (Aghash), 40 km west of Jalabad in eastern Afghanistan, killing 50 villagers there. This report also states that it is still not clear whether the Soviet soldiers were embarking on a punitive operation or whether the villagers were just killed in the course of a routine battle. But this report notes that a very important road on which the Afghan Muslim revolutionaries carried out an attack recently against the military columns of the Soviet forces is located 2 km from (Aghash).

/7358
CSO: 4640/94

BRIEFS

GOVERNMENT FORCES REPORTEDLY ATTACKED--Muslim Afghan revolutionaries fiercely fought the forces of the Soviet invasion and the regime ruling in Afghanistan on 14 December /date as heard/. During the battle which they fought in Luman Jaghuri in Eastern Afghanistan the Mujahidin killed more than 500 troops, including 2 high-ranking officers, and wounded a large number of the forces' members. IRNA has reported that the forces of the Soviet invasion and the Karmal regime were attacked by the Mujahidin while trying to occupy the (Jahoy) region using 900 tanks, armored military vehicles, fighter planes, and helicopters. They were forced to withdraw following heavy casualties and losses. During the battle, the Mujahidin destroyed 81 tanks, troop carriers, and tankers belonging to the forces of the Soviet occupation and the Kabul regime. /Text/ /Tehran International Service in Arabic 1730 GMT 11 Dec 85 GF/ 12228

WEAPONS, AMMUNITION CAPTURED--Muslim Afghan Revolutionaries have attacked a military column of the Soviet occupation forces and Afghan Government troops in the province in Badghisat in northwestern Afghanistan, killing approximately 90 of these forces and capturing 80 others. They also captured a considerable quantity of weapons and ammunition. Following the attack, Soviet aircraft bombed this area. The bombing results in the martydom of 130 Muslim civilians. /Text/ /Tehran International Service in Arabic 0700 GMT 13 Dec 85 GF/ 12228

MUJAHIDIN OPERATIONS REPORTED--Afghan Muslim revolutionaries last week attacked Qandahar Airport. They destroyed a cargo plane and a fighter plane belonging to the Soviet occupation forces. In the attack, they killed 15 Soviet pilots. The Afghan Muslim revolutionaries captured the strategic (Haji) camp belonging to the joint Soviet occupation and DRA forces in Paktia Province in eastern Afghanistan. This took place after a violent battle and a long siege. Reports have stated that the revolutionaries also killed Ahmad (Shiren), commander of the Karmal regime forces in the camp. Other reports have indicated that the Afghan Muslim revolutionaries foiled a large offensive launched by the joint Soviet and DRA forces on their positions in (Sakris) in Qandahar Province in southern Afghanistan. The Soviet forces were forced to retreat from the area, leaving 600 killed and wounded behind them. During these clashes the Muslim revolutionaries destroyed 11 helicopters and 90 tanks belonging to the Soviet invaders. /Text/ /Tehran International Service in Arabic 0700 GMT 15 Dec 85 GF/ 12228

INFLICTED LOSSES REPORTED--Afghan Muslim revolutionaries killed 14 of the joint government and usurpist forces and inflicted losses on them in operations carried out in the second half of the month of Aban [23 October-21 November]. According to reports received by IRNA, the Afghan Muslim revolutionaries attacked a security post near the (Sarpol) base, located 20 kms south of the province of Jowzjan, and killed six of the joint government usurpist forces. Another report states that the Afghan Muslim revolutionaries launched a missile attack on a military convoy of the joint government-occupationist forces in the vicinity of the Tagab city north of Meymaneh, the center of Faryab Province, and killed 8 of the joint enemy forces. [Text] [Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 0430 GMT 29 Nov 85 GF] /7358

CSO: 4640/95

IRAN

TEHRAN COMMENTS ON SADDAM HUSAYN'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

LD171603 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1058 GMT 17 Dec 85

/Station commentary/

/Excerpts/ Yesterday morning, /Iraqi president/ Saddam arrived in Moscow unannounced. He was accompanied by Taha Yasin Ramadan, and Tariq 'Aziz and General (Shumchel).

According to Soviet media, Saddam and his entourage conferred with foreign and defense officials, as well as the president, Andrey Gromyko, mainly about the various issues of the Middle East, and in particular the question of the war. These reports have the tendency of keeping the question of the war and related discussions in the background as against other Middle East issues.

It is noteworthy that this ia Saddam's first visit to Moscow since December 1978, and his first visit to an non-Arab capital since the waging of war by the Iraqi regime against the Islamic republic. Saddam, during the 5 years of the war, has visited Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Morocco.

Iraqi-Soviet relations in economic and military fields, since the beginning of the seventies, particularly after the signing of the 15-year friendship agreement in 1972, entered a new dimension, and Russian-made arsenals flooded Baghdad. Iraq, in return, made Um al-Qasr base and another garrison in northern Iraq, available to the Soviet military.

The reasons for such a visit--given the timing and the present situation--may have some connection with the glorious surge of our Karbala wayfarers toward the warfronts, defeats of Saddam at his own evil games, and the emergence of reasonable, practical tendencies among the Persian Gulf littoral states; in short, more defeats for the Iraqi regime in its battles against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Saddam presumed that my making Khark Iosland a target, and eventually depriving Iran of its oil exports, he might save himself from the self-made quagmire.

The Iraqi regime knows that military support offered by the great powers only delays its certain downfall. Those who are concerned with the regional security and who consider the war as meaningless must surely take more steps in the direction of severing military and economic aid to the regime. The Islamic Republic of Iran, relying on the power of belief and the boundless support of the Muslim nation is determined to continue its just war, as it has shown in the past 5 years, until the final victory is gained and the source of intrigue is destroyed.

The support offered to Saddam will bear no other fruit than that of lengthening the war. As some foreign media have sporadically noted in recent times, the world must accept the reality of an Iraq without Saddam's regime.

/12228
CSO: 4640/118

COMMANDER SPEAKS ON ANTISMUGGLING CAMPAIGN

LD041459 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 4 Dec 85

[Text] In an exclusive interview with the correspondent of the Central News Unit this morning, Colonel Sohrabi, the commander of Gendarmerie of the Islamic Republic of Iran, described the Gendarmerie's plans and activities. Referring to the recent clashes between Gendarmerie personnel and smugglers in the border areas of Sistan va Baluchestan which resulted in the martyrdom of 16 selfless Gendarmerie personnel, he said:

In these clashes two bands of international smugglers equipped with arms and vehicles were crushed; dozens of smugglers were killed, and nearly 90 arrested. In addition, more than three [as heard] weapons, over 45,000 rounds of ammunition, seven field vehicles and 12 motorcycles were recovered from them. Sohrabi added that air-supported efforts to hunt down and arrest the smugglers are continuing most vigorously in southeastern parts of the country. With the programs we have devised we shall turn the country's eastern frontier into a graveyard for smugglers, he said.

Sohrabi then referred to the activities of the Jondollah patrol teams, saying: Some 221 Jonndollah patrol teams have engaged in outstanding activities together with Gendarmerie personnel. During the first 8 months of the [Iranian] year they have been able to seize more than 7,300 kilograms of opium, 947 kilograms of heroin, and 584 kilograms of hashish, and to arrest 2,907 people involved in narcotics trafficking. They have also uncovered more than 6 million packets of cigarettes, hundreds of meters of cloth, hundreds of suits of clothes, and more than 50 kilograms of smuggled gold, silver, and jewellery, resulting in the arrest of more than 6,000 people.

Turning to the Gendarmerie's fight against foreign currency smuggling, Col Sohrabi said: during the first 8 months of the year, Gendarmerie personnel uncovered 50 million rials' worth of smuggled foreign currency, precious commodities, gold, and jewellery. He concluded by thanking the Gendarmerie highway police for their round-the-clock efforts saying, during the first 8 months of the year, the Gendarmerie highways police imposed fines totalling more than 2.711 million rials on offenders.

/7358
CSO: 4640/98

FINANCIAL 'DISPUTE' HINDERS RELATIONS WITH FRANCE

GF081817 Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 7 Dec 85 p 20

/"Exclusive" report/

/Excerpts/ AL-QABAS has learned from well-informed sources in Paris that France has told Iran that it refuses to return the down payment of a huge loan of $2.5 billion which Iran is asking for. However, France has agreed to enter serious negotiations with Iranian officials to settle the financial problem, which is important from all aspects.

The sources affirmed that a French delegation visited Tehran last week and returned to Paris 2 days ago. The delegation informed Iranian authorities of the decision.

In fact, the financial problem is the main obstacle to improving relations between Tehran and Paris. It is the subject of secret talks between the two sides which have been going on for a long time.

The issue dates back to 1975 when the Shah of Iran gave France a $1 billion /as published/ loan to establish the (Orodeve) Corp., which would treat uranium for peaceful purposes.

Early last week, a French delegation, which included a number of experts in nuclear and legal affairs, went to Tehran. The delegation held talks with Iranian officials in an attempt to reach an understanding in the dispute.

AL-QABAS has learned from well-informed sources in Paris that the French delegation affirmed the following points to Iranian officials:

1. The French Government is determined to reach an acceptable solution to the problem and that it is also eager to improve relations with the Iranian rulers.

2. France cannot simply give a $1.5 billion /as published/ check to Iran as Iran wants because the issue is complicated. The French believe that Iran violated the agreement with France and the FRG by withdrawing from (Orodeve) and therefore Iran should legally pay financial compensation to the French.

3. Furthermore, France cannot return such a huge amount in one payment, even if the amount of compensation is deducted from it. In case an understanding is reached on the final amount, France is ready to settle it in installments and to sell Iran various French products or to reach an agreement on joint economic and trade cooperation between the two countries. However, the French side pointed out that it is not likely that France would sell Iran military equipment.

4. In view of these considerations, it seems that this case is very complicated and thorny. Thus it requires many sessions of negotiations and it cannot be settled quickly through a decree by the president or the premier.

In this light, the French side told the Iranian officials that it proposes appointing a prominent French personality to play the role of mediator, or more correctly, to hold contacts and negotiations with the Iranian authorities on this financial problem and other issues related to it in one way or another. The Iranian side welcomed the French proposal.

After the French delegation returned to Paris, the French External Relations Ministry announced the appointment of Jacques Martin to be in charge of negotiations with the Iranians, to be assisted by number of experts in nuclear, financial, and legal affairs. Martin is a senior official at the French Ministry of External Relations. He is 63 years old and for some time occupied the post of assistant secretary general of the ministry. He is an expert in nuclear affairs and has vast experience in negotiations on complicated issues.

Informed French sources speculate that Martin's mission will last a few months. They rule out that this financial dispute will be settled before the parliamentary elections scheduled to be held in March 1986, in which parties and groups opposing French socialist rule are expected to win.

Therefore, some say that the French officials intend to leave the settlement of this huge amoung to Iran as a poisonous gift to the French opposition in case it takes over rule after the spring next elections.

/12228
CSO: 4604/15

OFFICIAL UNDERLINES IMPORTANCE OF PORT

LD290157 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 2030 GMT 28 Nov 85

[Excerpts] The deputy of the Ministry of Roads and Transport and the managing-director of the Shipping Ports Organization, in an exclusive interview with a Central News Unit reporter in connection with the important role played by the Martyr Raja'i port [in Bandar Abbas] in unloading and loading commodities, and this big project's economic importance, stated: A top-priority program is in the process of being implemented which, by employing the facilities provided by this port, will reduce the problem of ships waiting period [to be unloaded] which reached a total of a 100 days during 1973-74.

This program will be observed until better results are achieved. In connection with the unloading of goods at this port, the managing-director of the Shipping Ports Organization, stated: the Martyr Raja'i port has the capacity for unloading up to 10 million metric tons of goods in a single workshift and use is being made of this capacity at present. He also referred to the length of the Martyr Raja'i port's jetty which is 4.9 km long, and which has the capacity of 60,000 metric tons and two oil tankers up to a capacity of 70,000 metric tons, and stated: this port will be connected with other parts of the country by means of asphalt-surface roads and 19 km of domestic railway line has been built in the port to speed up the delivery of goods, and which will be connected to the Bafq-Bandar-Abbas railway line.

/7358
CSO: 4640/101

IRAN

RADICALS IN KEY POSTS

London MEED/THE MIDDLE EAST'S BUSINESS WEEKLY in English 23-29 Nov 85 p 23

/Article: "Radicals Take top Oil Ministry Jobs"/

/Text/ Four radicals have been appointed to key posts in the Oil Ministry, indicating that Gholamreza Aqazadeh, the new oil minister, intends quickly to stamp his identity on national oil policy. Aqazadeh's own controversial appointment in the late-October cabinet reshuffle was opposed by President Khamenei, who is reported to have disliked his views on more public involvement in the running of the economy.

The new appointments closely reflect Aqazadeh's own views; three of the men worked with him at the Prime Minister's office, and the fourth has a reputation as a radical. The four are:

☐ Hossain Kazempour Ardebili, who moves from the Foreign Affairs Ministry to become deputy minister in charge of international and commercial affairs

☐ Seyyed Gholam-Hossein Hassan-Tash, who takes over the ministry's general secretariat

☐ Reza Mostajeran, who takes charge of ***National Iranian Oil Company's (NIOC's)*** commercial affairs

☐ Mohammad Souri, who is to head ***National Iranian Tankers Company (NITC),*** and becomes adviser to the minister.

Aqazadeh has yet to specify any policy changes but now his advisers are in place, he is likely to act. In a 29 October speech to the majlis (parliament), the minister said he wanted to link the purchase of foreign goods to oil sales. He is believed to favour oil barter, which the former minister, Mohammad Gharazi, opposed.

/12851
CSO: 4600/128

IRAN

OPPOSITION PAPER COMMENTS ON SUCCESSION

GF101301 London KEYHAN in Persian 5 Dec 85 p 6

[Editorial: "The Presence of Two Jurisconsultants in the Field"]

[Text] The announcement of Ayatollah Montazeri's appointment as the successor to Ayatollah Khomeyni in view of his position as a jurisconsult will not in itself surprise anyone. Montazeri, in fact, had won a majority of votes from the council of experts last year. We published the report on the same day in KEYHAN.

The matter which needs thorough scrutiny is the timing and the mode of the announcement. The council of experts held three secret meetings a fortnight ago. If the appointment of Montazeri was to be formally announced, it should have been announced at that time. It can be said that at least one group of the influential mullahs within the government did not wish Montazeri's appointment to be formally announced. However, their opponents, using a deviant maneuver, created a situation in which they could not help but formally confirm this news item.

Barikbin, (Friday 'imam of Qazvin) announced the news of Montazeri's place in the succession last Friday in that city's Friday mosque. It is obvious that he had done so at the urging of still more influential mullahs.

After a silence of 24 hours, while the rival mullahs busily tried to decide whether or not to deny the report, those who supported confirming the news won and Montazeri was formally given the title of "vali faqih". For at least the past 2 years Montazeri has come out as a leader of the moderates. Mr Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Mahdavi-Kani, and Musavi-Ardabili have differences among them, but are all members of the same group. The rival group is unted. Khamene'i, Khoi'niha, and Meshkini, who likewise differ among themselves on several points, are united in their opposition to Montazeri.

The announcement of the succession of Montazeri is interesting in another way also. Khomeyni, in recent months, has watched whatever influence he still commands being threatened. Several clerics from top to bottom now compete to bypass the "imam's" commands. It can be convincingly stated that Khomeyni did not want Montazeri's succession to be announced before Khomeyni's own death. However, he was placed in a situation in which he could not help but submit to the decision for the announcement. During recent weeks, Khomeyni has been trying to come to terms with the radical group (the opponents of Montazeri).

Let us now see what situation the presence of two faqihs at one time might create. It is quite possible that the radicals may continue to refer to Khomeyni as their religious authority, while their rivals go to Montazeri.

Ayatollah Khomeyni has thus created another innovation with respect to the "succession tradition".

Announcement of Montazeri's succession does not solve the problem of the power struggle. This battle will go on until the defeat or elimination of one of the parties.

/6662
CSO: 4640/113

DISAGREEMENT SAID ARISING ON MONTAZERI'S SELECTION

GF131518 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian 1330 GMT 13 Dec 85

/Excerpts/ The London-based AL-DUSTUR paper comments on the issue of the approval of Sheykh Hoseyn 'ali Montazeri as the leader of the Islamic revolution, and writes that it will initiate a clash of wills and culminate into a /word indistinct/ and violent dispute. According to AL-DUSTUR, this selection will not be accepted by Iran's clerical body, and even some government mullahs will reject it.

Citing informed sources in Tehran, AL-DUSTUR writes: The selection of Sheykh Hoseyn 'ali Montazeri, who is considered a common and semiliterate seminarian, took place with the assistance of Hashemi-Rafsanjani so that he could wield the fulcrum of power under cover of Montazeri in the Islamic regime.

This weekly claims that the consensus of some members of the Council of Experts had been to set up a three-man panel, comprised of Ayatollah Najafi-Mar'ashi, Ayatollah Golpayegani, and Sheykh Hoseyn 'ali Montazeri, to jontly succeed Khomeyni. But this proposal was shelved due to Hashemi-Rafsanjani's pressure, and Montazeri became Khomeyni's successor even though he lacked the theological qualifications and social (?position). Despite the fact that the news of Hoseyn 'ali Montazeri's succession was greeted with silence among the Islamic regime's officials, this sudden selection continues to be a controversial topic in circles abroad. Sources close to the Islamic regime state that Montazeri was selected in Khomeyni's lifetime as his successor, contrary to the regime's constitution, because all the regime's officials are aware that this action is bereft of democratic (?license) and so no one will support him. It was in this context that Fakhreddin Hejazi, the Majlis deputy, warned that if Montazeri is not imposed on the people beforehand, Iran will be transformed into Beirut and a civil war will engulf the country. The utterances of Fakhreddin Hejazi and Hashemi-Rafsanjani, who say that the Council of Experts took such a step to protect the leadership from downfall, is evidence that they were positive that following Khomeyni's demise, Montazeri will not be favored by the majority of the people and will not even enjoy the support of most governmental mullahs such as Khamene'i, despite the constitutional predictions. These sources explained that one factor which exerted pressure on the Council of Experts was that Hashemi-Rafsanjani knew that the council would not approve the selection of Montazeri in the event of Khomeyni's demise. Our correspondent in Tehran has just informed us that in today's Friday sermon at

Tehran's congregation in Tehran, Hashemi-Rafsanjani spoke on Montazeri's selection, but it was censored by the government radio and was not mentioned in today's newscast.

We have another report on the same subject and to which we draw your attention: Since last week the wave of opposition to Ayatollah Montazeri's selection has been rising in the seminaries at Qom, Hashhad, Esfahan, and Tehran. Two hundred Majlis deputies sent a letter to Ayatollah Khomeyni to counteract this opposition and have expressed hope for his longevity and have congratulated him on Montazeri's selection. According to informed sources in Tehran, these deputies have sent the above letter as a result of instructions and duress from Hashemi-Rafsanjani.

The Sunni clerics of Iran also believe that Ayatollah Montazeri is not a fullfledged source of emulation and cannot claim any credit for carrying the Islamic revolution to fruition.

/12228
CSO: 4640/114

NVOI NOTES SUSPENSION OF TUDEH PARTY OFFICIALS

TA102125 (Clandestine) National Voice of Iran in Persian 1730 GMT 10 Dec 85

[Unattributed commentary: "Effort Doomed to Failure"]

[Excerpts] Dear compatriots: NAMEH-YE MARDOM, central organ of the Iranian Tudeh Party, in issue 78, dated 28 November 1985, published a long and interesting article titled "A Talk About Organizational Problems and Party Principles," which listed specific violations of party principles and standards stipulated in the constitution by the three-member group comprised of Messrs Babak Amir-Khosrovi, Fereydun Azar-Nur, and Farhad Farjad. These violations were the main reason for their suspension from membership in and from their positions as advisors to the central committee in accordance with the decision by the Iranian Tudeh Party Central Committee Politburo. The article embarked on a review of the views of this group and disclosed its clear distortions, unreliable quotes, and its baseless harmful accusations. The article also embarked on a theoretical review of the country's social, political, and economic situation. We draw the attention of our dear compatriots to parts of this lengthy article.

NAMEH-YE MARDOM writes: The country's social, political, and ecomomic situation is deteriorating. A crisis has engulfed the entire society. Power struggle, which began between various wings of the leadership the day after the revolution's victory, is continuing with increasing intensity. The regime's policy in defense of the interests of major capitalists and landlords faces widespread opposition from the deprived people. The million-strong masses of toilers, who are fed up with the war, high costs, unemployment, poverty, and lack of housing, are increasingly turning away from the regime of medieval despotism. General discontent is rising. This is a fact which the regime's authorities, too, cannot hide. Leaders of the Islamic Republic regime do not shrink any crime to crush the resistance of the masses. They harshly suppress opponents of the destructive war and throw striking workers into dungeons without any legal justification. The suppression of members and followers of national progressive organizations is continuing. The torturing and murdering of political prisoners has been transformed into the regime's daily policy. In other words, the regime is resorting more than ever to terror and repression in order to safeguard its shaky foundations.

NAMEH-YE MARDOM, addressing members and followers of the party, writes: Under such conditions a grave duty faces members and followers of the party, who are continuing their clandestine activity amid difficult conditions and under the constant blows of suppressive organs. The escalation of political disclosure by taking the party's programs and demands directly to the masses, with the aid of mobilizing antiregime forces, is one of the main duties of all party cells. The party's members and followers should exploit all opportunities to consolidate links and unite with the toiling masses, foremost of which the working class. One should support with utmost power the economic and political demands of workers and other toilers. Propaganda and publicity work should, in the first stage, be transferred to factories and labor districts.

NAMEH-YE MARDOM, referring to the forced emigration of a large number of the party's members and followers to all parts of the world, and to the fact that this forced political emigration has under no circumstances prevented, nor can it prevent, the continuation of resistance, writes: The decisive majority of our comrades abroad, each in his own way, are continuing the struggle. Naturally, the aim of activity by the party's members and followers abroad consists of aiding the party cells within the country.

NAMEH-YE MARDOM, then writes: Unfortunately, it should be stated that a handful of individuals abroad engage in acts that violate the accepted principles and standards of the working class party. Our objective is the three-member group of Babak Amir-Khosrovi, Fereydun Azar-Nur, and Farhad Farjad. Some time ago the announcement of their suspension from membership in and from their positions as advisers to the central committee was published in NAMEH-YE MARDOM.

NAMEH-YE MARDOM then reviews in detail the specific violations of party principles and standards by this three-member group, its resort to the most unpleasant method contrary to communist ethics in order to exculpate itself, thus openly abusing the party's members and followers; its resort to various ploys in order to cover up its antiparty deed, distorting the party's history and disclosing party secrets, thus inevitably placing party secrets at the disposal of the party's enemies; and its lack of understanding of the difference between various approaches and views that constitute democratic centralism.

At the conclusion of this very lengthy article NAMEH-YE MARDOM writes: In its activity our party relies on the masses. Unity with toilers as well as their class education and their preparation for a revolutionary struggle was and remains the most important task of the party since its establishment. It is precisely for this reason that we have always been the target of the most severe attacks by foes of the working class. Our party places on the current agenda the ability to guide toilers, the need to struggle with any sort of deviation by anyone, irreconcilability with accusations and slander, and false imaginations and rumors.

/6662
CSO: 4640/111

IRAN

FORMATION OF 'FREE CLERGY SOCIETY' REPORTED

GF041940 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian 1330 GMT 4 Dec 85

[Text] A group of clergymen, Friday imams, and seminarians who are against the Velayat-e Faqieh, Khomeyni's Islam, and the Islamic Republic, have established a group called the Free Clergy Society. In their first statement this group has said that the activities of Khomeyni's regime have brought nothing but the destruction of the nation and the country. The statement of the Free Clergy Society recognises Montazeri's election as successor to Khomeyni as an insult to the clergy. The statement says: Montazeri, an ordinary tutor of the Qom seminary, wants to become the guardian of 40 million Iranians and the guardian and source of emulation for Islamic 'ulema after Khomeyni, while the Velayat-e Faqieh is itself fictitious and is unknown in all religious books and in Oslam. In this statement the society described the constitution of the Islamic Republic as invalid and against the spirit of Islam. They have said that Khomeyni does what he wants in the name of Velayat-e Faqieh, and tomorrow Montazeri will carry on the same method. The Koran prohibited the prophet from forcing the religion on people, so how would it allow a person who is dependent on the point of a spear, murder, and torture, which are all against the commandments of Islam, to impose on millions of people as the Velayat-e Faqieh?

The statement of the Free Clergy Society adds: Khomeyni's regime has transformed Islamic Iran and the proud dear Iranians into a poor, helpless, and nameless people, and has pushed the country's culture to a corner of isolation and forgetfulness. They have placed the respectful Muslim 'ulema under house arrest and have planted the seed of conflict and animosity amongst the Iranian Muslims and Muslims from other countries. The statement condemns the Islamic revolution and describes Khomeyni's regime as a warmongering one which is the cause of bloodshed and killing. At the end of this statement, addressing the clergymen and religious sources, it says: If you do not break your silence, if you do not announce your judgment, if you do not inform the people of their responsibilities during these sensitive and difficult conditions, tomorrow you will be [words indistinct] under the clergy-looking turbaned men and Muslim-looking communists, and the so-called Islamic Republic will start a war against Islam, Muslims, and the Koran. Then there will be no sign of purity.

/7358
CSO: 4640/100

RADIO REPORTS ATTACK ON BASE

GF221522 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian 1300 GMT 22 Nov 85

[Text] The mobilization base of the Guards' Corps in Jiroft in the village of (Vehkolut) was the target of a lightning raid by the tribal Baluchi combatants, (?party) of Shapur Bakhtiar, the leader of the National Resistance Movement of Iran. All the arms and ammunition, as well as six automobiles, were seized.

A communique issued by the Baluch tribesmen stated that this attack took place on the night of 10 November. Sixteen armed officials of the regime were killed. We draw your attention to the text of the communique issued by the Baluch tribesmen:

On the night of 10 November 1985, the mobilization base of the Guards' Corps In Jiroft in the village of (Vehkolut) was besieged by the combatants of the Lashari and Bameri tribes under the command of Bahram Mir-Lashari and (Asa) Bameri, and 16 guards were killed in the blitzkrieg while a large number were wounded. The base fell after the lightning onslaught and all the arms and ammunition and all the vehicles there were seized undamaged. With the grace of God, all the Baluch tribesmen returned unharmed to their mountain base. The (Vehkolut) base was set up to resist the nationalist Baluchis.

With blessings to the wise leader Shapur Bakhtiar, with salutations to the self-sacrificing ones in the path of the liberation of Iran.

[Signed] Baluch tribesmen.

/7358
CSO: 4640/101

IRAN

OPPOSITION PAPER WRITES OF PLANS FOR ARMY

GF050416 London KEYHAN in Persian 28 Nov 85 pp 1, 14

[London KEYHAN weekly in Persian; founder and publisher Dr Mesbahzadeh]

[Text] The plan to change the entire organization of the Iranian Armed Forces, to lower the credibility of the regular Armed Forces in order to raise that of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps [IRGC], will be implemented as of next March.

According to Seyyed Reza Karami, the spokesman for the Majlis Defense Committee, the plans to change the Armed Forces' organization will be reviewed again by the Majlis Defense Committee, after which it will be sent for approval to the Supreme Defense Council, then back to the Majlis for a final endorsement. This includes plans to create air force and navy units within the IRGC to match those in the regular Armed Forces.

Akrami disclosed that the plans would turn the Armed Forces upside down, and that implementing them would start in March at the latest.

The spokesman for the Majlis defense committee spoke about the new organizational plans for the Armed Forces. He said: Our aim is to undertake a whole new change in the Armed Forces. This plan must totally rennovate the Armed Forces.

Akrami responded to the rumors which circulated soon after Ayatollah Khomeyni ordered the formation of an air force and a navy within the IRGC, which in effect meant the total destruction of the Armed Forces. He said: These rumors are not true. Our aim is to increase the power of the IRGC to equal that of the Army so that the Army can defend the borders of the country and the IRGC, in addition to defending the borders, would also be in charge of security within the Islamic Republic. There were air force and naval units in the IRGC before, but our goal is to raise this capability to that which the regular Armed Forces have now. Thus the Army could be stationed on the borders, with a free hand to defend the Islamic Republic, knowing that the situation is secure along the border inside the country as well.

We remind you that Ayatollah Khomeyni's message to the IRGC commander, Mohsen Reza'i, caused a great deal of concern among Armed Forces personnel. In the end Khomeyni was forced to clarify his statement and to praise the Army. Akrami also spoke on this and said: The army must never think that, God forbid, we want to dismantle the Army, because the imam has always been in favor of the Army.

/7358
CSO: 4640/102

IRAN

BRIEFS

ARMS TALKS--Tehran, 17 Dec IRNA--Iraqi ruler Saddam Husayn paid an unexpected visit to Moscow Monday. Political analysts say that Saddam's trip to Moscow was made with great reluctance and was shrouded in secrecy because of the likelihood of a possible coup in his absence. Analysts also say that the unannounced trip show that the Iraqi ruler is facing serious problems at home and in his imposed war against Iran. Soviet Union is Iraq's main arms supplier. Saddam is accompanied in his trip by his Defense Minister 'Abd al-Jabbar who was the chief of the Iraqi joint staff headquarters until recently. Saddam Husayn has visited the Soviet Union seven times between 1970 and 1978 but this is his first visit to Moscow in the capacity of the President. Due to the war, Saddam very rarely leaves the country. Since late 1983 he has only visited Saudi Arabia and Jordan and attended the Arab summit in Morocco. /Text/ /Tehran IRNA in English 0720 GMT 17 Dec 85 LD/ 12228

MAGNESIUM ORE DEPOSITS--Yazd, Yazd Province, 9 Dec IRNA--The exploitation of "Narigan 1" magnesium ore mine in the region of Bafq, Kerman Province, with 800,000 to 1 million tons of oxidised reserves is underway, the managing director of Iran's Central Ore Co. said here Monday. He said that the mineral has an alloy content of 35 percent iron and 6 to 7 percent of magnesium. A total of 17,000 tons of magnesium ore have been exploited since late March and another 35,000 tons will be extracted by the end of the year, the managing director said. /Text/ /Tehran IRNA in English 1445 GMT 9 Dec 85 LD/ 12228

COPPER MINE DISCOVERY--Zahedan, Sistan-Baluchestan Province, 7 Dec IRAN--A rich copper mine containing an estimated 15 million tons in deposit has been discovered in Sistan-Baluchestan Province. Acting minister of mines and metals, Mohammad Motevalian /IRNA spelling/ further said at the end of a 2-day seminar of directors and officials of mines and metals departments of the country held here that the province has rich unexploited mineral resources. He added that since the victory of the Islamic revolution, 849 small and large mines of various kinds of metals, phosphates, aluminum, asbestos, and construction materials have been identified and more than 70 percent of them were put at the disposal of public and private sectors and cooperatives for exploitation. Motevalian said that there are between 800 to 900 active mines in the country and during the current Iranian year (starting 21 March 1985) about 500 million rials (dls. 5.7m) were put at the disposal of the various departments for discovery and exploitation. This credit excludes the discovery budget of the companies affiliated to the ministry. /Text/ /Tehran IRNA in English 1538 GMT 7 Dec 85 LD/ 12228

OPPOSITIONIST TAKES ISSUE--In the issue of your newspaper dated 9 November the interview I granted carries the headline: "I, Madani, Khomeyni's Enemy." I consider it necessary to explain that these words cannot be attributed to me, inasmuch as they are contrary to my beliefs. In fact, my efforts are aimed at alleviating conflicts, because I believe that the Iranian society of tomorrow needs peace and friendship, not hatred and rancors. I am also quoted as saying that "The powers which Khomeyni assumed were not those envisaged by the constitution." Here too I must specify that I have never made such assertions. I said that I refused to vote for the article of the Islamic constitution that grants Ayatollah Khomeyni the powers of a "Velayat-e Faqih." [Letter from Iranian oppositionist Admiral Ahmad Madani: "I Am Khomeyni's Friend"] [Excerpt] [Roma LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 30 Nov 85 p 8 PM] /6662

BAZAARIS REPORTEDLY PROTEST RECENT TAX INCREASES--The bazaaris have protested at the recent decisions of the Musavi Government. The inefficient country decided to impose (?trade) taxes in order to mitigate its dwindling income. This plan, which increases the brunt of financial pressure on the feeble fabric of the national economy, has encountered the opposition of traders, bazaaris, and store owners and managers. We have a report on this: /begin correspondent's recording/ The Islamic Republic regime has increased the scale of direct and indirect taxes in order to compensate for the decrease in its foreign exchange income due to the reduction of oil exports. The annual taxes which have risen dramatically have aroused the furor of the guilds' merchants. Most of them say that their annual income does not permit them to imburse 150,000 to 1 million tumans in annual taxes. Some of these taxes will be imposed definitely and (?at a flat rate) and none of the bazaaris have the right to object, without any regard to regulations or scale of income. A group of bazaaris visited the Finance Ministry's revenue department to protest against taxes on income and said that they have to pay income tax as well as (?municipal) taxes and our position is quite clear. The income tax officials are able to assess the actual scale of taxes, but most of these taxes are not imposed on the basis of the regulations. Besides, the scale is (?30) times more than before 1978, and they are unable to pay this amount. The protest by the bazaaris on the increase in the taxes remains unanswered. /end recording/ /Text/ /(Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian 1500 GMT 13 Dec 85 GF/ 12228

EXECUTIONS REPORTED--According to the Voice of Liberation of Iran correspondent in Tehran, over the past 3 days 160 persons were executed in 3 prisons--(Gowhardasht), Evin, and Qezel Hesar. However, we have received nothing about their identity or any particulars thus far. We have come to know through sources close to the revolutionary courts that out of the persons executed, six were from northern areas connected with the jungle resistance movement. Two were Tudeh members, 7 were Mojaheds, 12 were monarchists, several held lower ranks in the navy, 2 army captains and 1 pilot. /Text/ /(Clandestine) Voice of Liberation of Iran in Persian 0300 GMT 14 Dec 85 GF/ 12228

HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS REPORTED--The members of a French delegation who had gone to Tehran to find a possible way to release the French hostages in Lebanon seem to have left Tehran without any results. In Tehran, Reza Mo'ayeri, Ahmad 'Azizi, Badel Harandi, and Larijani met with members of the French delegation. It is rumored in the capital that there is a severe difference of opinion among the regime leaders with regard to finding ways to improve relations with France. In articles printed in Tehran newspapers last Sunday, France has been called an American puppet who is supporting Iraq upon the orders of the United States. It is not certain, if that is the case, why and how come this delegation was invited to Tehran. [Text] [(Clandestine) Voice of the Liberation of Iran in Persian 0330 GMT 18 Dec 85 GF] /6662

WHEAT ORDER CANCELED--An estimated $300 million-a-year contract to import wheat and agricultural products from Argentina has been cancelled. The Iranian embassy in Buenos Aires says the decision was due to Argentina's refusal to buy Iranian oil and raw materials. But Argentinian diplomats have implied that the real reason may have been the recently finalised sale of 20 Pucara ground-attack aircraft to Iraq (MEED 16:11:85, Iraq). The cancellation is a severe blow to Argentina's agricultural exports and foreign currency earnings. In 1984 Iran was Argentina's third-largest grain buyer, importing 1.2 million tonnes of wheat, corn, oilseed and rice, valued at some $400 million. It is unclear whether the move will affect an agreement to supply 5,000 tonnes of meat, with an option for another 5,000 tonnes, that was close to conclusion (MEED 6:7:85). Iranian agricultural imports last year were estimated at roughly $2,000 million; wheat imports rose by 20 percent to 5.5 million tonnes in 1983/84, because of drought in the western region. The government expects a bumper crop this year and announced that it intends to cut 1985's agricultural import bill by $500 million, with wheat imports to be reduced by 700,000 tonnes. /Text/ /London MEED/THE MIDDLE EAST'S BUSINESS WEEKLY in English 23-29 Nov 85 p 23/ /12851

EXPLOSION IN KARAJ--According to a report by our correspondent, during a bomb explosion in Karaj on 7 December, the daughter of Mohammad Barezani was killed. Our correspondent reports: On 7 December in 'Azimiyeh in Karaj, as a result of a bomb explosion near the house of Sheykh Mohammad Barezani, the brother of Mostafa Barezani, Sakineh, Mohammad Barezani's daughter, was killed, and Mohammad Barezani was severely injured and transferred to Tehran for treatment. At the time of the explosion, a wedding ceremony was taking place in Barezani's house. An unknown person was also injured by the explosion. The walls of Barezani's house were destroyed. /Text/ /(Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian 1330 GMT 11 Dec 85 GF/ 12228

OPPONENTS ARRESTED--The Islamic government has arrested 39 members of Fada'ian-e Eslam as its first reaction against opposition to Hoseyn 'Ali Montazeri. /Text/ /(Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian 1330 GMT 11 Dec 85 GF/ 12228

CLANDESTINE ON LEBANESE DELEGATION--The Islamic Republic's embassy in Beirut announced that a delegation consisting of a Lebanese Hizballah group and members of the Paramilitary Shi'ite Amal group left Beirut for Tehran yesterday. In a communique issued by the Islamic Republic of Iran's embassy in Beirut, it was stated that this delegation will confer with the Islamic Republic's officials on ways and means of expanding ties with Islamic elements in Lebanon for the purpose of foiling the actions of the enemies of Islam. This delegation includes two noncleric members: Mustaf Jirani and 'Ali al-Husayni; and two clergymen; Shaykh Adib Haydar and Ibrahim al-Amin. Political observers in Beirut said that the real reason for the visit by this delegation which includes some religious terrorists is discussions regarding the fate of French hostages in Beirut and a plan for fresh acts of terrorism in the Lebanon and the region with the connivance of the Islamic Republic's officials. [Excerpt] [(Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian 1330 GMT 6 Dec 85 GF] /6662

ARMS SUPPLY--The protracted Iran-Iraq was has assumed fresh dimension. Based on [foreign press] reports, Shaykh Muhammad, son of the amir of Dubai and who was for a time minister of defense of the UAE, has, as an arms dealer, bought millions of dollars worth of arms for the Islamic Republic. Since some of the arms-producing countries were not willing to sell arms to the Islamic Republic, he apparently purchased the arms for the UAE, then shipped them by boat from Dubai to Bandar 'Abbas. It must be stated that Shaykh Rashid the amir of Dubai, who has close relations with the former regime of Iran, has been confined to bed for the past 4 years with a serious illness. His two sons have practically taken over all power in Dubai. The step taken by Dubai to hand over the Iranian pilots to Iran was condemned by a large number of Arabic language papers and according to the Egyptian paper AL-SHA'B: "Dubai's action was anti-Islamic, immoral, and inhuman. Even the Arab bedouins do not hand over refugees." The Islamic Republic, while applauding the step taken by Dubai, has formally conveyed its thanks to the UAE authorities. [Excerpts] [London KEYHAN in Persian 5 Dec 85 p 14 GF] /6662

MICROWAVE CIRCUITS FOR MILITARY--The Engineering Department of the university jihad of Sharif Technical University for the first time has planned and built microwave circuits. One of the designers of these circuits said in an interview with a Central News Unit correspondent: One of the advantages of such circuits is their small size and their greater accuracy compared with old-fashioned systems, and they play an important role in electronic defense and communication systems and communication relay stations. He added: As microwave circuits play an important role in advanced military and communication equipments such as radars and relay stations, and in view of the war and the great need of military establishment for that equipment, the engineering department of the university jihad of Sharif Technical University started studying and planning some microwave equipment such as decoders [ashekarsaz] and boosters and has succeeded in manufacturing parts of the microwave circuit complexes by using thin films [laye-ye nazok] technology. In conclusion he said: These days the use of microwave parts of small size and weight and with a high quality has enabled the ever-increasing use of microwave frequencies in modern military equipment such as guided missiles. [Text] [Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 4 Dec 85 LD] /7358

INDUSTRIAL EXPORTS REPORTEDLY UP--The industrial exports of the country during the past 7 months of this year, showed an increase of 37.9 percent in value compared to the same period last year. One of the deputy commerce ministers, in an interview with the Central News Unit correspondent in Kashan said: Following the government policies about increasing nonoil exports as well as reducing reliance on oil, during the past 7 months of this year, the exports of the country have increased 167.64 percent in weight and 17.66 percent in value compared to the same period last year. Noting the nature of nonoil exports and the Commerce Ministry's plans for concentrating maximum efforts on expansion of nonoil exports such as agricultural, industrial, and mineral goods, he said: Agricultural exports during the same period show an increase of 63.7 percent in weight and 9.5 percent in value. During the month of Shahrivar exports of fruits increased 12-fold compared to last Shahrivar. /Text/ /Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 2030 GMT 6 Dec 85 LD/ 12228

DISAPPROVAL OVER MONTAZERI--Shi'ite sources of emulation and 'ulema in Qom, Mashhad, and other seminarians are disagreeing with the election of Montazeri as deputy of Faqieh. According to reports by the Free Voice of Iran correspondents, in Tehran, Mashhad, Qom, Esfahan, and Tabriz, the majority of Shi'ite sources of emulations have expressed their disagreement with the recent decision by Khomeyni and his mullahs in electing Montazeri as the deputy of Faqieh, and have prohibited any religious consultation with Hoseyn 'ali Montazeri. The 'ulema and grand ayatollahs have condemned the announcement of Montazeri as the highest Faqieh and have recognized such election as contrary to the [word indistinct] (?custom). According to reports, some Qom seminarians have been arrested for disagreeing with this election. According to other reports, there has been demonstrations in Qom, Esfahan, and Mashhad against Montazeri. Some of these demonstrations have taken place [words indistinct] against the Hezbollahi agents of Khomeyni. There is no further information on these clashes. [Excerpt] [(Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian 1500 GMT 5 Dec 85 GF] /7358

CSO: 4640/100

COMMENTARY VIEWS HAQ-GANDHI MEETINGS

GF041500 Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 22 Nov 85 p 3

[Editorial: "Just a Handshake Is Not Enough"]

[Excerpts] President Ziaul Haq and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi recently met in Oman, where it was agreed that President Ziaul Haq would visit India next month for another meeting with the Indian prime minister.

Whenever these two heads of state meet it is said the meeting are very successful. They discussed this or that and made progress in thawing relations. It is usually said after similar meetings that the dust had settled and many apprehensions and misgivings had been removed, or that Pakistan and India will now form closer relations.

President Ziaul Haq, after his return from Oman said now familiar words, that he had a very agreeable meeting with Rajiv Gandhi and that the recent statements of Rajiv Gandhi would prove the success of his talks with Gandhi.

However, Prime Miniser Rajiv Gandhi made no statement after arriving from Oman. He made one statement on 13 November, though, which sounded slightly positive.

President Ziaul Haq has often said that he is conservative by nature, hence he is an optimist. That is why he paints an optimistic picture on such meetings to the nation.

It is good to be friendly with your neighbors. We also believe in having good relations with our neighbors. However, for example, we have noticed that when the occasion for indirect talks between Pakistan and the Karmal administration comes nearer, Afghan violations of our airspace increase. On the other hand, whenever Pakistan extends a hand of friendship to India, or holds high-level talks with India, Indian statements about Pakistan become harsh and more acetic.

Now once again, President Ziaul Haq assured the public of the good talks he held with the Indian prime minister in Oman, which in our opinion is an overstatement; the very day the president was being optimistic about his talks in Oman with Mr Rajiv Gandhi at a press conference in Islamabad, the Indian foreign minister was speaking the Indian Parliament--in the presence of Mr Rajiv Gandhi--about his doubts over the peaceful purposes of Pakistan's atomic energy program. What is more, he said with some finality that Pakistan had enough material to produce five atomic bombs. On this occasion Mr Rajiv Gandhi was also interjecting his remarks and answering certain questions raised in the Indian house. When the Indian foreign minister remarked that several countries were helping Pakistan in its atomic project, he was asked by the members to name those countries. At this point, Mr Rajiv Gandhi said that the names of those countries could not be mentioned in the parliament. He said any member interested in those names could call on him personally and find out. [passage omitted on further details of the question-and-answer session in the Indian parliament]

These series of accusations leveled against Pakistan clearly show that the Indian leadership is not sincere in its claims of friendship with Pakistan. If it were sincere the campaign of maligning Pakistan would have somewhat ceased or abated.

We are not ready to accept that the last meeting between President Ziaul Haq and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, or any other previous meeting, has had any result. Until the real meeting of minds is achieved little should be expected. Just a handshake is not enough.

/7358
CSO: 4656/28

SPEEDIER RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY URGED

GF061316 Lahore NAWA-E WAQT in Urdu 29 Nov 85 p 3

[Editorial: "A Conducive Atmosphere for Restoration of Democracy"]

[Excerpts] Legal and administrative preparations to bid farewell to martial law are in the final stage but the series of simultaneous restrictions imposed on political leaders and a ban on their movement from one province to another has created grounds for discontent and complaints. It is antithetical that preparations for the restoration of democracy should take place alongside such undemocratic actions which were routine during the tenure of martial law in the country. This creates the misgiving that when democracy is restored it will merely be martial law in disguise. A positive answer to this state of affairs would be for the government to meet its opponents in the political fields and not depend on bans and restrictions.

The recent statement by Federal Minister of Information and Broadcasting Hamid Nasir Chatha that "we will meet our opponents on the political arena because we are certain that the people will be with us rather than with the MRD because they have actively participated in the polls and given us a vote of confidence for 5 years" is very heartening and appropriate.

We are now passing through a transitional phase from the political point of view and whatever the intentions of the democracy-loving politicians may be, the fact is that democracy has not yet been restored, nor has martial law been lifted. This inchoate democracy is analogous to the setting of a fractured bone which is still in a plaster cast. Hence, it is necessary to be cautious in every step we take.

In his speech at the inaugural session of the National Assembly, President Ziaul Haq said that "it is better to cool the food before eating it." Even though this was addressed to the newly-elected National Assembly members it also implies that the politicians should not be hasty and should not do anything during the transitional period which might jeopardize the restitution of democracy or hamper the process. It is no wonder that, after 8 and 1/2 years of martial law, the cup of their patience is brimming over but the conditions at home and the external dangers looming overhead are such that any untimely or impatient step by the politicians could ruin the process.

As far as the implications of the "encounter in the political arena" are concerned, those who were unsuccessful or did not participate for one reason or the other could not participate in the elections should wait for the next elections and should endeavor to work for their success. This does not mean merely to hold meetings or raise slogans but to do some "homework" and assess the nature of problems confronting the country and this kind of perspicacity has been lacking in our politicians throughout these years. We have numerous political parties and we hear the echoes of their slogans but we do not see that acumen, that insight, which are the demands of solid democratic institutions and concerted planning. This is that fundamental weakness that does not allow the struggle and sacrifices for democracy to achieve success and bear fruit. We have become the kind of nation which considers martial law the only path to salvation and the struggle for democracy under the aegis of martial law seems our only achievement.

The imposition of martial law for over 8 years is no minor tragedy but now that the path is being prepared for the restoration of democracy, the politicians should not be whetting their knives, but preparing to dress the wounds of the past which were inflicted in the period when there was a vacuum instead of democracy. Hence, they should give a chance to the bedridden chronic patient to recuperate and grow healthy.

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CSO: 4656/28

PAKISTAN

COMMENTARY VIEWS ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES

GF081337 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 11 Nov 85 p 4

[Editorial: "Role of Political Parties"]

[Text] Syed Fakhar Imam, the speaker of the National Assembly, has once again emphasised the vital importance of political parties for long-term working of the democratic system. He said, since ultimately the political parties have to emerge in our system, the shorter the interim period the better it would be. The timely observations of the speaker are pertinent to the issue with which the current session of the National Assembly would be preoccupied. The proposed law will not only determine the process through which the parties are to be restored but will also define their role in the new political set-up. For the past eight years political parties have been viewed as rival contenders for power and efforts have been made either to isolate them or by-pass them. It seems that despite the initiation of a democratic process and induction of civilian institutions, there is still some reluctance to accord legitimacy to the political parties. The times have changed and the realities of the new situation warrant re-orientation of attitude towards the role of political parties.

It seems that in some circles the parties are associated with chaos and instability. There are apprehensions that as soon as the parties are revived they will indulge in irresponsible agitational activities. The envisaged phased programme of the revival of political parties is indicative of such a frame of mind. With the induction of the democratic system the perception of political stability and law and order should also change. Democracy must tolerate divergence and dissidence, and articulation of grievances through mass mobilisation should not be considered an attempt to disrupt unity or stability. The parties should be recognised as an essential and integral part of the democratic system and no attempt should be made either to limit their role or prolong the interim period. Hopefully, the proposed parties act will not be perceived as one of the ad hoc measures which in the past have created a great deal of confusion and uncertainty. It should be aimed at creating a durable political system in which political paties are accorded their legitimate position.

/7358
CSO: 4600/131

ALLEGED PLANS FOR STATE OF EMERGENCY OPPOSED

GF131459 Rawalpindi HAIDAR in Urdu 6 Dec 85 p 3

[Editorial: "Muslim League, A Government Party"]

[Text] A paper has reported that Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo is in favor of making the Muslim League a government party, and that prior to lifting martial law and declaring a state of emergency, he wants to have his party established. It is believed that a large number of National Assembly and senate members will join this party.

Like others, the prime minister undoubtedly also has the right to set up his own party under any name. The National Assembly members or the senators have the rights to participate in the prime minister's party, or in any other party for that matter; this right cannot be challenged. However, the news that is very upsetting is that the prime minister intends to set up his party soon after lifting martial law and before declaring a state of emergency. If this news is correct, then it would mean that a state of emergency in the country is to be declared as soon as martial law is lifted. The people who know the hidden meanings of such declarations also know that clamping a state of emergency on a country amounts to depriving the citizens of their basic rights.

Basic rights are suspended even now due to martial law. People have been waiting for the lifting of martial law for the last 8 years because they wanted restoration of their basic rights. If a state of emergency is declared soon after lifting martial law then it would mean the death of people's hopes and aspirations. In such a case, the nation would be justified in raising its voice in an orderly way to protest. We pray that the civilian government may not commit the error of declaring a state of emergency. If the civilian government insisted on committing this mistake the responsibility for any unpleasant consequences would fall on the shoulders of the prime minister and his colleagues.

/8309
CSO: 4656/29

PAKISTAN

OIL PRODUCTION SITUATION REVIEWED

GF121842 Lahore JANG in Urdu 9 Dec 85 p 3

[Editorial: "Growth in Oil Output"]

[Text] Federal Minister of State for Natural Resources Dr Muhammad Asad Khan in a question-answer session in the National Assembly said that during the last 2 years there has been a 96-percent increase in oil output in the country. During the same period a sum of 6.464 billion rupees worth of foreign exchange was saved. Due to the efforts of the present regime, there has been a growth in the production of oil and gas in the country. The average of drilling of experimental wells has also been much more than that of the past regimes. The energy crisis in Pakistan has resulted in stepped up efforts in locating oil and gas reserves in the country. It is a matter of satisfaction that the sector of oil and gas exploration has been handed over to a technocrat who is fully aware of the land of our country. He is also internationally well known in this line. It is due to the present regime that it has selected appropriate personnel for the various jobs. Drilling is going on at the coastal areas close to Karachi. The experience thus gained will be useful in exploring offshore oil deposits. Another happy event in the country is that oil drilling rigs are now being made in the country. The first rig with 90 percent of its parts made in Pakistan, is already in use. A sum of 1.315 billion rupees has been earmarked by the government in the current financial year for the oil and gas exploration sector.

A separate item of 630 million rupees has been set aside by the government for providing facilities in the petroleum sector. The private sector is also being encouraged to invest in this line. It is hoped that these efforts will help the country to overcome the oil crisis. We would also invite the attention of the regime toward economizing in oil. Car imports should be restricted. Unrestricted use of imported cars should also be banned. The petrol thus saved would mean less expenditure in our foreign exchange.

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CSO: 4656/29

END

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Near East/South Asia Report

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BROAD STUDY SURVEYS LANDLORDS' GRIEVANCES

Struggle Between Landlords, Tenants

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic 8 Nov 85 pp 12-17

[Article by Raja' 'Abdallah, Rabi' Abu al-Khayr, Muhammad al-Shadhili, Ghali Muhammad and Sayyid Zaki]

[Text] In its upcoming session, the People's Assembly will observe the draft of a law presented by the Ministry of Agriculture in the name of the National Party government to realize justice for 16 million landlords and tenants who are the two sides to the struggle regarding this issue. The draft law is to contain a review of land tax value and a discussion on raising per-feddan rents over their current level. It will also address itself to the problem of the bequest of contracts to the heirs of tenants after the death of the latter. The problem is great in magnitude when we realize that 40 percent of Egypt's area is farmed by tenants in various ways. Now that 30 years have elapsed during which the economic and social conditions of the landowners and tenants have changed, it has been necessary to seek a solution to alleviate the intensity of the struggle and tension which have increased in recent years between landlords and tenants in order to maintain the stability of social peace in the society and guarantee that the productivity of the land will not deteriorate.

AL-MUSAWWAR went down into the villages of some governorates in Upper and Lower Egypt and the canal to conduct an investigation on the actual ground and record the real testimony of the parties to the struggle. The landlords' view is that it is necessary to raise rents now that the prices of crops have risen and the revenues they receive from them are paltry. The tenants acknowledge that the landlords are unjustly treated and request that the rents be raised gradually, so that attention may be given to their own circumstances. Agricultural experts said that permanent contracts between landlords and tenants do not provide adequate flexibility for the attainment of the government's goals and that there is no dipute over the landlord's right to obtain an attractive yield, but they are opposed to the expulsion of tenants from their land. Researchers consider that current rental policy embodies a severe injustice to landlords and leads to a deterioration in the productivity of the land. The opposition parties unanimously agreed that it was necessary to realize justice and issue a law regulating the relationship between the two parties once that is thoroughly studied.

The land reform laws issued in 1952 and 1961 managed to change the map of agricultural ownership in Egypt, realizing social justice for millions of peasants and people working on the land and bringing the inverted pyramid back to its proper condition. Prior to the issuance of the law, the land was in the hands of a small number of landowners, with no more than 2,000 representing 1 percent of the owners and owning more than 1 million feddans of land!

Once ownership was restricted to 100 feddans per person, the number of owners came to 3 million, possessing 3.7 million feddans.

If to that one adds the number of owners of land reclaimed in the period 1952-80, which came to 1,181,000 feddans, we will find that small farmers owning agricultural land now number more than 4 million.

Thirty-three years of time have passed, bringing many social changes in conditions in the Egyptian countryside with them. Concomitantly, the screams of landowners demanding justice and equity have started to grow loud.

The years have brought on a process of migration from rural areas to towns, as children have moved to schools and universities and those who have graduated have proceeded to live in Cairo and the capitals of the regions. Fathers owning land have died, the inheritance has been distributed among children, and they have found it necessary to rent the land out to tenants, who farm it for a material amount determined by contract between them or by the law which sets the per-feddan rent at seven times tax.

The years have also brought with them the forefathers' weakness in persevering in the face of time and the migration of manpower abroad in search of a livelihood, so that the forefathers also turned to the trap of renting and landowners became remote from the land, living out their days in anticipation of what the tenants would pay them.

Then the years also brought further change. Prices have risen increasingly with the passage of time, the requirements of living and life have increased and burned the landlords with their flame, along with the others who have been burned, and they have come to require an additional income, but the land has not been provident to people who live far away from it.

The pyramid was inverted once again. The land is owned by people who do not benefit from it, and the people who benefit from it do not own it. Landowners have sought to get rid of it by selling to people who would devote themselves to it full time, but they have not found anyone to buy land which in reality is in other people's hands, that is, in the hands of tenants; 2.24 million feddans, representing 40 percent of the land of Egypt, have been converted into rented land.

The prices of farmland have increased astonishingly and landowners have come to possess great wealth though dying without acquiring it. It is frozen wealth, lacking an attractive yield for its owners.

The problem has manifested itself clearly -- the problem of the relationship between landlord and tenant, which of them is the real owner of the land, which of them is the oppressor and which is the oppressed.

However, the answer does not come as easily or simply as one might imagine. It has become apparent that the location of the land makes a difference as between one region and another. The Delta governorates are very different from those of the canal, and these in turn are different from the heart of Upper Egypt.

The type of crop also makes a difference. Vegetables and fruit differ from the main crops such as wheat, rice and cotton, and the differences are numerous.

The form of the relationship between landlord and tenant also makes a difference. This assumes three forms: a cash rental contract, a contract between landlord and tenant where the landowner receives seven times the tax as a price for the land, as the law stipulates (a form which accounts for 81 percent of the amount of land rented out), a participation contract between landlord and tenant, where the landlord obtains half the crop though he is remote from the land, and the final form, where the landlord and tenant share in farming the land and dividing up its yield.

Each of these forms has its positive and negative features but ultimately gives the advantage to the tenant.

Therefore, it has been necessary that AL-MUSAWWAR review each of these differences and the effect derived from them on the relationship between the landlord and tenant, so that the truth could be drawn from the ground of reality.

We must mention that we, all the editors, started the excursion with feelings that were totally different from those it ended with. We traveled to the villages and towns bearing a feeling impregnated with sympathy for the tenant in our hearts, a traditional feeling that he was the party that was sinned against, and an increasing enthusiasm to defend him, out of fear that the landlord would predominate or that sympathizing with him would increase his power. However, we came back with a totally different feeling, a feeling which the reader will discern and share with us after reading this article.

The Picture in Asyut

We started the excursion in Asyut, the capital of Upper Egypt. We found that one could offer as a summary of the picture there that the landowners were sitting in armchairs with their land mortgaged, built upon and subleased.

In Asyut they say "If you are in the right, do not turn to the courts!" Seizure is not advantageous to landowners because the tenant makes his payment to the money-changer into the land tax account. The situation reaches the point where crimes are committed in the event total despair grips some landowners or a state of pride over committing crimes prevails among some strong tenants. The result, as Brig Gen Husni al-Daba', director of criminal intelligence in Asyut, replied when I asked him "Do these severe disputes between landowners and tenants reach you?" is "Corpses, wounded people, enmity and new grounds for revenge reach us!"

The agricultural engineer Fikri Hafiz al-Far, secretary general of the governorate, a landowner who worked for 18 years in the Agrarian Reform [Department], said:

"The damage always falls on the small landowners. The tenants today give the owners crumbs. What does the landowner do, especially if he is a government employee and has children in school and university? A social disruption has occurred, one result of which has been that the tenants get the whole crop and the landowner gets only the crumbs."

He recommended "It is necessary that part of the land belong to the landowner and that he rent it out or dispose of it freely. At least, the landlord should get back 10 feddans, half of what he owns, especially landowners who are transferred to retirement so that they can earn from them. We must face this problem boldly.

"Raising rents is no solution, because the result will be a rise in crop prices. In addition, putting rental contracts on an annual basis is an incorrect solution, because the landowners will expel the tenants as soon as the year ends, and this will guarantee that a revolution will be created in Egypt."

Participation Is Necessary

Counsellor Rif'at al-Sayyid, chief of court and a major landowner, said,

"The participation system of farming between the landowner and tenant is necessary in cases where the landowner is a peasant. The land must provide a suitable rent to landowners who engage in another job as a profession by increasing the value of the tax imposed on the land or having the landlord accept the system of participating in farming with the tenant. People who own less than 3 feddans (small farmers and landowners) must, if they do not have another occupation besides farming, be given the ability to regain their land in full in two cases:

"The first case is that if the original tenant dies the rental contract should not pass on to his heirs. The second case is where the original tenant has another occupation besides farming."

Al-Hajj 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abd-al-Wahid is a major tenant but in spite of that demanded that the tax on farmland be increased, saying,

"The landowner is treated unfairly because the rental value per feddan is about 60 pounds a year, of which he pays 12 pounds in taxes, and what does he do in this time? The solution is to increase the rent until things are in balance and justice becomes prevalent. I say this though I am a tenant."

Dr Salih Hasan Farraj, deputy minister of agriculture in the Governorate of Asyut, said, "To me the solution is to raise per-feddan rents in the light of the rise in crop prices. Moreover, the peasants do not just farm the land once a year. Is it the sin of anyone who has 5 feddans as the result of an inheritance or personal labors to sit and watch his land? The optimum solution for agricultural production, and I say this as an official, is for the landowner to have the freedom to rent out to anyone, by temporary sharecropping contract or participation, on the basis of the prevailing prices in the rural areas, and the tenant must get the land for a feasible rent and an annually-renewed contract.

"As an official, I consider that the best types of rental are temporary sharecropping contracts or participation, because both the landlord and the tenant receive a reasonable return. Through the statistics, you find that the productivity of a person who gets a rental contract for a year is high because he is fighting to realize a greater return and pay off the rent."

How Can We Break up the Scuffles?

Muhammad 'Abd-al-Muhsin, chairman of the local people's assembly for the Governorate of Asyut, who farms 122 feddans and owns 17, which he rents out, said:

"It is in the interests of any landowner to divide the land or raise the rent. This is normal.

"The scuffles between landlords and tenants can be resolved by reappraising rents every 3 years in accordance with constant price increases. Peasants are committed to paying stipulated amounts of money which increase annually, and according to the cooperative marketing statute they are committed to supplying quantities of wheat, fava beans and lentils at prices below the world markets. These prices do not compensate the peasants for their effort but let the consumer obtain these commodities at reasonable prices. These are recovered one way or another by the people as a whole. If land rents increase in a manner which is not compatible with the prices of the crops they supply to the government, the peasants will turn away from the land and abandon it. If the per-feddan rents rise, it is necessary to raise the prices of the crops. Ultimately all these increases will be recovered through the ordinary citizen in Egypt."

Why Do the Peasants Procrastinate?

Concerning the phenomenon of the evasion of payment of modest rents by most tenants, Muhammad 'Abd-al-Muhsin said, "The annual production per feddan in some places yields the peasants only enough to cover the costs of production and their costs of living, and they are left with nothing by which to pay rent. They are compelled to procrastinate sometimes. Any new law issued on behalf of the landlord without considering the tenants will be a major disaster. The peasant will commit suicide on the land. Even if the tenant procrastinates in paying the rent, the court rules that he should be evicted from the land and the police come to carry out the verdict, it is the tenant who goes to the land and farms it, and the landlord is compelled to reach an understanding with him. Not 1 percent of the eviction verdicts are carried out except in cases of force and landlord's influence. However, the disputes continue and people become victims, to the point where half a feddan has led to the murder of 28 people in our village."

At the Mansi home in the village of Bani Muhammadiyat, the basic property was 800 feddans. The property was broken up and each member of the family now has 40 to 50 feddans. Since most of them became educated and got government jobs, they rented out the land to farmers and entered the vortex of collecting rent from the tenants. Prior to the campaign to collect weapons from villages in Upper Egypt, making a request for rent was dangerous in itself and a weak landowner could not make a request of a strong tenant without being treated contemptibly and dealt with in a bad manner. In 1977, the date of the weapon-collecting campaign, they started to demand rents and have not obtained more than 10 percent of what was owed them. Since they have not obtained rent at all for years, real estate taxes have accumulated against them and they are now demanding 10,000 pounds in arrears. Hilmi Mansi said, "Our relationship with the tenants is disturbing and we obtain rents only as beggars." Riyad Mansi said, "I farmed 18 feddans and they took that from me by pressure and intimidation." The wife of Mr Falubus, who owns 37 feddans, said,

"Isn't it outrageous that the rent should be 50 pounds per feddan and when I ask the tenant I get 25 pounds and pay 25 pounds in taxes? I have a water buffalo for which I rented out 12 qirats for 300 pounds, and I have land. I have 11 qirats which 'Abd-al-Muhaymin took, and he has not given me a single millieme for 11 years. Everytime I ask him for the rent he screams at me and says the land comes to just 9 qirats. Moreover, is it in perpetuity? If his heart is merciful he gives me 5 pounds, and if I want to sell it he asks for half.

"'Amm 'Uthman bought a feddan from my son for 2,000 pounds and sold it the next day for 13,000 in cash. My son got 1,000 pounds, and the other 1,000 he is getting in instalments. 'Amm Hamdan bought some feddans from the family for 6,000 pounds and sold them the same week for 16,000, and has not paid us the rest of the amount yet. Al-Hajj Kamil Husayn rents 3 feddans and a qirat from me, and does not pay me rent."

The Tenant Is Stronger Than the Landlord

In the village of Bani Murr, we met with 'Ali 'Atiyah Husayn, who owns 5 feddans and rents out parts of them. He told us,

"You can say that the tenant is now stronger than the landlord. The tenant is the new feudal tyrant. Therefore, I recommend that a law be passed which will enable the landlord to recover property he owns of less than 5 feddans. It is necessary to amend the agrarian reform law so that justice will be set right."

The agricultural engineer Jamal Iskandar Ibrahim of the agricultural society in Bani Murr said, "The landlord gets 60 piasters a month from renting out a feddan, while the tenant gets 60 pounds. The landlords recommend that the tenant leave the land to them and that they pay him the rent!

"The agricultural society was the body which resolved disputes. The committee to break up disputes has been eliminated and the matter has been submitted to the judiciary."

In Bani Murr, we found the farmer Muhammad Mustafa Abu al-'Ala, a landowner, working with a tenant, though the land was his father's property!

Al-Hajj 'Ali 'Abd-al-Wahhab of the village of Bani Muhammadiyat said:

"Farming is not my occupation. I own 20 feddans along with my brothers and cannot find land to farm. It is all rented out. Therefore, I have been appointed to the Health [Ministry]. The 20 feddans are rented out not to a single tenant but to a number of them, and they are distributed among a number of areas. The tenants of the land do not pay the rent in a friendly manner. The payment of the rent is due on 1 October, and no one has paid yet in spite of the meagerness of the rent.

"We, two brothers and six girls, get only 500 pounds from the 20 feddans we own, and in order to get that I spend a similar amount moving around and on transportation. The tenants' procrastination is unlimited. In collecting the rent, I observe strange methods."

One story we heard in the village of al-Shahabiyah is that a lady went to ask the tenant for the new rent and the overdue rent; she owned 4 feddans. She was sworn and cursed at and to vindicate her honor sold the land to a strongman for a few pounds and handed the deed over to him. along with the indebtedness on it. This strongman managed to evict the tenant.

Hamid Jawdah al-Shaykh, a big landowner, who was "under sequestration," said that the tenants on his land sublet it for 500 pounds per feddan and procrastinate in paying him 50 pounds. [He said] "One cannot prove subleasing cases and no one testifies on my behalf, unfortunately. That is a total crime in the real meaning of the word. There are laws but it is difficult to carry them out."

Brig Gen Husni al-Daba', director of criminal investigation in the Asyut security department, said, "Ninety-nine percent of the incidents in the governorate arise from agricultural problems and disputes between landowners and tenants. The struggle over farmland is the catalyst of the incidents here."

A Surprise in Al-Gharbiyah

When we went down to the village of Tatay in the district of al-Santa in al-Gharbiyah Governorate, the suprise was that the majority of the tenants favored an increase in land rents, albeit a relative, conditional one. They agreed that the landlord was also unfairly treated and that he was at the mercy of inflation. However, landlords have other occupations on which they depend while the tenants have only the land they work, and they ask that that be taken into account in the increase and also that all the changes that have occurred in the Egyptian countryside be taken into account.

The difference in views between landlord and tenant is embodied in the calculation of the cost of agricultural accessories and the yield per feddan. The former raises the cost and the latter lowers it. For example, a tenant quoted the yield from the crop of a feddan of cotton at the equivalent of 104 pounds, 80 pounds of which he paid in rent to the landowner; ultimately, he was left with just 24 pounds.

The landlord differed over the estimate. He stated that a feddan of cotton gave a net yield estimated at 300 pounds, to which one should add 200 pounds as the yield from growing bersim, so that the net yield became 500 pounds, 70 pounds of which he paid to the landlord; thus the net became 430 pounds per feddan.

'Ali Wardah pointed out to us that a feddan of vegetables earned him 500 pounds a year.

If the above figures, overall and on the average, mean that the tenant realizes a great income per feddan of land which is not in keeping with the landowner's income, we must first of all find out the tenant's opinion.

'Abd-al-Mu'ti Yunis al-Shinawi, a landowner and tenant, said:

"Yes, crop prices are better today than before, and I am in favor of an increase in land rents for the landowner, because he has children and expenses."

'Abd-al-'Aziz Abu al-'Azm Sa'd, who owns a feddan and a half and rents 2 feddans, stressed that the income from the land was not enough for him and his six children and that the rent on the land must not be raised in these circumstances of inflation. The landlord has another occupation which he depends on, and an increase in the per-feddan rent to 100 pounds is to be considered a great amount.

'Abd-al-'Azim al-Shinawi, with a feddan owned and 2 feddans rented, said, "I have eight children, including six girls. The landowner is a government employee and the income from the land is not enough. The workforce is unfair with the tenant."

'Abd-al-Qadir Khurshid, an old man, has 6 qirats owned and 10 qirats rented. [He said] "This acreage is not enough for me and my children, and I work as a farmer for this reason. I cannot put up with the landlord's rights. I gave the landlord an increase over the rent specified in a friendly fashion, but he deceived me and complained to me over getting these paltry qirats, but what do the 10 qirats yield us that he should increase their rent?"

Al-Sayyid Mahmud Yunus, who owns 2 feddans, that is, is not a tenant, nonetheless felt solidarity with tenants and said "They are unfairly treated. No one can pay the prices."

Mahmud Ahmad Khalil, with half a feddan rented, said, "A sudden increase would be difficult for tenants, and it is better that there be a gradual increase each year."

Rents in the Black Market

Before addressing ourselves to the landlords' views on this issue, we must mention that we heard about the phenomenon of landlords and land tenants who were not able to farm renting land out to others so that the rental per qirat increased in accordance with supply and demand and the crop cycle. The rent for a qirat of land rose to between 15 and 25 pounds, meaning that the rent per feddan in this black market has ranged from 460 to 640 pounds.

Eng 'Abd-al-Ra'uf, manager of the agricultural society in Tatay, said "If the peasant's land is all farmed with a consolidated crop in accordance with the crop cycle, he has the right to rent land for the period of one season from another farmer to farm crops that are required for his home and his cattle. This is a legal loophole since every season the tenants rent out their land to others on the black market but do not rent it out on a permanent basis to other farmers, lest they be subject to the law.

"This phenomenon has driven the landowners to get their land back. In addition to this, there is the rise in prices of land lying in the built-up zone, which has made some landowners negotiate with the tenants to get their land back."

'Abd-al-'Aziz Turki, head of the village of Mit Ghazal, with 80 feddans rented, said, "The rent was set years in the past. Circumstances have changed, crop prices have increased, inflation is inundating the landowner and he has no income except the income from his land. Of the rent that I obtain, 60 pounds per feddan, I pay 12 pounds in taxes due the government; I am left with 48 pounds per feddan. My total income from the 80 feddans after deductions is 8,340 pounds a year [sic], that is, about 315 pounds a month on the average. The amount has brought the rent per feddan to 150 pounds a year. This does not entail injustice to the tenant, who realizes 1,000 pounds a year in income per feddan.

"I also consider that rentals should not be handed down as an inheritance, because this is something that is unheard of. It should be considered an injustice. If I rent out a feddan, that is unlawful, because if a tenant holds onto the land for a period by farming that will come to eight times a feddan. The ordinary tenant, the peasant, rents out a feddan a number of times in accordance with the number of crops per year and consequently obtains several times the ordinary rent he pays to the landowner. Not every landowner has another job. Even if he does, he has the right to get an increase in rent."

'Abd-al-'Aziz Rajab said "The government's protection of the tenant and response to all his demands have caused him to keep doing what he is doing. It is the tenant who has stripped off the farmland to sell it to brick factories, without the landlord's knowledge.

"In addition, the tenant is supposed to relinquish the land which is turned into land for buildings.

"I recommend that the system of participation prevail between the landlord and tenant so that the two parties will benefit from this land."

Muhammad Ja'far, the owner of a grocery shop, with 10 feddans rented out, said, "My income from this land is no more than 460 pounds a year and there are 10 people in my family. What can I do with 40 pounds a month? My monthly expenditures are more than 400 pounds. My daughter, a student at the university, spends 150 pounds a month, that is, the equivalent of the annual income from 3 feddans.

"I consider that if the rent per feddan comes to 200 pounds, the tenant will gain. An ardebb of corn is now about 25 pounds."

Why Aren't They on Equal Footing with the Owners of Buildings?

Muhammad al-Bandari Hijab, who works as a tailor and has 12 feddans rented out, said, "I do not want land to farm; rather, we want an increase in rent which is in keeping with the landlord's needs. Why isn't land treated like buildings and why doesn't the law let people who own more than 5 rented feddans have a space where they are acknowledged, like someone who has a building and has a share of apartments which he can dispose of?"

Ahmad al-'Uways, who has 5 rented feddans, said, "The government promised us a number of times to review the relationship between landlords and tenants, but that has not happened. Circumstances have changed. The tenant now is dealing in land, not engaging in farming but subleasing the land in an unlawful way. I consider that the per-feddan rent should be raised to 250 pounds, measured by black market prices. I consider that the tenant should stay on the land with an increase in rents."

Muhammad al-Wardani, who has 27 qirats rented out, said, "The feddan I farm is not enough to meet living requirements. I have five children who are studying in school." As a peasant engaged in agriculture, he considered "The tenant gains, and I as a small property owner working in agriculture am more entitled to farm my land, which is small in area." His wife Najat Muhammad Sulayman interrupted, saying "The rent per feddan must come to 300 pounds a year."

Hanim 'Abd-al-'Al, from the village of al-Hamadiyah, Birkat al-Sab', owns 6 qirats rented out and said, "I want this small area for dill-farming, so that I can see my children. My husband married another woman and left me without any income!"

Muhammad Sulayman al-Shabakah, the moneychanger in the village of Qitay, said, "The tenants' power is now greater than that of the landowners, now that the phenomenon of subleasing land, where the tenant gets 500 pounds per feddan as rent and pays just 75 to the landlord, has become widespread. Out of the latter amount the landlord pays the government taxes and insurance ranging from 10 to 12 pounds.

"This year the rent will rise to 30 pounds for land included under the tile drainage project. This will be better than the old system."

Eng Sayyid 'Awadallah of the agricultural society in Qitay said, "Subleasing land to more than one farmer results in the deterioration of the productivity of the land, because the land tenant is concerned only with his farming and puts a burden on the land to realize the greatest output."

On Canal Land

The land in the Governorate of the Canal is almost owned by the tenants, since it has become a legacy of theirs. Sons inherit land rental contracts from fathers. It is land which is not bound to delivering crops to the government. Fruit and vegetables are farmed on most of it, realizing the highest productivity and quality.

We paused before some of this good land in I'ta'ah, five hundred expansive feddans, green in color, with fine crops. Some peasants there replied that they were farming plots of land in participation with Shaykh al-Yamani. Shaykh al-Yamani is the tenant and has taken over all this land. After hesitating they answered, most bluntly, "The fact is that the landowner is oppressed, oppressed, oppressed."

How so?

The 500 feddans are owned by a large family. Shaykh al-Yamani rented it all more than 30 years ago. He grew fruit and vegetables on it. How much does Shaykh al-Yamani pay the landowners? He pays 60 pounds per feddan a year. He said simply that that was the rent the law had stipulated, which was seven times the tax.

When he saw the amazement on our faces, he smiled and said that he had been paying this rent recently. According to the rental agreement, he had previously been paying 25 pounds.

How much does he earn from a feddan? The situation differs from crop to crop, but the minimum for the tomato crop, for example, is 1,500 pounds, and the price is double in the case of the fruit crop!

The landowner takes 60 pounds, and the tenant's earnings, after deduction of costs, are no less than 1,000 pounds.

The tragedy here is that the landowners live on the land. They are not absent from it. They have homes in the middle of the land.

The peak of the tragedy comes when we realize that because they cannot farm the whole area by themselves, the tenants sublease it to other tenants through participation, and do not vacate the rental contracts. Stranger than all that, the owners of the land itself have also been compelled to rent areas from tenants on the basis of participation, in order to seek the aid of their work on the land to meet living costs.

Ultimately, they own the 500 feddans of land on paper only. Reality states that the real landowners here are the tenants and their sons, during their lives and beyond, and that the law allows the sons to inherit the rental contracts.

Eternal Rental Agreements!

In another of the numerous conditions which are similar in circumstances, the tenant is al-Hajj 'Abd-al-Sattar and the landlord is in the town. The land has been in the tenant's hands for 30 years. He pays rent of 70 pounds per year per feddan for it. The landlord now wants part of the land to be returned to him. His son is a graduate agricultural engineer. However, he cannot go back. The rental contract is almost eternal. The son of the tenant is preparing as of now to inherit it from his father.

These cases repeat themselves the length and breadth of the governorate, especially since the area has been subjected to emigration more than once and the land has been left to tenants. When the owners of the land returned they had no way to get the land back. It remained with the tenants. There is no way to sell, no matter how many small parts the ownership may be broken down into, because the tenants refuse to buy it for more than half the price prevailing in the region.

In Al-Daqahliyah the Situation Is Different

The situation in the Governorate of al-Daqahliyah is different from that in the other governorates. Al-Daqahliyah is bound to farm the main crops, which are wheat, cotton and rice, and to deliver them to the government.

Mrs 'A'idah Mahmud, who inherited a number of feddans here and lives in Cairo, said:

"The land now is a burden on the people who own it, whether the relationship between the landowner and the tenant is a direct rental one or one in the form of partnership." In the latter case, which is the one that connects her to the tenant, her share of the production is determined in accordance with the basic crop, which is wheat, for example, or rice, while the tenant benefits from all the crops he sells for his own private account, for instance bersim, whose price is several times greater than that of wheat. The peasant also sells the chaff of the wheat for his own account, and the tenant can make calculations with the landlord on the basis of a quantity less than the real quantity a feddan produces. In addition, there are excesses in the prices of the materials used in farming.

[She said] "There have been times when I, the landlord, have paid the tenant close to 300 pounds per feddan. The fact is that this may be attributed first of all to existing flaws in agricultural policy. The agricultural society and the village bank impose taxes and requirements in which the tenant and the landlord both lose themselves, especially with respect to the prices of crops and the quantities which have to be delivered. Because these are decrees which are issued at a distance from actual circumstances, they lead to many results which harm not just the landlord but also the land and national product.

Deliberately Keeping the Land Fallow!

"For example, some tenants now refuse to farm the main crops and prefer to pay fines. Some others leave the land fallow while they go to regular jobs which earn them better money. This statement does not arise from a vacuum. I personally left 3 feddans of land unplanted this year, because we did not find anyone to farm it.

"Selling the land is out of the question now, because land where there is a tenant is sold vacant only. The tenant will bargain with the landlord either to get all of half the price to abandon the land or to pay only half the price himself and buy it.

"In any case, the landlord is the loser and the tenant is the beneficiary.

"In my opinion, the payment of rent is not enough. A review of the entire economic policy is what is needed. It is necessary to raise the purchase price of the crop and properly estimate it so that we can encourage peasants to be interested in the land and in farming it, as well as to define what is to be delivered to the government in a realistic manner. The farmers give an example of rice farming, when the societies requested that two and a half daribas of rice be handed over per feddan, which does not produce this much. They had either to buy it from the black market or pay the fine.

"What is strange is that the ministry asked the persons harmed by the bad crop, who sought to complain, to pay the sum of 100 pounds to prove the seriousness of their complaint.

"It is also necessary that the rental contract be confined to the tenant only and that rights not be transferred from him to his children after him, so that the contract becomes a legacy, especially since many of these children do not work the land themselves, but move to the cities and sublease the land on their own behalf."

A Neutral View

Al-Hajj Sayyid 'Ali, a man who is neutral, considers the whole issue facing himself in all its aspects, and is knowledgeable about the minute details of it; he lives on land which he farms and owns, knows its cost and productivity and speaks objectively. He said,

"The optimum situation is for the person who owns the land to farm it, but since this situation is not easy to find, the laws governing the relationship between landlords and tenants, most important of which is the eternal nature of the contract, must be reviewed. The rental agreement must be for a limited period and renewable if both parties are satisfied, with the rent to be determined each time in accordance with actual production and production prices.

"The provision must be that the law give consideration to compelling the landlord to farm the land in the event he gets it back, so that he will not convert it into another situation and the farmland declines."

"Thus, people in all situations are in agreement over the need for a law which will bring about justice between landlord and tenant.

What do the two parties consider is appropriate for solving the rent problem?

The Search for a Solution Which Will Satisfy Both Parties

The village of al-Barajil: "At the same time the government must review amending rents in order to realize a kind of justice for the two parties. We must increase the rent four times above its current level. I believe that 300 pounds are a fair rent for the landowner to get, because no tenant's annual income now is less than 1,000 pounds per feddan on the average if he grows traditional crops such as wheat and corn and no less than 2,000 pounds if he farms non-traditional crops. This situation exists and it is not possible for a person who wants to set out a just solution to the problem to ignore it. It is true that farming costs have increased, but conversely crop prices have increased. It has become necessary to create a just formula governing the relationship between the landowner and the tenant which will reduce the severity of the tension which disturbs it now. I will give an example of pressure and dominance on the tenant's part: a short time ago I wanted to buy a feddan of land and agreed with the landowner over the sum of 20,000 pounds. Since the land had been 'occupied' by other tenants, I went to reach an understanding with them to complete the purchase. He [sic] agreed that I should pay him 25,000 pounds in key money to evacuate the land and of course I refused."

Rawash Jum'ah al-Mughrabi, a tenant, considered "The government should pay attention to the small tenants' circumstances. It is not reasonable that the tenant of a feddan or half a feddan should be the equal of another tenant working on more than 10 feddans, and it is necessary to take into account the circumstances of a person who owns 3 or 4 feddans of which he rents out one or two and another owner of more than 10 feddans who has rented out 2 feddans of that. Thus it is necessary to set out rules governing the relationship between the owner and the tenant to take these differences into account."

'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abd-al-Ghaffar has a different opinion. He recommended that the rent be gradated, so that it will be modified every so often to give attention to the landowner's circumstances. It is not reasonable that the landowner should get 90 pounds a year while the tenant's income is greater than 1,000 pounds.

Concerning the system of participation in farming, he said that that was a failure because it created a state of distrust between landowner and tenant. Participation, in his view, is acceptable in form but from the practical standpoint if it is applied its flaws become obvious. The tenants farm the land and view landowners as people who want to share the bounties of the land with them without exerting any effort, while the landowners view the tenants as persons who have plundered their land and been blessed with its bounties.

Another example of an owner of half a feddan is a government employee who inherited half a feddan from his father after he died. Salim 'Atiyah said, "The area I inherited is small and there is a tenant on it. I proposed to him to sell the land, because my house was in danger of collapsing at any time and it was necessary to destroy it and rebuild it. The tenant refused, although he is a government employee and owns property which brings him a large income, and his children are government employees. I am now bewildered. I was injured in war operations in 1973 during the gap, and left the army with 40 percent disability. I have no other income except my minor salary. I also proposed to the tenant that I sell half the area and he refused. What shall I do? Shall I beg? I wrote complaints about my situation to all the bodies, the office of the president and the Ministry of Agriculture, and I have not yet come up with a solution."

After this broad excursion over the length and breadth of the country, the urgent need to re-establish balance in the relationship between landowner and tenant and raise land rents in a manner which will bring about justice and eliminate tension between them became clearly apparent through consensus everywhere.

However, the views concerning ways to bring such justice about differed, although confined to these recommendations:

The level of rent should rise to no less than 10 times tax, rather than seven times, or the rent should be set according to the real yield of the land; rents should not be unified in the case of all the land; and attention must be paid to the nature of the crops farmed, their differences and the nature and location of the land.

The demand that rental contracts not be passed on to the sons of tenants by inheritance unless the latter are peasants farming the land themselves.

The rental contract should specify a time for review of the rent, after each period, with attention paid to the realization of stability for the peasant and a guarantee of his rights, so that we will not revert to a new feudalism which the landowners will create if the land is returned to them and the peasant comes to have no role except work as a wage-earner.

The demand that the timely collection of rent be guaranteed in sound ways without recourse to the judiciary, by having the village banks collect it and hand it over to the landowners. More accurately, the bank should be the guarantor of rental contracts.

Rents' Effect on Productivity

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic 8 Nov 85 p 15

[Text] This title was the subject of the thesis for a doctorate the researcher 'Atif Hilmi al-Shimi received in the Faculty of Agriculture at Asyut last year. He carried out a field study on 503 farms in the Governorate of Bani Suwayf, 244 of which were owned and 259 rented out. The researcher's choice of the Governorate of Bani Suwayf was justifiable, since it ranks first among governorates in the republic in terms of the ratio of rented land to the total area farmed throughout the governorate, which comes to 57.5 percent.

The researcher concluded that the average net income per feddan of land owned exceeded equivalent income on rented land. He broke down the categories of landowners and tenants into five tax groups in accordance with area farmed, ranked as follows: less than 5 feddans, 5 feddans, 8 feddans, 9 feddans and 10 feddans and more. The result was that landowners belonging to the first group and farming by themselves get 191 pounds per feddan on the average while what tenants in the same group get is no more than 142 pounds and that this comes to 319 and 252 pounds for landowners and tenants in the second category, 386 and 270 pounds for the third categroy, 463 and 333 pounds for the fourth category and 591 and 368 pounds for the fifth category.

Dr 'Atif Hilmi al-Shimi said that 92 percent of the landowners covered by the study confirmed that there were flaws and negative features in current rental policy and that the continuation of this policy, with the rules regulating relations between farmland owners and tenants it entails, constitutes an severe injustice to them in one area and leads to a deterioration in per-feddan agricultural productivity in another, as well as the collapse of social relations between the parties to this relationship in a third area.

The researcher recommended two methods for rectifying the relationship, one of which concerns the determination of what is known as "equity rent," which could be defined as a rent which will bring about stability in the ratio of the rent per feddan to the total costs of production per feddan. The second method is to estimate the general trend in per-feddan production costs and determine their average annual increase, and consider that a basis for defining the rent in the future. It is worth pointing out that the estimated equity rent for 1983 came to 367.65 pounds, which is very close to unrestricted rent, known as subleasing, which comes to 350 pounds. It is well known that the legal rent at present comes to 75 pounds per feddan.

The strange thing is that the legal rent per feddan, which is set at seven times the tax assessed on farmland, ranges from 9.8 to 78.4 pounds per year.

Landlords, Tenants Describe Figures

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic 8 Nov 85 p 17

[Text] In the village of al-Barajil in the Governorate of Giza, we listened to Farahat Mabruk 'Uwaydah, a peasant who owns 3 feddans, 1 feddan of which he has been renting out for 20 years, while he farms two. Farahat 'Uwaydah managed to give us a practical picture of the costs of farming a feddan with various crops and the income per feddan as well. He said:

"For me, as a peasant farming 2 feddans, wheat is a basic crop. The situation has now changed. It is true that wheat production now yields a feasible return for peasants, but there are other more profitable crops such as green onions, cauliflower, lettuce and bersim which have started to predominate in the land."

Farahat 'Uwaydah added, "I get 90 pounds from the tenant, out of which I pay money to the government, and I am left with 70 pounds. What should I do with this sort of sum, which can scarcely pay for a pack of cigarettes a day for a landowner? By simple arithmetic, if the tenant farms a feddan of wheat which stays in the ground for 3 months, his net income after costs will be 900 pounds!

"If we make calculations in black market prices, the average production of a feddan's yield is from 12 to 15 ardebbs. An ardebb sells for 25 pounds, so the total is 375 pounds, to which one should add straw or chaff, of which about 15 "straw loads" are sold per feddan, each load being sold for 40 pounds; that is, ultimately he will get 600 pounds.

"If we calculate the costs of wheat per feddan in current market prices, we will find that they are as follows: 8 balance-trays of seeds for 16 pounds, two plowings per feddan for 40 pounds, irrigation three times for 30 pounds, one and a half sacks of fertilizer for 20 pounds, harvesting for 80 pounds, a crop threshing for 50 pounds and winnowing for 50 pounds. If we add the rent for this period, at about 30 pounds, we will find that the total costs are 316 pounds. Therefore the tenant gets 650 pounds while the landlord gets only 30 pounds. That is, the wheat crop yields about 20 times the rent. Is this reasonable?"

1,000 Pounds in Revenues per Feddan of Bersim

'Abd-al-'Ati Sabir al-Mughrabi gave us another example of another traditional crop, bersim, which is more profitable than the others.

'Abd-al-'Ati al-Mughrabi, who owns more than 3 feddans, said, "It takes a third of a day to farm a feddan of bersim and it yields a return of 1,000 to 1,400 pounds. The costs of farming this in black market prices are as follows: seeds for 50 pounds, fertilizer for 25 pounds, irrigation 12 times at 120 pounds and plowing and farrowing at 40 pounds; thus the total costs are 235 pounds. If we calculate how the crop is sold, we must realize that all peasants harvest seven 'cuttings' per feddan, and a single cutting sells for 200 pounds; therefore if the landowner or tenant farms a feddan of bersim, his net income will be about 1,000 pounds and sometimes that comes to 2,000 pounds, if its price in the market is high.

'Abd-al-'Ati al-Mughrabi added, "Most peasants now have turned to farming non-traditional crops. Whereas corn and wheat were the two dominant crops in terms of acreage, other crops have now started to take up this space; for example, lettuce, which stays in the ground for 3 months, costs no more than 225 pounds and the yield of the crop is sold for 1,000 pounds.

"If we calculate the costs per feddan of lettuce on the basis of black market prices, we will find that each feddan requires 2 kilograms of seeds for 10 pounds, 5 sacks of super fertilizer for 25 pounds, 10 sacks of chemical fertilizer for 50 pounds, three hoeings at a cost of 25 pounds per hoeing, irrigation five times for 50 pounds and insecticide for 25 pounds; therefore the total cost is 185 pounds. That is, if a peasant is a landowner he will get a net income of about 815 pounds and if he is a tenant he will get 790 pounds, because he will pay 25 pounds in rent.

There No Longer Are Indigent Peasants!

Al-Hajj Mabruk Abu 'Atiyah, a model of a farmer-landowner who at the same time rents land to farm on a single-crop basis, agreed with him and said, "The lives of peasants today are totally different. They sell their crops at reasonable prices and have now become able to buy irrigation machinery and new threshers."

Al-Hajj Mabruk gave an example of the income a peasant gets, stating "In 1973 I rented a feddan from a farmer to plant with tomatoes for 150 pounds. The net income I obtained after costs was about 1,000 pounds. Meanwhile, the price of a feddan of farmland at that time was no more than 1,200 pounds -- that is, the return on farming a feddan of tomatoes was close to the price of buying a feddan of land."

'Ali Abu 'Atiyah, a tenant on 3 feddans since 1956, asserted that he paid 100 pounds in rent per feddan annually.

When we asked him about his income from farming, he pointed out to us that he farmed his land with tomatoes and lost 250 pounds per feddan.

Al-Hajj Sayyid 'Abd-al-Karim, who owns more than 5 feddans and farms the same crop, answered him, "This is not true. The tomato crop in the worst of circumstances covers its costs. A 'clever' peasant can realize 600 pounds per feddan after deducting the costs of the crop."

We asked al-Hajj Sayyid about the crops he farmed that gave him a feasible return.

He replied, "We are receptive to farming the sweet potato crop, which is a non-traditional crop, in order to solve the problem of fodder. The crop stays about 6 months in the ground and its cost is about 300 pounds in black market prices, while the crop sells for about 1,300 pounds. Peasants sell two 'growths' of sweet potato greens, that is, the green leaves; the first growth sells for 800 pounds and the second for 500 pounds. If we deduct the costs of farming from the sales price of the crop, the peasant will be left 1,000 pounds net."

Al-Hajj Sayyid 'Abd-al-Karim added, "There are other crops which provide a feasible yield, for example green onions, which it takes a month and a half to farm. Its actual cost is about 370 pounds in irrigation, plowing, fertilizer, insecticides and labor, while the crop sells for 1,000 pounds. Therefore the peasant's income in a month and a half comes to 630 pounds."

Conclusion

Therefore, by simple arithmetic, we can deduce the following facts:

Crops of tenants who farm a feddan of wheat cost 316 pounds and they sell wheat and straw for 795 pounds. They are left with a net income of 651 pounds over 3 months, while landlords get only 25 pounds of this income, which is the per-feddan rent for this period, and they get it at the end of the year.

If the tenant plants bersim on a single feddan, he will spend 235 pounds on it in 8 months, which is the bersim growing-period, and he will sell the crop for 1,400 pounds. His net income will be 1,156 pounds, sometimes reaching 1,500 or 2,000 pounds. Meanwhile, the landowner gets only 70 pounds of this in rent per feddan over that period.

If he plants lettuce on a single feddan, he will realize a net return of 790 pounds after deduction of the costs, which come to 225 pounds, in the course of just 4 months, while the landowner will get only 25 pounds in rent.

If he farms this feddan with sweet potatoes, he will realize a net yield of 1,000 pounds after setting aside costs, while the landowner will get 45 pounds only.

Meanwhile, if he farms green onions, he will get a net income of 630 pounds in a month and a half, the period for farming the crop; of this, the landowner will get just 15 pounds.

Experts' Views on Relationship

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic 8 Nov 85 pp 18, 19

[Text] During this excursion, it was necessary for us to poll the views of agriculture experts in Egypt.

Dr Mustafa al-Jabali, former minister of agriculture, said that he was against the presence of an eternal relationship between landowner and peasant, on the farmland specifically, because that would deprive the landowner of the rental contract. Also, it is not proper that rent on farmland should have been fixed since the revolution, in spite of the changes which have occurred in production costs and crop costs and the radical social change which has occurred in Egyptian society.

Dr Mustafa al-Jabali added, "I am against eternal contracts since in my view they do not give adequate flexibility for realizing the government's goals in terms of agricultural development strategy, since the small farmers' whole goal now is to realize 'a livelihood,' not 'sufficiency.' The gravity of this situation is apparent when we realize that 65 percent of all the properties are rented out to small tenants, causing Egypt to suffer from what is called the food gap. Even now, with the government's policy relative to the wheat crop specifically, the tenants are now finding it easy to get their wheat and corn requirements through subsidies, in order to farm all their land by bersim. This is confirmed by recent data which has referred to the spread of bersim farming over close to 3 million feddans."

Dr al-Jabali said, "The solution in my opinion is for rents to be for a period of 5 years which can be renewed by having the landowner and tenant agree over the rent and the method for exploiting the land. Moreover, the current rent must be raised to double at the lowest estimate, because it is not proper than it should be less than 150 pounds a year. Indeed, the sum of 300 pounds is not a hardship for a tenant who wants to work and not sleep. The proof of this is that the per-feddan rent during a single growing season, 6 months, is now much greater than 150 pounds, and the rent figure must not be frozen at the level where it was 5 years ago. Rather, the rent must be contingent not on tax but on the basis of the productive ability of the single basin which contains the farmland under contract, since the productive ability depends on the five levels of land quality. The tenant must commit himself to retaining per-feddan productivity at high levels and raising the level of per-feddan productivity from second class to first class, and so on."

Dr al-Jabali went on to say, "Under the worst of conditions, the landowner must be given the right to rent out his land for cash or participation in the output with the tenant, on condition that the share of each be set in a manner which will guarantee equity in the distribution of income to the two parties. It is absolutely not fair for the tenant to get the equivalent of the value or the area of half the land he rents if the landowner wants to get his land back because that should be considered infringement on ownership rights at a time when there are no feudalists in Egypt. Perhaps this situation was understandable and logical in 1952 but now the situation has changed."

I asked him, "Are there other solutions?"

Dr al-Jabali replied, "The agricultural cooperative societies which encompass all the productive farmers in Egyptian villages can provide planning for ways of exploiting rented lands and supervise execution of the plans they set out, provided that all the farmers, landowners and tenants, participate in setting these plans out, keeping accounts of the various units on the basis of each unit's net revenues, and setting out the bases for dividing this revenue up among landowners and tenants in a manner which ultimately will guarantee equity in income distribution and dominance of the proper productive relationship.

"At the end, I would like to say that whatever the proposed solutions for breaking up the conflict between the landowners and peasants might be, it is necessary to 'move gradually' in creating the requisite change in the direction of a better situation which will bring about justice for both parties, because all the landowners reject the current situation, as it gives them a sense of psychological instability, while the tenants believe that they are incontestably in the right and not to be questioned. This will come about only by creating concessions with both parties and meeting at a point in the middle which will retain the inviolability of property and the tradition of social circumstances."

Changes Which Require Amendments

Fathallah Rif'at, chairman of the Agricultural Development and Credit Bank and chairman of the economic committee in the People's Assembly, said,

"Many changes have occurred over the past 33 years which have made the issue of balance between landowners and tenants a subject of discussion among people. Landowners now get only 70 pounds a year per feddan from tenants in rent, on the basis of the calculation the government has stipulated for these, at a rate of seven times tax. It is well known that the tax is estimated at 10 pounds per feddan per year.

"Although a number of changes have already been made in the current tax in order to improve landowners' incomes, this benefit has not yet reached a point which will cover the landowner's basic costs of living. While I grant that the revolution came about to support the oppressed peasant classes, I can say that a form of injustice has befallen another class, and that is the landowners, especially since they cannot get their land back today, since rented land is now inherited by the tenant's heirs in the event he dies."

Fathallah Rif'at added, "Therefore, before the government issues a decree concerning this problem, the studies on which this decree is to be based must not just be official ones! Rather, it is necessary to listen to various views, so that the dimensions and angles of the problem will be totally clear to the decision-makers, especially since the masses of tenants are used to a specific income at the same time the landowners are complaining of this situation.

"Therefore I say that it is necesary rapidly to look for an equation which will restabilize the relationship between landowners and tenants to reduce the severity of the numerous disputes between them, whose harshness the economic and social change which has taken place in recent years has helped to aggravate.

"The optimum solution, in my opinion, must be introduced to create a balance so that the tenant's real average income will be weighed and the tenant will get a reasonable, not excessive, surplus from the revenues per feddan. This solution must carefully scrutinize differentials in the per-feddan yield from one crop to another and one area to another, and therefore the rent must not be the same for all types of crop. The rent per feddan must not be the same in the case of all types of crops. Perhaps we will thereby be able to restore some balance, not the desired balance, to the relationship between landowners and tenants.

"In spite of all this, I consider that it is not desirable to deprive tenants of guarantees and that it is not desirable to give the landowner the right to own and act as he wishes. In addition, it is not desirable to keep the situation as it is, because it is necessary to show attention to the interests of the two parties in a manner which will not disrupt the social peace, in the sense that one class or group will not harbor a grudge against another!"

Keeping the Tenant's Presence

Dr Ahmad Hasan, senior expert in the National Planning Institute, said, "We are not opposed to the landowner's right to get a just rent in a manner which is in keeping with the general level of prices, but in the context of the rise and power of labor wages. We must keep the tenant on his land so that he and his children will farm it.

"To keep the tenant's presence and preserve the rights of the society and the landowner at the same time, it is necessary to preserve the rule of suitability of farmland rent, which is seven times tax, because that guarantees society what it is owed by the landowner, as it guarantees the landowner what he is owed by the tenant. This rule of suitability is not a violation of the land reform laws, but rather an extension of the application of a legislative stipulation which was set out in the thirties and forties in the context of governments of people representing owners of farmland."

Alternatives for Appraising Rents

Dr Ahmad Hasan reviewed a number of alternatives for appraising rents in the study he carried out, and found that the most suitable solution for taking the two parties' interests into consideration was to increase rents every 10 years through general reappraisals stipulated in the tax laws, based on the analysis of absolute net revenues from the land during the reappraisal years. This will lead to the farming system which exists in the land reform law at present, since that is the most suitable, just method for both the landowner and the tenant, if the conditions included in the land reform law are amended and the costs are also split equally between landowners and tenants in the light of considerations related to the tremendous rise in costs of labor, for example, which is one of the sections on costs to which the land reform law binds the tenant.

"This is unfair to the tenant, especially if we go back to the cost of labor relative to rent. In 1960, in the cotton crop, labor costs accounted for 24 percent of total overall costs per feddan, and rent accounted for 46 percent of this total.

"Conversely, rents came to represent 11 percent of the total costs per feddan relative to cotton, and labor costs represented 59.3 percent, in 1984. These figures confirm the unsuitability of the agricultural system at present.

"This rise in labor wages confirms that the tenant is a natural resource supporting the slogan 'the land to those who work it' and is indeed an economic necessity, not just a social necessity."

Dr Ahmad Hasan added "It is necessary to apply the agrarian reform law to tenants who farm vegetables." He stressed the option of choosing rents between landowners and peasants, as is the case with fruit, especially since vegetable cultivation has become profitable.

Liberalization Has Affected Land Prices

Dr Mahmud Ibrahim Badir, professor of rural sociology in the Cairo Agriculture [Faculty], considered "The relationship between landowners and tenants was stable up to 1973, when the political practices of economic liberalization started to constitute a form of speculation in prices of farmland, making their prices increase as a reflection of the value of the crops. When we try to unearth or determine the current problem, we find ourselves faced with new figures in 1984, stating that 70 percent of the landowners own less than a feddan, that what they own constitutes 17 percent of the total farmland, that 95 percent of the landowners own less than 5 feddans, that this comes to 44 percent of the total cultivated land in Egypt, that 134,000 landowners control 21.3 percent of the farmed area, that each of them owns between 5 and 20 feddans, that 23,000 owners control 12.2 percent of the farmland and that each one of them owns from 20 to 50 feddans.

"As far as rented land goes, that comes to more than 2 million feddans, that is, about 40 percent of the total land farmed; 81.50 percent of that is rented out by the cash system, and the rest through participation.

"This is one aspect of the problem. Another aspect holds that the average farmland rented out is declining. In 1952, the ratio of rented land to the total area farmed in Egypt was 60 percent. This dropped to 51 percent in 1960 and 40 percent in 1984. This can be attributed to the increase in buying power and the conversion of the tenant into a landowner as a result of the agrarian reform laws.

"How many landowners and tenants are affected, negatively or positively?

"Sixteen million citizens, throughout the republic. This figure includes the members of families of landowners and tenants.

"Thus it is possible to identify the problem behind tenants' revenues rising in a manner which is not in keeping with rents and return on landowners' per-feddan investment. The price of a feddan now has become unused capital.

"How to get out of this problem?"

Dr Badir said, "There are a number of aspects to the solution to this problem. First is that it is necessary to define rents on the basis of productivity and profits per feddan in accordance with each region's circumstances, taking into account a number of reservations, the most important of which are abrogating subsidies on some subsidized crops such as cotton and corn and changing the crop pricing policy on grounds that the local price should approximate the international price, especially in the case of export crops, so that the prices will be attractive to farmers. In addition, it is necessary to change the crop structure so that it will reflect the geographic structure in the case of markets adjacent to us, which will lead to the modernization of agriculture in accordance with this structure.

"The second aspect is that rents be determined in accordance with economic and social changes every 5 years, provided that tenants refrain from subleasing land except in specific cases, for instance if they fall ill, and that that be with the knowledge of the landowner, who will then have the right to increase the rent by 20 percent for a specified period of time agreed to by the landowner and connected to the period of the tenant's illness.

"The third aspect is that passing the rental contract on to the tenant's heirs should continue if farming is the profession of one of the heirs, in order to preserve the structure of the family and its performance of its duties toward society and its members, on condition that the land be taken away from the tenant's heirs if it is proved that they have not farmed the land bequeathed to them.

"The fourth aspect is that the government should distribute reclaimed lands free of charge to tenant farmers who want to leave the land to landowners, on condition that the government provide all services on the new lands.

"Finally, agricultural cooperative societies should oversee the land to make sure that it is farmed in a scientific manner which will yield the best output, so tenants will not resort to keeping it fallow or farming it indiscriminately to continue to distress landowners, and that rental contracts are abrogated if the tenant goes abroad to work, especially now that it has been proved that the number of agricultural workers who have gone abroad to work in Gulf countries came to 40 percent of the total number of people working in agriculture, totalling 5 million agricultural workers, and that the people who have remained in Egypt are awaiting an opportunity to go abroad. These are called 'unsettled workers.'

"Recent research indicates that 92 percent of people current farming do not have the desire to have 'their children' continue in agricultural work and that 86 percent of agricultural engineers and supervisors have no desire to continue with agricultural work; if they find an opportunity to work in any other area, they will seize it!"

Opposition Leaders Discuss Subject

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic 8 Nov 85 p 19

[Article by Sulayman 'Abd-al-'Azim]

[Text] After AL-MUSAWWAR's excursion through the Egyptian countryside and with agricultural experts and specialists on the subject of the relationship between landowners and tenants, it was necessary that we listen to the views of the opposition parties on this subject.

The Wafd: No Opinion at Present!

When AL-MUSAWWAR contacted Mr Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din, chairman of the Wafd Party, to ascertain the party's view on the relationship between landowners and tenants, the party chairman said, "I will review this subject in my political speech at the celebration of National Holy War Day on 13 November. Therefore, it is not possible for the party to give any opinion on this subject now."

Labor: Yes to Modifications in Rents

Eng Ibrahim Shukri, chairman of the Labor Party, said "The agrarian land reform law managed to spare Egyptian society upheaval, indeed bloody revolution, after the problem was remedied through legislation. An important matter I would like to point out is that the law I submitted to the Chamber of Deputies 2 years before the revolution was compatible with the law issued in September 1952: the two gave compensation to people owning land taken over which was in excess of the stipulated limit on ownership. The law was founded on a basis of appropriation of ownership for the public benefit and did not assume the form of expropriation, although the situation later changed when the issuance of compensation bonds was suspended.

"In any event, the situation which equates the calculation of rent to seven times tax is not a fair one now as far as landowners go, since the tax is normally calculated on the basis of the major crops. How can the rent be at this price when there is a constant increase in the prices of some non-basic crops, when there is a constant rise in the prices of the bersim crop because of the extreme receptivity toward it, although it was farmed as an additional crop before cotton, when there is this instability in the prices of additional yields of certain grains, embodied in straw, whose prices have increased over those of wheat, and when rice greens can get a price whereas they used to be burned as waste!

"The most nearly logical remedy for establishing a balance between landowner's and tenant's shares might be to turn toward the system of participation by temporary sharecropping contracts after studying the practical results arising from the amendments introduced into the temporary sharecroping contract system in 1964, since it is possible to combine the abilities of landowners and tenants by this system to realize the highest production bringing benefits for both of them.

"Of course the relationship between landowner and tenant in the system I advocate must end when one of the two parties dies. This might be desirable in the case of future relations but in the case of relations which exist now it is possible to set out a period of time, let us say 6 years, when the relationship between landowner and tenant will end, with death or the end of the relationship, whichever comes later."

Eng Ibrahim Shukri added, "As regards rents, I recommend that new rules be set out where attention will be paid to changes in crop prices in accordance with a specific rule. In order to remedy current conditions, if the participation system is accepted by the two parties in accordance with the abovementioned rules, there will be no problem, but if the tenant does not accept this situation in this case it will be possible to abrogate the rental contract after the 6-year period I recommend ends, if the tenant does not want to continue with the participation system."

The Liberals: Raising Rents to 10 Times Tax

Mustafa Kamil Murad, chairman of the Liberal Party, requested a review of relations between landowners and tenants on farmland for the following reasons:

"First, the rise in crop prices to nearly five times their 1952 level. Cotton has risen from 10 to 65 pounds per qintar, wheat has risen from 3 to 15 pounds per ardebb, and so on, specifically in the case of crops where there is a buyer's monopoly.

"Second, the rise in living costs because of inflation, whose annual rate comes to 15 percent, making the burdens of living on landowners increase constantly.

"Third, per-feddan rent on the black market ranges from 200 to 350 pounds a year, while the rent by law, seven times tax, ranges from 50 to 70 pounds a year. Therefore, we consider that the first step in reform is to raise the tax. Thus the landowners' income will rise to 70 to 100 pounds per feddan a year and thus justice will be realized to some extent."

The Grouping: A Review of the Law Is Necessary -- But

Concerning the Grouping Party's view on the relationship between landowners and tenants, Muhammad Muhammad 'Iraqi, member of the peasants' office in the party and secretary of the Egyptian Peasants' Federation currently being established, said, "Raising the rent by increasing tax must take place after very careful study of the revenues from such basic marketing crops as cotton, rice, wheat, onions, corn and so forth, so that the value of the calculation of the average net income of these crops after deduction of all farming cost categories will be known. After that, the rent will be set at half the net per-feddan rent for these crops. In other words, landlords and tenants should divide average per-feddan net revenues, so that the landowner will have half and the tenant half, and this process will be repeated every number of years so that it will be in keeping with the various changes which have occurred in the agricultural process." Muhammad 'Iraqi warned about the danger of spontaneous tax appraisals aimed at increasing rents without the performance of such accurate studies and he requested that the government not act hastily over any measure in this regard before discussing it at a symposium in which the parties and all political forces will take part.

He said, "We are in favor of having the tenant's stable presence on his land and keeping from threatening him with expulsion from the land, because the anxiety which exists at present is reflected on the productive process, with the result that the tenants are diverted from performing serious service for the land."

11887
CSO: 4504/90

PEOPLE'S BUREAU ISSUES STATEMENT ON MALAYSIAN FUNDAMENTALIST

HK230554 Hong Kong AFP in English 0529 GMT 23 Nov 85

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, Nov 23 (AFP)--Libya has denied any links with a Malaysian Moslem religious teacher whose followers attacked police with choppers, bamboo spears, poison arrows and molotov cocktails in the northern state of Kedah on Tuesday in a clash that left 18 people dead.

The Libyan People's Bureau here said in a statement that it could not ascertain whether politician-turned-teacher Ibrahim Mahmud called "Ibrahim Libya" by his followers had been educated in Libya as claimed by local officials.

"Even if he had, Libya could not be responsible for his way of thinking or his actions," the bureau said.

It added that it regretted that local newspapers had chosen to link Mr Ibrahim with Libya "as if they wanted to tarnish the image and good name of Libya in the eyes of the public."

Mr Ibrahim, a member of the fundamentalist Parti Islam Sa-Malaysia, led some 400 of his supporters, including women and children, into battle with police near Baling town, 432 kilometers (270 miles) north of here, after security officials tried to detain him and some of his followers for possession of weapons, intimidation and resisting arrest.

Local newspapers had said that Mr Ibrahim had been preaching his brand of deviationist Islam to poor rubber tappers in the remote village of Memali for some eight years, during which he had built up a substantial following.

/12624
CSO: 4500/36

TUNISIA

LOANS FOR AGRICULTURAL, INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS REPORTED

Tunis LE TEMPS in French 15 Nov 85 p 2

[Article: "Development of South And Central Tunisia: Two Algerian Loans for $30 Million to Tunisia"]

[Text] The neighborly working visit to Algeria at the end of September by Mohamed Mzali, prime minister and minister of the interior, continued to have beneficial results for relations between the two neighboring countries. Algeria and Tunisia continue, as a matter of fact, to reap the fruit of the meetings which Mzali had with Algerian Prime Minister Abdelhamid Brahimi.

Thus, in accordance with the desire of Presidents Habib Bourguiba and Chadli Bendjedid to strengthen ties of cooperation and solidarity between the two countries, and in order to give concrete form to the agreements worked out by the prime minister and his Algerian counterpart, an official ceremony was held on Wednesday in Algiers in the presence of Moualem Ben Hamouda, minister of finance, during which Noureddine Hached, minister of labor and Mohamed Tarbeche, secretary general of the Algerian Ministry of Finance, signed two financial agreements according to which Algeria, through the Maghreb Arab Development Bank, granted Tunisia two loans for the realization of industrial and agricultural projects in Tunisia.

The first loan is for $10 million repayable over a long period of time on very favorable terms including particularly a reduced interest rate. The loan will be spent on financing industrial projects in Tunisia's central and southern areas, and in the border area between the two countries.

The amount of the second loan, made on the same conditions, totals $20 million.

It will go to finance agricultural projects in the south of Tunisia.

In a speech made on this occasion, Noureddine Hached emphasized the closeness of the special relations between the two countries, and the exemplary nature of bilateral cooperation which has been constantly strengthened since the signing of the treaty of fraternity and concord by Presidents Bourguiba and Bendjedid in March 1983. Today, this cooperation has been extended to all sectors, he said.

In the name of the president, and the Tunisian government and people, Hached also thanked Algeria for its latest display of active solidarity with Tunisia.

9824
CSO: 4519/27

U.S. POLICY IN GULF CRITICIZED

Kuwait AL-TALI'AH in Arabic 23 Oct 85 pp 18-19

[Article by Dr 'Abd-al-Hadi Khalaf: "America Gains Increased 'Rights' of Intervention"]

[Text] In its 5 September 1985 issue, the NEW YORK TIMES newspaper published an article by Gwertzman, its writer specializing in defense affairs, on the agreement of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to give the United States the right to use Saudi military bases and installations in case of "Soviet aggression" or a crisis in the Gulf which is "beyond the ability of the kingdom to resolve."

The article was based on a secret report presented by Richard Murphy to members of Congress, summarizing a study undertaken by the American government of its military sales to states of the Middle East.

The article attracted wide attention and long sections of it were published in some Arab newspapers. It also attracted official denials. In spite of their denials, the reality of the agreement-accord can not be denied.

By this agreement-accord, the clock is turned back more than two decades, to the time when the United States enjoyed the right to use Saudi military bases and installations.

With this agreement-accord, the lack of credibility of the calls we have heard repeatedly that "the security of the Gulf is the responsibility of its residents" can be judged anew. In spite of their repetition over more than 15 years, these calls still have not changed the tangible reality. Nothing on the horizon forecasts that.

At any rate, the agreement-accord means stationing American forces on Saudi territory only in the cases of a "Soviet attack" or a crisis in the Gulf. From a formal standpoint, this situation is, certainly, better than that which obtains in other Gulf countries, such as Oman, Bahrain or the Emirates, where American forces, under various cover, are actually stationed, along with their ships and planes.

But this point is formal only. Experience of cooperation with the United States by many Arab and non-Arab states confirms that the United States is not content merely to obtain a signature giving it "the right to use bases and installations," but it works, directly for practical implementation of the "right."

It works to create suitable means to make implementation of its right an acceptable matter, or, rather, a matter desired by those in power and authority in the country friendly to it.

The United States does not need to go far in its search for justifications of its military presence in the Arab Gulf region. The war in the Gulf is unabated--in all of its ramifications--as a war of attrition. Clearly and importantly, it is marked by all of the characteristics by which it may be described as what the agreement-accord calls " a crisis beyond the abilities of the kingdom to resolve." This means, in other words, that the option to send American forces to use these bases and installations is an option for which all of the conditions and considerations are available. All that is needed is for the officials of the Pentagon to decide that the time has come to exercise it.

This means, also, that an important issue, the introduction of foreign forces in to the territory of an independent state, and the possession of influence and standing at the regional level--by means of the agreement-accord mentioned--has come to be a matter beyond the frame of the power of the officials of the relevant countries, and, from a practical point of view, is confined to the Pentagon.

Naturally, the Gulf has no fear of a Soviet attack, since Kremlin officials have repeated their peaceful intentions toward the Gulf region. Perhaps Soviet initiatives related to preserving a stable security and peace for the nations surrounding the Gulf are greater proof of these peaceful intentions, in spite of the negative attitude these states have taken toward these initiatives. Naturally, American forces will never enter the larger countries of the Gulf as a result of a Soviet attack. There is no possibility of this.

The more likely scenario is for the United States to continue to expand the forms of its military presence in the region by using "the rights belonging to it" for this that are set down in writing in agreements between it and some of the states of the region. However, this expansion can not continue easily unless the guardian United States is able to continue the protusion of security crises in countries of the Gulf, and as long as the long-lived crisis of the Gulf war continues.

Beyond this, since American intervention will never result from a "Soviet attack," the efforts of those concerned with the apparatus of destruction and disorganization in the American Central Intelligence Agency will be intent on introducing a variety of security crises in one or more of the countries on the Gulf region, in view of the fact that these security crises form the cover needed to increase and reinforce the American military concentration in the region.

Since the issue has become, simply, that the majority of the states of the region are not able, for suitable foreign and domestic reasons, to agree to station a larger number of American forces in them, as America would like, unless a crisis which these states can not resolve has occured, the regional conclusion is for the United States to continue to aggravate the situation in the region to create a state of fear among the local officials, so that it becomes acceptable and desirable to station its forces, equipment and material in the region.

Something like this scenario means creation of a situation characterized by an organic connection between the number and frequency and degree of violence of security crises and the size and type of the American military presence. The more the crises increase and the more violent they become, the more the "demand increases for a larger, more dense and more technically developed American military presence.

In a digression, everything that is needed to bring about an increase in the security problems of the countries of the region and to bring about an inclination for these crises is available, because there is a new type of crisis which the region has not seen before that is, the development of crises without a social or political background, that do not rest on the usual pressure groups or on social alliances among the citizens of the countries of the region who are disadvantaged politically, socially or economically in terms of the course on which the regimes are oriented.

In connection with the preceding is the continued presence of "anonymous" groups carrying out terrorist and sabotage actions that are deceptively attributed to this or that opposition group, and so suitable conditions and circumstances become available for the Americans to provide whatever "assistance" they can.

As for this part of the application of the scenario, we have not seen the "anonymous" groups. They are unable to mobilize the elements needed to create security crises of any magnitude. The Gulf teems, as is well known, with many who are capable and inclined to join the plans of these "anonymous" groups, and the Gulf teems with plenty of people ready to sacrifice themselves.

Having already turned over the keys to the house to someone who has announced, often and repeatedly, his firm desire to occupy it, there is no possibility, after all that has been published by officials of the White House and the Pentagon in terms of threats and claims that "the security of the Gulf region is a strategic part of the security of the United States," that they are concerned with the security and peace of our region. They are concerned, first and last, with the security and peace of the interests of the United States of America in our region. Notwithstanding the political and financial sacrifices that have been imposed on the states of the region, and the abuse that has been imposed on their sovereignty and on the security and comfort of their people for the sake of guaranteeing the security and peace of American interests (economic, political and strategic), and notwithstanding, with all due emphasis, the disastrous results caused by continued growth of the size and power of the American military concentration in our region for the sake of the security of the region and the security and peace of the world, perhaps the most direct and prominent of these results is the confirmation of these states of the region joining in American plans and projects hostile to the real interests of the peoples of the region and the other peoples of the world.

12780/13068
CSO: 4404/28

KUWAIT

INFORMATION MINISTER ON DEMOCRACY, SECURITY, PRESS

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 12 Oct 85 p 61

[Interview with Shaykh Nasir Muhammad al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah, minister of information for Kuwait, by Sulayman Nimr: "Democracy and Kuwait Are Inseparable Twins"; date, place not given]

[Text] No one can deny that the democratic experiment which Kuwait has been experiencing since its amir, Shaykh Jabir al-Almad, restored the practice of the constitution, and since the last parliamentary elections, which were held 8 months ago, is real. Any visitor to Kuwait can notice it and can see this political interaction between the citizen and his government.

The political interaction between the citizen and the nation is what made all Kuwaitis, in their various groups and their various intellectual and political tendencies, rally around the amir of their country when he was the object of an assassination attempt. The political interaction about which we are speaking is what made all Kuwaitis, in their various views and opinions, stand as one in defense of their country when the security of this country was threatened by the bombing of a popular coffeehouse this past summer.

The political interaction between the citizen and the nation, and between the citizen and the state, can only be caused by the existence of real democratic political life, which makes the government accept other opinion and take it into consideration, no matter how strident or critical it becomes. There are many examples of this. Perhaps the best known of them is the case of the interpellation of the former minister of justice, Shaykh Sulayman al-Du'ayj al-Sabah, which resulted in the resignation of the minister but not dismissal of the deputies.

When we met with the Kuwaiti minister of information, Shaykh Nasir Muhamad al-almad al-Jabir al-Sabah, we presented all of these fears to him in this conversation:

[Question] In a well-known statement, the amir of Kuwait, Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad, said: "We believe in democracy and freedom, in principle and program. We must practice them in all of their senses." Does this mean the continuation of your democratic experiment without limit? Or that the Kuwait government thinks that there are definite limits that may not be crossed in democratic life?

[Answer] We all believe in democracy as a means and way of life. Therefore, the words of our revered amir, Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad, that you mentioned in your question are a true expression and realistic reflection of what the amir, the government and the people of Kuwait believe. It is a belief that we always translate into action, not just today, but since the establishment of the bases of democracy in our country by his highness the late amir Shaykh 'Abdallah al-Salam al-Sabah. Even before independence, consultation, freedom of opinion and expression and supremacy of the public interest were frameworks that ruled our lives. History and the events that Kuwait has experienced in the past and the present are the best witness to this.

As for the limits about which you asked, which may not be crossed in the practice of democracy, I believe that the true practice of democracy, raising the level of awareness and putting the public interest above all considerations are all guarantees changing, without overstepping, democracy. Our people have proved, praise be to God, that they are responsible and are exercising their natural right to democracy.

[Question] The events that have happened recently in Kuwait, which have threatened its security, beginning with the attempted assassination of the amir of the country and ending with the explosion in the popular coffeehouse--what affect have they had on democratic life in Kuwait?

[Answer] The great rallying around his highness Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad after the treacherous attempt this past 25 May confirms the soundness of the path on which Kuwait is moving. Kuwait, its old men, youth, women and young men rushed to stand as one person behind the amir of the country. This certainly proved something. Much more, it proves that the Kuwaiti experiment is a strong and lasting experiment. Likewise for the cowardly actions of the explosion in the popular coffeehouse which struck peaceful, innocent people, included women, children and old men, which was aimed, inasmuch as it was aimed at something, at damaging our democratic experiment and the system of institutions that we and the Kuwaiti people have chosen as a way and program of life. I want to go back and emphasize that our Kuwaiti experiment is a strong and lasting experiment. It will continue.

[Question] This means that you think that the democratic path in Kuwait has become a reality, requiring that all of its responsibilities and consequences be borne. Are you among those who fear for the democratic experiment that Kuwait is experiencing?

[Answer] The practical experiment has demonstrated, praise be to God, that our people have become responsible, and, furthermore, that the government, under the directives of his highness the amir of the country and his excellency the crown prince, is stongly desirous of deepening democratic practice in Kuwait and working to anchor its bases. Therefore, there is no room for fear for the future of democracy and continuation of its course in Kuwait, no matter what its result. In truth, the duration of the democratic experiment always makes us confident that the course of democracy will continue and that the cooperation between the legislative and executive authorities will continue, to the good of the country.

[Question] Do you believe that the Kuwaiti democratic experiment will have a specific influence on the Gulf region, and has the experiment caused some complications with some Arab states?

[Answer] We practice democratic life in Kuwait according to our own satisfaction, in harmony with the way of life that satisfies us. Each Arab state has the right to practice the same right and to choose for itself what it considers the appropriate form of government. I do not believe that our experiment in Kuwait might cause difficulty for us or stir up resentment by any state. To my knowledge, there has been no agitation of this problem from any direction. Moreover, it has had no effect on our relations with any state, praise be to God. We have relations of friendship, affection and common understanding with all the Arab states, whether the Gulf states or other states. This is the biggest proof that the the fears and complications that some have discussed from time to time have no basis in reality.

[Question] Many have observed that the Kuwaiti media, particularly the Kuwaiti press, is experiencing a real and healthy florescence, and is able, under this florescence, to reflect in action the democratic atmosphere that Kuwait is experiencing. Is this a result of your strong belief in freedom of the press, or is this a reflection of the situation through which Kuwait is passing? What is the extent of the freedom available to the Kuwaiti press?

[Answer] Whatever freedom the Kuwaiti press enjoys, and whatever broad florescence it has achieved and whatever success it has realized are matters of which we are proud. We are strongly intent on preserving them. The Kuwaiti press has not achieved this by chance or accident. Rather, it has done so by virtue of a natural development. It is an inevitable result of the system of government that has satisfied us since Kuwait obtained independence. We have from the beginning sought to give complete freedom to the press and to provide the facilities necessary to it. We have allocated coupons at nominal cost to newspapers, and we have given them interest-free loans to make it possible for them to build presses and purchase modern equipment, so they have achieved a high degree of technology and development. The press has stood as one in condemnation and criticism of the terrorist actions that have afflicted us. This position indicates a great degree of viligance, awareness and sensitivity to responsibility.

[Question] The previous Kuwait government prepared a draft bill for a new law on printed materials for submission to the national assembly. What is the prospect of this law?

[Answer] The draft bill is still a proposal on the agenda of the national assembly. It was decided to debate and decide on it under the previous national assembly. But the number of topics submitted to the assembly have delayed issuance of this law so far. The ministry received, some time before this past May, the brother chairman and members of the committee on education, culture and guidance affairs in the national assembly to discuss some of the matters pertaining to this law preparatory to presenting it to a session of the next assembly. The agreement between the government and the assembly guarantees arrival together at an appropriate form for this law, so that it becomes harmonious with the desire of all and achieves the public interest.

[Question] Reports are mentioned frequently about the government's intentions to reorganize the newspapers. This reorganization includes incorporation of the papers and their transformation into joint organizations. How true are these reports?

[Answer] I find your purveying these reports very strange, since you know that the newspapers in Kuwait are owned by individuals, organizations or companies. So those who have the right to incorporate or change or any thing else of this sort are the owners of the papers themselves, not the government. To my knowledge, no owner of a newspaper has thought of something like this. Everything progresses in a natural way. There is no truth at all to these rumors.

12780/13068
CSO: 4404/28

QATAR

NORTH FIELD GAS PROJECT DISCUSSED

Paris LE MONDE in French 21 Nov 85 p 14

[Article signed P.B.: "The North Field Project: To Develop the Largest Gas Deposit in the World"]

[Text] The economy of Qatar is based on oil and gas, and will still be based on them in the 21st century: oil, extracted since 1949, which led to the country's spectacular development after independence, in 1971; and gas, the fuel of the future, which has begun to relay oil. Indeed, the decline in world oil consumption and the fact that Qatar will never be a large producer have encouraged its rulers to accelerate the development of the huge North Field gas deposit, also called North Dome, which is 100 km long and 50 km wide, and lies at the limit of Iranian territorial waters; considered to be the largest on earth, it enables the emirate to rank third worldwide for gas reserves, after the Soviet Union and Iran.

Oil reserves represent only 454 million tons--less than the annual production of Saudi Arabia--and will therefore last only about 30 years, compared with 150-200 years for the North Field reserves. In addition, Qatar must comply with the quotas imposed by OPEC to cope with the crisis, so that it produces less associated gas from oil to operate its factories (87 million cubic feet in 1983, compared with 101 million in 1982). It must also expect prices to fall again, which may further reduce its revenues compared with the affluent period 1973-1980. Finally, the land gas deposit of Khouf--114 million cubic feet in 1984--will start to decline in 1988 and will be unable to meet the country's increasing needs.

$10 Billion

The very ambitious North Field project will require an investment of the order of $10 billion. It should start by mid-1986 or 1987 at the latest, and be completed around 1995. The State holds 70 percent of the capital--$6 billion--and has reserved the rest for foreign interests, as follows: Total-CFP [French Petroleum Company] (France), 7.5 percent; British Petroleum (Great-Britain), 7.5 percent; Marubini (Japan), 7.5 percent. The remaining 7.5 percent could be attributed to a German company or to another Japanese company, depending on their marketing capacities.

Studies concerning the installation of oil-drilling platforms, pumping stations and the separation unit were made by the U.S. firm Bechtel. Construction will be entrusted to one of the six firms whose bids are under consideration; they include Bechtel and Technip (France) which intend to form a partnership and thus hope to obtain the contract. The minister of finance and petroleum, sheikh Abd al-'Aziz bin Khalifa, told us that the choice would be made public before the end of the year.

The Gulf Gas Pipeline

The first 3-4 year stage will require an investment of $2 billion. Its goal will be to meet local demand, i.e. 600-800 millon cubic meters by 1988. Should production momentarily exceed the demand, the surplus would be reinjected pending the implementation of the second stage. The latter will require an investment of the order of $5 billion for the construction of a natural-gas liquefaction plant, with gas being extracted at the rate of 1.6 million cubic meters per year. Liquefied natural gas would be exported mainly to Japan, Australia and other Asian countries.

The third stage will see the construction of a gas pipeline specific to the Gulf region. Kuwait is said to be especially interested in Qatari gas, and a gas pipeline connecting the two countries would cost about $450 million. It could be extended to Turkey, which also needs fuel for its industry. Ankara has already started negotiations with the emirate. The Turks are also considering an extension of the lines toward Greece and Italy, from where the gas could be distributed to the rest of Europe by the end of the century. The United States, which are concerned by Europe's gas dependence on the USSR, would view such a project favorably: however, the project may come up against competition from Algerian and North-Sea gas.

Qatar's industrialization focusses on petrochemistry and fertilizers in order to recover the associated gas that used to be burnt off and therefore lost. Since its cost price was attractive, it was to be used both as a raw material and as a fuel and, therefore, was to make Qatari products competitive. Results, however, have been uneven.

Thus, QAPCO (Qatar Petrochemical Company), whose shareholders are QGPC (Qatar General Petroleum Company) with 84 percent of the capital and the French company CDF-Chemistry [French Coal Mines/Chemistry] (16 percent) shows a deficit: there is not enough of the associated gas used to make ethane so that, in this sector, the plant operates at 60 percent of its capacity. To remedy the problem, an ethane recovery unit (500 of the 1,100 tons required per day) should be completed in the next few months. QAPCO will then be able to produce, as scheduled, 280,000 tons of ethane, 160,000 tons of low-density polyethylene used to make plastic films, and 4,600 tons of sulfur. But even with an output rate of over 100 percent, will it make a profit when polyethylene prices have dropped from $700 to $450 per ton?

A Chemical Industry

QAFCO (Qatar Fertilizer Company), 24 percent of whose capital is held by Norsk Hydro from Norway, has achieved production records. With 632,000 tons of ammonia and 734,000 tons of urea in 1984, it made a net profit of 172 million rials. But its management fears that the results may not be as good this year, due to lower prices. QUASCO (Qatar Steel Company), which has two Japanese shareholders (Kobe Steel, 20 percent; Tokyo Boeki, 10 percent), is experiencing similar problems: during the first half of 1985, it beat its own records with a production of 263,000 tons of steels, exported mainly to Gulf countries, but it has suffered indirectly from the dumping practices of Brazil and South Korea, which caused prices to drop to around $230 per ton.

The results achieved in the private sector and in the banking sector are controversial. Merchants and bankers imply that they will show a deficit this year. The government points out that they expressed the same concern during the past 3 years but that both still made profits, albeit smaller, in a country where subsidies are many and taxes unknown.

Under these conditions, the crisis forces the State and the private sector to exert rigor and increase productivity at a time when the national budget shows a deficit and some companies are complaining that they are paid several months late. Finance officials, however, point out that the situation is sound and that the country's reserves amount to $8 billion, bringing in some $700 million per year.

Priority projects have been temporarily shelved. For instance, the giant electric power and seawater desalination plant of Al-Wousail; this project, however, cannot be delayed for long as industrial and social needs are increasing. Similarly, the construction of a military airfield, the need for which is felt, may have to wait for better days. Imports have also been reduced by about 20 percent in 1984, amounting to 4.17 billion rials, compared with 7 billion in 1982 and 5.29 billion in 1983.

Simultaneously, planners are studying ways of reducing expenditures and increasing revenues. Indeed, most services, including education and health care, are free for all. Also, the Qatari do not pay for water or for electricity. Electricity is provided to non-Qatari and to manufacturers at one fifth of its actual cost, which places a burden of 1.3 billion rials on the State. As for gasoline, it costs only 60 cents per gallon, i.e. FF 4.80 for 4.5 liters. Abolishing or reducing these benefits may be unpopular, but it is quite possible that the Gulf Cooperation Council will make the governments'task easier by formulating recommendations and recalling that the time of the providence-State and cheap energy is over.

9294
CSO: 4419/5

QATAR

STRONG POLITICAL, CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH FRANCE DISCUSSED

Paris LE MONDE in French 21 Nov 85 p 13

[Article signed P.B.: " Paris-Doha: From A Marriage of Convenience to Falling in Love"]

[Text] Relations between France and Qatar began with a marriage of convenience and continued with romance, so that this State has become the most francophile in the region; a region that, for two centuries and until independence in 1971, had remained a British preseve. The splendor of the emir's, sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani's official visit, starting on 20 November, and its exceptional character--it is one of four official visits to France this year--illustrate the importance that Paris attaches to its ties with Qatar. It also underlines the strength and regularity of bilateral relations: the emir came to France on an official visit for the first time on 27-28 October 1975, and Mr Giscard d'Estaing in turn went to Qatar on 4-5 March 1980.

Another symbol: on 31 October, the ground was broken for the construction of the French embassy seat in the new residential district of Doha. When it is completed, in 15 months and at a cost of FF 50 million, the building will house the ambassador's residence and the chancellery. "The construction of this embassy is proof that France has confidence in the future of Qatar, which is a well-run state," we were told by the French ambassador, Mr Fernand Brejon de Lavergnee.

Diplomatic relations between Paris and Doha were established only a few days before sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad, then crown prince and prime minister, acceded to power, on 22 February 1972. At the time, he wanted to keep his distance from Great-Britain which, as a result of colonization, was still very much in control. For its part, France wanted to achieve a "breakthrough" in the Gulf. However, it was Qatar that took the initiative of a rapprochement and, already in July, it was the first of the emirates in the region to appoint an ambassador to reside in Paris.

The emir had appreciated the Arab policy practiced by General de Gaulle after the Algerian war and especially after 1967. He thought that Paris would be a good "locomotive" in bringing Europe along this road, to counterbalance the two superpowers. France was also to contribute to the development of the young State and advise it in matters of armament and defense. For its part, Paris could not ignore that, despite its small size, Qatar possessed huge gas deposits and had the highest per-capita income in the world. This was a solid basis on which to cultivate a policy of reciprocal and mutually profitable interests.

How can we account, however, for the fact that feelings were added to convenience? We can mention various causes, having to do with men and circumstances. It is probably significant that the emir's political advisor, Mr Hassan Kamel, a highly educated Egyptian, studied in France and is very much attached to our language. He also used French to deliver Qatar's candidacy speech at the United Nations. The emir then liked his first stay in Paris and, since then, has been taking his vacations in France with his family every year. He has acquired an estate in the South of France and hired a private tutor to teach French to his family.

Ranking 5th

In turn, several ministers and high officials started learning French, and French instruction was introduced in Qatari schools.

This climate of friendship helped the French economic breakthrough in the peninsula; it would have been still far more vigorous if French manufacturers and businessmen were more dynamic and more visible, like their main competitors.

Indeed, France dropped from the third to the fifth rank of Qatar's suppliers, with 5.4 percent of Qatari imports, following Japan (19.2 percent), Great-Britain (14.6 percent), the United States (9.1 percent) and the FRG (7.2 percent). In 1984, French exports amounted to FF 800 million (vs. only FF 45 million in 1973), but its imports, especially its oil imports, amounted to FF 4.5 billion. Until now, it appears, the deficit was made up for to an extent that is not known by arms sales.

However, declining revenues have led Qatar to cut down on this budget item. True, the government appointed a French company to study the construction of a military base and aircraft runway, but the construction of the project itself is no longer a priority item.

From Technip to "Poison"

Until now, the French as a whole had been awarded large contracts: electrical installations, salt-water desalination, port facilities, telephone, etc. Technip built the large Oum-Said refinery, and this highpoint of bilateral cooperation in the field of petrochemistry was the first industrial cross-investment made with an Arab country. The Dunkirk petrochemical complex, COPENOR (Petrochemical Company of the North) was financed 60 percent by CED-Chemistry [French Coal Mines/Chemistry] and 40 percent by the QGPC (Qatar General Petroleum Company), and in Qatar both firms own the QAPCO [expansion unknown] complex.

A major future project is the development of the North Field gas deposit, in which Technip, which has already proved itself, hopes to participate; because of its scope and duration, the project will have numerous spinoffs in various industrial sectors. Other major projects, however, may well be fewer than in the past; for the time being, the largest are the water and electric power plant of Al-Wousail and the military base.

But there are also a number of projects, ranging from 50 to 300 million rials, which are not insignificant. The agricultural field, although limited, could be promising and could interest the French in two respects: develoment of new land and reconstitution of the ground water table. We should also mention the improvement of the sewer system, the modernization of the towns of Madinat-al-Chamal and Wakra, the construction of new headquarters for the Consultative Council, and other buildings.

If France wants to improve its balance of payments with Qatar, it must not rely solely on large contracts, but persuade small and medium-size firms to show some imagination and dynamism, even if that means banding together to export. It is surprising that France should have sold only 300 of the 15,000 cars imported by Qatar in 1984, especially from Japan and Germany. On the other hand, sales of perfumes and cosmetics totalled more than car sales; when it ventured to go on location to introduce its latest perfume, "Poison," the Christian Dior team "made a great hit"! Similarly, the success of Arques Crystal, whose products are found throughout the peninsula, should serve as an example to other companies of a similar size in fields as varied as paints, ink, paper, household appliances, small supplies, etc. Actually, the main problem of many French companies is that they do not know how to take advantage of circumstances* and of the favorable ground maintained by the political and cultural dialogue that goes on between the two States.

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* Thus, a symposium to present Qatar and its potential was organized in September by the French-Arab Chamber of Commerce with the aid of the Qatar and French embassies.

QATAR

BRIEFS

HOUSING PLANS--Mr 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Dirham, director of the public housing department in the Qatari Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, said that the construction boom in Qatar has begun to make progress especially in the area of providing suitable dwellings for the Qatari family. Mr al-Dirham added in an interview with the newspaper AL-RAYAH that he had begun to fulfill the desires of the Qatari family for a high quality dwelling having finished drafting plans to construct a dwelling composed of four bedrooms, a living room, a dining room, a family room, a kitchen, a storeroom, and four bathrooms. The floor space will be no less than that allocated for senior Qatari officials. The foundation on which the dwelling for fixed income families is to be built is expandable for the future. These dwellings are currently under construction. Mr al-Dirham explained that the conditions for receiving public housing are that the beneficiary be a Qatari national from a fixed income group between the ages of 20 and 50, married, willing to submit to a medical examination, unable to build a suitable dwelling for himself and not benefiting from any other housing program. The director of the public housing department in the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs said that there are no difficulties or problems facing the work, but housing projects depend on a number of governmental agencies and this makes it necessary for those who undertake the projects to take their time and study the matter. Concerning Gulf cooperation in the field of housing, Mr Dirham said that in the light of the meetings which have taken place regarding the housing sector a number of results and recommendations have come forth including the standardization of specifications for building materials, giving priority to construction products manufactured in the Gulf Cooperation Council States, as well as the standardization and classification of contractors in the Council States. [Text] [Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 5 Oct 85 p 17] /9274

CSO: 4404/143

MINISTER OF PILGRIMAGES, ENDOWMENTS INTERVIEWED

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 10 Sep 85 p 3

[Report on interview with 'Abd-al-Wahhab 'Abd-al-Wasi', minister of pilgrimage affairs and religious trusts: "Kingdom Spares No Effort in Establishing Service Projects, Paving Roads, Digging Tunnels and Building Hospitals To Serve Pilgrims"; Jiddah, date not given]

[Text] Jiddah (Saudi News Agency)--His Excellency 'Abd-al-Wahhab 'Abd-al-Wasi', minister of pilgrimages and religious trusts, stated that the kingdom, under the leadership of His Majesty King Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, keeper of the Holy Places, and his highness, the crown prince, is sparing no effort and withholding no resources in establishing numerous public service projects, completing many walkways, digging tunnels, building bridges, paving roads, constructing hospitals and clinics, and providing health care in order to offer optimal services to pilgrims to the holy House of God.

In a statement to the Saudi News Agency, his excellency said that all state agencies involved with the pilgrimage are mobilizing all forces and capacities to organize the pilgrimage activities and to offer all services on a regular, planned and organized basis. He indicated that he foresees the provision of more conveniences and facilities for pilgrims at the sites of religious ceremonies.

The minister of pilgrimages and religious trusts made it clear that the ministry has special development programs for a continued increase in services to the pilgrims. These programs are in keeping with the aspirations of the kingdom and in agreement with its goals. No limit has been set; new projects to serve pilgrims, he emphasized, will be completed at each new pilgrimage season.

He said that the ministry devotes great attention to all suggestions submitted to it for the development of pilgrim-related services, and that it does not hesitate to implement any sound ones.

His Excellency 'Abd-al-Wahhab 'Abd-al-Wasi' added that the kingdom has generously and liberally supported pilgrimage-related services and the care of pilgrims; it has withheld no resource to improve all utilities and to install the most modern equipment.

His excellency mentioned that he is very hopeful now that the pilgrim guide service has been developed and organized into agencies through which many matters will be regulated in the future. The idea of creating these agencies is one in which the ministry takes pride. It will serve to provide optimal services for the pilgrims.

His excellency indicated that projects to enlarge the mosques used for pilgrimage rites and the mosques at Namirah and al-Khayf are among the activities of which the ministry is proud and which it considers important and outstanding. He stated that credit for all of this is due first to God and then to his majesty the king, who offers support in every field to the service of Islam.

His excellency 'Abd-al-Wahhab 'Abd-al-Wasi' stated that the government of the kingdom, guided by Islamic law, is working to organize the pilgrimage and to implement measures that will improve and facilitate services to the pilgrims. It is not trying to limit the number of people who wish to make the pilgrimage, but it is spurring any efforts to organize the pilgrimage and the pilgrims.

Reviewing the most important accomplishments and developments of the last 10 years in the organization of the pilgrimage, his excellency said that the Ministry of Pilgrimages and Religious Trusts has worked constantly since its creation; every minister charged with responsibility for the activities of the ministry has done his utmost to raise their level. Everything is proceeding in the light of policy set by the government. Everything is being supervised by his majesty the king, keeper of the Holy Places, who personally directs and follows all activities with the goal of raising them to the highest levels of execution and development.

His excellency added that the ministry has paid much attention to mosques, especially in pilgrimage areas. In the last 5 years, no fewer than 2,500 mosques have been added to the mosques in the kingdom, raising the total number of mosques in the kingdom to 25,000. The ministry has given particular attention to mosques at pilgrimage assembly points. These have been constructed according to the most modern methods and specifications, in a fully Islamic style, and they have been provided with public services and utilities and parking lots for automobiles and buses. He indicated that the mosque at the assembly point of Wadi Muharram has been provided with all public services and enlarged to an area of 1,200 square meters, with a capacity of 1,600 worshipers, at a cost of 24 million riyals.

His excellency the minister of pilgrimages and religious trusts said that the mosque of al-Miqat has been completed and that it has been built on the plan of the mosque at the Wadi Muharram assembly point. A 10-million-riyal contract has recently been signed for the rebuilding of the assembly-point mosque at al-Juhfah and for the construction at Yalamlam of an assembly point and temporary mosque of prefabricated buildings, until the new projects for expansion are completed in the near future. Expansion of the al-Khayf mosque at Muna has been completed; its area has been increased several fold, at a cost of 60 million riyals.

As a convenience to pilgrims, the ministry has installed 2,000 toilets and 4,000 ablution basins at Mina, at a cost of 6 million riyals. The mosque at Muzdalifah has been torn down and rebuilt at a cost of 4 million riyals. The mosque at Namirah has been enlarged to an area of about 118,500 square meters; huge air-conditioning units, 1,000 toilets and 2,000 ablution taps have been installed. Adjoining the mosque are halls for the distribution of alms in the name of the late King 'Abd-al-'Aziz Al-Sa'ud (may God bless him). The facilities of this mosque extent to world-wide satellite transmission of the ceremonies at 'Arafah. Costs of the mosque amounted to 323 million riyals.

His excellency added that mosques in Medinah have been enlarged and rebuilt following the pattern of those at Mecca, at places of pilgrimage rites, and in various other parts of the kingdom. The mosque at Qaba' has been enlarged. [His majesty the king,] keeper of the Holy Places, laid the cornerstone for this enlargement during the last visit to Medinah. Studies and plans have been completed for the enlargement and rebuilding in Islamic style of the Mosque of the Two Qiblahs.

During this year's pilgrimage season, the King Fahd Academy for Printing the Koran began to produce the Medinah edition of the Koran. With a production capacity of 8 million Korans in various sizes, the academy is one of the largest printing projects in the Arab and Islamic worlds. Each pilgrim has received a copy of the Medinah edition of the Koran as a gift from [his majesty the king,] keeper of the Holy Places. The cost of building and equipping this establishment, with its equipment, machines and fully-furnished living quarters, came to 1 billion riyals. Costs for its management, operation, maintenance and the training of its Saudi personnel have reached approximately 1.5 billion riyals over a period of 3 years.

His excellency the minister of pilgrimages and religious trusts, said that the factory producing the Kiswah [the embroidered covering for the Kaaba] has been renovated. Everything needed has been provided, enabling the factory to produce two coverings for the Kaaba every year. Other improvements connected with the pilgrimage include the following: The activity of the traditional pilgrims' guides has been handed over to organizations. The document on pilgrimage traffic has been put into effect, which has already contributed to the saving of time and effort by the pilgrims. For pilgrims who travel overland, stations have been provided in Mecca and Medinah and rest stops on the pilgrimage highway. In the ports of entry, the offices of the consolidated bureau of agents have been improved to insure the pilgrims' comfort. Attention has been paid to directing pilgrims who become lost at the Holy Places and at pilgrimage ceremonies, and a number of centers and improved services have been provided. Care has been given to housing pilgrims. Work is being done on building state-supervised pilgrim cities in Mecca and Medinah.

Pilgrim transport operations have been developed, with opportunties for each new company to participate in transport operations. This has led to competition between the operators of these companies in introducing new fleets of cars and buses equipped to carry pilgrims over long distances in comfort, with air conditioning and toilets. Stations and lockers have been built at the various sites where ceremonies take place, at a cost of 65 million riyals. There is a program to build canopies for shade at various ceremony sites, at a cost of 8 million riyals.

His excellency said that centers to direct pilgrims have been constructed at a cost of 18 million riyals. The ministry publishes the magazine AL-TADAMUN AL-ISLAMI [Islamic Solidarity], formerly called AL-HAJJ [The Pilgrimage] magazine, to provide information to the pilgrims. A special department of information has been established within the ministry. The distribution of books and publications is being expanded. A large Islamic symposium will be held to discuss contemporary Islamic problems. Cassette tapes will be produced containing questions and answers about the pilgrimage rites in nine languages and in accordance with the four legal schools [of Sunni Islam].

Thousands of books and publications in the various languages of the Islamic world have been distributed to pilgrims. A group of educational programs has been produced for radio and television for the information of pilgrims during the pilgrimage season. The ministry has paid special attention to pilgrims in delegations, to deepening the relationship between them and the ministry, and to defining a clear range of services to be provided to the pilgrims in these delegations during their presence at the pilgrimage.

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SAUDI ARABIA

VISA FORGERY UNCOVERED

Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 13 Oct 85 p 5

/Article: "Saudi Visa Forgery Racket Uncovered"/

/Text/ COLOMBO, Oct. 12 (KUNA): Police in Sri Lanka have uncovered a forgery racket involving air tickets and visas for Saudi Arabia.

Police said today that 15 people had been arrested after a raid on a house in Galle, about 70 miles south of Colombo. Police recovered more than 80 books of forged Saudi airline tickets and passports with forged Saudi Arabian entry visas from the house.

According to the police the airline tickets had been printed in a press in Colombo. More arrests were likely to be made over the weekend, police said.

Stranded

Preliminary investigations revealed the fake airtickets and visas had been given to those seeking jobs in Saudi Arabia for a sum of about $1,500.

But the clients either got stranded at Colombo airport or at airports in India.

Police said the forged airtickets and visas could never have been used to board Saudi Arabian Airline flights as they were too crude. "We believe the forgeries enabled the racketeers to fleece their unsuspecting victims, most of whom had never seen an airline ticket before," a senior police official said.

Samples

A spokesman for Saudi Arabian Airlines in Colombo said they were expecting police to give them samples of the forged air tickets and visas together with a full report on the racket for security reasons.

Saudi Arabian Airlines operates from Colombo on a "temporary operating permit" as there is no bilateral air agreement between Colombo and Riyadh.

A team of Saudi government officials is expected to visit Sri Lanka next month to negotiate a bilateral air agreement between the two countries, airline sources said.

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CSO: 4400/67

SAUDI ARABIA

LARGE TIN DEPOSIT FOUND

Jeddah ARAB NEWS in English 3 Oct 85 p 3

[Article by Patrick Werr: "At Silsilah Exploration: One Million Tons of Ore Found"]

[Text] JEDDAH, Oct. 2 — Work at the Silsilah tin deposits over the last two and a half years has uncovered a deposit of one million tons of ore at a grade of 0.18 percent tin, according to exploration geologists with the Deputy Ministry for Mineral Resources (DMMR).

However, although these findings and others are "good pointers along the way" toward uncovering economic deposits, the geologists stressed that the ore was not of a sufficient grade or quality to be economic. "They are a good incentive to continue exploring," they said.

DMMR geologists have only been looking seriously for tin — along with tungsten, which is often closely associated with the mineral — in Saudi Arabia for five years. Before then there had been little evidence to suggest that there were important deposits, according to the geologists.

Since then, three main ore bodies have been found. The first was at Baid Al-Jimalah, 150 kms southwest of Buraidah. In 1982 another was found in Bir Al-Tawilah, 50 kms east of Zalim, and in 1983 a third at Jabal Al-Silsilah, 100 kms west of Buraidah.

The mineralization at Silsilah is scattered about a four-square-kilometer area, although the most important is located in several discrete areas. The tin occurs dispersed in highly altered granites. The exploration work done at Silsilah was undertaken mainly in 1984 and early 1985, and included geochemical and geophysical testing, detailed geological mapping, trenching and drilling. The geologists drilled 80 shallow percussion drill holes up to 50 meters deep, concentrating on two main areas.

According to preliminary results, the best area evaluated contained about one million tons of tin-bearing rock at a grade of 0.18 percent, with a small amount of silver and other minerals. In the other areas there were indications of much material, though of a lower grade.

The geologists noted that although there was a lot of surface tin at Silsilah, there was no evidence of any ancient mining, common with gold and copper occurrences throughout the Kingdom.

At Baid Al-Jimalah, drilling has indicated the presence of quartz veins containing mainly tungsten with minor tin. But the mineralization uncovered so far is too widely dispersed to be of economic interest.

At Bir Tawiiah, similar quartz veins contain tin, together with tungsten, silver, copper and zinc. Two other prospects in the area contain mainly tungsten. All are small and in themselves would not be economic, although further exploration work is justified, said the geologists, as it is at Baid Al-Jimalah.

During the last year they have identified many areas associated with the mineral. But due partly to world commodity prices and partly to a need for more testing of the occurrences, none as of yet represent economic deposits. Drilling is needed to determine tonnage and grade.

Near Abha and Khamis Mushayt down to the Yemeni border, widespread tungsten mineralization, often associated with tin, has been discovered, but only in minor occurrencies.

There is evidence of alluvial tin on the Red Sea coastal plain, especially near

Rabigh. The presence of tin in the sand may indicate undiscovered tin-associated granites either on the surface or below ground, said the geologists.

Studies carried out by the DMMR have led to an understanding of the relationship of tin and tungsten with certain types of granite formed late in the history of the Arabian shield, they added.

The DMMR had stepped up its exploration for tin and tungsten deposits, which is still in a relatively early stage. However, in the last six months there have been severe cutbacks in regional exploration and in the ministry's ability to drill in areas where there have been encouraging results.

Like gold, tin would be relatively easy to mine if economic deposits were found, because it can be concentrated on site. The valuable, concentrated ore is easily transported.

/12851
CSO: 4400/67

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

NGPF ASSISTANT SECRETARY INTERVIEWED

Cairo AL-WAHDAH in Arabic 15 Oct 85 pp 8-10

[Interview with Muhammad 'Ali Haytham, assistant secretary general of the NGPF: "Violence Is a Barbaric Tool, We Are Not Crusaders Against Communism, We Do Not Reject Dialogue With the Aden Regime, They Aim To Liberate the Peninsula, 600,000 Yemenis in the Open Air--Why?; time and place not given]

> [Text] This newspaper interview was conducted by a journalist colleague who works for the Egyptian newspaper AL-AHALI, one of the opposition newspapers. However, the newspaper's editorial management did not approve its publication. AL-WAHDAH is publishing it in its pages as a careful political interview conducted by a journalist colleague with whom we differ in opinion. He belongs to a particular political operation, and we have an outlook that sometimes does not agree with his.
>
> We are therefore publishing the interview, thanking him for it, without retouching or interfering with it. As our colleague says, "It is a conversation of complete sincerity and patriotism."--the editorial staff of AL-WAHDAH magazine.

"We are striving to open a channel for dialogue between us and Aden, but without begging."

"Because dialogue is the only language of civilization, and because bullets are a logic opposed to words and discourse, thus the future is always the victory of dialogue and the retreat from violence and hope lies in man as a creature of reason, not in man as shooter of bullets. There is where one begins from."

Entering into a long discussion with one of the makers of the revolution, one who at the same time is one of the rebels against the government, is perhaps an operation surrounded with dangers: the clash is violent, the enmity is bloody, and the search for meeting places is like the search for a needle in an endless desert.

However, if we agree on the need for dialogue and for overcoming the dichotomy of bullets and words, there is no avoiding the search for "the needle." It is absolutely necessary.

Hence comes the conversation with Mr Muhammad 'Ali Haytham, assistant secretary general of the National Grouping of Popular Forces [NGPF] in South Yemen, former prime minister, and one of the "sons of Dathinah" who embarked on the epoch-making battle with British imperialism and who took hope as their companion at the dawn of their youth. He is still giving, in spite of having moved from the seats of power to those of opposition, from being a man whom the state protected and whose life it saved, to being a man pursued by the cars of murderers and death squads out to bring back his head at any price.

What did Muhammad 'Ali Haytham say? What are the real points of difference between him and the government in his country? To what extent has the opposition shown sincere intentions toward a national democratic dialogue to save the country and stop the continuous whirlpools of violence?

Here are Muhammad 'Ali Haytham's answers:

[Question] Mr Assistant Secretary General, is it possible for us to define the issues on which dialogue between you and the Aden regime can concentrate? Or is the possibility of dialogue nonexistent, so that disagreement has turned into a breach?

[Answer] The most important of the issues about which we disagreed is the method of operations. When we disagree, it is necessary that we rise to the level of debate, which means rejecting violence as a means of solution and of conflict settlement. The first of these issues was the use of violence against the elements that fought and participated in making the revolution, comrades in arms and builders of independence. I would mention that when I was interior minister, I was surprised to find 3,500 prisoners. I immediately stipulated the formation of a committee to investigate the matter with a view to their release within 3 months. And it was so.

Nevertheless, violence remained the authorized means of conducting the struggle, until the dominant mentality came to operate only through such violence. I objected.

A scientific method is one thing; what it does is something else. I do not condemn violence; I condemn indiscriminateness in its use. The principal conflict at a particular stage in history was with imperialism. Violence was called for.

I confess that we were extreme in violence against imperialism. We showed it no mercy, and it in turn showed us no mercy. Imperialism put us into a closed circle: killer or killed. So there was no escape from violence.

However, things have to be different when we are sitting in the seat of authority. Violence should not be the language among us. Bullets should not be aimed at the hearts of our brothers and countrymen.

So as not to exaggerate, let me ask:

What is the result today?

-- An endless chain of violence, terrorism and murder.

There are more than 600,000 Yemeni citizens unable to return to their country. You would cry if you saw them in North Yemen or in the canyons of Saudi Arabia, out in the open air. they are no longer even able to buy tents!

These are men who used to own their houses, lands and animals. They lost everything and went off to wait for aid from the United Nations and the Catholics, aid that stopped 5 years ago!

-- To say nothing of the hundreds of thousands who were killed inside the country.

(Sadly) What if it had happened in Egypt or in any other Arab country? Would we disagree about condemning or opposing it?

We are not incapable of using violence. Any man can be as violent as the next. We are seeking dialogue, another language--civilized men and not savages!

[Question] But what has the NGPF done to oppose all this violence?

[Answer] I can say that since we began to participate in the opposition to the regime, we have "muzzled" this style of violence. This has been done through the possibility of creating political and national conditions that can help us complete the dialogue and express ourselves in a higher language--and not losing this [possibility].

The NGPF and the Conditions of Rule

[Question] What is the nature of these conditions that the NGPF can create?

[Answer] We do not create conditions. We call for dialogue. It is absurd for this bloody current to continue relying on violence as the only instrument. We say clearly that enough of our countrymen have been lost. We say that violence is not our goal.

[Question] Has the NGPF set any conditions for participation in the present government as a basis for dialogue or meeting?

[Answer] It is difficult for a person to propose conditions before meeting with the other side. When I propose conditions, that does not reflect a sincere intention. It means that I am intent on obstructing, not on dialogue, and that would prove to the other side that we do not desire relations and discussion.

Hence, we have no conditions at all. Rather, we come forward with sincere intent to overcome all the problems that stand between us and the meeting.

[Question] What have you offered to prove good intentions?

[Answer] We have said frankly that all of us are ready to return as citizens, not as sharers in the government. But what guarantee does the other side offer? The wall of trust between us and them has collapsed. If you asked any of the citizens who have been chased out of the country, he would reply to you in the negative.

Patriotism and the Experience of Power

[Question] Does you lack of trust come from your personal knowledge of the elements of the regime? Or does this evaluation come in the light of "the experience of power"?

[Answer] There is no dispute about the patriotism of the present elements and about their love of their country. That, however, was in the past.

Power strips a man and makes him insolent, if he does not examine his conscience and hold to his principles and morals.

We differ with the regime as a "ruling establishment," not as individuals. No one can deprive them of their patriotism. We do not condemn individuals; we condemn particular practices.

[Question] What, then, are the steps that you in the NGPF have taken toward the expected dialogue?

[Answer] In October 1980, we issued a communique in which we expressed our readiness for dialogue. We requested it from the regime in order to spare our people further bloodshed. What we are concerned about fundamentally is the individual Yemeni inside the country. In 1983, we sent out another call. In spite of this, the violent actions continued.

[Question] Mr Assistant Secretary General, are you hostile to socialism?

[Answer] I am against mistaken actions, not against human ideas in general. Marxism is a great human idea. There are more than 1.2 billion people on earth who embrace Marxism and are applying it in their countries. How can we condemn ideas?

[Question] What, then, is the point of difference in regard to the actions of the regime?

[Answer] For example, there is the theory of class struggle. I have studied and know that this theory was only created by various circumstances and conditions in the history of Europe. In Yemen, however, we are a tribal society. We have different circumstances and other conditions. We do not have class contradictions in the scientific sense of the word, nor has a class conflict developed in the European social and political sense of the term. How can we jump over reality and ignore it to such an extent? How can we subject our society to propositions and ideas that do not spring from its history and conditions? Our dispute is with application, not with theory.

Criticism and Frank Answers

[Question] Let me be completely candid with you: What we hold against the opposition is that it has become the protege of the anticommunist front. It has become part of the world propaganda campaign to combat communism, and it no longer distinguishes between communism and the regime it opposes.

[Anwer] When we attack the Marxist regime in Aden, that does not mean that we are attacking Marxism or communism in general.

We condemn the application of Marxism in our country. We condemn the Marxists, not Marxism. We are not crusaders against communism!

[Question] What is the real role of the opposition grouping now?

[Answer] That is a very embarrassing question.

[Question] We agreed to be frank.

[Answer] (Smiling) The real role is to restore hope in the souls of those who have been forced out of their homeland--to restore it after their dreams of return have been scattered and they have been overcome by a deadly despair.

The second role is to help these people with food, clothing and tents. The third role is to care for students and provide scholarships for them. But the important role that we strive to perform is to open a channel of dialogue between us and the regime--without begging.

[Question] What moved you to disagree with your comrades in arms, especially on the subject of "exporting revolution"? What did they mean by that?

[Answer] (Smiling) They were aiming to liberate the peninsula!

[Question] Was that the only point of difference?

[Answer] No, there were other causes, such as violence directed at comrades in arms and lack of respect for the law or violation of it.

[Question] Are these reasons sufficient to drive them to try several times to assassinate you?

[Answer] (Laughing) Ask them, my friend!

[Question] Mr Assistant Secretary General, thank you for your frankness.

[Answer] Thank you.

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PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

ACTIVITIES, RESULTS OF PARTY CONGRESS SESSIONS DISCUSSED

Aden AL-RAYAH in Arabic 17 Oct 85 pp 3-4

[Article: "Minutes of Third Yemeni Socialist Party Congress"]

[Text] The Third Congress, which convened last Friday, held five working sessions during which a number of important charters were ratified, including the political report that the party's secretary general submitted on party activity in the various activities undertaken between the Second and Third Congresses. The congress also ratified the major directions of the Third (1986-90) 5-year Plan for economic and social development and the report of the party's Central Audit Committee. The minutes included several discussions of the political report and the major directions of the plan, in addition to the party's Central Audit Committee. The congress also received a torrent of congratulatory telegrams and greetings from the various Arab and international revolutionary movement groups and from popular and creative organizations.

Opening Session

Comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, amid warm applause by 426 conferees who came from the various governorates, the armed forces, and the party's organizations abroad, announced in a resolute and firm voice the opening of the congress in the name of the revolution and the party under the great motto "let us struggle for the defense of the Yemeni revolution, for the implementation of the 5-year plan, and for the achievement of Yemeni unity."

There was warm applause when Comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad took the main podium where the Preparatory Committee was seated to deliver a speech warmly welcoming the party's representatives who came from the governorates, the armed forces, and the party organizations abroad as well as friendly and brotherly delegations which participated in the congress. He also welcomed the participation of Dr George Habash, secretary general of the PFLP.

Comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad asked the conferees to stand for a minute of silence in honor of the martyrs of the Yemeni revolution who shed their pure blood on every hill and mountain and sacrificed their lives at the alter of freedom for the triumph of the revolution's goals and for the cause of the leading Yemeni Socialist Party.

In his important speech, Comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad spelled out the allegations and losing bets of the revolution's enemies, emphasizing that "the enemy bet on the failure of this experience and used to bet on many other things, but we have foiled all their bets, one after the other. Here we are, convening our congress at the scheduled time, proving once again that our party and our people are stronger than all conspiracies."

The secretary general expressed his warm and highly appreciative greetings to all the comrades who, through their creative work and various activities and abilities, contributed to the success of the intellectual, political, and organizational preparation for the party's Third Congress.

The secretary general expressed special thanks and appreciation to the families of the revolution's martyrs and party fighters who gave their lives for the triumph of the party's cause and the cause of the Yemeni revolution. He also singled out the laborers, the farm workers, the cooperative farmers, and all the country's toiling masses who met the congress with magnificent work in the production field for warm greetings and great appreciation.

He expressed deep-felt thanks to the educated class of journalists, mass media personnel, and employees of the cultural, fine arts, and literary fields as well as to the ideological front fighters, who devoted all their creativity to meet the congress in a fashion, the secretary general said, befitting the party's status as a leader, an inspirer, and a guiding force for the people in the revolutionary process.

Furthermore, Comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad expressed warm greetings and great appreciation to the officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers of the armed forces, the state security forces, the popular police, and the popular militia who protect the country, defend its sovereignty with courage and honor, and safeguard the people's security and stability.

Comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad expressed similar greetings to students and to our mothers and our homemakers who provide the right atmosphere for their husbands, brothers, and sons to carry on their revolutionary tasks and national duties in the various fields of work. He also included our strategic allies and class brothers in the Arab and international revolutionary movement, in the forefront of which is the Soviet Communist Party.

Comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad described the party's Third Congress as an outstanding historic event in the lives of the people and a true demonstration that our party is continually changing into a real political force for all the people.

He reiterated his confidence that the people will continue to support and rally around the party, saying: "The masses cannot relinquish the gains they have realized and will defend with all their might their accomplishments and financial gains as well as their security and national aspirations."

He explained that since the convocation of the Second Emergency Congress 5 years ago, our country has witnessed significant progressive changes which no one can ignore.

He added: "Our great aspirations can become a reality when, through practical action, we direct all our activities and devote all our efforts to their realization based on the party's platform, charters, and resolutions and the activities of its leading organizations without skipping any phases or overstepping the rules and regulations of historical development."

In an awe-inspiring procession, the representatives of the Yemeni Vanguard Organization entered the conference hall carrying roses, banners, and important slogans. They spread out in an orderly manner and one group offered the roses to the secretary general and members of the Preparatory Committee and then sang some meaningful vanguard songs.

Following the opening address, the conferees unanimously approved the agenda and then elected the conference's chairmanship, which was composed of the members of the conference's Preparatory Committee. The following comrades were also elected as members of the conference's Secretariat:

1. 'Ali Sa'id Muthanna
2. Riyad al-'Akbari
3. Salim Bikayr
4. Faruq 'Ali Ahmad

The following were elected to the Information Committee:

1. Salim Salih Muhammad
2. Zaki Barakat
3. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Qawi
4. 'Abd-al-Razzaq Sha'if
5. Ahmad 'Abd-al-Rahman Bishir

The Appeals Committee was elected as follows:

1. Mutallaq 'Abdallah
2. 'Abdallah Ahmad Ghanim
3. Muhammad Salim al-Tawi
4. Sayf Munsir
5. Ahmad 'Awad al-Mahruq
6. Muhammad 'Ali Bamuslim
7. Sa'd Salim Faraj
8. Muhammad Sa'id 'Abd-al-Karim
9. Salih 'Ubayd

The conference voted on the Secretariat and the Information and Appeals Committees originating from the conference and the opening session was adjourned. The conference reconvened Saturday morning.

Second Session

At the beginning of the session which Comrade Staff Col 'Ali Ahmad Nasir Antar, politburo member and deputy chairman of the Supreme People's Council, opened in the name of the revolution and the Yemeni Socialist Party under the great motto of our party's Third Conference--"Let us struggle for the defense of the Yemeni revolution, for the implementation of the 5-year plan, and for the achievement of Yemeni unity"--'Ali Nasir Muhammad read the political report of the Central Committee, which included the party's activities between the two conferences in various economic, political, social, and cultural fields and our party's activities on the level of the Yemeni national cause and its relations on the Arab and international levels.

The secretary general presented in this session the first chapter of the report dealing with the consolidation of the party's unity and the strengthening of its leadership role as the central link for the development of the revolutionary process in our country and the second charter dealing with the intensification of ideological action as one of the party's principal tasks.

In its political report the Central Committee described the conference as a new step and a qualitative addition to the revolutionary struggle of our party and our people that will become the staging ground for the broader development of the revolutionary process in our country on its way to accomplishing the national revolutionary tasks with their socialist horizons.

Comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad affirmed in the Central Committee report that the conference was convening after 5 years of fruitful and creative efforts which have enabled us to continue our struggle with determination in defense of our national sovereignty and progressive accomplishments based on our ideological and political choices under the banner of scientific socialism and the proletarian international. These choices have been actively embodied in the party's program and bylaws and in the resolutions of its leading bodies as well as in the revolutionary pursuits of the party's members, the cadres, and various bodies in our revolutionary course around which the toiling masses have rallied and which enjoys the support of our people and the backing and appreciation of the international revolutionary movement detachments.

He emphasized that the past years were full of giving and sacrifices and witnessed the establishment and intensification of democratic Yemen's socialist orientation through the regeneration of political, economic, social, and cultural changes. He pointed out that society's social and class structure has witnessed important developments which have allowed the influence of the working class and its allies to grow and expand while the spiritual life has been marked by a measure of revival owing to the expansion and intensification of the influence of the working class' scientific ideology coupled with the growth of the country's defense capabilities and the consolidation of the citizens' security and stability.

The political report touched on cooperation and coordination with the northern region of the homeland, emphasizing its positive effect in resisting the imperialist and reactionary forces which are constantly trying to bring about tension and fighting between the two regions of the country.

He stressed the necessity for more caution and vigilance toward the machinations of the forces opposed to our people's unity and progress.

Concerning the policy of peaceful coexistence under our regional circumstances, he mentioned that we have been able to practice it in a way that ensures our country's security and ability to provide the proper conditions for building a new peaceful life for us, saying that this policy cannot be separated from the pursuit of solidarity with the struggle of our Arab peoples for the sake of liberation, democracy, and social progress, side by side with the forces of progress, peace and socialism in the world.

Comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad presented a comprehensive analytical review based on the conclusions drawn from and the experiences of revolutionary construction. He identified the weak points and suggested ways to overcome them.

Third Session

The conference convened its third session yesterday evening at 7 pm to resume reading the Central Committee's report submitted by 'Ali Nasir Muhammad. The conferees heard Chapters 3-7 which talked about the party's efforts to improve the standard of living of the toiling masses as the principal objective of the party's economic policy and to modernize the social structure in order to consolidate democratic relations and protect constitutional legitimacy in an effort to reinforce the government's democratic content and relations between the two parts of the country as well as the party's struggle for the sake of unity on sound democratic grounds. The report also talked about measures to defend peace and realize international relaxation and to foil the imperialist and Zionist attack on our Arab people as principal party tasks.

During this session, the secretary general finished reading the Central Committee's report and a number of good-will cables and messages sent to the conference by a number of friendly and fraternal parties were read. The conferees listened to good-will telegrams and messages from the Bulgarian CP, the German Socialist Unity Party, the Cuban CP, the Czechoslovakian CP, the Polish United Workers Party, and the Vietnamese CP as well as a message of good wishes from the Central Committee of the Sudanese CP.

Comrade Abu Bakr Badib, politburo member, secretary of the Central Committee, and member of the conference's chairmanship, who directed the third session of the conference, announced the arrival of a number of good-will messages from the Lebanese Action Organization, the Egyptian National Progressive Unionist Grouping Party, and the General Federation of Palestinian Journalists and Writers.

The conference also received greetings from the General Federation of Labor Unions, the National Command of the Popular Defense Committees Organization, the Yemeni Writers Federation, the Yemeni Democratic Journalists Organization, Yemeni Socialist Party organizations abroad, the Yemeni Democratic Engineers Association, the Yemeni Democratic Bar Association, the Petroleum Exploration Department, the Yemeni Doctors and Pharmacists Federation, the Yemeni Farmers Union, and the Yemeni Women's Federation.

The Third Congress of the Yemeni Socialist Party began its second session yesterday morning at 10 am under the chairmanship of Comrade 'Ali Nasir

Muhammad, secretary general of the Central Committee, president of the Supreme People's Council, and conference chairman.

Moreover, a number of good-will messages were read in the conference, including a telegram the conference received from the Central Committee of the Soviet CP praising the great accomplishments that our Yemeni people have realized in consolidating national independence and in building the country, in setting up an economy which can grow on the basis of planning, and in dealing with important social issues. It also praised the party's growing role in the country's economic, social, and political life.

Fourth Session

The Third Session of the Yemeni Socialist Party reconvened yesterday morning by holding its fourth session under the chairmanship of Comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, secretary general of the Yemeni Socialist Party's Central Committee, president of the Supreme People's Council, and conference chairman. At the beginning of the session, Engr Abu Bakr al-'Attas, Politburo member and prime minister, announced in the name of the revolution and of the Yemeni Socialist Party, under the great motto "let us struggle for the defense of the Yemeni revolution, for the implementation of the 5-year plan, and for the achievement of Yemeni unity," the opening of the fourth session during which the conferees heard discussions and presentations about the Yemeni Socialist Party Central Committee's report to the Third Congress.

Presentation About the Party's Leading Role and Struggle for the Sake of Its Unity:

Comrade 'Abdallah Nasir Rashid, party secretary in Shabwah Governorate, delivered a presentation on the party's leading role and the struggle for its unity.

Presentation About the Party's Social and Economic Policy:

Comrade Dr Yasin Sa'id Na'man, Central Committee member, deputy prime minister, and minister of fish resources, delivered a presentation on the Central Committee's report entitled "The Party's Social and Economic Policy."

Presentation on Reinforcing the Country's Defense Capabilities:

Comrade Col 'Abdallah 'Ali 'Ulaywah, deputy defense minister and chief of the general staff, delivered a presentation on the political report entitled "On Reinforcing the Country's Defense Capabilities."

Presentation on the National Cause:

This presentation about our national cause and the struggle for Yemeni unity, which was delivered by Comrade Mahmud 'Abdallah 'Ashish, minister of state for unity affairs, dealt with the importance of reunifying the Yemeni homeland.

Ratification of Political Report

Following the presentation, the speeches, and the general report, Comrade Engr Haydar Abu Bakr al-'Attas made a motion to end discussion about the general report. The motion was seconded unanimously and the conferees thereafter listened to the concluding speech about the report delivered by Comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad in which he praised the presentations presented by the conference representatives from party organizations in the governorates and the armed forces during which they debated the highlights of the political report. He explained that the presentations underscored the political line and the practical activity of our party's Central Committee during the past 5 years. Moreover, the future horizons outlined in the report were unanimously approved and this gives us a feeling of pride and deep satisfaction.

The secretary general affirmed that the presentations were marked by a spirit of criticism of some aspects of our activity during the past period, explaining that this had a deep significance not only in our party life but also in the courage to identify and uncover shortcomings and propose solutions and safe remedies for them.

He pointed out that the accomplishments in the past phase could not have been realized without collective action by party agencies and without the united efforts of the party organizations in the governorates and the armed forces coupled with party unity with the toiling masses and their democratic organizations. He added that the results of our action were the fruit of collective efforts by both our party and our people.

He alluded to the role played by the international support our party and our people received from our allies and friends in the international revolutionary movement and specifically in the socialist countries led by the USSR.

The secretary general concluded his speech, saying: "Creative action awaits us and we must unite our forces and prove, as we have always done, so that we are worthy of our party's confidence, of the wide support our party has received from the people, and of the vanguard role we have taken upon ourselves in leading progressive change and building the new Yemeni society."

Upon listening to the concluding speech, the conferees ratified the political report unanimously and Comrade Haydar al-'Attas read the conference's resolution of ratification.

Discussion and Ratification of 1986-90 5-year Plan

In the fourth session, the conferees listened to the main orientation of the Third 5-year Plan for economic and social development for 1986-90 by Comrade Haydar Abu Bakr al-'Attas, politburo member and prime minister. They also listened to a presentation about the main orientation of the Third 5-year Plan presented by Comrade Sayf Munsir.

Following the presentation, Comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad made a motion to approve this orientation and they were ratified unanimously.

Concluding Speech About Main Orientation of Third 5-year Plan

Comrade Engr Haydar Abu Bakr al-'Attas delivered the concluding speech in which he saluted the presentations on the plan's main orientation, explaining that it reflected our party's concern with economic and social issues as well as support and development of the successes achieved in the course of implementing the last 5-year plan.

He expressed satisfaction with the enlightened support for the main orientation of the Third 5-year Development Plan, emphasizing that the next stage will witness creative action and widespread solidarity among all party members and party leading agencies in all party organizations in the governorates and the work place for the sake of implementing the Third 5-year Plan for economic and social development as the second program of our Yemeni Socialist Party during the next 5 years.

Engr Haydar al-'Attas said that we will all take firm and confident steps in a collective spirit to employ all energies and capabilities in order to reach the plan's goals and to accomplish its missions represented primarily in the achievement of new growth rates in the various economic sectors, raising the productive efficiency of economic structures and existing production units and achieving more overall planned improvements in the toiling masses' standard of material and spiritual living.

He expressed confidence in achieving more successes owing to the deep-rooted unity between the party and the people, guided by our party's charters outlining our initial choices on the road to completing the tasks of the national revolution's democratic phase.

Moreover, the conference unanimously ratified the draft of the main orientation of the Third 5-year Plan for economic and social development for 1986-90. The resolution stated the following:

The Third General Conference of the Yemeni Socialist Party ratified the draft of the main orientation of the Third 1986-90 5-year Plan. The elected Central Committee is charged with examining and reviewing the indicators when discussing the draft of the Third 1986-90 5-year Plan in the December 1985 session for final approval.

Good-will Messages

The conference listened during the fourth session to a number of good-will messages sent it by the Supreme Committee for Popular Oversight, the Federation of International Democratic Youth, the Norwegian CP, the Spanish CP, the Yemeni Democratic Artists Union, Yemeni Communists in India, Kuwait, and Britain, the Progressive Arab Student Organizations in Czechoslovakia, the Council of Arab Teachers Organizations in Democratic Yemen, the Yemeni Pilots Society, the Egyptian CP, and the soldiers, NCO's, and officers of the popular police. The American CP also sent a good-will telegram.

The conference also received a cable of congratulations from the Central Committee of the Chinese CP. It also received similar cables from the Laotian Revolutionary Popular Party, the British CP, and the foreign students organizations. A cable from the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Labor Party was read to the conference. It affirmed the Hungarian Communists' supreme appreciation of the long-term economic, social, and political changes which have occurred in our country under the leadership of the Yemeni Socialist Party.

The cable from the Hungarian Communists wished the conference success.

The conference also heard the cable from the National Command of the Syrian Socialist Arab Ba'th Party, confirming that the Ba'th Party fighters are satisfied with every success achieved by the party and the people in democratic Yemen under the leadership of Comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad.

It indicated that the Syrian and Yemeni revolutions are the fulcrum of an Arab liberational struggle which brings us together in the whole Arab world.

Fifth Session

In the session which convened at 8 pm, the conference considered and approved the report of the Audit Committee. The report was read by Comrade Sa'id Salim al-Khaybah, chairman of the Yemeni Socialist Party's Central Audit Committee.

According to the conference report, the conference will resume its work tomorrow morning, Tuesday, to complete its agenda to allow party and government leaders and conference representatives to celebrate with our people the 22d anniversary of the glories of the 14 October revolution.

Sixth Session

In a climate of party enthusiasm and popular thrust, and under the motto "let us fight for the defense of the Yemeni revolution, the implementation of the 5-year plan, and the realization of Yemeni unity," the conference will conclude its work this morning by holding a final opening session under the chairmanship of Comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, secretary general of the Central Committee, president of the Supreme People's Council, and conference chairman.

The conference will issue its final communique on its work, resolutions, recommendations, and the outcome of the party's Central Committee and Central Audit Committee elections.

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AFGHANISTAN

RESISTANCE COMMANDER ANALYZES 'STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS' OF WAR

Kuala Lumpur ASIAN DEFENCE JOURNAL in English Oct 85 pp 104-110

[Article by Abdul Rashid]

[Text] The peoples of the Free World have the gratitude of the Afghan people for their support of our cause of national liberation. I hope that, by explaining the situation in Afghanistan as many thoughtful mujahideen commanders see it today, I will be able to help them strengthen this support and, through us, to help the rest of humanity in our common struggle against the most barbaric of modern imperialist forces.

It is not our battle alone. Indeed, it is that rare event: a war of virtue against evil, of the defence of natural liberties. Therefore, it is the battle of the entire Free World.

By explaining our situation, I hope to clarify the basis of our belief that the Soviet Union, with all its military might, can still be beaten — as all other evil empires have been defeated by freedom-loving peoples. It is our fundamental belief that the Soviet Union has reached a climax in its policies — a zenith whence it must descend.

THE INVASION AS A STRATEGIC SOVIET MISTAKE

The ultimate weapon in the defeat of the Soviet Union will be religion. Military force can halt Soviet expansion, but it is the impact of religion that will bring about the dissolution of the Soviet empire. In this great conflict, the adherents of Christianity and Islam — and, indeed, of all of the world's great religions — can work together.

The process of unravelling the Soviet empire can begin in Afghanistan. The Russians committed a fundamental mistake in invading Afghanistan. The invasion undermined the Soviet strategy of attacking the Free World through proxies and through the cultivation of hatred toward the West. Their strategy for many years has featured the indirect approach, but that strategy has been — and continues to be — negated by the invasion of Afghanistan and by the ongoing war against the Afghan people.

The military intervention in Afghanistan has damaged the image and interests of the Soviet Union throughout the Third World. In Afghanistan the Soviets have exposed their uniformed troops in a war against a poor Third World country which had had no imperialist infrastructure to speak of — which, indeed, was noted for its independence throughout the era of colonial imperialism. And there was no apparent danger to the Soviet Union from these poorly clad, illfed, uneducated and otherwise deprived masses.[1] Afghanistan was a friendly neighbour. Thus, by invading Afghanistan, the Soviet Union has earned the potential enmity of most of the Third World nations, and has created apprehension among them which in every way acts against Moscow's policies and objectives.[2]

I can speak from personal experience of the lost Soviet opportunity to exploit the anti-American feelings that exist among many Muslim youths. The Soviet Union has exploited anti-Americanism effectively for many years and in many parts of the world. But since December 1979 it has forfeited this opportunity by presenting an anti-Muslim and anti-humanitarian – in fact, a barbarian – posture to the world in the Muslim nation of Afghanistan.[3]

The policy mistake that was thus committed by Moscow is a grave one. The Islamic nations are strategically important to the Soviet Union and, in some respects, are ripe for exploitation by Moscow. After what has transpired in the past five years, however, the Soviets cannot take full advantage of the opportunities in the Muslim world. On the contrary, they have exposed a vulnerability in themselves that the Free World can exploit in bringing about a fatal weakening of the very foundations of the Soviet power base.

The Free World clearly has the resources to defeat the Soviet Union in this indirect way, if it will but use them. What is needed is the will to win and a strategy for victory. Even before that, the Free World must regain its understanding of the fact


The invasion of Afghanistan
Dec 1979
USSR
Termez
USSR
Feizabad
Kunduz
Shiberghan
Mazar-I-sharif
NURISTAN
Pul-I-Khumri
Doshi
INDIA
Kushka
Salang
Barikot
Asmar
NANGARHAR
Hindu Kush
Herat
Paghman
Kabul
Jelalabad
Khyber Pass
HAZARAJAT
Shindand
Ghazni
PAKTIA
main axes of Soviet invasion
Soviet airborne division
HERAT
Farah
Kandahar
IRAN
AFGHANISTAN
Khojak Pass
PAKISTAN
TURKEY
SOVIET UNION
CHINA
IRAQ
AFGHANISTAN
EGYPT
IRAN
PAKISTAN
NEPAL
SAUDI ARABIA
INDIA
SUDAN

▲*Following their invasion of Afghanistan at 2300 hrs on December 24, 1979 the Soviets established garrisons in all the major Afghan cities in an attempt to prop up the regime of the much-reviled Babrak Karmal.*

that the Soviet Union is its mortal enemy. I am afraid that the democracies sometimes lose sight of this fact, and come to believe that they can preserve their security through persuasive diplomacy.

By invading Afghanistan, the Soviets forfeited – at least temporarily – opportunities elsewhere in this and other regions. As just one example, take the Iran-Iraq conflict. Had it not been for the Afghanistan invasion, the Soviets could have easily and quickly won over Iran following the fall of the Shah – and Iran is more important to Soviet strategy than is Afghanistan. True, the Soviets now have bases in Afghanistan that are 500 miles closer to the Persian Gulf than those in the USSR. Yet, when it undertook the invasion, Moscow already commanded bases in Ethiopia and the two Yemens. In any case, moreover, if they want to cut off oil supplies through the Gulf, the Soviets can accomplish this more easily, and at lesser risk, by creating instability in the Gulf and other Arab nations through exploiting the antagonism of the intelligentsia against the ruling families instead of taking military actions. In short, their gain in Afghanistan was not essential to their long-range strategy for expansion in the region.

SOVIET CALCULATIONS

If it was such a large mistake for the Soviet Union to involve Afghanistan, why did they do it? I believe that the Russians knew, when they decided on the invasion, that it would be a costly move. They expected resistance, which is why they used such a massive number of their own troops in a surprise attack. But they were taking a calculated risk, not a reckless gamble. For they were certain to lose in Afghanistan if they did nothing,[4] and they weighed that certain loss against possible setbacks in the Third World that might result from their invasion. In these calculations, I believe, they wagered that the political damage to their policy for the Third World would be only temporary, and that the costs would be great and lasting only if the Free World chose fully to exploit the invasion. Thus far, the Free World has not done so: while, as I have noted, Soviet political losses have been substantial, from Moscow's vantagepoint they have not necessarily been inordinate, nor have the economic and military costs been excessive.

The communist regime that had been installed in Kabul in April 1978 came under threat at a bad time for the Soviets, because they had not prepared the Afghan population for a direct Soviet involvement. At the same time, they obviously felt that they had little choice but to invade, for the following reasons:

- The Brezhnev Doctrine might have been shown to be invalid if they had waited even a short time longer, because the communist regime in Kabul was about to be overthrown.
- Had this overthrow occurred, the Soviet Union – and communism as an ideology – would have lost prestige and been weakened politically throughout the Muslim world.[5]
- The overthrow of the communist regime in Afghanistan could have given new inspiration to the Muslim population

in Central Asia, which has not yet been fully subdued under the Russian yoke.

- A newly free Afghanistan, previously a neutral buffer-state, could have become — thanks to its experience with communism in 1978-1979 — a frontline state against the Soviet Union, possibly to be exploited by the United States and other powers.
- The overthrow of the communist regime in Afghanistan could have encouraged dissident populations in Poland and other countries under communist control to rebel against the Soviet Union.

For these reasons, the overthrow of the Afghan communist regime would have meant not just a regional loss for Moscow; but one of larger dimensions. The Soviet stakes in Afghanistan were much higher than American stakes had been in Vietnam. Afghanistan shares a border with the Soviet Union, whereas Vietnam was far from the United States. Afghanistan shares a cultural and religious identity with Soviet Central Asia, which Vietnam did not with the United States. And finally, the loss of Afghanistan would have represented a direct defeat to communism and could have increased instability in adjacent Soviet Central Asia — which both Brezhnev and Gromyko subsequently referred to as the "soft underbelly" of the USSR.

Moreover, against the costs of invading Afghanistan, the Soviets have gained certain benefits:

- The Soviet rescue of a communist regime increased the confidence of other communist and socialist regimes, particularly those of Libya, Nicaragua and Ethiopia, in the Soviet Union as an ally.
- To some degree, the Soviets have been able to hold off the rising wave of Islam inside the USSR by demonstrating to Central Asians that the government can react, and that religious insurgency has no future in the Soviet Union. Afghanistan had always been a buffer state hedging the Russian empire's border; now Moscow hopes to use it also as a barrier keeping the surge of Islam away from Soviet Central Asia.
- Through their intervention, the Soviets have succeeded — at least temporarily — in preserving the Brezhnev Doctrine.

SOVIET PROSPECTS IN AFGHANISTAN

If, in the next year or two, the Soviet Union should be successful in overcoming the Afghan Resistance and maintaining a pro-Soviet communist regime of one sort or another, it will be helped strategically in every sense. If, on the other hand, it cannot crush the Resistance, the war in Afghanistan will increasingly turn ideological, becoming a war of religion against antireligious communism. Because communism is losing its appeal, the Soviets will lose this ideological war. Therefore, Afghanistan may become a turning point in history, leading to the ultimate defeat of communism.

The logic behind this projection is as follows. The Soviet form of communism is more suitable for a traditional proletariat. Yet, in modern, technological societies, the proletariat is giving way to middle-class, white-collar workers. The middle class demands from the nation's resources a higher standard of living. Communist governments cannot meet these demands; this is evidenced even in the Soviet Union itself, where Western culture is making inroads and leading to expectations that cannot be met. The long lines before Soviet shops that carry Western goods are proof of those inroads.

Partly for those reasons, the international Soviet appeal now is pitched more and more to nationalism, which they can subsequently exploit, rather than to communist ideology, in order to attract intellectuals who are predominantly in the middle class. In effect, the Soviets are endeavoring to create a nationalist communist proletariat.

Ultimately, the appeal to nationalism carries with it dangers for the Soviet Union itself, for no amount of propaganda can make the Soviet Union itself into a unified nation. So, Moscow must try to insulate the various nationalities within the borders of the USSR from the potentially divisive effects of nationalism while it exploits nationalist sentiment in other countries: Andropov was explicit about this.

Thus, the Soviet Union faces a sharp dilemma. As the conflict in Afghanistan turns toward ideology, the Soviets become losers, because communism is a loser. On the other hand, if the Soviets try to avoid defeat in the ideological contest by appealing to Afghan nationalism, they risk a spillover into Soviet Central Asia which could loosen the central bond holding the Soviet Union together — communism. As this bond is loosened, nationalist forces within the Soviet Union will begin to compete with the military for resources. As such internal demands increase, the Soviet Union will be less able to invest resources in its military machine and in external military adventures.

The Soviets already are at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the West in technology and economic vigour. Should they, in addition, lose their ability to withhold wealth from their population, they face certain defeat in their battle against the Free World in the long term.

STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT OF THE SOVIET UNION

In Clausewitz's theory of war, the first offensive should be launched at the enemy's weakest link. As has been emphasized, in the case of the Soviet Union this weakest link is ideology. If the Soviet Government can be forced to appeal to nationalism, with its inherent middle-class values and demands, it will be unable, for the reasons that have been outlined, to compete with Western technology and economic resources.

One means to force the Soviets to lean harder on nationalism is to heighten their concern that the forces of religion are growing stronger, threatening the bonds of communism. This process can be begun in Soviet Central Asia by mujahideen who can cross into the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, stimulating the forces of Islam within the Soviet population.

It should be noted in this context that the invasion of Afghanistan was completely counter to the Soviet strategy of indirect involvement, for the following reasons:

1. Instead of proxies, Soviet troops were used.
2. Instead of attempting to win the hearts of the population through indirectly aiding the intelligentsia, uniformed troops

were used in direct suppression — an act of enmity that fans nationalism.[6]

3. Conditions in Afghanistan were unsuitable for Soviet-style communism. There is no substantial working class in the country, and most of the population is peasantry. The Chinese model of communism was more suitable to Afghanistan — as the Russians knew only too well. In fact, one of the spurs for the invasion was the knowledge by the Soviets that, if the Free World did not exploit the situation of an overthrow of a Soviet backed regime in Kabul, the Afghan political group most likely to take advantage of it would be oriented to China.

Having acted contrary to their established precepts, the Soviets are vulnerable to a strategy consisting of three basic phases:

- **Phase One:** Hold the line against communist attempts at success anywhere in the world, achieving at least a stalemate. This will remove from communism and crypto-communist movements their image as the "wave of the future" — particularly among the youth of the world. Nobody wants to be with a loser.
- **Phase Two:** A stalemate will gain time and lead to demoralization in the communist camp. Time is required for the development of the preparatory phase of the ideological offensive. In this phase, religious and other ideological forces should be given a chance to take their toll of communist ideology. That means that the educated classes everywhere should be helped — acknowledged, given status and brought into the political process. Financially, this calls for only a limited investment, but it will create a stable anti-communist base. Intellectuals need only modest economic help, but their psychological needs for prestige and influence are enormous. If thwarted in this by Free World forces, they will turn to those who woo them — the communists.
- **Phase Three:** Having achieved a stalemate and an ideological base, the Free World should encourage religious values and fervour among the intellectual classes in areas around the entire periphery of the Soviet Union (and around its satellites, wherever they may be). The involvement of a genuine intellectual class (as differentiated by the half-educated and ambitious) will moderate extremist religious tendencies. The potential of such developments can be seen in events in Poland and Afghanistan in recent years. This process needs to be consciously supported and aided on a global scale.

STRATEGY FOR AFGHANISTAN

The Soviets have taken a methodical approach in Afghanistan, but time is becoming a heavy burden for them. The Soviet political and Sovietization programmes are proving ineffective in the face of the mujahideen counter-campaign, with its religious and ideological content. The stalemate in Afghanistan, as I have noted, is preventing the Soviets from exploiting the forces of Muslim youth, especially in the Middle East. The Russians are growing increasingly frustrated and impatient for immediate results, as their announcements indicate. Thus, in

January and February 1984 statements were made by the Soviets to the effect that the insurgency would be defeated by the end of the year. Babrak Karmal, head of the puppet government in Kabul, has issued similar assertions.



Since they first invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, the Soviets have mounted eight major offensives in the Panjshir (or "Five Lions") valley floor, each more destructive and on a larger scale than the last.

KHOST
Pol-i-Khomri
HINDU KUSH
ANDARAB
Parian
Dasht-i-Rewat
Sefid Chir
Khenj
Puzhgur
Bahrak
Bazarak
Salang
Rukha
Panjshir River
Darrah side valley
Anawa
Jabal Seraj
Gulbahar
NURISTAN
Bagram Airbase
Kabul
Kabul River
Jalalabad
U.S.S.R.
AFGHANISTAN
Peshawar
PAKISTAN

Soviet efforts to entice India, their air incursions into Pakistan, the warnings to Pakistan by the Soviets and the Afghan regime — all these indicate Moscow's desire to conclude the war soon. This is understandable, since all demographic, statistical and ideological analyses indicate that the war — in its broad geopolitical implications — is going against them.

The Soviets, however, will not pull back and lose face. Instead, they will use India in order to pressure Pakistan into accepting a negotiated settlement. This would provide the Soviets with a face-saving solution while preserving their military position. The Soviets can win through purely military means only at the high cost of incurring the complete hatred of all Muslims — which is against all Soviet strategic interests. Therefore, they must win instead through a combination of diplomatic and military measures.

The nations of the Free World should not give the Soviet Union an opening for the face-saving solution they seek.[7] Instead, they should play for time, in line with the basic phases suggested above. When the Soviet Union has been sufficiently weakened, a coordinated counter-effort should be launched. Such a strategy requires the following:

- Increasing the effectiveness of the Afghan mujahideen.
- Decreasing the immediate dependence of the mujahideen on outside sources for supplies by developing small ammunition producing units inside Afghanistan. This will also shorten logistic lines.
- Increasing Western support for Pakistan, to help it resist Soviet pressures (to be discussed below).
- Organizing the mujahideen so as to increase their combat and political effectiveness, creating a form of unity by reducing

economic disparities and diversity of logistic lines among different parties. At present, economic aid from a variety of sources is distributed via a number of separate channels, encouraging disunity and competition among the mujahideen forces for the limited resources.

- Countering the enormous Soviet efforts to bribe the Afghan population — with cash, food, weapons or other incentives — into support of a Soviet puppet regime or at least neutrality between the regime and the Resistance.
- Organizing the vehicles for a propaganda offensive based on religious, ethnic, cultural and nationalistic appeals to the Soviet population and launched from Europe as well as Afghanistan.

Parts of the above strategy are already being executed, but the execution is piecemeal and uncoordinated. Moreover, on the psychological warfare front, there seems to be uncertainty as to whether the emphasis should be on nationalism or on religion. It seems fair to say that those who are executing the strategy, not being directly involved in the Afghan war and not having faced Russians in battle or commanded mujahideen troops, do not understand the intricacies of the Afghan battlefield. Thus, for example, regular army training for mujahideen is beneficial in some circumstances, but it becomes a hindrance for executing a type of combat which the conventional military mind cannot really comprehend.

SOVIET PRESSURES ON PAKISTAN

At the present juncture, several basic options are available to the Soviets in resolving their predicament in Afghanistan. The first and obvious option is to apply political-military presure on Pakistan in order to halt that country's support for the Afghan Resistance. If the Pakistani sanctuary and assistance were denied to the mujahideen, the Afghan Resistance would be destroyed within a short time (10 to 15 days) because of the present lack of alternative logistic sources and lines into Afghanistan.

To stand up to such pressure, President Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan will have to rely on support from the United States and China. He will rely on Chinese promises but not on American ones[8] — even though he will accept American economic and military support. If he has assurances from both China and the United States that they will support Pakistan in the event of all-out war with both India *and* the USSR, President Zia will not cave in to the Soviets.

Yet, in order for Zia to stand firm in the face of such pressure, Pakistan needs a military posture of her own to defend against an attack by India alone — an attack waged with Soviet complicity but without the active involvement of Soviet troops. For this, Pakistan requires more mobile weapons, so that its borders can be defended at less expense than with the present arsenal of immobile weapons, which increase the defence burden and manpower requirements for Pakistan without increasing the combat effectiveness of Pakistan's forces.

A second and related alternative for the Soviets is to undermine the Zia regime by creating an insurgency in Pakistan. Indeed, the Soviets may try this course during the election period in Pakistan in the next several months. They have the elements available in the form of Pakistani dissidents (some of them based in Afghanistan) and of weapons already smuggled into and stockpiled in Pakistan.[9]

MOSCOW'S OPTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

In Afghanistan itself, a Soviet option is to set up a "coalition" puppet government with mujahideen members. The successful enticement of recognized mujahideen leaders into such a government could cause the collapse of the Resistance. The Russians have already sent letters to leaders of many groups, proposing that they join a "nationalist coalition" government.[10]

Our greatest fear now is that some individual or group will agree to negotiate with the Soviets on behalf of the Afghan people. The world has seen many times — in Vietnam and Central America, and Yalta and Helsinki, for example — how the communists can and do make temporary, tactical concessions in order to gain a strategic victory. Many mujahideen commanders are politically unsophisticated, and some of the Afghan party leaders living in Pakistan are either naive or self-seeking. Either of these categories could produce individuals willing to negotiate with the Soviets in order to gain leadership of a "nationalist" government.[11]

One way to defeat this option is to guard against excessive popularity for individual Resistance figures. The glorification of individuals is especially dangerous because Afghans are unsophisticated and, in pursuit of nationalism, are susceptible to manipulation by the Soviets. This is where religion comes in: efforts must be made to build a national platform upon a religious emphasis in order to guard against the Soviet manipulation of nationalism as a purely secular and thus divisive element.

PROSPECTS IN IRAN

There is another option open to the Soviets, which relates indirectly to the situation in Afghanistan but is strongly tied to developments there: namely, the option of effecting a communist takeover in Iran. The military stalemate in the war between Iran and Iraq is sapping the spirit of Iranians. Today the Iranian youth by and large is still with Khomeini because of nationalist and religious fervour. Yet, religious fervour is cooling, and the loss of the war with Iraq will both weaken the drive of nationalism and turn it against Khomeini. The appeal of the left is growing stronger, especially among the youth. Bahais, Kurds, Baluchis and the Mujahideen-I-Khalq movement already are opposing Khomeini — and only the left can provide leadership to the anti-Khomeini forces.

Under these conditions, in a year or two the Soviet Union could bring communists to power in Iran, uniting dissident forces under the banner of "nationalism." The Soviets would avoid direct involvement, but could use covert action to promote their interests. Indeed, the effect on Iran of a stalemate in the Iran-Iraq war is the main reason why the Soviets have been providing abundant arms to Iraq.

PAKISTAN'S MILITARY PREDICAMENT

The first Soviet option that has been noted above — to place political and military pressure on Pakistan — is already in motion. Pakistan today faces the buildup of Soviet forces in Afghanistan and allied Indian military deployments along Pakistan's eastern border. The combination of these forces now make it possible to defeat Pakistan militarily within hours. Even if this option is never exercised, its existence serves to reduce Zia's political and military options and to push him toward accommodation with the Soviet Union.

Pakistani forces total only 20 divisions. On Pakistan's northern border alone, 11 or more Soviet divisions are available in Afghanistan for attack, including one tank division and more than one airborne division. In addition, the Afghan army has 18 divisions (under Soviet command), even though at depleted strength. On its eastern border, India commands 42 divisions, 25 of which can be deployed against Pakistan. Of Pakistan's 20 divisions, 12 must be designated for the defence of the border with India. This leaves only 8 for defending the border with Afghanistan — with no reserve forces available. If those 8 divisions are deployed along threatened axes (Peshawar, Parachinar, Wana, Khost and almost all of Baluchistan), Pakistani forces along a frontier extending 1,200 — 1,400 rugged miles will be so thinly deployed that any motorized attack at any point will be successful. No warning of the exact point of penetration of a Soviet/Afghan mechanized attack is possible for Pakistan; the only suitable defence would be the rapid redeployment of mechanized reserves — which Pakistan does not have.

Therefore, the Soviets are capable of penetrating Pakistan at many different points. The Soviets face some potential bottlenecks at Chaman, Wana and Landi Kotal, but these could be overcome quickly by Russian heliborne forces, which can act as advance columns to occupy them while the mechanized divisions, in two-to-three division strength, can assault Quetta, Peshawar or Dera Ismail Khan in less than 12 hours. With these locations in Russian hands, the further development of the attack on the plains can be a sweeping move conducted by Afghan forces — always under Soviet command — or by remaining Russian divisions. They can strike at Islamabad along the Indus River: following the plain, they will have a free run and can neutralize the Government of Pakistan before it can react.

The mobilization of ground divisions specifically based on foot mobility takes at least one day. Shifting such a division-strength column of foot soldiers in order to ward off a very rapidly moving Russian mechanized column presents a very difficult task due to the inherent flexibility of mechanized/track forces.

In the eventuality that Pakistan is partially overrun, the chances of resistance there will be virtually nil, as will the hope for outside help. Even the American Rapid Deployment Force would require seven days' warning in order to deploy in division strength. But the Soviets need only three days to capture Islamabad, Quetta, Peshawar and other cities and regions. No country would be likely to come to the aid of Pakistani forces once its government has fallen.

The Soviets have already amassed enough military manpower in Afghanistan to mount the optimal forces for attack. No more than six divisions would be required for the initial assault; the follow-up operations can be conducted by Afghan forces and a few Soviet divisions. The present deployment sectors of the forces suggest that, if the Soviets should want to, they could launch an attack on Pakistan in a very short time without an additional buildup. Such an attack, with all the elements of surprise, speed and firepower available to the Soviets, has every chance of success.

On the other hand, if the Soviets could not hope to achieve surprise or the rapid neutralization of Pakistan, they would face the risk that such a move could escalate into global war — a risk which they will avoid. But, to create this situation — in which the Soviets cannot be sure of quick success and will therefore hesitate to move — requires the preparation of Pakistan's defence in advance and the predeployment of Pakistani forces along expected points of entry.

Pakistan cannot take these required steps, however, for several reasons. A major one is that redevelopment carries political risk: it would antagonize the Soviets and might provide them with an excuse to attack. An even bigger risk, as far as the Afghan mujahideen are concerned, is that it would place the preponderance of Pakistani forces along the routes that serve as logistic lines for the mujahideen, leaving the Government of Pakistan no excuse for not blocking those routes. The Soviets are already demanding that they do so.

The only option, then, is for the Government of Pakistan to place more *mobile* forces on its western (Afghan) border. This requires more and more armoured carriers, tanks and helicopters, including Cobras. However, that would entail a huge defence expenditure which Pakistan cannot afford. Pakistan, as a front-line state, should be further helped to meet its defence needs.

THE INDIAN VARIABLE

If the Soviets calculate a substantial risk that a war may escalate, they will go for a second option: to threaten Pakistan through Afghan forces, thereby pinning down at least one-third of the Pakistani forces in the northwest, while thus enabling India to attack the Kashmir, Lahore and Badin Umarkot sectors, gaining territory near Lahore and in Kashmir. An Indian attack may not result in reaching Lahore and overthrowing the Government of Pakistan directly, but even a small loss of territory would humiliate Zia's government and cause it to fall.

This second option is a relatively safe one for the Russians — and a dangerous one for Zia and the mujahideen. The optimal time for such an attack would probably be before the March 1985 elections in Pakistan (although it could come later).

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi needed — and her son and successor still urgently needs — a means to divert the attention of the Indian public from internal problems and to defuse the enormous communal conflict in India. This conflict has been intensified, not relieved, by Rajiv Gandhi's sweeping election victory, which has further sharpened the divisions between Hindus and non-Hindus. The most expedient way to deal with the strife is by rekindling Indian nationalism — and Pakistan provides the only pretext for doing so. This also coincides with the Soviet desire to dislodge Zia's government without the direct involvement of Soviet forces.

Mrs. Gandhi's secret visit to Tashkent, the regional planning centre for Soviet political-military measures — a visit that came shortly after her military attack on the Sikh Golden Temple in Amritsar last summer — and her subsequent buildup of forces in Kashmir and the Punjab (which is closed to journalists), suggested an intention to carry out such an attack. Her death may have delayed it, but not necessarily foreclosed it.

DANGERS AND OPPORTUNITIES

This, then, is a summary of the situation at present, as we see it. The war in Afghanistan continues — much to the frustration of the Soviets, who looked for a quick resolution. Its full implications, for both the Soviet Union and the Free World — not to mention the Afghans and others in the region — have not yet even begun to be assessed or understood.

For all the reasons that I have outlined, Afghanistan is not merely an instance of Soviet suppression in an isolated region remote from "vital" Western interests. Rather, Afghanistan represents a strategic battleground — a pivotal one in terms of the longer-term struggle for the future of the globe.

In their brutal assault on a hapless but fiercely proud people, the Soviets have exposed not only — and once again — their readiness to use military force in pursuit of their political and ideological objectives, but also a fundamental vulnerability of their system and of their power base. The situation is thus fraught not only with danger but, as I have tried to indicate, with opportunities as well — if, and only, if, the Free World will recognize and seize them. ■

/9274
CSO: 4600/143

AFGHANISTAN

HUNDREDS REPORTEDLY DEFECT TO MUJAHIDIN

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 24 Oct 85 p 4

[Text] NEW DELHI, (Dispatches) — Several hundred Afghan government troops defected to guerrillas in the strategic Panjsher Valley, where Soviet forces appear set for a major new offensive, diplomats said Tuesday.

The diplomats said large numbers of dead and wounded Afghan government troops were brought back to Kabul last week from the valley, which serves as a base for guerrilla attacks on the capital's main supply route from the Soviet Union.

"Reports reaching here suggest the Soviets may again be massing for an assault on the Panjsher before the onset of winter," said one of two western diplomats who held separate briefings for reporters on condition they not be named.

She added that little equipment could be seen at military bases in Kabul and fewer military aircraft were using the airport, suggesting troops already had moved into assault positions.

The report could not be independently confirmed

Afghan Mujahideen fighting to oust an estimated 115,000 Soviet troops and the government of Babrak Karmal installed after Moscow's 1979 invasion have stubbornly resisted several major Soviet offensives in the Panjsher.

The last thrust came in June and July and was reported to have left hundreds of Soviet and Afghan government troops dead. There were also reports of widespread defections by government troops to the guerrilla side.

"Several hundred more (Afghan government) soldiers are said to have defected in the Panjsher in the last week or so," said one diplomat. She said a new division of Afghan troops, numbering some 1,000 men, was formed in Kabul "to meet critical manpower needs."

In an apparent effort to stop Mujahideen ambushes on the main Salang Highway between Kabul and the Panjsher, 40 miles (65 km) to the north, Soviet helicopters bombed villages near the road believed to be guerrilla hideouts, the diplomats said.

The bombings on Oct. 17 and 18 in the Guldara region caused "a large number of civilian casualties," one diplomat said.

A Soviet-built helicopter which may have been shuttling troops to the Panjsher crashed into a house in north Kabul on Oct. 19, the diplomats said.

The pilot was killed. Two crewmen, as well as several Afghan civilians, were injured, diplomatic sources reported.

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CSO: 4600/138

AFGHANISTAN

REDUCED MILITARY ACTIVITY MARKS APPROACH OF WINTER

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 17 Oct 85 p 1

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, Oct.16 (Dispatches) — Heavy fighting has died down in recent days as Soviet and Afghan government forces pull back in part due to the approach of winter, western diplomatic sources said, who spoke on condition that they not be identified.

The diplomat further said fighting in the Paghman area to the north of the Afghan capital of Kabul, and in Wardak and Loghar Provinces to the south and west, and tapered off.

Soviet armored groups backed by helicopter gunships and jet fighter-bombers launched a series of attacks earlier this month, trying to clear Islamic freedom fighters from the areas.

Mujahideen had reported heavy fighting earlier, with their forces battling to stave off ground attacks as their positions and some villages came under air attack. One official, asking not to be named, estimated that up to 5,000 Soviet and Afghan troops had been involved in the fighting in Loghar Province.

The Soviet and Afghan forces apparently had started to pull back amid signs of reduced military activity.

Aircraft movement at the main Soviet military air base at Kabul airport had dropped noticeably and the numbers of Soviet and Afghan helicopters at the installation also had dropped, they said.

The first snow of the winter had fallen on the mountains around Kabul during the past week, earlier than usual and indicating a hard winter, the sources said. Fighting slows considerably during the winter in Afghanistan as snow and bad weather make travel in the mountainous nation difficult.

Fighting was going on in the south and west of Afghanistan, the sources said, with daily clashes reported from Kandahar.

The Afghan government had lost control of parts of the city to the Mujahideen and rocket and grenade attacks were reported daily, they said.

About 1,000 fresh Soviet troops had arrived in Kandahar in September to replace the garrison, the sources said. The Soviet troops were concentrated at the city airport or in surrounding garrisons, they said.

Conditions in Kabul were quiet with only minor fighting apparent, the sources said.

The diplomats reported an attempted breakout from Kabul's Pol-e-Charki prison by a group of prisoners who had been sentenced to death, the sources said. Some 13 prisoners started the attempt and were joined by others before guards opened fire, killing several inmates, they said. The prison reportedly holds thousands of political prisoners.

Wireless Station Destroyed

In related news the Afghan Mujahideen destroyed a wireless station in Kandahar cantonment, killing seven Karmal troops including Colonel Abdul Latif and injuring several others, according to the London-based Afghan Press Agency.

The report added that a group of Mujahideen launched a missile attack on the wireless station on October 4 during which three Karmal soldiers defected to the Mujahideen.

A couple of days ago, the Mujahideen had wiped out the wireless station near the headquarters of Arghustan.

/9312
CSO: 4600/138

AFGHANISTAN

SOLDIERS REPORTEDLY KILL OFFICERS, DEFECT TO MUJAHIDIN

Tehran KEYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 30 Oct 85 p 1

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Oct. 29 (Dispatches) — About 100 Soviet-backed Afghan troops killed four officers and defected to Mujahideen in Kandahar, Afghanistan's second largest city, where Muslim guerrillas have tightened their control, Western diplomats said Tuesday.

In other developments, Afghan Mujahideen killed or wounded more than 60 Soviet troops in the strategic Panjsher Valley as Soviets attempted to strengthen their forces before the onset of winter, two diplomats told reporters in separate briefings.

On Oct. 22, about 100 Afghan government troops killed four officers and defected to Afghan Mujahideen in Kandahar, about 290 miles (460 km) southwest of the capital of Kabul, the diplomats said. No further details were given.

"The resistance's grip on Kandahar is tightening," said one diplomat. Afghan government troops have abandoned their posts in the city's main Herat Bazaar area which is now controlled by guerrillas, the diplomats said.

"Fighting in the city continues and the Mujahideen (Muslim guerrillas) are in a stronger position now than one year ago," one diplomat said. The other diplomat said food supplies to the city were adequate, "but electricity is a thing of the past."

"The overland trip (from Kandahar) to Kabul remains hazardous," the diplomat said. He said Afghan government troops man between four and six checkpoints along the road, while guerrillas control 10 checkpoints.

In the Panjsher Valley, about 40 miles (65 km) north of Kabul, guerrillas killed or wounded between 60 and 70 Soviet troops in battles near the towns of Anawa and Rokha in the lower part of the valley about two weeks ago, the diplomats said.

The Panjsher Valley has been the scene of the nearly 6-year-old war's fiercest battles between Afghan Mujahideen and Soviet troops as it provides an ideal staging area for guerrilla attacks on the Salang Road, Kabul's only land link with the Soviet Union.

"As in the past, the fighting was preceded by massive bombings," by Soviet "high performance jets," said one diplomat. He quoted "an Afghan source" as saying guerrillas shot down 15 Soviet aircraft in an unspecified two-day period.

The diplomats said Soviet and Afghan government forces used bulldozers to flatten trees, crops and houses along a 10-mile (16 km) stretch of the Salang highway near the mouth of the Panjsher to deny cover to the guerrillas.

"It appears the Soviets are intent in tightening their positions lower down the valley and along the Salang Road," one diplomat said. He said fighting in the upper valley had tapered off as winter set in with early snowfalls.

Afghan Mujahideen are fighting to expel and estimated 115,000 Soviet troops and to oust the government of President Babrak Karmal installed by the Soviets after they invaded the country in December 1979.

/9274
CSO: 4600/145

PAKISTANI CORRESPONDENT REPORTS ON OBSERVATIONS

Jeddah SAUDI GAZETTE in English 18-21 Dec 85

[Report by Mazhar Hasan Siddiq: "Cannon Against Catapult"]

[Text] Each of the 29 provinces of Afghanistan is resisting the forces of Soviet Russia and the Babrak Karmal regime, in a Jihad (Holy War) that has gone on for over five years. Some of the fiercest fighting can be seen in the provinces of Paktia, Herrat, Kabul, Qandhar, Takhar, Panjsher, Qundus, Logar, Perwan Kunhar and Nangarhar.

Ten of these provinces share the 1,200 km border with Pakistan.

Paktia, the province through which Salahuddin passed is important to Russia both politically and strategically. Two significant supply routes for the Mujahideen branch out from here.

The city of Khost, where the enemy army is under siege, is a priority area for Russia, which has been making efforts to take the city in order to evacuate its army and personnel.

It is from this city and Paktia province that Russia can extend the war into the whole region.

The province's population is intact with minimal emigration to Pakistan and its residents vehemently support the Mujahideen's struggle.

Russia has been terrifying the people with its relentless attacks and guerrilla activities but its indoctrination campaigns have failed in their goal to compel the population to migrate to Pakistan, which would reduce the strength of the Mujahideen and allow the Soviet and Afghan armies to mount effective attacks against their forces and lift the siege.

In Paktia, the handful of workers of the Parcham and Khalq communist parties are not co-operating with each other, nor are they extending any support to Babrak Karmal's administrative machinery and the Soviet forces. They support the Mujahideen wholeheartedly but stealthily.

Pakistan's defence is firmly linked with the province of Paktia. Khost has long been a centre for most of the Soviet operations against Pakistan and the

Mujahideen's refugee camps are located there. From here, North Waziristan, Bannu, Kohat and Peshawar can be attacked.

Today, as ever, it is a living symbol of Afghan resistance against Soviet hegemony and Babrak Karmal's rule.

Khost was the first city to demonstrate the Afghan nation's determination to reject the emergence of communism. It was here that a formal proclamation of Jihad was issued. Processions and demonstrations were organised. Protest marches were held. Strikes, civil disobedience and violence against the ruling junta marked the beginnings of resistance to a communist rule.

The terrain and topography of each of the country's provinces has its own advantages and disadvantages for the two fighting forces. But, by and large, it is all more favourable to the Mujahideen, though lightly armed and defenceless compared to their Superpower adversary.

The deserts, valleys, streams, swamps, rocky mountains, forests, extreme temperatures, and the absence of roads, electricity, water and communications all aid the Mujahideen forces facing the well-equipped Russian army. As one fighter said, "all these provide us an indestructible defence."

The intensity of enemy attacks varies from province to province. A few months ago it was the Panjsher which braved a spate of severe attacks and humbled the combined forces of the Afghan government and Soviet Russia.

But Paktia has always been a target for massive operations against the Mujahideen.

In Khost a brigade of Soviet army and a very large number of Karmal troops have been besieged for the last five years.

The Soviet forces in their first attack had captured the city and all its 21 posts. But the Mujahideen not only retook 19 of them but also effectively cut off all air and ground links to the enemy forces. The Siege by the lightly armed Mujahideen is so strong that so far all the combined efforts of the Soviet and Afghan forces have failed to dislodge it.

On August 12, in one of the severest attacks, aimed at breaking the siege, the two forces deployed some 20,000 troops, mostly Russians. The attack failed.

The Soviet and Babrak Karmal armies themselves can only supply their besieged troops in Khost by air drops. For fear of Mujahideen offensives the Soviet army has not been able to improve its makeshift runway there. The aircraft, mostly Antonov transporters, keep moving escorted by heavy trucks on both sides. The aircraft hurriedly load and unload and take off: A brief stop on the runway may invite fire from the Mujahideen. Khost is thus virtually under Mujahideen's control.

The siege is tight and the besieged troops can find no escape. All conceivable outlets have been plugged and the road held by the Mujahideen cuts off Khost from the nearby town of Dargai.

The besieged personnel include not only Afghan government officials but also a good number of Russian military officers and troops, advisers, experts and engineers.

Khost is a very important cantonment for Russia, which knows it as "little Moscow."

Some time ago the Russians in Paktia province and elsewhere distributed large quantities of arms and ammunition to the local people urging them to use them against the Mujahideen. Not only did the Afghans not use these weapons against the fighters, they themselves joined the Mujahideen along with all the arms supplied by the Russians.

An Afghan Mujahid who came to Karachi to meet pressmen, bemoaned the Islamic world's apathy, particularly that of journalists based in nearby Pakistan. In his view they were showing an unprofessional attitude and failing in their Islamic duty by not covering the Jihad nor participating in it. The Mujahid impressed upon them that a full-fledged war was going unreported.

The Mujahid then compared this unpardonable unconcern with the deep interest shown by journalists from far-off countries whose survival and security are not directly affected by the war.

Instead of covering the war at first hand, the Mujahid complained the Islamic world's media had been carrying news datelined Paris or London and reproducing comments and analysis without investigating the real spirit of the struggle.

They had been running stories that served the interests of the "enemy," promoting a viewpoint little at variance with that of Kabul or Moscow.

He felt that the indifference demonstrated by Muslim journalists confirmed to some extent the indirect but very effective influence of Soviet propaganda on the struggle.

Such piercing remarks moved Salahuddin to see for himself the war Mujahideen were waging against the Superpower.

Salahuddin stayed in Paktia province from July 1 to August 7, 1985, not travelling incognito but not introduced as a journalist either. He was simply a Haji, a title that commands respect with the Afghans.

He covered some 120 kms on foot. Once he travelled almost non-stop for about 12 hours over difficult terrain. He was provided with a mule, but could not manage it. He braved foul weather, rain, storms and heat and even faced bombing and heavy artillery fire, salvoes of rockets, aircraft strafing and machinegun bullets.

At many places there was no proper shelter. The only chance of safety was the natural cover of rocks or hills but there were not always enough to conceal everyone.

The Mujahideen's short-range anti-aircraft guns could keep enemy aircraft at a considerable height, but Salahuddin saw constant random fire taking its toll many times.

Once, he and his party were spotted and were just within range of a barrage of artillery fire. But all escaped the sharpnel and flying rocks.

At some places he saw in rows corpses of Afghan and Russian troops but was unable to photograph them amid the intermittent firing and bombardment. In one palce countless corpses were strewn over a wide area, many of them being Russian soldiers. He was told that these were the enemy's casualties of the 27th of July offensive.

Salahuddin's first stop was Zawar, the Mujahideen's first well-equipped and fortified operations centre. It is also a provincial communications centre, and has a small but beautiful mosque and a hospital run by Mujahideen for their own sick and wounded.

The journey to Zawar by foot and jeep was arduous and nerve shattering. The party was overtaken by a severe storm and rain, and the whole area was completely submerged in water. Human bodies, cattles, vehicles, trees and shrubs were all floating. They were cautioned that the onward journey would be impossible because of heavy flooding of streams and rivers. As they saw for themselves, the whole valley became a raging torrent in a matter of minutes. The heavy winds and rains kept the valley overflowing without any chance of stopping.

Salahuddin recalled an incident in which a message was intercepted in Zawar, indicating a heavy attack on Lagori.

Lagori and its surrounding areas were promptly attacked by repeated sorties of 10 aircraft for several hours. The ear-splitting explosions were audible as far as Zawar, but no heavy damage was caused to the Mujahideen.

The next day, August 3, 1985, Salahuddin was himself in Lagori. Maulana Jalaluddin Haqqani, the commander of Paktia province, provided some interesting details about the attack, including the defection of a group of Babrak Karmal's soldiers and officers. At Farm Bagh, an outpost of the enemy, near Khost airport, a group of five officers and 31 soldiers mutined and defected under the leadership of their commander, Hayat Ullah, and joined the Mujahideen along with many Kalashnikovs and wireless sets and a large quantity of ammunition.

Zabita Umar Khan, 28, is the commander in-charge of Zawar centre, which he himself established. Son of a retired brigadier who is now a refugee in Pakistan, this highly educated Mujahid was himself a lieutenant in the Afghan army. But he was charmed by Maulana Haqqani's personality, and so exchanged his mundance arms career for the spiritual force of the Mujahideen.

Before joining the fighters he and his companions finished off a good number of communists and destroyed a large quantity of enemy arms and ammunition.

Khan has trained hundreds of Mujahideen and in the Zawar centre has set up a fully-fledged maintenance and repair workshop, which can repair Kalashnikovs, tanks, anti-aircrafts guns and other weapons.

Zawar centre has always been a target for the Afghan and Russian armies. It was some time in 1983 that some 26 Russian bombers rained hell for more than two hours, dropping some 90 bombs of various sizes as well as many rockets. "But it inflicted no damage on the centre," a Mujahid told Salahuddin. "In the nearby valleys and hills you can see the tell-tale signs of the attack," he added.

Zawar centre has a Russian-built 72 mm four-ton mortar, seized intact in an encounter. Some 16 Mujahideen brought it in on their shoulders. It also has an armoured troop carrier, T44 and T45 tanks, a 101 mm mortar, and a number of machine-guns and wireless sets.

Recently the centre was bombarded intermittently for more than two weeks. Russian SU 25 and TU 28 aircraft, together dropped a record number of 2,000 bombs.

The Mujahideen downed only one SU25 along with its crew of both Soviet and Afghan airmen. Zabita Khan said, "our aim has always been to maximise losses of the enemy." And that is what Salahuddin could see in the scattered parts of the aircraft.

The journey from Zawar to Lagori was no less tortuous and dangerous. Before departure, Salahuddin was given instructions to carry only essential luggage. He was also asked to have a bath and a shave. He was provided with a mule. "The instructions suggested the need for cuation in going to the war front," he said. He felt the Mujahideen did not approve of his onward journey and thought it would be dangerous.

Salahuddin and his party crossed steep mountains and high passes and forded seasonal streams in the valleys. On the way they met caravans of sick and weary children, women and old folk, on foot or occasionally on mules. Their faces told stories of exploitation and destitution, agony and apathy, hunger and haplessness.

The party passed bombed houses and settlements. In many places they saw carcasses of cattle, unexploded bombs and wreckage of tanks and aircraft.

Sometimes they felt the vibrations of hovering helicopter gunships and saw strafing by aircraft. At times they were within range of the shelling, and felt the shock waves from the exploding bombs and rockets. Salahuddin told the GAZETTE: "We were in the amidst of attacks from all sides. I wonder even today how all of us escaped the raining hell. It was no less than a miracle that the heavy firing and shelling missed us."

"My mission was to participate in the Mihad and that's why I didn't ask my hosts to get me a safe shelter and postpone the journey to some other hour of the day or night. I was going ahead with the full determination of a Momin (a pious Muslim) without fear of death," said Salahuddin. "I don't recall my legs ever trembling or my feet faltering. There was some hidden energy in me that made me walk as confidently as the others."

From Tani onward the journey was equally difficult. Here, too, there was no selter when it was needed. "The only cover was our belief that the end for all of us will be the hour appointed by the Creator. So if there was no shelter available, so be it." That is how Salahuddin comforted himself during his travels.

The party crossed Dasht-i-Khost in three hours. From here they could see Antonov aircraft landing and taking off.

"Thank God, during this crossing that we were out spotted," said Salahuddin. "But," as he continued, "a great relief to all of us was the proximity of the Lagori centre, and maybe the Afghan and Soviet forces deliberately avoided the risk of overtaking us near the Mujahideen's strongest post."

"As we neared the Lagori centre, we felt we were safe," he continued. "But our hosts looked happier at my safe journey than at their own.

He could see the mosque and was told by his escort that there were caves dug into the hillside. "The mosque is an inspiration for them. It is a symbol of their determination to brave all the odds that stand in the way of Muslims," Salahuddin stated.

Around here, too, tell-tale signs of Soviet barbarism were visible.

While approaching the Lagori centre they divided into two parties for safety's sake.

Haji Ibrahim, commander of the Ismail Khail centre, was their leader: he is the younger brother of Maulana Haqqani.

As soon as they had separated, the enemy spotted them and opened fire. Hiding behind the rocks they continued moving until they reached a muddy area.

The continuous fire confused not only the party but also the accompanying mule. At one place, it stopped and would not move an inch. It was pushed and dragged, but it remained stationery.

Salahuddin took shelter nearby, but before long it dawned on the party that the mule was taking them along the right track and it was the escort who had missed the turning under the heavy hselling.

The expanse of mud and shallow water provided them with a timely shelter. The intensity of the attack subsided a little as soon as they became invisible to the enemy.

They were just trying to get out of the mud when a man with a Kalashnikov appeared from behind a mound and was about to shoot Salahuddin. But the guide yelled, "He is our man."

"We had just come out of the mud with great difficulty when the aircraft appeared on the scene to do their job," said Salahuddin. "The mud that we had cursed now became a safe shelter for all of us," Salahuddin said. "We remained in that muddy swamp for more than 45 minutes."

Salahuddin met some legendary figures in the vanguard of the fight to rout the Superpower and talked to many fighters determined to free their country from the clutches of the mercenary and imperialist forces.

Maulana Haqqani and Ahmad Shah Massaod, the commander of the Panjsher province, strike terror into the hearts of both the Afghan and Soviet armies. Both command respect and virtually rule the hearts and minds of the Afghan naton.

Maulana Haqqani belongs to the resistance organisation called Itte-had-i-Islami. His younger brothers are Haji Ibrahim, commander of the Ismail Khel centre, Muhammad Ismail, commander of the Siran centre, and Muhammad Khalil.

Haqqani had always opposed the growth of relations with Soviet Russia. But one incident that particularly incited him to take up arms against the secular and anti-Islamic regime was the sending of innocent Afghan students to Russia. He strongly opposed the idea and organized demonstrations throughout the province of Paktia. The reverberations of the protest spread far and wide, and within a matter of a few days it engulfed the whole of the country.

He was arrested three times along with other leaders. The deposed Zahir Shah was against religious leaders and it was during his rule that some 100 Ulema and Huffaz (who memorise the Quran) were killed.

The group of leaders who first proclaimed Jihad and declared guerrilla war against Zahir Shah's rule include Maulvi Habibur Rahman, Dr Muhammad Omar, Engineer Habibur Rahman, Engineer Gulbadin Hikmatyar, Abdul Rahim Niazi and Ustad Mansur. Maulana Haqqani was then an active member of the movement against anti-Islamic rule in the country.

This group, with no thought for their own lives and those of their children and families, organised nationwide protest marches against the influx of Russians.

The group was arrested and put in jail, where they dug a tunnel to a bakery in a busy market across the road. As luck would have it, the tunnel was detected by the authorities. Only Gulabdin Hikmatyar and the owner of the bakery, named Mujahid, managed to escape. The rest were hanged.

Salahuddin met Haqqani at his small cave at Uch Khara, in Lagori. When he reached there Maulana Haqqani was hearing a case--he was then a Qadi or Shariah court judge.

A worn out mat, maps of various sizes, a lantern, copies of the Holy Quran and some other books, Kalashnikovs, a few clothes, blankets, sheets and shoes were also he could find in the dimly lit cave. [as published]

It was for the leader an operations room, a shelter, a court, an office, a living room and a mosque.

Salahuddin raised a pertinent question about the justification of continuing a war against a Superpower. Maulana Haqqani replied that history has always been full of incidents in which a worldly Superpower of its time was confronted with a comparatively insignificant opponent. He recounted some cases in point namely Namrud against Abraham; Pharaoh against Moses; the Quraish against 313 of the Companions of the Prophet at Badr; the Mujahideen of the Caliphate against the Kings of Persia, the British empire against the Indian subcontinent and so on.

"And, who was the winner?" Haqqani asked. In his view, history would repeat itself in the case of Afghanistan also.

When he was asked about the result of his own struggle over some 13 years, Haqqani's spontaneous reply was: "The struggle for the independence of the subcontinent started in 1857 and culminated in freedom in 1947, a period of 90 years. Let us have result in nine more years, not 90."

Salahuddin told the GAZETTE that Maulana Haqqani had in his possession a document exposing the role of the Soviet media in counteracting the Mujahideen's struggle. It was a four-point propaganda plan to be carried out by its own media men and also others in its paid service or influence all over the world.

The first point in the document required that in no case should the struggle be called a war between Russia and the Afghan Mujahideen, or be mentioned in any way as a "people's war." It should be noted that with the Soviet Russia the use of prefix "people" is something unjuxtaposeable. But in the case of Afghanistan it is expedient to drop the prefix. It should be labelled as only a confrontation between Russia and America.

The second point stressed that refugees should be portrayed as disloyal, unpatriotic criminals and as drug traffickers. Here the purpose was complete character assassination not only of the refugees in Pakistan, Iran and elsewhere but also of the whole Afghan nation.

The United Nations team's observation, as Haqqani pointed out was that the Afghan refugees were the most disciplined and had the highest morals of any refugee community anywhere in the world.

The aim behind such propaganda was to divert the world's attention from the pitiable lot of the refugees and to block moral and material assistance to them. If such an attempt, was successful Haqqani stressed, the refugees would suffer greatly and it would have a great impact on the efficiency of the Mujahideen fighting machinery.

The third point insisted that the whole world should be made to believe that Russia has taken over full control of the country, that there is no war beyond cases of sporadic firing from the Mujahideen, which should be labelled as no more than suicidal attempts arising from sheer desperation.

Elaborating on this point, Haqqani asked Salahuddin, "Have you noticed a single hour without an offensive and counter-offensive of some kind, or a moment without jet strafing, bombing or mortar shelling?"

As for control by the Babrak Karmal or Russian forces, Haqqani said: "With all their combined strength and joint strategies they do not have even a tight grip on Kabul."

He offered a challenge: "If the combined imperialist and mercenary forces were made to evacuate the land mass reported to be in their control, and asked to go over to the other side of the River Amu (the natural boundary between Afghanistan and Russia), the Mujahideen would expose the myth of their control within an hour."

It has been reported and confirmed that the capital, Kabul, is under constant attack. At night it is under curfew.

The areas where the Russian residences or bases are located are surrounded by multiple circles of mines for safety.

Entry into or exit from Kabul entails checking at some eight posts, where everyone undergoes thorough search and heavy interrogation.

In July this year, the Mujahideen attacked Kabul with rockets. The main targets were the Russian embassy, strategic installations, the airport and some of the government offices.

It was also disclosed to Salahuddin that Mujahideen had retaken 80 percent of the land that had fallen under the control of the Afghan and Soviet forces.

The fourth point was no less ingenious in its strategy. Through intensive propaganda efforts the whole world should be urged to recognise the Babrak Karmal regime. As Haqqani forecast, once the regime was recognised as lawful and legitimate, all its past and future actions would find international endorsement.

* * *

The victories of the Mujahideen confused both Soviet and Afghan government forces. The two are so nervous that they consume in two days what should be enough ammunition for two months.

But Haqqani admitted the Mujahideen's lack of a country-wide communications system. So far they have been operating with a provincial or regional wireless network. In his view, the Mujahideen would have performed much more effectively had they been in possession of a unified, modern communications system.

Haqqani charged that, this year, the Afghan government did not bother to arrange for the air transport of pilgrims. Afghan's Ariana airline had no planes for this purpose! "It was not true to say that there were no planes available for pilgrims. It was a reprisal against the Mujahideen for their attack last year of Afghan Ariana's plane at Qandhar Airport," said Haqqani.

He realised, as did other leaders, that if Mujahideen had modern weaponry the whole situation would have been much better for them today.

* * *

Other leaders and fighters showed their mettle and their dedication to that mission. They clearly distinguish themselves from a mercenary force: they are fighters more interested in upholding the banner of their faith than fighting merely for comforts, bread or land.

Salahuddin met a wireless operator named Allahdad who is warned dead or alive by the mercenary and imperialist forces.

A graduate and a trained teacher he was forcibly recruited and trained when young, by the Russians and posted to Paktia. As soon as he found a chance he fled along with a good quantity of wireless sets and ammunition.

Today he operates one of the captured wireless sets, intercepting messages.

Once he intercepted a communication ordering the airforce to bomb a Mujahideen concentration. After a brief pause he replied that the concentration had moved to another location where the bombing should be carried immediately. When the enemy forces did so, they hit a concentration of Soviet and Babrak Karmal troops.

Maulvi Ahmad Gul, who has since been martyred at Lizan on September 7, was the second in command in the province of Paktia. He was 43.

Maulvi Gul was succeeded by Maulvi Fatahullah. He was also martyred, on September 13, on the same front in heavy fighting.

Maulvi Ahmad Gul was a member of the Markazi Majlis-i-Shura. He organised demonstrations against the growth in Afghanistan of Russian relations and communist activities in the country.

In his interview with Salahuddin, he said that during Daoud's regime the total strength of the communists in the country was not more than 44,000, the majority being those who were registered as such under duress. He put the true figure at no more than 5,000.

The Soviet forces have always been suspicious about the integrity of the Afghan communists. The repercussions of the fall of the Tudeh party in Iran could be found in the demoralisation of the Afghan army, and the performance of the Soviet machinery in Afghanistan. "They don't trust Afghan troops. They even kill Afghan soldiers when they are about to be surrounded or trapped or are going to surrender," he said. "The survival of Parchamis and Khalaqis (the two communist parties) has been made difficult by the Russians. They use them as cannon-fodder in offensives against the Mujahideen, and they treat them as no better than servants."

Maulvi Gul disclosed to Salahuddin that the Russian troops in the early days were drawn from Samarkand and Bukhara. Before coming they were told that their duties in Afghanistan would be of a civil mature, mainly construction of roads and bridges. Many were addicted to drugs.

"But when they came into contact with Mujahideen, and discovered their actual duties, they gave up drugs and asked for copies of the Quran. Not only that, they also assured us of their full cooperation with the Mujahideen," Maulvi Gul said. But they were soon replaced by troops from Russia's western regions.

Maulvi Gul added that in the Russian-held Turkestani region the beginnings of a struggle for autonomy and independence were taking shape. The impact of the Mujahideen's struggle has been felt beyond the Afghan frontiers, in the Muslim communities of Russia.

The Russian government has taken extra care in dealing with the new awakening. There is now an elaborate system of satellite and radar, security checks and control on movements in the Muslim-populated areas. There is censorship on communication and the people are under constant watch.

Maulvi Ahmad Gul said that on August 4 a Tashkent-bound train was heavily fired upon for half an hour by Soviet Russia's Turkestani soldiers, who also destroyed some radar stations.

There have been confirmed reports that a good number of Mujahideen have been secretly crossing the Russian borders for Tabligh (the propagation of Islam).

Maulvi Fatahullah Haqqani was 45 at the time of his martyrdom. Before his death he had captured three very important enemy posts. He was about to take the fourth post when death overtook him.

Maulvi Haqqani, a strategist in his own right, was commander of the forces that had captured the famous Bari Qila in December 1982.

He was also among those who had strongly protested against Afghan-Russian relations, and always opposed Russian activities in his country.

It was during Nur Muhammad Taraki's regime that he proclaimed Jihad and took over a number of police stations.

He had just returned on September 6 from the Hajj. He attended the burial of Maulvi Ahmad Gul, and went straight from the graveyard to the front. He returned to the graveyard as a martyr on September 13, and was buried by the side of his predecessor and commander.

Haji Ibrahim, 35, commander-in-chief of all posts in the Ismail Khel region, is the younger brother of Maulana Haqqani. He established the Ismail Khel centre and has been engaged in Jihad since the premiership of Sardar Daod Khan, participating in many operations against the enemy.

He told of an offensive on July 26, when the Mujahideen successfully attacked a convoy of enemy troops. They captured four tanks and a large quantity of arms and ammunition and killed some 60 of the enemy.

The fighting continued for several days. At one stage the Mujahideen purposely vacated their outposts and retreated secretly to dig up new trenches. The enemy came out of its hideouts and took over the vacated posts. The Mujahideen opened fire, killing 35 troops and capturing a number of Kalashnikovs, hand grenades, wireless sets and ammunition.

"The cowardice of the Soviet soldiers can be seen in the way they hide in underground shelters in cities with multiple circles of mines all around," Haji Ibrahim said.

In his view, Afghanistan was not the last stop for Russia; from Afghanistan it would reach out to the warm waters, oil-rich regions and international sea lanes of the Mid-east. He said the unity of the Islamic nations, the resistance movement of the Afghan Mujahideen, their Jihad against the infidels and their faith in God would all work together to throw the Russians out of their country.

"In Afghanistan, Russia is using all its most modern weaponry, which it has not used elsewhere," he added.

* * *

Kamil Shah, 35, is a trained teacher. He has been involved in the Jihad ever since its very beginning holding important commands and taking part in many missions. He has successfully destroyed a number of tanks, armoured cars, armoured personnel carriers and trucks laden with arms, ammunition and fuel as well as capturing arms and ammunitions depots.

Mulla Sadim Khan, 33, has a similar record. Like many others Hukum Khan, 26, was forcibly recruited by the Russians. He joined the Mujahideen's struggle and now commands a group of some 500 fighters. He has many feathers in his cap, but the one that distinguishes him is the gift of mastering the workings of all kinds of caputred machinery and weapons. He can maintain and repair such items and can train others to use them.

Gulab Khan, 27, took refuge in Pakistan, and did odd jobs to make a living. But that life did not excite him much, and he came back to join the struggle. He has only one brother, who is a Khalaqi (a member of the communist party of that name). Gulab Khan's only ambition is to shoot his own communist brother.

The Mujahideen are united and so are their parties. Recently the seven leaders, Maulvi Muhammad Nabi (Mahaz-i-Milli), Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani (Jamaat-i-Islami), Engineer Gulbadin Hikmatyar (Hizb-i-Islami), Professor Abdur Rasool Sayyaf (Ittehad-i-Islami), Maulvi Yonus Khalis (Younus Khalis group of Hizb-i-Islami), Pir Syed Ahmad Jilani (Harkat-i-Inquilab-i-Islami), and Professor Sabghat Ullah Mujaddadi (Nejat-i-Milli), have entered into an effective arrangement for joint cooperation and planning at strategic and political levels. These parties are internationally recognised parties, and the head of the alliance is chosen by rotation.

They have a 60-member Majlis-i-Shora, under which work several committees.

Salahuddin concluded after meeting a number of leaders that differences between the parties were limited to matters of distribution of provisions, money or relief supplies. Logically, every tribe or tribal chief would like to have as much as possible for his tribe as quickly as possible. That sometimes caused conflict, but they were absolutely united in the efforts to oust Babrak Karmal and the Soviet forces.

In the past there have been conflicts in matters of command over forces consisting of several tribes. These conflicts too have been resolved. Now the commander will be chosen from the tribe with the greatest influence in the province of the fighting. The groups or parties with relatively less influence will be under the unified command of the provincial commander. Those representing other provinces will also fight under the commander.

Such differences, in situations like the one the Afghans face today, are only natural. Many problems arise from the scarcity of resources at their disposal. "But there is no conflict whatsoever in fighting the 'twin enemy', Babrak Karmal and the Soviet forces, and there is complete unanimity and consensus on the continuation of the struggle," said a leader.

* * *

The Soviet propaganda offensive against the Mujahideen and their struggle is so effective that the whole world seems to have ignored the true mettle, morale and the spirit of the poorly-equipped fighters.

The fighting is continuous in almost every province but the intensity varies. The world media highlight the progress of fighting in only a couple of provinces. Such ignorance serves the interests of the Kremlin which goes unchecked and unchallenged on what it says through its own media and through others under its influence. The net result is that the situation in Afghanistan is known as a very localised war and not as one involving the whole nation.

The world media and particularly that of the Islamic world, has never troubled to cover the war to show the world that a hapless people is at war with a superpower. It has not carried stories that could have shown the mettle and the morale of the Afghan people.

They are a unique people. A few scenes testify to this fact. While approaching a village, Salahuddin and his party saw a child aged about five or six. He hurriedly turned and in a few seconds, a pitcher of water in his hands he rushed towards the strangers. Fire opened and the whole surrounding area became covered by thick black smoke. Falling rockets and shells created a din that drowned all warnings to the child to stop and lie down. Houses were on fire and the party was in utter confusion as to how to stop the approaching child.

All lay prostrate, hushing their accompanying mule. The guide frantically beckoned to the child to lie down with the rest. But he would not. He continued running until he reached the party of strangers to his village and handed them the pitcher. After that he obediently lay prostrate with the others.

Later the guide angrily asked the child why he had not lain down as soon as he was told to do so. "Bombs and rockets are common place," the boy quipped. The guide was not at all satisfied with the reply. But the child added, "Every one has to die at a fixed hour, not a moment earlier or later, that is what my mother taught me." And the Mujahid guide was more than satisfied. Afghan tradition demands the offering of a meal or water to anybody passing through the village. The war could not deter the child from fulfilling the tradition.

Salahuddin and his party met caravans, on foot and on mules, that had survived aerial and ground attacks. The caravans were organised with children and women riding the mules and old folk on foot, holding the reins. Each group was accompanied by a young man. Asked about the ordeals they had suffered on the way, they thanked God profusely that they were safe until that moment, without mentioning any incidents, and continued their march.

"It is our 31st day," said one caravan. "It is the 27th day of our journey," said another, without asking for sympathy from the enquirer.

The majority of the able survivors of such caravans join the struggle. The disabled and the aged, along with women and children trek into Pakistan and add to the number of refugees there.

Only a few such caravans enter Iran: There are now restrictions on their entry.

Salahuddin came across a graveyard, where a martyr was being buried. He had stepped on a mine and had lost half of his lower body. Salahuddin wanted to console the grieving relatives and friends, but someone stopped him: "The deceased won the martyrdom he wanted and it is a matter to be happy about not to grieve over."

Salahuddin called on Maulana Haqqani's mother. This graceful elderly lady was sitting with children aged between three and six. She introduced each one to him: They were all orphans as well as her real nephews and nieces.

Morale is exemplary among the Afghan refugees.

[19 Dec 85 p 5]

['We Don't Join Blocs']

[Text]

The Soviet forces have made the whole expanse of Afghanistan a testing ground for its sophisticated armaments and deadly chemical weapons.

They have poisoned water used by humans and cattle, and thus killed hundreds of Mujahideen and their innocent families. They have laid mines in civilian areas, used "toy" bombs and dropped napalm bombs on civilian areas. They have harassed the whole nation by all conceiveable means. But it has not submitted.

The Mujahideen fighters say prayers even when bombs and rockets and missiles fall in the vicinity and aircraft and helicopter gunships are hovering around.

The commander will lead the prayers, hold courts and pass verdicts based on the Sharia. He ensures equality of treatment, and takes food only after making sure that everyone also has already eaten. He will not go to bed until he has personally checked that every one has received a blanket, or a bandage.

When one of the Mujahideen's leader was asked about the availability of American weaponry, the curt reply was: "You have been to every post in the province. You have seen our depots. Did you ever find an American knife in our arsenals? We are Muslims; we are fighting for Islam, and we don't join blocs."

* * *

At meal times, which were fitted into brief lulls in the fighting, the Mujahideen are at a loss over how to treat the guests in a proper manner. They take out dry bread and pieces of dry raw sugar. They put the latter on one side of the mouth and go on chewing and gulping the dry bread. They then drink rain water from a nearby pond. The same water is used for ablutions.

At some posts nothing is available for breakfast, lunch or dinner, so they eat only leaves and drink only rain water for 25 days.

* * *

Unheard of barbarism, torture and atrocities towards civilians are an everyday scene. A whole village was raided by the Soviet forces. They killed all the inhabitants except a few who escaped and a few more left alive intentionally. They also captured alive young girls, loaded on them onto helicopters and started throwing out their dresses in front of those who were kept alive or had missed death by chance.

The targets of government troops and Soviet forces is the sparse civilian population, water mills, granaries, cattle and mules. The two forces seem allergic to the sight of camels, or at least they appear to be afraid. Everywhere there can be found burnt carcasses of this animal, and also those of mules.

For the Mujahideen the camel is the only major means of transportation. But camels today are rather safer, thanks to the availability of rocket launchers, which also scare away the helicopter gunships.

The main purpose behind such destruction is to shatter the rural economy. "If they are successful in doing this, our fighting machinery will be severely affected," one Mujahideen said.

Whatever crops they produce are burnt.

Orchards and vineyards are dying of thirst. Production of cotton and rice has declined considerably. Tractors and other farming implements are destroyed on sight. Water courses are bombarded. Underground conduits, surface canals, river channels and mountain streams are irreparably disrupted. Farmhouses are razed to the ground. ponds with rain water are poisoned. Roads, bridges and transmission lines are erased.

Sources of food supplies are cut off. The regions once known as breadbaskets are growing nothing.

* * *

Against this barbarism are deployed ingenuity and valour. Mujahideen have been capturing tanks intact with the help of a long, coarse, cloth sheet slung over their shoulders. They soak the sheet in water and roll it over and over again to make a heavy ball. They ambush tanks by throwing the ball between the toothed chain and wheel. The tank stops with a jerk and ultimately jams. The man astride the tank with a kalashnikov in his hand ducks inside the tank and seals it from inside. Immediately the Mujahideen will soil and blacken the viewing glass used for viewing.

The confusion thus created make the occupants surrender. A good number of tanks have been captured with this technique.

The coarse cloth sheet has unique significance with Mujahideen. It is a part of their body; they keep it slung throughout the day and night. It is what they lift sick and wounded with; they make bandages and dressings of it; it is used as a stretcher; they lift arms and ammunitions with its help; it covers and wraps the dead bodies; it is a prayer mat; and it can be used as a table cloth, towel, bedsheet, blanket and overall.

So is klashnikov important for Mujahideen. It is a currency and a means of barter. Once richness is measured in number of klashnikovs one has. One can enter deals of any tune with.

[20 Dec 85 p 5]

[Failure to Get Desired Results]

[Text] Young students are sent to Russia for education, where they are given training under a very special curriculum. The Mujahideen were asked about the impact of this indoctrination on the young generation. They said that according to some rough estimates 40,000 students were sent to Russia for education during the last five years, but this year a significant drop in numbers was noted. The conclusion they drew was that attempts to brainwash them, have failed to provide the desired results. They have failed also in their massive conscription schemes at home and programmes for military training in Russia. One fighter said, "So will end their indoctrination programmes against innocent children." Another added: "We are genuinely hopeful that both our soldiers and students will return undamaged and undefiled."

The highly anti-Islamic education that was openly imparted during Hafeezullah Amin's regime is now diluted. But there are schemes and programmes under the cover of which efforts are still being made to indoctrinate the youth against the Mujahideen.

The Mujahideen said that the traditional Islamic mosque or *madarsah* education in the Holy Quran and Hadith could now be found only in Mujahideen-controlled areas. In Kabul or in the few cities under government control, the curriculum designed for moral uplifting were only nominal.

Cases of human rights violations were also reported. "Third degree" treatment of innocent prisoners was a routine practice. Khad, the KGB of Afghanistan, has Russian advisors, who are said to be involved in torture and murder.

The Karmal government is not in a position to overcrowd its jails and detention centres, or the Khad offices, with every suspect Mujahid or anti-regime individual, so the short cut for the regime or Khad is to mete out the harshest possible treatment or to kill the suspect.

Amnesty International has a record of human rights violations by the regime, and the whole world knows that repression is now at its ugliest and the infringement of fundamental rights is at its most extreme, the Mujahid added.

* * *

With regard to the possibility the return of Zahir Shah after the exit of Babrak Karmal and the Soviet forces, the Mujahideen are unanimous in their view that it was the deposed king who not only accepted the influence of Russia but welcomed it wholeheartedly. They have no liking for him. But the name of his son-in-law, a major general, was heard in some circles as one of the possible candidates to take over the reins of the country.

A very small minority of secularists supports the return of the king, but the Mujahideen will give him no support.

* * *

Some interesting facts and figures were collected. More than 80 percent of weapons used by the Mujahideen are that were captured intact or repaired by them for use. The balance they produce locally.

Out of a total population of some 16 million, some more than three million have taken refuge in Pakistan, about one million in Iran and a similar number in various other countries of the world. Over one million of the population has been killed in the war. More than one million are engaged actively in the struggle. Of the remaining 10 million people, a very large majority lives in the Mujahideen-controlled areas and supports the struggle, and only a very small minority lives in the areas under the control or influence of the Karmal government. More and more areas are coming under the control of the Mujahideen.

Some 3,000 persons go over to Pakistan daily and add to the refugee population. The Mujahideen put the figure of Pakistan's refugees at more than 3.3 million, and the total number of refugees at more than five million.

The strength of the Soviet and Afghan government troops is reported to be about 150,000 and between 30,000 and 40,000 respectively.

Annually some 10,000 soldiers are trained by the Afghan government, and about the same number promptly defect to the Mujahideen.

[21 Dec 85 p 5]

[A War Without Reference To Land]

[Text] The Afghan Mujahideen do not care about casualties on the battlefield. They only care about the toll of innocent family members back home.

The ratio of casualties in engagements is always in the Mujahideen's favour. But the elimination of villages and massacre of the civilians disturb the ratio.

* * *

The Mujahideen's war is altogether different from other contemporary struggles fought by Muslims in or outside of their own countries. As Salahuddin found himself and as their leaders put it, the differnece is faith. Islam versus atheism, infidelity, heresy and, of course, imperialism. It is a struggle without reference to land.

It is a struggle in which the Ulema are commanders in all 29 provinces. In every action and thought they draw heavily on Islamic traditions and practices. A Mujahid said, "We are fighting for the supremacy of Islam. Even if the Russian troops pack up and evacuate the country, we will not give up the struggle until Islam rules in Afghanistan."

The Mujahideen have among them neither the socialists nor communists nor secularists. They are just Muslims, with Islam as their creed and Islam as their way of life. Their whole struggle is for the cause of Islam. It is only an added dimension that the Mujahideen want to save their country from the clutches of socialism and communism and prepare a bulwark for defence of other countries in the region.

It is also unique because the Mujahideen have no one behind them, no moral or material support. They are fighting a super power, with which no Islamic nation has ever had a direct showdown. No wars have been fought in a landlocked country like Afghanistan. It is virtually cut off from the outside world. It is a war where the peoples are fighting on two fronts: against an alien super power and against an un-Islamic government at home.

But the Afghan Ulema have inexhaustible resources in Islamic history from which they receive inspiration and guidance. Before them are the battles, victories and heroes of hundreds of years of Islam in various continents. As one leader put it: "The continuation of our war is in no way dependent on the mundane resources of the supply of provisions, arms and ammunitions. We believe more in the proper realisation of our inspiration with education and training in the true Islamic way." As the leader said confidently, "Anyone with a modern, secular, scientific education steeped in alien culture would not have the puritanical inspiration needed to rule a people. An empire on land could be set up but one could never rule hearts and minds without the help of a faith."

With Mujahideen the ideals are Bilal, the slave of the Abyssinian origin and the first Mua'adhin of Islam, Salman Al-Farsi, a companion of the Prophet and Khubaib Bin Adi Al-Ansari, one of the first martyrs of Islam, as well as many other legendary figures of Islamic history.

It is this inspiration that supports the Mujahideen as they take up arms against a heretic government backed and installed by communists.

An Afghan leader drew a parallel: "It is like errecting a solid wall or building strong barriers contain water in a dam. If the wall or barrier it will be a disaster for the whole area. We have been facing a super power for years, and we have been resisting it with our own modest resources. But others would not be able to fight for even a few days."

When the leaders were asked about the reaction of the Afghan masses to the presence of the Soviet forces and the imposition of a puppet leadership in the person of Babrak Karmal, the unanimous reply was: "Barring partial control on Kabul and some other provincial capitals the whole country is under the control of Mujahideen. Not only large scale defections but also constant support for us and assistance to our families in the cities, towns and villages is living proof of our control and influence."

The leaders said that ever since the presence of the Soviet forces and the installation of Babrak Karmal not even a single day or night in Kabul passes without an offensive of some kind by the Mujahideen. Such as bomb and rocket attacks on the Radio Kabul building and government installations.

One fighter questioned, "Could we wage a war in 29 provinces against a super power without the support or blessings of the local masses?"

The leaders said that Karmal's own administrative machinery and defence organisation was affected by serious conflicts. There was a deepening crisis of leadership among the Parcham and Khalaq parties.

About the legitimacy, competence and role of the Loyah Jirgah (grand assembly) and the government by council, the leaders said: "It did not have any roots in the masses nor did it reflect their mood or aspirations. It was a hand-picked team including only the people under the control of the ruling junta. It failed the same way as did the erstwhile National Fatherland Front."

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/9274
CSO: 4600/142

AFGHANISTAN

EXPORT BANK EXPANDING ACTIVITIES

Kabul DEHQAN in Dari 25 Sep 85 p 8

[Text] The Export Development Bank was founded in the first half of 1355 [21 March 1976 - 20 March 1977] with an initial capital of 100 million afghanis in order to help provide the necessary financing for exporters. After the victory of the glorious Sawr revolution, the banking activities of this institution expanded and became ever more intensive. A source from the Export Development Bank told DEHQAN correspondent:

From the time all the banks were nationalized, they have been separated in various sectors of specialized activities. For instance, the Industrial Development Bank is active in the industrial sector, the Agricultural Development Bank is active in the sector of agriculture and the commercial banks all have a special role in providing services in the area of foreign trade. The Export Development Bank, which is one of the commercial banks, provides credit financing in the area of private industry and commerce, it also provides similar services to various other institutions, corportations and cooperatives according to the provisions of the loan bill and other pertinent regulations.

The extension of loans of this bank to the above-stated sectors as of 1355 until the end of 1363 [21 March 1984 - 20 March 1985] have been divided into two export and import categories. In the year 1355 there were no import credit loans while in the same period there were 218.5 million afghanis of export credit loans. Similarly, in 1363 the import loans amounted to 646.08 million afghanis and the export credit loans came to 1.515 billion afghanis. The balance of import loans of the bank from 1355 until the end of 1363 was 2.974 billion afghanis and that of the export loans for the same period amounted to 9.072 billion afghanis. The total figure stood at 12.047 billion afghanis which showed a year to year increase in the amount of loan credit activities.

The abovementioned source also added: The distribution of loans for exportable products of the country such as raisins, almonds, sesames, linseed, cotton, the skin of Karakul lamb, carpets, cereals and medicinal herbs are provided to the merchants of the country according to the provisions of the loan bills and other pertinent regulations. Furthermore, for the purpose of facilitating the process of permissible import merchandise the amount of pertinent loans have had a year to year increase.

In answer to a question the source stated: Although in the articles of association of the bank the issue of marketing as regards the exportable goods of merchants and various other companies has been discussed and to this end, the Export Development Bank has been able up to a certain extent to provide pertinent services for the interested exporters, however it should be mentioned that this bank does not have a branch in any other country. Therefore, based on the pertinent foreign reports this bank provides the necessary marketing consultation for its customers. As a result of this activity the transaction relations of the Export Development Bank with reputable banks of the world have been expanded.

The aforementioned source also said: The proper plan for export and import loans has already been projected and we hope that with the ever-increasing assistance from the Bank of Afghanistan we will be able to provide more help to individual/private merchants and various other import and export institutions.

12719
CSO: 4665/15

AFGHANISTAN

SECOND PHASE OF LAND REFORM UNDERWAY IN PROVINCES

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 19 Oct 85 pp 1, 2

/Article: "Land Reform Goes on in Provinces"/

/Text/ **PROVINCES, (BIA)**— Thirty-three landless and small-scale land holding peasant families in Ali Khel village related to the centre of Laghman recently received forty land ownership documents in continuation of the process of the implementation of the second phase of the just and democratic land and water reforms.

At the function which was also attended by a large number of the peasants and workers of the village, Shair Aqa, one of the peasants who received land ownership document in an interview said, "On behalf of the peasants of my village I assure the party and the revolutionary state that since the party and the revolutionary state make indefatigable efforts day and night for the prosperity and improvement of the living conditions of the toilers of the country, we consider it our moral responsibility to support and safeguard the gains of the April Revolution till the last moments of our lives.

Likewise, thirty-four landless and small-scale land holding peasantry families of Madad Khel and Eshqabad villages of Jabul Saraj district of Parwan province in a recent function received land ownership documents.

According to a spokesman for the Democratic Land Reform Directorate of Parwan province, an area covering 25 hectares of land was cleared in afore-mentioned villages and forty one surplus land was given to the landowners.

Similarly, during the same period, the Democratic Land Reform Directorate distributed a quantity of 11,932 tons of chemical fertilizers and 5 tons of improved agricultural seeds to the peasants who had received land ownership documents.

Another report from Kunduz province states that the peasantry council in Ghondi Kalai relates to Chardara district of Kunduz province, was set up in order to attract the peasants for further participation in the implementation of the second phase of the democratic land and water reforms.

The function was attended by a large number of the peasants among whom Rahman Jan, was elected chairman and six others as members of the council in a free and democratic atmosphere.

* * *

The session of the Commission for the Democratic Land and Water Reforms of Paktia Province on the results of the work of that commission during the current year was recently opened in Gardiz city.

The report on the work and activity of the commission during the first six months of the current Afghan year (begun March 21, 1985) was presented by Shair Ahmad Fazli, head of the General Directorate of the Land Reforms of Paktia province which in part says:

"During the first six months of the current year the land-ownership area of 310 peasantry families, equivalent to 500 hectares of land was clarified and documented and more than 260 hectares of surplus land were distributed to 251 deserving peasantry families, free of charge.

Likewise, during this period 500 ownership documents were given to the landless and small-scale landholding peasants of the province, seven peasantry councils and three peasantry committees were lately established through which the water quotas of 310 peasantry families have been defined and 72 cases have been settled."

The report adds that during this period 141 cubic meters of irrigation canals have been repaired and re-activated and as a result of the voluntary and callective work of the peasants 5,400 square meters of canals have been cleaned with the help of the facilities provided by the Irrigation Department of Paktia Province.

Similarly, material and technical aid of the Department to the peasants amounted to 128 tons of chemical fertilisers, 14 tons of agricultural seeds totally amounting to more than 389,500 Afs.

The report adds that right now, the implementation of the second phase of the democratic land reform is going on successfully in eleven villages of Mangal district.

/12851
CSO: 4600/130

FARMERS ASSISTED IN SOWING

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 19 Oct 85 p 1

/Article: "State Aid in Autumn Sowing Campaign"/

/Text/ "The autumn sowing campaign will be launched in the country on an area of 1,600,000 hectares of agricultural lands. The Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reforms has decided to seriously undertake extensive and coordinated programmes for its successful implmentation. Peasant's higher standard of living and their prosperity as well as higher agricultural outputs are the main objectives of the party and the revolutionary government. The peasants make majority of our population and they are to play a crucial role the advancement and reconstruction of the homeland."

This was said by a spokesman for the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reforms to a KNT correspondent.

The spokesman added: "For higher yields of wheat which is a staple food in Afghanistan, 880,000 hectares of irrigated land and 606,000 hectares of dry land have been allocated for cultivation of this crop all over the country. For the same purpose, 90,000 hectares have been set aside for barley, 17,000 for growing clover and alfala and 8000 hectares of better land for growing vegetables.

Use of Fertilizers have an unprecented effect on raising agricultural yields. This is why their distribution is being accelerated in the sowing campaigns For the autumn sowing campaign it has been decided to distribute 66,000 tons of fertilizers, 39,088 tons of urea and the remaining is phosphorus bearing fertilizers. This figure indicates an increase of 9,000 tons cemparing with the previous, year.

"Improved seeds have also great impact on crop capacity. The farmers, therefore, will be getting additional quantity of improved seeds for the present autumn campaign. They will also receive pesticides worth of more than 26 million Afs. to save their crops from noxious diseases and pests. Meanwhile, the Agricultural Development Bank provides the farmers with a sum of 216,373 Afghanis as credits on an easy term for purchasing improved seeds, pesticides and others. The credit distributed is 63 per cent more than the previous year.

"The area under mechanized agriculture was only five thousand hectares last year. This area was expanded to 23,000 hectares for the present campaign. Likewise, land of the state farms under cultivation was doubled.

"In addition to the programmes described, the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reforms is determined to popularize mechanization of agriculture both on state farms, experimental farms, farms of the Improved Seed Company and on private land or the land belonging to agricultural cooperatives, which all in all comprise 22,880 hectares. Mechanised agriculture will also be applied on a wider scale in Nangararhar Valley Project to raise the efficiency of agriculture in this province.

"The credit provided by the Agricultural Development Bank to individuals and members of cooperatives are aimed at serving them.

For this purpose, the bank facilitates granting credits to the farmers.

The credits will be used for purchasing improved seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and other.

"The General Department of the Extension and Agricultural Products accelerates the process of the implementation of the campaign through special programmes. The employees of the department guide the peasants in utilising necessary facilities and teach them how to apply new methods.

/12851
CSO: 4600/130

HUNDREDS MOBILIZED AROUND AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES

Kabul DEHQAN in Dari 2 Oct 85 p 6

[Text] With regard to the continual care and agricultural policy of the PDPA and the government of the DRA, in contemplation of improving the living condition and increasing the farm products and in order to be able to give timely assistance in the matter of the cultivation and the harvest of farmers' crop with each and every passing with the active and voluntary participation of the farmers throughout various provinces, districts and rural areas of the country new agricultural services cooperatives are created.

By being mobilized around agricultural cooperatives, the farmers can easily and on time obtain their various bare necessities such as chemical fertilizers, improved wheat seeds, pesticides, herbicides, farm machinery and equipment. Regarding the above-stated subject, DEHQAN's reporter has prepared a report on on the activities of the branch cooperative of the Land and Agriculture Department of Deh Sabz district which will appear below.

A source from the Land and Agriculture Reform branch of Deh Sabz district stated: For the purpose of mobilizing the farmers into a unified force, with the voluntary participation of 681 farmers, with a capital share of 182,200 afghanis, involving 300 acres of land, eight agricultual services cooperatives were formed in the villages of Deh Yahya, Pay Minar, Bakhtiaran, Khajah Chasht, Dod Kheyl, Yakah Tut, Tarah Kheyl and Qabel Pay.

In the spring campaign of the current year, the members of the agricultural cooperatives have obtained 491,825 afghanis through grants and loans from their revolutionary government. On the other hand, they've also received 58.3 tons of white fertilizer, 24 tons of black fertilizer, 29 tons of improved wheat seeds and 79 bags of soil-enriching sulphur. In the same period, 177,000 afghanis of previous loans were paid back and after proper familiarization with the goals of the cooperatives 34 farmers have voluntarily become members of these cooperatives. Furthermore, the members of the agricultural cooperatives of Deh Yahya village decided to export 1,708 tons of grapes and 431 tons of raisins through the medium of abovementioned cooperatives after correctly realizing that these cooperatives are protecting their interests.

The source went on to add: The members of the agricultural cooperatives of Hod Kheyl, Tarah Kheyl, Deh Yahya, Khajeh Chasht, Yakah Tut, Bakhtiaran and Pay Minar have played an active role in realizing the second phase of the democratic Land

and Water Reform and also in fulfilling the progressive objectives of the party and the revolutionary government. To this end, 457 members of the cooperatives of the aforementioned villages have received land deeds and have settled their pertinent disputes. Moreover, during the same time period an illiteracy course in which 20 farmers have taken part was established in the village of Deh Yahya. Similarly, in order to facilitate the process of cultivation and harvest of agricultural products of the members of the cooperatives of this district, an area of 280 hectares has been properly prepared by mechanized farm machinery.

The source also added: In addition to their sacrifice, sweat and utmost efforts for increasing farm products and securing the necessary foodstuff for themselves and their countrymen, the members of the cooperatives also have taken up arms and some 67 members of these cooperatives through creation of security centers are valiantly denfending the achievements of the revolution shoulder to shoulder with other defenders.

12719
CSO: 4665/14

ANIMAL FARMERS RECEIVE ASSISTANCE

Kabul DEHQAN in Dari 2 Oct 85 p 8

[Text] The improvement of stockbreeding affairs and the provision of assistance to stockbreeders is one of the main concerns of our revolutionary government. It is for this reason that the Department of Animal Husbandry of the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reform through proper treatment and vaccination of animals carries out effective and practical programs.

In order to enhance the growth of animal products, proper efforts are put in force to improve animal and poultry breeding throughout the country. To be able to realize this objective, pertinent animal and poultry farms and artificial insemination projects have been created, to, on the one hand insure the improvement of poultry and animals and their proliferation, and on the other to make certain that this sector plays its fundamental role in buttressing the national economy of the country.

Based on the plan of 1364 [21 March 1985 - 20 March 1986] with an eye to improving and proliferating a better breed of animals, the stockbreeding department in the first quarter of the current year has carried out the following measures: During the first quarter of the year in the animal farm of Bini Hesar a total of 292 milk cows and calves were properly bred which realized 98 percent of the projected plan. Annual plan for production of milk in this farm is 175,000 liters and in the first quarter it produced 55,000 liters of milk. The production of milk for the current quarter was 42,495 liters.

During the first quarter of the year in the Qarah Qol farm of Balkh Province 43 rams, 182 ewes and 120 male and female lambs were properly bred. Furthermore, more than 377 tons of dairy products were processed. Similarly, through the Dairly Product of Afghanistan Project which will have an annual projected plan of 265,650 tons of milk, more than 8,935 liters of milk were produced during the first quarter of the year. Moreover, during the same period 53,874 kilograms of curdled milk, 855 kg of butter and 1,223 kg of cheese were produced through the same project.

A projected plan for the incubation and breeding of 5,000 stock chickens in the annual program of the poultry project of Bagrami and Jangalak have been included and during the first quarter of the year this number reached 4,135. Likewise, in the same period 48,605 eggs, 13,267 chickens and 514,700 kg of fowl were sold and 104,675 eggs and 28,239 chickens were produced.

In the artificial insemination project, the projected annual plan called for keeping 12 buffaloes, however in the first quarter of the year 14 buffaloes which were bred through artificial insemination were kept. Further, the annual artificial insemination of 20,000 cows was projected in the relevant plan, and in the first quarter of the year 6,680 cows were artificially inseminated.

In the bee culture project, during the first quarter of the year over 1,000 kg of honey and nine kilograms of beeswax were produced. Furthermore, in the same project 30 eggs of honeybees which had been laid in large cells were fed on royal jelly to produce 30 young queens and after copulation of the queens 30 complete colonies each consisting of a queen, workers and drones were produced.

According to the report of a source from the Animal Husbandry Department, the Stockbreeding and Propagation Department of Balkh Province has carried out the following operations during the first quarter of the year for the purpose of improving the breeding of animals:

- Providing guidance and technical consultation to 1,285 stockbreeders.
- Preparing or organizing simple and more complex building plans for the construction of special quarters for 765 stockbreeders.
- Preparing and organizing feeding charts with due consideration to environmental conditions and preservation of fodder for the animals together with providing necessary consultation to 905 stockbreeders.
- Continuous technical cooperation with government and private farms and cooperatives, and cooperation with 12 small cow-breeding farms.
- Cooperating with the Jan and Pars Department for the purpose of establishing a poultry farm.
- Providing guidance and cooperation with Silo Department for the purpose of creating a cow-breeding farm.
- Encouraging 1,358 farmers and stockbreeders to set up or form poultry, sheep-breeding or Karakul lam-breeding farms.

12719
CSO: 4665/14

NATIONAL FATHERLAND FRONT ASSISTING MARTYRS FAMILIES

Kabul ANIS in Dari 1 Oct 85 pp 1, 4

[Text] The Provincial National Fatherland Front of Samangan has one city council, one district council, one subdistrict, five village and 41 residential councils. From the aforementioned total number of councils, one district council, three village and 20 residential councils were created during the current year. Likewise, 714 persons from the total number of the provincial council members which comprise 1,498 have newly joined the various councils of the NFF of Samangan.

Also 18 peace councils with 130 members have been created in the Provincial NFF of Samangan. Furthermore, 18 literacy courses with 270 students have been created in the central district councils of Samangan Province. Recently, 27 individuals were graduated from the above-stated literacy courses.

The director of the Provincial NFF Council of Samangan added: Moreover, 25 mobile and stationary propaganda groups have been formed in the NFF of Samangan. According to previously prepared plans these groups are charged with the extensive task of informing the inhabitants of the villages and hamlets of their relevant region about the goals of the party, the government of the DRA, the land and water reform, the importance of literacy, rules and laws of the local organs and government departments, the decisions and decrees of the grand tribal assemblies, the crimes of the mercenaries and exposing their true and filthy nature, securing national peace and putting an end to fratricide throughout the country.

In addition to the aforementioned activities the representative of the provincial council has been able to create seven farmers councils and two consumer cooperatives with the cooperation of other relevant institutions. Beside, he also has been able to select and appoint eight water-distributors with their assistants in order to help distribute water among farmers on a fair basis.

During the current year, the Provincial NFF Council of Samangan has also provided 115,000 afghanis from the gratis/gift money fund as aid to the families of the martyrs of the revolution, the invalids and the disabled. In a like manner, it has distributed an equal share of wheat from the relief assistance of friendly countries among 318 individuals who are members of the defenders of the revolution working in various parts of the said province. Additionally, 676 patients including children and adults from the district of Hazrat-e Soltan have received medical aid and treatment from the mobile doctors.

12719
CSO: 4665/15

NEW HEALTH CENTER PROVIDES GRATIS SERVICE TO ALL

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 21 Oct 85 p 4

[Text] KABUL (BIA) -- Health insurance and medical care form one of the basic and crucial objectives of the PDPA and the state of the DRA. Therefore, the revolutionary party and state pay great attention to the health and well-being of the people and the health services are being extended day by day on countrywide scale.

In line with the philanthropic policy of our revolutionary party and state, generalisation of medical care by the Ministry of Public Health of DRA has achieved great successes. Despite the plots and subversive activities of the counter-revolutionary elements, the Ministry with the moral and material aid of the friendly countries, headed by the Soviet Union and with the technical assistance of international organisations has built hospitals, clinics and other medical service centers throughout the country.

The State Central Polyclinic of the Ministry of Public Health of the DRA which is well-equipped with advanced and modern facilities is one of the brilliant examples of internationalist co-operation of the great country of Soviets with the DRA. The polyclinic which was inaugurated last week provides all medical services to our compatriots free of charge.

Dr Ahmad Wali Babak, the General President of the State Central Polyclinic in an interview said, "Despite the fact that daily norm of the Polyclinic is planned for 600 patients, a week after the inauguration more than 14,000 patients have visited the polyclinic and made use of its services.

The State Central Polyclinic has sections as Internal surgery, ear and throat, psychiatric, neuro-surgery, urology, obstetrics and gynaecology, Opthalmology, dermatology, pediatrics and other auxiliaries such as operation room, laboratory, X-rays, infectious diseases, including tuberculosis, malaria, emergency section, family planning, gastric juice, vaccination and pharmacy, each of these sections are equipped with the most up-to-date medical facilities.

Right now, forty local doctors and 3 specialists from the friendly country, the Soviet Union, are engaged in various sections of the polyclinic to provide medical care to our compatriots.

The president of the State Central Polyclinic said, general medical check-ups are being carried out in various sections of the polyclinic and the required medicines and drugs are dispensed to the patients free of charge.

The pharmacology section of the polyclinic is equipped with modern facilities to make synthetic drugs. Here the drugs are synthesized and dispensed to the patients free of charge. The physical therapy section of the polyclinic is equipped with the most advanced facilities, being unique in the country. This, in itself is a new manifestation in the field of medicine in Afghanistan. The stomatology section of the polyclinic possesses four well-equipped apparatuses for dental treatments, x-rays, tooth orthopedy and various complex treatments.

Concerning the other sections of the polyclinic, the President said: "Medical check-ups are carried out and the prescribed medicines are being distributed to the patients free of charge by the pharmacy. He went on to say that in case the patients need continued treatment, they are being introduced to other hospitals.

The foundation stone of the Polyclinic was laid in 1981 at a total cost of 131,000,000 Afs. from the state development budget and 9 million rubles, aid of the friendly country, the Soviet Union, was spent on the construction of the polyclinic. The polyclinic was completed in 3.5 years by Banai Construction Unit in three blocks of three-storeyed buildings with about 300 rooms. Local engineers and specialists from the friendly country the Soviet Union Co-operated in its construction. The State Polyclinic of the Ministry of Public Health of the DRA is open from 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. to render service to the patients. Besides, the polyclinic is open from 4:30 to 6 p.m. for the state employees who cannot come to the polyclinic during the official working hours.

/12851
CSO: 4600/129

HEALTH SERVICES EXTENDED

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 22 Oct 85 p 1

/Article: "Free of Charge Medical Services for People"7

/Text7 KABUL (BIA) -- Since giving medical services free of charge and ensuring equal rights for our countrymen in making use of health services, make up part of the popular policy of the PDPA and the state of the DRA, the government has taken effective and extensive steps towards the popularization of medicine and improving free medical services, in the light of the Programme of Action of the PDPA.

A spokesman for the Ministry of Public Health reported that based on the proposal of the Ministry, the Council of Ministers of the DRA has approved gratuitousness of another part of medical services which has still been paid for.

The spokesman added that on the basis of this decision of the Council of Ministers, laboratory tests, except those of the water supply projects and complete tests of the materials having commercial aspect the paid beds in the hospitals, X-Ray treatment, including that of cancer diseases, dental treatment, the paid operations in the Avicina Hospital, electrocardiogram, audiometry, physiotherapy, electroencephalography and other technical and orthopedic services have become free of charge all over the country.

The government had already declared the gratuitousness of a main part of medical services in the country as well. Among them one can name gynecology service at home deliveries, giving blood free of charge and giving free medical services in the NOOR hospital and the Institute of Child Health named after Indira Gandhi.

The state accepts annual subsidy of millions of Afghanis for rendering free medical services to people.

/12851
CSO: 4600/129

VILLAGE COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP GROWING

Kabul DEHQAN in Dari 2 Oct 85 pp 6-7

[Text] Members of the Farmers' Cooperatives Union of Faryab Province: The Provincial Council of the Farmers' Cooperative Union of Faryab Province, which was formed for the purpose of attracting farmers and other toiling individuals in joining the consumers and handicrafts cooperatives, was created in 1361 [21 March 1982 - 20 March 1983] and now has 3,204 members. The social composition of its membership roster comprise 1,064 farmers, 387 workers, 630 intellectuals and 465 craftsmen who are mobilized in 20 consumer and handicraft cooperatives with a capital share of 2,565,500 afghanis.

Regarding the activities in the first quarter of the current year the director of the Provincial Council of the Farmers' Cooperatives Union of Faryab Province told DEHQAN's reporter: In the first quarter of the current year two consumer cooperatives, one called Kuhi-Khaneh located in the provincial capital and another called Hambastegi situated in the Pole-Cheragh district with a total of 228 members, were created. Furthermore, in the same period 191 individuals joined other consumer cooperatives of the province and a new butcher shop with a capital share of 100,000 afghanis was opened in Andkhui city. Moreover, in the same period 941,572 afghanis worth of consumer goods, an equivalent amount of 888,420 afghanis of chemical fertilizers, improved wheat seeds, pesticides and herbicides and an equivalent amount of 571,121 afghanis worth of farmers surplus products were made available for sale to the farmers and other toiling workers of Faryab Province through consumer and agricultual product stores at lower than the regular market prices.

Likewise, with a view to forming the farmers and other toiling workers into a unified force and keeping them in close touch with the party and the revolutionary government, particularly the realization of the important decisions of the grand tribal assembly, two meetings were held for farmers during the first quarter of the current year through the efforts of this union. In order to fulfill the decrees and decisions of the grand tribal assembly and secure the peace and security and protect the great achievements of the revolution the majority of the members of consumer and handicraft cooperatives carry arms in one hand and farm tools in the other. With an eye to completely eliminating illiteracy among farmers, during the same period four literacy courses were recently established with the participation of some farmers.

As regards the deficiencies and inadequacies of the said union, the director of the provincial council stated: There are four inactive handicraft cooperatives within the framework of the Farmers' Cooperatives Union of Faryab Province, although for the purpose of reactivating these cooperatives which have an important role in the economy of the country, we've asked on several occasions for financial help from the Farmers' Union Central Council of the DRA, and have dispatched a representative of the union to the capital, but unfortunately each time our representative has come back to Faryab Province empty-handed. Likewise, we are facing some problems in transferring consumer goods from Mazar-e Sharif to Faryab Province. The transfer of consumer goods only takes place twice a year which can by no means answer the needs of all the members of consumer cooperatives. Furthermore, since Faryab Province is one of the agricultural provinces of the country a sum of two million afghanis has been allocated for the purchase of surplus products of the farmers through the Farmers Union Central Council of the DRA, however because of the short supply of cash, unfortunately we are not in a position to buy the surplus products of many farmers. We hope that the Central Council of the Farmers' Cooperatives Union of the DRA will help us toward the growth of our cooperative movement so that we will be able to reactivate the handicraft cooperatives and to make it possible for us to purchase the surplus products of the farmers and provide us with the capability to more frequently transfer consumer goods.

12719
CSO: 4665/14

AFGHANISTAN

WATER PUMP INSTALLATION INTENDED TO REMEDY WATER SHORTAGE

Kabul DEHQAN in Dari 2 Oct 85 p 8

[Text] In the same way that the national democratic Sawr revolution unshackled the hands and feet of the farmers from the oppressive chains of the feudalists, it has also continued and still continues to expand its various agricultural services through the medium of government departments in order to enhance their living condition. In line with the humanitarian goals of the revolution and according to the provisions of the law regarding utilization of water and its relevant regulations pertaining to the users, two sets of mobile water pumps, type 50-80 manufactured in the Soviet Union, were installed and became operational in the village of Qarah Kutarmah, in the district of Hazrat-e Imam in Qonduz Province. During the start of the operation, which was initiated by the governor of Qonduz, hundreds of farmers, responsible officials of the branch office of Agriculture and Land Reform of the provincial party committee and heads of the Irrigation and Agriculture Departments of Qonduz Province were present. These water pumps went into operation in order to inusre the happiness or prosperity of the country's farmers and boost their yields.

Thereafter, Abdol Rashid, one of the village farmers, on behalf of others while expressing his appreciation for the government and party's care and consideration, stated: With the installation of these water pumps, the land of us, the farmers, which had been left unused during recent years as a result of the ravages and devastation of the dams and water-ways by the godless insurgents, will once again spring back to life and become green and blooming through the care and interest of the party and government organs. We will protect these water pumps like our own lives and property and make proper and sagacious use of them in increasing our cultivation and productivity.

Quoting the head of the Irrigation Department of Qonduz, DEHQAN's correspondent reported that the capacity of both water pumps is 165 liters of water per second and they are capable of irrigating an area of over 2,000 acres of land.

12719
CSO: 4665/14

AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

FORCES REPORTEDLY KILLED--Mashhad, Khorassan Prov., 17 Dec (IRNA)--Over 100 joint Afghan-Soviet forces were killed and 80 other captured in a Mujahidin ambush attack on a large military convoy of the joint forces two weeks ago. The convoy was on its way from Herat to Badghis Province. During the attach 12 enemy tanks were destroyed and 116 truck-loads of munitions were seized by the Afghan Muslim Mujahideen. Meanwhile, in retaliation for the Muhahidin's attack, the joint forces bombed and missile attacked villages in the region, massacring more than 100 Muslim women and children. [Text] [Tehran IRNA in English 0850 GMT 17 Dec 85 LD] /9738

FORCES SAID RETREATING--London, 17 Dec (IRNA)--Afghan Mujahidin have killed 20 joint government and Soviet soldiers and captured two trucks loaded with ammunition, cutting off all access roads to the beseiged sub-divisional headquarters of Maruf, in Qandahar Province. The two has been under seige since 24 November, according to agency Afghan press here. Meanwhile, a group of Mujahidin led by Captain Hadi have beaten back an attack launched on the Hazarhjat area, Bamiyan Province, say reports. It was the first time during six years of occupation that Soviet troops have attacked Hazarehjat, but the Mujahidin foiled their attempts and forced them to retreat with heavy losses. [Text] [Tehran IRNA in English 1840 GMT 17 Dec 85 LD] /9738

CASUALTIES REPORTED--Tehran, 14 Dec (IRNA)--Afghan Mujahideen have smashed a joint Soviet-Karmal offensive in Khakriz [IRNA spelling], Qandahhar Province, killing or wounding more than 600 troops, besides destroying 90 enemy tanks and personnel carriers, as well as 11 helicopters. According to Mujahideen sources Saturday [14 December], the joint offensive launched last week was badly beaten and forced to retreat. Kabul Radio has confirmed the attack in its daily program, but has since blacked out any information about its progress or the number of casualties suffered by either side. [Text] [Tehran IRNA in English 1835 GMT 14 Dec 85 LD] /9738

SOVIET WITHDRAWAL PREDICTED--Islamabad, 14 Dec (IRNA)--The leader of the Jamiat-i Islami (Islamic Society) of Afghanistan, Burhaneddin Rabbani, speaking in Peshawar Friday said that according to reliable sources, the Soviet Government will pull out its forces from Afghanistan next year. Rabbani, quoting informed sources said that the Soviet Defence Ministry has sent a letter to Afghan Government noting that Soviet forces are no longer able to fight against the Afghan Muslim Muhajideen. The Soviet officials have also informed Babrak Karmal that in 1986 they would not continue to maintain security of Karmal's Government and, therefore, will leave the responsibility for the Afghan Government, he added. Rabbani warned Muslim Mujahideen against any schism and said that the enemies were after such vicious plans. He further condemned the Geneva talks on Afghanistan, a new round of which is to start next week under the supervision of the United Nations. He said that such talks, held between representatives of Afghanistan and Pakistan would fail again. He stressed that no one had the right to negotiate on behalf of people of Afghanistan and make any decision for them. The fate of Afghanistan, he concluded, must be determined by Afghans. [Text] [Tehran IRNA in English 1210 GMT 14 Dec 85 LD] /9738

FORCES SAID SUSTAINING LOSSES--London, 13 Dec (IRNA)--AGENCY AFGHAN PRESS here said that Karmal mass media in Afghanistan has confirmed that the Mujahideen carried out operations in the provinces of Baghlan, Balkh, Herat, Farah, Uruzgan, Ghanzi, Nangarhar, Kabul and Laghman, in which 850 persons were claimed to have been kiyled and over 300 captured. Kabul Radio stated that worst hit were the provinces of Herat and Balkh where Soviet-Karmal forces sustained heavy losses. In Balkh Province, the Mujahideen with the collaboration of Soviet troops of the Muslim occupied state of Tajikistan blew up an ammunition depot, inflicting over 100 casualties on the Soviet troops. In addition, Balkh, the western province of Herat was the main target of Mujahideen's operations, which according to Kabul Radio were the scene of fierce clashes between the Mujahideen and Soviet-Karmal troops in Herat City. The AAP report said also that the main Jamia Josque of Herat City was severely damaged by joint forces' shelling which martyred 80 Afghan civilians. The Kabul Radio, however, did not mention the losses of Soviet-Karmal troops. [Text] [Tehran IRNA in English 1450 GMT 13 Dec 85 LD] /9738

CSO: 4600/136

BANGLADESH

BRIEFS

JAPANESE FOOD AID--Japan will provide Bangladesh with a grant of Taka 20 crore under notes the two governments exchanged in Dhaka yesterday. External Resources Division Secretary M K Anwar and Japanese ambassador Yoshitomo Tanaka signed the notes on behalf of their government. Japan will provide the grant assistance under the food aid convention of the international wheat agreement, 1971, known as Kennedy Round Programme, meant for food support to the developing countries. Of the total amount Taka 10 crore would be utilized by Bangladesh government to import wheat from the United States and taka 6 crore to import rice from Pakistan. The remaining amount of Taka 4 crore will be used for transportation of the foodgrains to Bangladesh ports. Since 1971 Bangladesh has received an amount of Taka 237 crore 26 lakh as grant for rice from Japan under the K R Programme. It is only this year that Japan agreed to provide wheat to Bangladesh for the first time. Total food grant received from Japan, including the present one will stand at Taka 256 crore 43 lakh. With the signing of the exchange of notes yesterday total grant assistance to Bangladesh will amount to Taka 963 crore 47 lakh. Japan also extended loan to Bangladesh amounting to Taka 2640 crore since 1974. [Text] [Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 13 Nov 85 pp 1, 8] /9274

COMMUNIST LEADER ARRESTED--Mr Tipu Biswas, a leader of the Communist League of Bangladesh and the Seven-party alliance was arrested at 11:30 a.m. yesterday from the GPO crossing along with six others. The other arrested persons are Zahiruddin Swapan, general secretary of Biplobi Chhatra Moitree and a leader of the Kendriyo Chhatra Sangram Paad, Syed rish Mohsin Al-Mamun, Mohammad Shahjahan, Rafiqul Islam, Aminul Islam and Sohrab Ali Sheikh. [Text] [Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 12 Nov 85 pp 1, 8] /9274

NEW THAI ENVOY--Thailand has appointed Niran Panupong as its new Ambassador to Bangladesh, report BSS. Born August 24, 1929 Mr Panupong entered the foreign service in 1950 after obtaining his Lib and M. A. (Diplomacy) from the Thammasat University. He was Minister Counsellor at the Thai Embassy in Vientiane prior to his present assignment. [Text] [Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 5 Nov 85 p 3] /9274

AMBASSADOR TO POLAND--The government has decided to appoint Mr K. M. Shehab uddin, at present Charge D'Affaires in Warsaw, as Ambassador of Bangladesh to the Polish People's Republic, according to an official source. A career diplomat, Mr K. M. Shehabuddin did his B.A. (Hons) and M.A. in History from the University of Dhaka. He joined Foreign Service in 1966 and served in various capacities in India, Nepal, France, Lebanon and Great Britain. He was the Deputy High Commissioner of Bangaldesh in London from 1979 to 1982. He also worked as Director and Director-General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Joint Secretary-in Charge of Relief and rehabilitation Division, Ministry of Food in 1982-83. He was appointed Charge D'Affaires of Bangladesh to Poland in July 1983. Mr. Shehabuddin has travelled widely as member of Bangladesh delegations to many countries in South and South East Asia, Middle East, Europe and America. He also attended the United Nations General Assembly Sessions several times. He is married and has children. [Text] [Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 3 Nov 85 p 3] /9274

PRC ENVOY'S CREDENTIALS--The Ambassador-designate of China to Bangladesh, Mr Zheng Jianying, presented his credentials to President M. H. Ershad at Bangabhaban on Sunday morning, reports BSS. Presenting his letter of credence, the new Ambassador expressed the hope that during his tenure of office the existing friendly ties and cooperation between Bangladesh and China would be further strengthened. Reciprocating the sentiments President Ershad assured Mr Zheng Jianying of all possible assistance and cooperation in the smooth discharge of his duties. Earlier, on arrival at Bangabhatan the Chinese Ambassador was given a Guard of Honour by President's Guard Regiment. He took the salute and inspected the guard. [Text] [Dhaka THE BANGLADESH TIMES in English 4 Nov 85 p 1] /9274

CANADIAN RAILROAD AID--Canada will provide ten main line metre gauge diesel electric locomotives of Tk 39 crore as grant to Bangladesh to support the development of railway transport and communication system in Bangladesh, says PID handout. A memorandum of understanding to this effect was signed in Dhaka on Wednesday by Mr M. K. Anwar, Secretary External Resources Division and Mr Anthony G. Vincent, Canadian High Commissioner to Bangladesh on behalf of their respective government. The expenditures for procurement shipment and all other related matters for this will be covered from this grant. The Railway Division of the Ministry of Communication will implement this project, With the procurement of ten locomotives, the total Canadian grant will rise to 22 locomotives and 12 broad gauge locomoties. [Text] [Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 31 Oct 85 p 8] /9274

CLASH IN CHITTAGONG--Chittagong, Oct 28--At least 30 people were injured when two rival groups clashed with guns and other lethal weapons at Charkhagari Union under Satkania upazila of the district this afternoon, reports BSS. According to Chittagong Medical College Hospital sources 20 people with bullet injuries were brought to the hospital to night. Of them 14 were released after first air while six others were admitted in serious condition. The admitted persons are Tajul Islam Kabir Ahmed Fauz Ahmed Aftabuddin Badan Ali and Jebar Ahmed. Ten injured persons were treated at different medicare centres of the upazila. According to police two rival groups clashed for two and a half hours from 1.00 p.m. to 3.30 p.m. today with fire arms. The violent clash originated from a land dispute police sources said. When contacted over telephone Satkania police said that a police team was sent to the spot and the situation was now under control. [Text] [Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 29 Oct 85 p 1] /9274

CSO: 4600/1210

SOVIET TRADE WITH MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES EXAMINED

London MEED/THE MIDDLE EAST'S BUSINESS WEEKLY in English 30 Nov-6 Dec 85 pp 14-16

/Article by A. Olshany, International Institute of Economic Problems of World Socialist System, CMEA: "Soviet Trade and Economic Co-operation with the Middle East Countries"/

/Text/ The Middle East countries have always played and today continue to play an important part in the foreign economic affairs of the Soviet state. Some 60 years back, the Soviet government repudiated, on Lenin's initiative, the agreements on the division of Iran and Turkey. About the same time, Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey were the first among the developing countries to conclude in 1921 inter-governmental agreements with the Soviet state. And today, Lenin's principles of foreign economic policy based on the ideas of friendship, equality, non-interference in internal affairs, mutual interest of the parties concerned, have made the groundwork for the agreements between the USSR and the Middle East countries, for hundreds of industrial projects completed and nearing completion in the key sectors of their economies with Soviet assistance, and for ever-growing mutual trade.

USSR — Middle East trade and economic relations continue to develop further on firm legal-contractual grounds underlain with inter-governmental treaties and agreements on economic and technical co-operation.

In the years 1960 through 1984, goods turnover between the USSR and the countries of the Middle East grew from 344.6 million to 5,982.7 million roubles. In 1984, the share which the Middle East states occupied in the total Soviet trade with all the developing countries constituted 32 per cent in goods turnover, 23 per cent in exports, and almost 47 per cent in imports.

Soviet exports to the Middle East countries include essentially the articles of means of production, such as machines, equipment and materials so important for the development of their national economies. In total Soviet exports of machines and equipment, 50 per cent are complete-set deliveries for the industrial projects constructed with Soviet aid. Other Soviet exports to these countries include various building materials, fuel, raw materials and foodstuffs.

The Soviet market is open to the traffic of traditional export goods of the Middle East countries, such as gas (Afghanistan), oil (Iraq, Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia), cotton (Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria, the Sudan), wool (Afghanistan, Syria, Turkey), raw hide (Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Syria). The tendency in recent years has been to increase purchases by Soviet trade organisations of processed materials, semifabricated and finished articles. These include superphosphates (Morocco), granulated urea (Afghanistan), cotton yarn (Egypt, Pakistan, Syria), textiles (Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, Syria, Turkey), knitted goods (Egypt, Iran, Libya, Syria), carpets (Egypt, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Syria), fish products (Iran, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Morocco), wine (Algeria).

Particular attention in the co-operation with the Middle East countries is given to developing sectors of material production, in particular heavy industry and agriculture, and to training national cadres. Appreciable assistance is rendered in the spheres of health care, housing and public utility construction.

In most cases, the Soviet economic and technical aid is given to develop multi-purpose engineering projects rather than to construct individual enterprises. Thus, the USSR has assisted Afghanistan in prospecting and developing natural gas deposits, constructing gas pipelines, building a factory for nitrogen fertilizer production and a large gas-burning power plant.

With Soviet aid, large-scale hydraulic power development have been accomplished in Syria and Egypt. Beside the dams, water storage reservoirs and huge water-power plants on the Euphrates and the Nile, these developments also include irrigation systems, a developed network of power transmission lines and enterprises of power-intensive industries.

The Aswan High Dam development has the largest Middle East hydraulic power plant of 2 100MW generating capacity. This electric power station makes the groundwork for the single grid of the country. Egypt has become the sixth country in the world (after the USSR, the USA, Canada, Finland and Sweden) that has built a unique 500kV overhead power line. The overall length of power transmission lines built with Soviet assistance totals 3 500 km. Putting into effect the Aswan High Dam project has provided conditions for reclaiming 840,000 hectares of new lands. The storage capacity of the water reservoir is sufficiently high to provide the assured 55-56 billion cu. m. of irrigation water annually.independently of the Nile seasonal freshet waters, to meet the needs of Egyptian agriculture.

The yields of crops such as rice, corn and sugar cane increased by a factor of 1.5-2. With Soviet aid Egypt has built power intensive enterprises such as the Helwan metallurgical combine and an aluminium plant in Naga-Hammadi. The Aswan High Dam is a highly profitable development which by mid-1985 had repaid the cost of its construction seven times.

In like manner, the Euphrates development in Syria produces a many-sided effect on the country's economy. Built with Soviet assistance, it includes the 800 MW hydraulic power plant, and a 12 billion cu. m. capacity water storage. The water can be used to irrigate 640,000 hectares of dry land which will double the irrigated land area in Syria. The company town built for the construction workers of the project has turned into a beautiful settlement amidst the desert and was symbolically called As-Saura (the Arabic for revolution).

The industrial enterprises built with the help of the Soviet Union play an important part in the economy of the Middle East countries. The share which the power stations built with Soviet aid contribute to the country's total electric power generation constitute more than 60 per cent in Syria, Iraq and in Afghanistan; 45 per cent in Egypt, and more than 20 per cent in Morocco and Pakistan.

As much as Soviet assistance is important in building up the electric power generating capacities to overcome the consequences of the energy crisis, so it is valuable in the prospecting and developing of the fuel and raw material deposits. The Soviet Union has helped to develop the national oil industry in Syria and gas industry in Afghanistan. Large-scale assistance continues in prospecting and developing oil and gas deposits in Iraq, Algeria, Libya and in a number of other countries of this region. Iran has extended coal production in the mines that are covered by the co-operation programs.

With Soviet aid, the Middle East countries have been able to explore and put into commercial use the natural deposits of the various fossil minerals. Most important developments new in commercial use are the iron ore mines in Egypt and Iran, polymetallic ore mines and ore-dressing factories in Algeria. Work is under way for the developing by Soviet organizations of the Mescale phosphorite deposits in Morocco, the project implying a mining enterprise of an annual rated capacity of 10,000,000 ton of ore plus the necessary features of infrastructure.

Ferrous metallurgy plays an important part in the development of the national economy in the countries of this region.

The USSR has assisted in the construction of metallurgical combines with a production capacity up to 2,000,000 tons of steel in Iskanderun (Turkey), up to 2,000,000 tons in Al-Khadjhar (Algeria), up to 1,900,000 tons in Isfahan (Iran); 1,500,000 tons in Helwan (Egypt) and 1,100,000 tons of steel per year in Karachi (Pakistan).

Co-operation programs carried out in petrochemical industry resulted in a number of oil refineries up to 10,000 000 tons per year each in Aliaga (Turkey) and some petrochemical enterprises in Egypt. Another sphere of co-operation of the

USSR with the Middle East countries has been the mechanical engineering industry, machine-making in particular. Dozens of factories and mechanical plants have been built among which are the machine-making plants in Iraq and Iran, machine-tool factory in Egypt, automobile repair plant in Afghanistan.

Soviet organizations give the Middle East countries the assistance necessary in the development of various sectors of the economy including construction materials, light and food industries, agriculture and fisheries.

The transfer of scientific-technical and design documentation, the accompanying licences and know-how has been one of the major components of co-operation in the area of capital construction. Soviet assistance in establishing the national design organization has been a specific form of technology transfer and co-operation. Thus, a project-design bureau was set up in Syria in connection with the developing petrochemistry.

Considerable aid comes from the USSR to the Middle East countries into the spheres of training national specialists during the course of construction and operation of the co-operative projects, in the training establishments organized locally with Soviet technical aid, and in the plants, factories and training centers in the USSR.

The experience gained in the course of co-operation provides evidence that trade and economic co-operation between the USSR and the Middle East countries is mutually beneficial and shows good prospects for further development. Imparting a stable, long-term and large-scale character to this co-operation comes in agreement with the capacities and interests of both sides.

Dynamic Growth of Trade Between the USSR and the Middle East Countries, million roubles

		1960	*1970*	*1980*	*1984*
All countries of the Middle East -total					
	turnover	344.6	1473.	3899.2	5982.7
	exports	169.0	898.3	2297.3	2462.2
	imports	175.6	575.3	1601.9	3520.5
Including:					
Afghanistan	turnover	44.0	66.9	504.7	898.7
	exports	28.8	36.0	247.7	594.7
	imports	15.2	30.9	257.7	304.0
Algeria	turnover	2.1	118.3	155.1	287.8
	exports	2.1	62.5	92.6	142.3
	imports	—	55.8	62.5	145.5
Arab Republic of Yemen	turnover	4.4	11.0	48.1	10.9
	exports	3.2	10.0	47.9	10.8
	imports	1.2	1.0	0.2	0.1
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen	turnover	—	4.5	61.2	116.0
	exports	—	4.3	55.9	110.2
	imports	—	0.2	5.3	5.8
Egypt	turnover	172.0	606.4	383.7	546.7
	exports	62.8	326.9	172.7	276.7
	imports	109.2	279.5	211.0	270.0
Iraq	turnover	21.3	63.5	731.7	941.7
	exports	18.2	59.4	473.2	272.9
	imports	3.1	4.1	258.5	668.8
Iran	turnover	33.3	231.2	334.6	484.1
	exports	16.2	169.0	259.2	241.7
	imports	17.1	62.2	75.4	242.4

		1960	1970	1980	1984
Lebanon	turnover	7.4	17.5	17.2	43.1
	exports	3.9	13.7	19.1	35.1
	imports	3.5	3.8	4.1	8.0
Libya	turnover	1.3	12.9	450.9	1273.3
	exports	0.9	12.9	163.4	139.9
	imports	0.4	—	287.5	1133.4
Morocco	turnover	8.8	50.1	198.0	159.7
	exports	5.2	32.5	92.6	118.3
	imports	3.6	17.6	105.4	41.4
Pakistan	turnover	6.2	60.4	176.6	123.5
	exports	2.2	32.1	126.2	77.3
	imports	4.0	28.3	50.4	46.2
Saudi Arabia	turnover	0.4	5.4	30.8	317.1
	exports	0.4	5.4	30.8	25.1
	imports	—	—	—	292.0
The Sudan	turnover	10.1	77.4	17.5	16.6
	exports	4.9	32.5	5.6	0.2
	imports	5.2	44.9	11.9	16.4
Syria	turnover	16.9	59.1	321.0	468.8
	exports	9.9	41.8	167.6	249.3
	imports	7.0	17.3	153.4	219.5
Tunisia	turnover	4.3	5.7	25.0	36.3
	exports	2.9	3.1	19.5	31.5
	imports	1.4	2.6	5.5	4.8
Turkey	turnover	12.1	83.3	443.1	258.4
	exports	7.4	56.2	329.3	136.2
	imports	4.7	27.1	113.8	122.2

/12851
CSO: 4600/127

IRAN

PREPARATION UNDERWAY TO PROVIDE ALTERNATE EXPORT ROUTE

London MEED/THE MIDDLE EAST'S BUSINESS WEEKLY in English 16-22 Nov 85 p 6

/Article by Vahe Petrossian: "Iraq's Kharg Strikes: Treason or Technology?"/

/Text/ WHEN Iraqi aircraft made their first successful attack on the Kharg island export terminal on 15 August, they found the island's formidable defences unmanned. This was according to plan; the commander of the island's anti-aircraft units had assured the Iraqis that his men would be taking a break at that precise moment.

The Iraqi air force managed to inflict considerable damage on the installations before the anti-aircraft units could go into action. In particular, they hit a very large crude carrier (VLCC) moored at the Sea Island jetty, on the western side of the island, starting a blaze which damaged parts of the terminal structure. The Iranian commander who tipped off the Iraqis is now in jail, facing the ultimate penalty for treason.

The Iraqis have carried out a series of air raids on the island since their mid-August success. However, these have been high-altitude attacks, lacking the precision of the earlier low-level raid.

This is one account of how the Iraqis managed to penetrate Kharg's defences, put forward by some highly placed Tehranis. It is contradicted by a more complex — and more deeply worrying — account advanced by officials close to the oil industry.

According to this version, most of the attacks since 15 August have involved low-level raids, supplemented by high-altitude bombing. Iraq's successes are attributed to better training by French instructors and the use of sophisticated, laser-guided missiles supplied by France.

Many of the attacks appear to be complex operations involving several dozen aircraft. The raiders are reported to approach Kharg at varying altitudes, making defence difficult. The use of laser-guided missiles also allows precision targeting from a distance.

Whichever account of the Iraqi successes is the more accurate, there is every sign that the Iranian authorities are taking the attacks seriously, making preparations to counter them and provide alternative arrangements for oil exports. Defences are being upgraded and other export terminals are being set up at safer sites (see above).

There are certainly no plans to abandon Kharg, although only essential repairs are being carried out on the damaged installations. The Sea Island jetty is still being used for some liftings, but it is not being repaired. Damaged pipelines and other equipment are being replaced.

Kharg, which was designed to handle up to 7 million barrels a day (b/d) of crude, has so much spare capacity that it can sustain heavy damage without affecting the present low export requirement of about 1.6 million b/d, local observers point out.

Loading operations are primitive: no pumps are required to load the crude on to tankers. The main pumping station is at an underground site at Gurreh, on the mainland; previous Iraqi attacks against Gurreh have failed. Repairs to pipelines can be done in a matter of days.

The Iraqis are now concentrating their raids on the huge tank farm on Kharg island. Dozens of reservoir tanks — some the size of two football pitches — present relatively easy targets, and at least one has been hit in recent weeks. However, even the complete destruction of the tank farm would not halt oil exports: "It would just give us more technical headaches," officials say.

Exports through Kharg, terminals at Lavan and Sirri islands in the east, and a floating terminal off Sirri serviced by a shuttle from Kharg, are averaging 1.5 million-2 million b/d, according to an official who sees daily export figures. This level would provide enough foreign exchange for planned imports of $16,500 million for the Iranian year ending 20 March 1986.

For the moment, the government seems assured of adequate revenues from oil. But it is bound to be nervous until it has all the alternatives to Kharg safely in place — some time in 1986.

/12851
CSO: 4600/126

IRAN

BUDGET ITEMS, CONSTRUCTION OF NEW PIPELINE, OIL SALE DISCUSSED

London MEED/THE MIDDLE EAST'S BUSINESS WEEKLY in English 7-13 Dec 85 pp 18-20

[Text] New Budget Cuts Spending

A $42,630 million deflationary budget has been proposed for the Iranian year starting 21 March 1986. Expenditure is down by about $890 million on the current year; when increased defence spending and inflation are taken into account, overall economic activity will be cut by about 10 percent in real terms.

The government of Prime Minister Hossain Moussavi presented the budget to the majlis (parliament) on 1 December; it has to be approved by 20 March 1986. The majlis has in the past slashed proposed government spending; this time, it would seem to have little room for manoeuvre.



Iran: budget 1985/86-1986/87*
(IR '000 million)

	1986/87	1985/86
General revenues	**3,574.7**	**3,780.4**
Taxes	1,169.8	1,138.2
Oil	1,600.0	1,867.0
Foreign exchange sales	111.0	119.0
Other	424.2	396.3
Special income	269.7	259.9
Deficit finance		
Domestic loans	390.0	200.0
Balance from previous year	85.0	154.4
Total revenues	**4,049.7**	**4,134.8**
Expenditure	**3,780.0**	**3,874.9**
Fixed investment	949.2	1,085.8
War reconstruction	35.0	50.0
Current expenditure	2,341.3	2,305.3
Repayment of foreign loans	24.5	33.8
War expenditure	430.0	400.0
From special income	269.7	259.9
Total expenditure	**4,049.7**	**4,134.8**

*Solar Hijra years 1364-65
Exchange rate: $1 = IR 95

Source: Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA)

Projected oil revenues are set at $16,800 million, about $2,800 million below the current budget figure. However, defence spending has been increased by roughly $300 million, to $4,530 million. Deficit financing is expected to amount to $5,000 million--$1,270 million above the projected deficit for the current year.

The government also plans to spend nearly $10,000 million on development programmes. This is about $1,500 million less than this year and nearly $5,000 million down on two years ago.

IGAT-2 Link Line Award Imminent

A $188 million contract to lay an oil pipeline to connect the Ahwaz fields with the IGAT-2 pipeline running to Taheri, on the Gulf, is expected to be awarded by the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) in the next few months, contractors say. The only companies known to be bidding for parts of the contract are Italy's Saipem and South Korea's Daelim Industrial Company; details of the project are a closely guarded secret.

The 140-kilometre line is designed to reduce the vulnerability of Iran's oil exports, following damaging Iraqi air attacks on the Kharg island export terminal in August and September. The exact route the pipeline will take is not known, but contractors say it will link up with IGAT-2, which has just been completed by Saipem. IGAT-2 was originally designed to carry gas exports to the Soviet Union; but if the Kharg terminal is damaged again, the link line will pump oil to IGAT-2, which will take it down to Taheri.

The scheme is the second pipeline project to emerge since the late-summer Iraqi attacks. The other comprises a $500 million twin line to run 380 kilometres from the Kharg island pumping station at Gurreh to a terminal at Asaluyeh, near Taheri. Bids for this scheme will be opened in Tehran on 5 December; three companies are vying for the pipe supply order and five groups are competing for the contract to assemble the line (MEED 30:11:85).

On completion, the two projects will enable Iran to export well above its OPEC quota of 1.6 million barrels a day (b/d) without using Kharg island. President Khamenei and recently appointed Oil Minister Gholamreza Aqazadeh say that, within a few months, Iran will have raised its export capacity to 13 million b/d. The latter emphasised that the government will not ask OPEC for a quota increase--implying that the two lines will be used for oil exports only if Kharg island is severely damaged.

When the two lines are not being used to export oil, they will carry gas in the opposite direction, from the Kangan gas field near Taheri and Asaluyeh. The IGAT-2 pipeline will have the double function of supplying gas to cities and pumping it up to the Ahwaz oil fields, where it will be used for secondary recovery. The line between Asaluyeh and Gurreh will also be used to pump gas up to the southern oil fields--again, for secondary recovery.

NIOC is understood to have approached only Saipem and Daelim for the link line to IGAT-2. Both companies have declined to release project details.

Other contractors believe the former is discussing a $100 million financing package for about 100 kilometres of pipeline; Daelim is understood to have quoted $88 million for 40 kilometres of pipeline, plus pumping stations.

ANZ Moves Into Oil Market

The Augralia & New Zealand Banking Group (ANZ Bank) and its subsidiary Grindlays Bank have recently been authorised to open letters of credit (LCs) for oil exports with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC).

The market is lucrative for banks--crude exports in 1984 were worth $17,500 million--although the margins are small. Banks not on the list have to get LCs for their clients confirmed by one of the banks acceptable to NIOC.

The 21 banks already on the list are: The Fuji Bank, The Bank of Tokyo, The Mitsubishi Bank, The Sumitomo Bank, The Tokai Bank, Lloyds Bank, Union Bank of Switzerland, Credit Suisse, Bank Melli Iran, Bank Saderat Iran, Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, Bayerische Vereinsbank, Dresdner Bank, Deutsche-Iranische Handelsbank, Banco di Roma, Banca Commerciale Italian, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, State Bank of India, Banco Hispano Americano and Banque Bruxelles Lamberg.

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IRAN

PROJECT INVITES BID ON PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION

London MEED/THE MIDDLE EAST'S BUSINESS WEEKLY in English 16-22 Nov 85 pp 4-6

/Article by Iain Jenkins: "Iran Acts in Pipeline War"/

/Text/ IRAN is moving ahead quickly with plans to build a $500 million, 380-kilometre twin pipeline, which will allow it to export its full OPEC quota without using the Kharg island export terminal. The decision follows the damaging Iraqi air strikes, which for one week in late September reduced oil exports from Kharg to a reported trickle and threatened to cripple Iran's war effort.

The speed with which the project is being put together has surprised international contractors. The first news of the project was a mid-October telex to 11 Far East and European companies, inviting them to bid for the contract to install the pipeline in one year (see box). They were given only until 20 November to submit offers. The telex said letters of intent would be issued between 3-6 December.

At the same time, three pipe manufacturers that have been involved for more than a year in bidding for a contract to supply gas pipes were asked for a final re-bid by 2 November. They were told that the pipeline — which was to have pumped gas from the offshore Pars field to the Ahwaz oil fields for secondary recovery — had been modified to a reversible oil/gas line. It was still to be used to pump gas to Ahwaz but, when needed, it would also be able to pump oil to a floating terminal south of Kharg.

"The scheme is a government project, not a National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) project, which is why it is moving so fast," says one contractor. "It is also a stroke of genius, as it is both a strategic and capital project. During the war it will be a back-up to Kharg island and when the war ends it will still have a useful role."

Taking no chances

The urgency on Iran's part reflects the success of the low-level Iraqi air strikes on Kharg island in August and September. Most of the berths at Kharg — which handles 85 per cent of oil exports — were reported to have been put out of action. Since then, quick repair work has restored exports to the normal level of 1.5 million barrels a day (b/d), but Iran has signalled that it is going to take no more chances.

The planned pipeline will have a capacity of up to 1.5 million b/d and will run from Gurreh, the pumping station for Kharg, along the coast to Asaluyeh, near the Pars gas field and halfway between Kharg and Bandar Abbas. It will connect with floating terminals or ultra-large crude carriers (ULCCs), moored at Bushehr and Asaluyeh, which will load the oil on to tankers.

The pipeline itself will only take about 24 hours to repair if bombed, the buoys will be difficult to hit from the air and easy to replace if damaged. This leaves the pumping stations as the only vulnerable part of Iran's latest plans to protect its oil exports — and they can be shielded in bomb-resistant concrete bunkers.

NIOC's invitation telex lists the main features of the construction contract — estimated to be worth $200 million — as: laying the pipeline, erecting storage facilities for 8 million barrels of oil, and installing booster stations, telecommunications systems and infrastructure.

Contractors have been given seven months to complete the first 350 kilometres of the pipeline, or 172 kilometres of the twin line. This would be enough to reach Bushehr, where some floating terminals will be moored, and would mean that Iran could have an alternative to Kharg for a large part of its oil exports by mid-1986. The rest of the line is to be commissioned within 12 months, with the booster stations and infrastructure to be completed within 15 months.

Unrealistic deadlines

"The Iranians are determined to rush the project through, but most of the deadlines look slightly unrealistic," says one contractor involved in the project. "I don't know how companies will be capable of making a meaningful offer after only one month. And laying the pipe in one year only looks unrealistic," he adds.

Of the companies invited to bid for the pipeline, none of the European concerns is expected to submit offers, apart from Saipem, which is finishing the IGAT-2 gas line (see map). The South Koreans will almost certainly bid, and Japan's involvement in the pipe supply contract may persuade the two Japanese contractors to put in offers.

The three groups bidding for the pipe supply contract, valued at about $ 300 million, are West Germany's Mannesmann, Italy's Italsider, and a Japanese consortium of Nippon Steel Company, Nippon Kokan, Sumitomo Metal Industries and Kawasaki Steel Corporation. The tender calls for the supply of up to 980 kilometres of 42-inch-diameter pipe — suitable for sour gas — and about 12 kilometres of 42-inch submarine pipe. In total, about 470,000 tons of steel pipes are involved.

NIOC is already evaluating these bids but, because of the tight timescale, is unlikely to award the contract to one supplier. This is because the pipe manufacturers do not have sufficient capacity to make such large quantities of pipe in the time allowed. The most likely outcome is that the order will be split between two or all of the bidders.

Oil barter payment

A vital element of both the supply and contracting packages will be the means of payment. The invitation telex says payment will be entirely or partially through crude oil barter, and asks for various financing proposals. "Oil barter is fine. The crucial factor is when the oil is lifted. If it is lifted before the work starts it is as good as cash, but if it is lifted after the work has been completed we will need financing," says one contractor involved in the bidding.

An additional option being considered by Iran is a 92-kilometre line from Gachsaran oil fields to the IGAT-2 gas line. Crude could then be pumped down the 56-inch-diameter gas line to floating terminals at Taheri.

The plan to build a pipeline to Asaluyeh is the latest phase in the war in which Iran's oil exports have become a main target. Iran hopes to receive about $ 17,500 million of oil income in 1985 — roughly 90 per cent of its total foreign currency earnings for the year. Any sustained interruption of oil exports would seriously damage the government's ability to pay for military hardware. Some analysts have suggested that this would provoke Iran to take radical action, including further disruption of Gulf shipping and even attacks on Iraq's Gulf allies.

Iraq has tried attacking tankers plying to Kharg island and loading at the terminal in an attempt to strangle the Iranian war effort. But at least 500 successful hits on shipping in the Gulf have failed to slow down oil exports, which for the past year have averaged close to Iran's OPEC quota of 1.6 million b/d. The Iraqi bombers have also kept up their attacks on Iranian oil installations, renewing the raids in September and October.

Until September it had been Iraq that was on the defensive in the "oil war." Its oil exporting capacity had shrunk to 800,000 b/d, from a pre-war level of about 3 million b/d, because of damage to Iraq's Gulf export terminals and Syria's closure of the pipeline from the Kirkuk field to the Mediterranean coast. But heavy investment in pipelines across Turkey and Saudi Arabia has increased Iraq's export capacity to 1.5 million b/d. Further work in Turkey and Saudi Arabia is projected to raise it further to 3.1 million b/d by mid-1988. Iran's new pipeline appears to be an attempt to regain the initiative in the oil war.


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Bandar Bushehr
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proposed pipeline
gas fields
Kangan
SAUDI ARABIA
Taheri
Asaluyeh

Out of range: *the 380-kilometre proposed pipeline will follow a route skirting the Gulf coast to Asaluyeh. The starting point will be Gurreh, site of the pumping station serving Kharg island. The line will connect with Bushehr where single-buoy moorings (SBMs) will be installed to serve tankers. A further pipeline proposal calls for a 92-kilometre crude oil link between Gachsaran and the IGAT-2 gas pipeline. This will give Iran the option of pumping crude oil to Taheri through the gas line.*

THE POTENTIAL BIDDERS

The 11 companies invited to bid for the pipeline construction are:

☐ South Korea – Daewoo Corporation, Daelim Industrial Company, Samsung, Ssangyong Construction Company

☐ UK – Costain Process Engineering & Construction Company; Davy McKee

☐ West Germany – Mannesmann Anlagenbau; Philipp Holzmann

☐ Japan – Chiyoda Chemical Engineering & Construction Company; JGC Corporation

☐ Italy – Saipem.

Two leading French pipeline contractors – Spie-Capag and Entrepose – have not been invited to bid, reflecting France's continuing support for Iraq in the Gulf war.

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IRAN

TALBOT OPTS FOR OIL BARTER

London MEED/THE MIDDLE EAST'S BUSINESS WEEKLY in English 16-22 Nov 85 p 18

/Text/ The UK's ***Peugeot Talbot*** has decided to accept an oil barter deal, using a Turkish company as intermediary, to enable it to complete its 1985 contract to supply car kits. The $ 100 million-a-year order ran into difficulties in early November, when letter of credit (LC) cover expired – leaving Talbot with 7,824 Hillman Hunter car kits for which no payment had been received (MEED 16:11:85).

The barter deal, through Turkey's ***Cukurova Holding,*** was signed in mid-November, and will ensure that Talbot is paid for this year's final shipments. The arrangement may be extended to cover the 1986 contract, which calls for the supply of a further 50,000 car kits, but Talbot is prepared to consider any other method of payment, a company representative says. A team is to visit Tehran in December to discuss the 1986 contract.

Talbot has refused to release details of the barter deal, but it is understood to be similar to an arrangement Iran has agreed with France's ***Renault,*** which also supplies car kits. Both agreements are believed to be covered by Turkey's $ 3,000 million barter deal with Iran, which calls for the former to import $ 1,500 million worth of crude oil in return for exports of manufactured goods; if Turkey is unable to fill its quota, it makes up the shortfall by supplying goods made in other countries.

Talbot's contract with Iran has been plagued by payments difficulties since 1982. Several UK oil companies visited Tehran in mid-1984 to discuss a possible role in a barter deal, seen at the time as the most promising way of resolving the payments delays, but nothing was agreed.

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REGIME'S LEADERS BLASTED BY FORMER PRIME MINISTER

London KEYHAN in Persian 28 Nov 85 p 6

[London KEYHAN weekly in Persian; founder and publisher Dr Mesbahzadeh]

[Text] The secretary general of the "Freedom Movement of Iran," Mehdi Bazargan whose open purpose in travelling to Belgium and Federal Republic of Germany was only a declaration in which he invited all Iranians who live abroad to unify,and contrary to his usual manner he did not make any comments against the ruling regime; however, after his return to Iran he has started his strife and squabble with the functionaries of the Islamic government.

Before his trip to Europe, in the month of Tir 1364 [22 June - 22 July 1985] in a letter he answered the charges which had been made against him by the two newspapers KEYHAN [printed in Tehran] and JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI and demanded that the abovementioned newspapers print his letter; however, neither of these two papers did so. Consequently, in the month of Mehr 1364 [23 September - 22 October 1985] after his return from Europe, Engineer Bazargan circulated the said letter in the form of a leaflet in Iran.

The two newspapers accused Bazargan of being of the same ilk as Saddam, since like Saddam and Mojahedin-e Khalq he promoted peace. Bazargan retorted that it was an erroneous comparison since Saddam closes his eyes at night when he falls asleep as does Khamenei, thus Saddam and Khamenei are of the same ilk too!

Bazargan asks: "Is it a sin to ask for peace?" and answers himself and says: It really is strange, it seems like we've come very close to the due date for the reappearance of the last Imam! It is considered dangerous and even treason to mention peace, security and safety, however it would be adjudged glorious and prideful to seek war and promote its continuity, even though it might cause the complete destruction of the two Muslim countries!

Bazargan, who had written this letter in the middle of the period when Tehran was being bombarded by Iraqi planes and thereafter when the ruling regime had staged a large demonstration on the "Day of Qods," in support of the war says: "Suppose one million people took part in your march, so what! Of course throughout the world it is accepted factual propaganda for the stability and continuity of the intended policies to mobilize forces which helps the success of a ruling regime. Notwithstanding, according to the Tehran police traffic report during the same 24 hours about 500,000 cars left Tehran for various destinations. Now, if we say that each car carried four passengers... or let's even say three... then we have 1.5 million people who left Tehran and we all know on that day how quiet and serene Tehran was!"

Bazargan goes on to add: "When the Freedom Movement decides to take part in the elections and proposes that we should have freedom and law for the elections, they say that the only thing this movement has in mind is the reign of power and thus they decide to nip it in the bud; however, when the Republic Party and your fellow-clerics set up seminars and go about promoting propaganda... or when a mere custodian of a pious foundation becomes chief and holds on to the helm of power with all his might, then that is called service to Islam."

Thereafter, Bazargan stressed the dual policy of the Islamic Republic which is a reference to the famous Persian proverb which says: Good heavens! How can there be two kinds of weather on the same roof? and states: "The ruling class has several newspapers, it has mosques and pulpits, it can give Friday sermons, it has the Voice and Vision [Radio and TV Network], it has a Majlis, it has special rules for employment and enrollment in the university, it has cooperatives and rations, it has courts, committees and corps, it has the Hajj pilgrimage organization, it has the Ministry of Guidance, it has foreign exchange... it has the freedom to say or do what it wants, while at the same time on the other side of the roof-top, for the Freedom Movement... it is only enough to have had a few representatives in the Majlis who within a period of three or four months had to bear so much abuse, beatings and quarreling... even that is too much for them and they should be thankful for that! You are right! Two kinds of weather over the same roof, two different sets of laws in one country for two class of people... yes, we are being too meddlesome and are busybodies and we ought to pay divine honor to them since they've given us the chance to breath! That goes for the rest of other groups or factions, whether it be national, Islamic or else...and some even enjoy less freedom that we do."

Furthermore, Bazargan asks the ruling officials: "Whether at a time when the late Dr Mossadeq... mentioned that in a constitutional government the shah acted as a monarch and not a ruler... which one of you and those individuals who call themselves the heroes of the revolution... had the guts and the gumption to express such a view? Was it not our sources of religious emulation, among them the leader of the revolution... who pinned their hope and reliance on the constitution of 1906 and asked for its execution...?"

Thereafter, Bazargan who has also been accused by the ruling officials of being "westernized," goes on to say: "They're accusing us of being westernized since we've studied in Europe or the United States." Then he asks: "Is it not true that the majority of the present ministers and top-ranking responsible officials of the ministries and those officials of the Voice and Vision have had more or less a few years of education either in Europe or the United States?"

Bazargan goes on to conclude the declaration of the Freedom Movement in this way:

From among the incriminating allegations which have been directed at us is that we do not use the motto "Down with the United States." I would like to say that we never used such a motto for any other country either. This kind of motto which was invented by the communists of the Tudeh Party from the time of Mossadeq has never been used in our religion or policy. Is it not true that the Qoran prohibits the use of abusive and foul language, even for the very infidels or the enemies of God. Is it not true that Imam Ali in one of his sermons stated that I do not like to see my followers use offensive or abusive language?... We believe that through the use of such mottos, you cannot impede the influence of foreigners... As long as we have to sell our oil--in any possible shape or form at any price we can get--to the industrial countries and as long as we have to import our most basic economic-military essentials, even our bread and meat, from the United States or one of its allies, then no matter how many times a day we say "down with the United States," yet our country cannot become independent... To tell you the truth, a true gentleman never uses abusive or insulting words!"

Observers of the political arena of Iran hint of the probability of a new phase of domestic struggle between various wings and the exertion of more pressure on Bazargan from two sides--on the one hand, from the left, the make-believe Muslims and on the other, the religious extremists. Furthermore, they predict that there is a probability of closer relations between Bazargan and the wing of the ruling body which is called the "pragmatists."

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IRAN

BRIEFS

PIPELINE BIDDERS NAMED--Five groups of bidders plan to compete for the $200 million-plus contract to build a strategic oil pipeline skirting the Gulf coast (MEED 16:11:85, page 4). The tender closing date has been put back to 5 December from the original 20 November, to give bidders time to draw up their offers. The 380-kilometre twin pipeline will run from Gurreh -- the pumping station for Kharg -- to Asaluyeh, and will have a capacity of about 1.5 million barrels a day (b/d). It will connect with single-buoy moorings (SBMs) at Bushehr and Asaluyeh. The aim is to provide a backup to Kharg -- which was reported to have been severely damaged in Iraqi attacks in August and September -- and allow Iran to route all its exports through the pipeline if Kharg is badly hit again. When Kharg is operating normally, the line will be used to pump natural gas from Asaluyeh to the Ahwaz oil fields, where it will be used for secondary recovery. The five groups of bidders are: South Korea's Daewoo Corporation and Japan's JGC Corporation, both of which were invited to bid separately; South Korea's Daelim Industrial Company, with the UK's Stone & Webster Engineering, an affiliate of the US' Stone & Webster, as subcontractor; South Korea's Samsung, which intends to form a consortium with affiliate companies and sublet some work to Far East or European contractors; Saipem and Snamprogetti, both of Italy, and West Germany's Philipp Holzmann; both Saipem and Holzmann were on the original invitation list; South Korea's Ssangyong Construction Company, with the UK affiliate of the US' Bechtel as subcontractor for technical and bidding services. Four companies invited to bid have indicated that they do not intend to do so. They are: West Germany's Mannesmann; Costain Process Engineering & Construction Company and Davy McKee, both of the UK, and Japan's Chiyoda Chemical Engineering & Construction Company. The pipeline is considered a priority by the government, which has set a tight schedule for tendering and completion of the work. The invitation telex sent out by National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) said letters of intent would be issued in early December; contractors would then be given seven months to complete the first 172 kilometres of twin line, with the rest of the line to be commissioned in 12 months. Contractors say the deadlines are slightly unrealistic, and they are not surprised by the two-week extension to the bid deadline. However, they stress that NIOC will stick to the timetable as far as possible. "They are serious about this project and intend to rush it through," says one bidder. "One indication that we got was when it took us only a few days to get our visas approved, compared with the usual two months." The Saipem/Holzmann consortium is tipped as front-runner because of the Italian firm's recent success at winning Middle East pipeline orders. But contractors say Ssangyong has also emerged as a favourite because of the 6,000-b/d refinery it owns jointly with Iran. Iran has a term contract to supply crude for the refinery, in Onson, South Korea; according to contractors, this might give Ssangyong an edge in arranging the oil barter NIOC has proposed as a method of paying for the line. Bids for the supply of 980 kilometres of pipe for the project were submitted on 2 November. The contract, for 42-inch-diameter pipe, was originally scheduled to be awarded in early December, but the letter of intent is now expected to be issued at the same time as the construction contract is let. Three companies or groups submitted offers for the pipe supply. They are: West Germany's Mannesmann, Italy's Italsider, and a Japanese consortium of Nippon Steel Company, Nippon Kokan, Sumitomo Metal Industries and Kawasaki Steel Corporation. Because of the tight schedule and the lack of spare capacity among the three bidders, pipe manufacturers say the contract is likely to be split between the companies. [Text] [London MEED/THE MIDDLE EAST'S BUSINESS WEEKLY in English 16-22 Nov 85 p 18] /12851

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